A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
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Chapter Thirty-Six On the banks of the Mississippi
Chapter Thirty-Six
On the banks of the Mississippi
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
“Grant’s next plan was bold but risky: March the army down the west side of the Mississippi; cross the river south of Vicksburg; and either attack Vicksburg from the south and the east or join forces with Fitz John Porter; capture Port Hudson; and then together reduce Vicksburg. Admiral David Dixon Porter would have to sneak past the guns to get sufficient gunboats and transport ships south of the city. Once they had completed the downstream passage, they would not be able to return past Vicksburg's guns because the river current would slow them too much.
On March 29, McClernand set his troops to work building bridges and corduroy roads. They filled in the swamps in their way as well, and by April 17 they had a rough, tortuous 70-mile (110 km) road from Milliken's Bend to the proposed river crossing at Hard Times, Louisiana, below Vicksburg.
On April 16, a clear night with no moon, Admiral Porter sent seven gunboats and three empty troop transports loaded with stores to run the bluff, taking care to minimize noise and lights. But the preparations were ineffective. Confederate sentries sighted the boats, and the bluff exploded with massive artillery fire. Fires were set along the banks to improve visibility. The Union gunboats answered back. Porter observed that the Confederates mainly hit the high parts of his boats, reasoned that they could not depress their guns, and had them hug the east shore, right under Confederate cannon, so close he could hear their commanders giving orders, shells flying overhead. The fleet survived with little damage; thirteen men were wounded and none killed. The Henry Clay was disabled and burned at the water's edge. On April 22, six more boats loaded with supplies made the run; one boat did not make it, though no one was killed—the crew floated downstream on the boat's remnants...
The final piece of Grant's strategy was to divert Bragg’s attention from the river crossing site that the Union troops would use. Grant chose two operations: a feint by Sherman against Snyder's Bluff, Mississippi, north of Vicksburg, and a daring cavalry raid through central Mississippi by Colonel Benjamin Grierson, known as Grierson's Raid. Both were inconclusive. Grierson was unable to draw out significant Confederate forces to chase him, as Bragg wished to avoid dispersing his defenses too far around the state. (Bragg was also wary of Fitz John Porter's impending advance up the river from Baton Rouge to threaten Port Hudson. This particularly difficult as Joseph Johnson had tried to claim jurisdiction over the garrison. Eventually it was “agreed”, i.e. President Davis ruled, that General Gardner and his two strong brigades would remain under Bragg’s directions.)…”
Admiral Porter's gunboats were an essential element of Grant's plan
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
“Major General Ulysses S. Grant's Union Army of the Tennessee started the campaign with about 44,000 men. The army was composed of four corps: the XIII Corps, under Major General John A. McClernand; the XV Corps, under Major General William T. Sherman; the XVII Corps, under Major General James B. McPherson; and a three-division detachment of the XVI Corps, under Major General Stephen Hurlbut.
General Braxton Bragg took operational command of the Army of Mississippi, effectively reducing Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton to a chief of staff’s role. The army numbered approximately 30,000 men, and consisted of two divisions, under Major Generals John Bankhead Magruder and William W. Loring. The seven divisions were commanded by Carter L. Stevenson, John H. Forney, Martin L. Smith, John S. Bowen, John S. Marmaduke and William H.T. Walker.
Bragg had no intention of ceding the initiative to Grant. Loring’s Right Corps was given the task of monitoring and defending the river north of Vicksburg, and Magruder’s Left Corps the South. Only Bowen’s Division of two brigades remained in the Vicksburg works under Pemberton. Bragg intended to contest any crossing “at the water’s edge”…”
The Battle of Grand Gulf - Admiral Porter led seven ironclads in an attack on the fortifications and batteries at Grand Gulf, Mississippi, with the intention of silencing the Confederate guns and then securing the area with troops of McClernand's XIII Corps who were on the accompanying transports and barges. The attack by the seven ironclads began at 8 a.m. and continued until about 1:30 p.m. During the fight, the ironclads moved within 100 yards of the Confederate guns and silenced the lower batteries of Fort Wade; the Confederate upper batteries at Fort Cobun remained out of reach and continued to fire. The Union ironclads (one of which, the Tuscumbia, had been put out of action) and the transports drew off. After dark, however, the ironclads engaged the Confederate guns again while the steamboats and barges ran the gauntlet. Grant marched his men overland across Coffee Point to below the Gulf. After the transports had passed Grand Gulf, they embarked the troops at Disharoon's plantation and disembarked them on the Mississippi shore at Bruinsburg, below Grand Gulf. The men immediately began marching overland towards Port Gibson, Mississippi. Magruder has been on hand throughout and knew a landing in the south was imminent…
The Battle of Grand Gulf
The Battle of Snyder's Bluff - To ensure that troops were not withdrawn to Grand Gulf to assist Confederates there, a combined Union army-navy force feigned an attack on Snyder's Bluff. After noon on April 29 eight gunboats and ten transports carrying Major General Francis P. Blair's division, inched up the Yazoo River to the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou where they spent the night. At 9 a.m., the next morning, the force, minus one gunboat, continued upriver to Drumgould's Bluff and engaged the enemy batteries. During the fighting, Choctaw suffered more than fifty hits, but no casualties occurred. Around 6 p.m., the troops disembarked and marched along Blake's Levee toward the guns. As they neared Drumgould's Bluff, a battery opened on them, creating havoc and casualties. The Union advance halted and, after dark, the men re-embarked on the transports. The next morning, transports disembarked other troops. The swampy terrain and enemy heavy artillery fire forced them to retire. The gunboats opened fire again, about 3 p.m. on May 1, causing some damage. Later, the boats' fire slackened and stopped altogether after dark. Sherman had received orders to land his troops at Milliken's Bend, so the gunboats returned to their anchorages at the mouth of the Yazoo. It was this attack that captured Bragg’s attention as he rode to Loring’s temporary headquarters near Hayne’s Bluff….
The Battle of Port Gibson - Grant's army began marching inland from Bruinsburg. Advancing on the Rodney Road towards Port Gibson, they ran into Confederate outposts after midnight and skirmished with them throughout the night. Union forces fought their way up the Rodney Road and a plantation road in the face of “a swarm of reb skirmishers”.
General Osterhaus scouted the ground before him and determined that a frontal assault through the canebrakes would be fruitless. Furthermore he was astonished at the nature of the works before him, and by the number of cannon visible in the works. He quickly vetoed any turning movement against the Confederate left flank. “The Rebels have clearly anticipated our movement and are heavily entrenched. Indeed I expect to be attacked myself...”Brigadier General Alvin P. Hovey's Division arrived and was soon joined by Andrew J. Smith’s Division…
The delay had allowed Magruder to bring up Stevenson’s and M.L. Smith’s Divisions from his headquarters at Willow Springs. Walker was on the way from Grand Gulf. When McClernand arrived he was frustrated at the delay and was not a little concerned about the imminent arrival of Grant. He ordered a direct assault on the works. Osterhaus and Hovey’s men surged forward storming the Confederate position. Both flanks having been turned, Magruder’s men broke and ran. McClernand stopped to reorganize and then, always the politician, launched into a series a grandiose speeches until Grant arrived and pointed out that the Confederates had merely withdrawn a small holding force to a more tenable position clearly held in force. Crucially Grant drew McClernand’s attention to the “cannon” that had concerned Osterhaus. They were black painted logs. Prince John was giving an encore to his defense of the Peninsula against McClellan…
Reinforced by Stevenson's Brigade of McPherson's XVII Corp, McClernand resumed the pursuit. With 20,000 men crowded into a 1.5-mile (2.4 km) front, McClernand's plan appeared to be to force his way past the Confederate line. A flanking assault by Colonel Francis Cockrell's Missourians crumpled the Federal right flank and gave McClernand pause.
Sundown found the two sides settling into a stalemate along a broad front on the Rodney Road several miles from Port Gibson where the Confederate had a second, more elaborate set of defensive works…
General McClernand was initially blamed for the repulse at Port Gibson but it was General McPherson who advocated the assault on the second line.
On the Bruinsburg Road front, Osterhaus had been content to pressure Magruder's command with sharpshooters and artillery, occasionally launching an unsupported regiment against the Confederate line. Major General James B. McPherson showed up late in the afternoon with John E. Smith's brigade. Donning a cloak to disguise his rank, he reviewed the front lines and quickly decided the work another ploy by Magruder.
Twenty minutes after the troops had been launched to the assault, the Federals were reeling back down the Bruinsburg Road, having left behind several hundred prisoners. The works were not a bluff and Magruder was entrenched in force before Port Gibson. Furthermore Grant now knew that Walker was trying to cross the North Fork of the Bayou Pierre to get into his rear. The road to his rear now threatened, Grant commenced retreating back down the road to the transports harassed all the way by Magruder. “Grant’s instinct was to stand and fight but he didn’t trust McClernand and he didn’t trust McClernand’s command to stand and fight after the bloody repulse. Only Eugene Carr was worth a damn of McClernand’s commanders and he wasn’t there” was Sherman’s judgment having spoken to Grant afterwards. "If Sherman had been there, or Logan or even Carr it might have been worth the fight. But with McClernand and Osterhaus and the river at our back and Bragg on hand it was not worth the risk" or so calculated Grant...
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
At this point, Grant faced a decision. His original orders were to capture Grand Gulf and then proceed south to link up with Fitz John Porter and reduce Port Hudson, after which their combined armies would return and capture Vicksburg. Luckily for Grant, such a course would put Fitz John Porter under his command as the more senior major general and the credit for any success in the theater would go to him. Since Porter had done little, except watch the build up of Joseph Johnson’s force in Alabama, he had informed Grant that he was ready to begin operations against Port Hudson within the next few days. Grant decided that rather than force the point with Magruder at Port Gibson he would mover further down the Mississippi to link up with Fitz John Porter against Port Hudson. He sent a message to Halleck about his intentions, knowing that it would take as many as eight days for Washington to receive the message and respond…”
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I love this update for many reasons:
1. Magruder suckers someone into attacking one of his 'fake' positions. Brillant.
2. McClernand is appropriately rubbish.
3. Grant is fallable and ambitious!
I can see Grant wanting Porter's troops if Porter is a junior officer - the IX Corps still being firmly under Reno's command is Virginia, Bragg might actually still outnumber Grant at the moment?
1. Magruder suckers someone into attacking one of his 'fake' positions. Brillant.
2. McClernand is appropriately rubbish.
3. Grant is fallable and ambitious!
I can see Grant wanting Porter's troops if Porter is a junior officer - the IX Corps still being firmly under Reno's command is Virginia, Bragg might actually still outnumber Grant at the moment?
Great timeline so far! Keep it up!
Thanks. I thought I might irritate some Grant fans out there with this.
I find Pemberton's defence of Vicksburg very wrongheaded. Someone more aggressive would have given Grant more problems and indeed Grant was outnumbered in the early stages of the campaign (which is worse now because Bragg has succeeded in getting troops from Arkansas and preventing Grierson scattering his forces). With Banks replaced with Porter, and with no reinforcements coming from the East (in OTL Grant eventually received IX Corps) I think Grant would be keen to consolidate his forces with Fitz John Porter's before proceeding further.
Agreed. I read Winston Groom's wonderful book "Vicksburg 1863" and the thing is that the Confederates would have had a good chance of stopping Grant on the water's edge; the terrain was ideally suited for defense.
He was probably the best general of the war, but Grant was not infallible.
Chapter Thirty-Seven Grant & the Two Porters -v- the Gardner of Port Hudson
Chapter Thirty-Seven
Grant & the Two Porters
-v-
the Gardner of Port Hudson
-v-
the Gardner of Port Hudson
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
LSU 1991
“The Siege of Port Hudson occurred from May 4 to June 2, 1863, when Union Army troops assaulted and then surrounded the Mississippi River town of Port Hudson, Louisiana. In cooperation with Major General Fitz-John Porter's advance from Baton Rouge, Major General Ulysses Grant’s army moved against the Confederate stronghold at Port Hudson...
According to historian Morgan Withers, "Port Hudson, unlike Baton Rouge, was one of the strongest points on the river, and batteries placed upon the bluffs could command the entire river front."
In May 1863, Union land and naval forces began a campaign they hoped would give them control of the full length of the Mississippi River. One army under Grant commenced operations against the Confederacy's fortified position at Vicksburg at the northern end of the stretch of the river still in Southern hands. At about the same time, another army under Fitz-John Porter moved against Port Hudson, which stood at the southern end…
The renewed support for the war brought about by the death of General Hunter galvanized the Lincoln administration into action. Major General Fitz-John Porter was diverted from a possible expedition to Mobile and given orders to take Port Hudson. The Union commander of all armies, Henry Wager Halleck stated to Porter that President Lincoln “regards the opening of the Mississippi River as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it”…”
From “The Bloody Crucible – The Siege of Port Hudson” by Morgan Withers
LSU 1983
LSU 1983
“Port Hudson began as a village sited on an 80 foot bluff on the east bank above a hairpin turn in the Mississippi river 25 miles upriver from Baton Rouge. The hills and ridges in the area of the town represented extremely rough terrain, a maze of deep, thickly forested ravines, swamps, and cane brakes giving the effect of a natural fortress. The town had appeared and grown as a point for shipping cotton and sugar downriver from the surrounding area. Despite the growing shipping business the town itself remained small, consisting of a few buildings and 200 people by the start of the war…
General Bragg had by this time realized that linking the Port Hudson and Clinton railway to Jackson, Mississippi would be invaluable in allowing reserves to be switched between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, depending upon which was most threatened. A desperate shortage of iron and transport within the Confederacy made this move impossible…
Poor supply lines, starvation, and disease were to remain the constant problems of the Port Hudson position, and overwhelm efforts to improve conditions for the soldiers of the garrison. Louisiana Private Robert D. Patrick wrote: “never since I have been in the army have I fared so badly and in truth I have been almost starved.” At the same time commercial activity between Port Hudson and areas west of the Mississippi increased, because Port Hudson and Vicksburg were the last remaining links with the Trans-Mississippi. This tended to tie up even more of Port Hudson’s limited transport facilities…
The arrival of Lincoln’s new commander of the Gulf, Fitz-John Porter, appeared to herald renewed action for the approximately 31,000 Union troops in New Orleans and the southern Louisiana area. The Confederate command reacted to this increased Union commitment by sending a new major general to take command of Port Hudson. Major General Franklin Gardner arrived at his post on the 27th of December 1862. Gardner was a career army officer who graduated from West Point 17th in his class in 1843. The native New Yorker commanded a cavalry brigade at Shiloh and was 39 years old at the time of his arrival. Upon taking command he reorganized the defenses at Port Hudson, concentrating the fields of fire of the heavy guns and setting up more earthworks using packed earth and sod rather than the traditional gabions or sandbags…
Fitz-John Porter busied himself in anticipation of the attack on Port Hudson with his usual slow but thorough preparations. What finally brought him to move on Port Hudson was the prospect of uniting with Grant’s army, currently maneuvering against Vicksburg, and word that a significant part of the Port Hudson garrison had been sent to Bragg in Vicksburg. When Grant’s attempts to force a lodgment south of Vicksburg stalled at Port Gibson, he sent word to Porter to meant him at Port Hudson…
Leading the advance was the cavalry brigade of Colonel Benjamin Henry Grierson, which had just joined Porter’s forces on April thirtieth after its raid through the Rebel lines. The entire advance involved a pincher movement with three army divisions advancing from the northwest from Bayou Sara meeting two divisions advancing from the south from Baton Rouge. The meeting of the two groups would surround Port Hudson pending the arrival of Grant’s force…
Leading the advance was the cavalry brigade of Colonel Benjamin Henry Grierson, which had just joined Porter’s forces on April thirtieth after its raid through the Rebel lines. The entire advance involved a pincher movement with three army divisions advancing from the northwest from Bayou Sara meeting two divisions advancing from the south from Baton Rouge. The meeting of the two groups would surround Port Hudson pending the arrival of Grant’s force…
Once Porter had completed the investment of the Port Hudson defenses he anticipated a formal siege. The arrival of Grant with the corps of McClernand and Sherman changed that. Grant hoped to overrun the entrenchments quickly, then take his army northward to attack Vicksburg…
General Gardner chose to reinforce the picket lines shielding the Confederate grain mill and support shops of the areas near Little Sandy Creek because he did not consider a siege probable, and had not fortified that perimeter. Other Confederate troops remained outside the fortifications, consisting of 1200 troops under the command of Colonel John L. Logan. These represented all of Gardner’s cavalry, the 9th Louisiana Battalion, Partisan Rangers, and two artillery pieces of Robert’s battery. These troops slowed the encirclement of Porter’s troops, and prevented them from discovering the weaknesses in the defenses. With Grant’s arrival the infantry assault was scheduled for the 8th of May. The short delay between the encirclement by Porter and the arrival of Grant had allowed Gardner to complete the ring of defenses around Port Hudson. He also had sufficient time to move some artillery from the river side of the fort to the east side fronting the Federal forces…
Grant had set up his headquarters at Riley’s plantation and planned the attacks with his staff and corps commanders. Porter was opposed to the idea of trying to overwhelm the fort with a simple assault, but Grant wanted to end the siege as quickly as possible in order to move on Vicksburg before the rebels could react in force, and felt that the 50,000 troops available to him would easily force the surrender of the 7,500 troops under Gardner, a seven to one advantage. Despite his reluctance, General Porter was given the task of organizing the assault. Four different assault groups were organized, under the commands of generals Godfrey Weitzel, Cuvier Grover, James B. Ricketts, and Thomas W. Sherman. Porter indicated dawn for his intended simultaneous attack…
Generals Weitzel and Sherman attacked on the north and northeast sides of the fort at dawn. However Ricketts was slow to get into action and Grover held off pending confirmation that Ricketts was ready. This meant that the attack on the east and southeast sides commenced at 10.30am. The naval bombardment began the night before the attack, firing most of the evening, and the upper and lower fleets beginning firing for an hour after 7am. The army land batteries also fired an hour bombardment after 5am. Weitzel’s and Sherman’s two divisions began the attack at 6am on the north, advancing through the densely forested ravines bordering the valley of Little Sandy Creek. This valley led the assault into a salient formed by a fortified ridge known as the “Bull Pen” where the defenders slaughtered cattle, and a lunette on a ridge nicknamed “Fort Desperate” which had been hastily improvised to protect the fort's grain mill.
At the end of this ravine between the two was a hill described as “Commissary Hill” with an artillery battery mounted on it. The Union troops were caught in a crossfire from these three positions, and held in place by dense vegetation and obstacles placed by Rebel troops that halted their advance. The combination of rugged terrain, a crossfire from three sides, and rebel sharpshooters inflicted many casualties. The Union troops advancing west of the Bull Pen were caught between the Bull Pen, which had been reinforced with three Arkansas regiments from the east side of Port Hudson, and a more western fortified ridge manned by Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Locke’s Alabama troops. Once again the combination of steep sided ravines, dense vegetation, and a rebel crossfire from ridge top trenches halted the Union advance. Premature shell bursts from the supporting artillery of the 1st Maine Battery also caused Union casualties…
Seeing that his advance had been stopped, Brigadier General William Dwight ordered the Louisiana Native Guards forward into the attack. These troops were not intended to take part in the attack due to the general prejudice against negro troops on the part of General Porter. Dwight was determined to break though the Confederate fortifications however, and committed them to the attack at 10 am. Since they had been deployed as pioneers (for which they had initially been raised), working on the pontoon bridge over Big Sandy Creek near its junction with the Mississippi, these troops were in the worst possible position for an attack than all the units in Weitzel’s northern assault group.
The Guard first had to advance over the pontoon bridge, along Telegraph Road with a fortified ridge to their left manned by Mississippi troops supported by a light artillery battery, the Confederate heavy artillery batteries to their front, and the Mississippi river to their immediate left. Despite the heavy crossfire from rifles, field artillery, and heavy coast guns, the Louisiana Native Guards advanced with determination and courage, led by Captain Andre Cailloux, a free black citizen of New Orleans. Giving orders in English and French, Cailloux led the Guard regiments forward until injured by artillery fire. Taking heavy losses, the attackers were forced to retreat to avoid annihilation. This fearless advance did much to dissipate any remaining doubts in the Western armies that negro troops were unreliable under fire…
The attack of the Louisiana Native Guards
While the infantry attacks raged against the northern section of the fortress, General Porter had sought to line up 38 cannon opposite the eastern side of the fortress and conducted a steady bombardment of the rebel works and battery positions, supported by sharpshooters aiming for Confederate artillery crews. This effort had some success, but General Grant, upon hearing no massed rifle fire from the Union center, visited Grover’s headquarters and threatened to relieve him of command unless he advanced his troops. Grover then began the attack on the eastern edge of the Port Hudson works at about 10.30am.
These attacks included some of the troops of Ricketts as well as his own, and had less in the way of natural terrain obstacles to contend with, but in this area the Confederates had more time to construct fortifications, and had put more effort and firepower into them. One feature of the earthworks in this region was a dry moat and more abatis in front of the parapet. The Union negro pioneer companies, mostly former Louisiana slaves, carried axes, poles, planks, cotton bags and fascines to fill in the ditch and effectively led the attack...
When the Union infantry closed within 150 yards they were met by a hail of rifle and canister fire, and few made it within 50 yards of the Confederate lines. Grover was wounded in these attacks, and Lieutenant Colonel James O'Brien, commanding the pioneer companies, was killed. At 3pm Union troops raised a white flag to signal a truce to remove the wounded and dead from the field. This ended the fighting for the day. None of the Union attacks had even made it to the Confederate parapets…
The successful defense of their lines brought a renewed confidence to Gardner and his garrison. They felt that through a combination of well planned defensive earthworks and the skillful and deliberate reinforcement of threatened areas, the superior numbers of attackers had been repulsed. Learning from his experience, Gardner organized a more methodical system of defense. This involved dividing the fortifications into a network of defense zones, with an engineering officer in charge of strengthening the defense in each area. For the most part this involved once again charting the best cross fire for artillery positions, improving firepower concentrations, and digging protective pits to house artillery when not in use, to protect them from enemy bombardment…
Spent bullets and scrap metal were sewed into shirtsleeves to make up canister casings for the artillery, and the heavy coast guns facing the river that had center pivot mounts were cleared for firing on Union positions on the eastern side of the fortress. Three of these guns were equipped for this, and one 10-inch Columbiad in Battery Four was so effective in this that Union troops referred to it as the “Demoralizer." Its fearful reputation spawned the myth that it was mounted on a railroad car, and could fire from any position in the fortifications. Rifles captured from the enemy or taken from hospitalized soldiers were stacked for use by troops in the trench lines.
Positions in front of the lines were land mined with unexploded 13-inch mortar shells, known as “torpedoes” at the time. Sniper positions were also prepared at high points in the trench works for sharpshooters. These methods improved the defense, but could not make up for the fact that the garrison was short of everything except gunpowder. The food shortage was a drag on morale, and resulted in a significant level of desertion to the enemy. This drain on manpower was recorded by Colonel Steedman who wrote, “Our most serious and annoying difficulty is the unreliable character of a portion of our Louisiana troops. Many have deserted to the enemy, giving him information of our real condition; yet in the same regiments we have some of our ablest officers and men”…
On the Union side, astonishment and chagrin were near universal in reaction to the decisive defeat of the infantry assaults. Grant was furious at the setback. Porter too was unimpressed with the performance of several of his commanders notwithstanding his previous opposition to any attack. Ricketts was promptly relieved of his command for his delay. He would not be re-employed…
The resources of the entire command were now called into play, and men and material poured into the Union encirclement. General Porter took command of all the artillery at hand and began a relentless bombardment of the Rebel works…
Union batteries during the Siege of Port Hudson
The second assault began with a redoubled shelling of the Confederate works beginning at 11:15am on June 1 and lasting an hour. Grant then sent a message to Gardner demanding the surrender of his position. Gardner’s reply was, “My honor and my duty require me to defend this position, and therefore I decline to surrender”. Porter continued the bombardment during the night, and Grant gave the order for what was to be a simultaneous three prong infantry attack at 1am on June 2. The attack began at 1:30am. McClernand’s corps led the assault from the north.
McClernand was keen to swipe anyway any stain on his reputation from Port Gibson. It was the most difficult sector to assault but as William T. Sherman observed “McClernand was aggressive. Regardless of the position or odds. Perhaps the most aggressive general in Grant’s army. He was the only person who wanted to fight even when Grant did not”. His column struck the Confederate line at “Fort Desperate” before the other columns reached the Rebel lines, and the same formidable terrain combined with the enhanced Confederate defense almost stopped the attack outside the rebel works. William T. Sherman's attack in the center, spearheaded by Steele’s Division, and the attack on the southern end of the line by Fitz-John Porter’s troops, arrived in time to prevent any attempts by Gardner to reallocate his troops within the works – he was attacked all along the line.
Porter’s troops redeemed themselves by being the first to break through the defenses, closely followed by McClernand’s troops under Eugene Carr. Rebel troops quickly began to stream from the outer defenses into the small town and inner defenses…
As dawn broke General Grant demanded the surrender of General Gardner. Gardner prevaricated for a almost a day before surrendering on June 2. General Porter assembled some of his “eastern” troops at the corps headquarters and thanked them for their brave efforts and sacrifices. In response General McClernand gave a speech of praise to his “westerners”. In historian John Murdoch’s opinion “a war of words now erupted between the easterners and westerners in Grant’s army that was to poison some relationships, while prompting a competition that would spur both factions to greater deeds”…”
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
Empire 1984
“The surrender gave the Union almost complete control of the Mississippi River and its major tributaries, save for Vicksburg. Both sides suffered heavy casualties: between 5,000 to 5,750 Union men were casualties, and an additional 7,000 fell prey to disease or sunstroke; Gardner's forces suffered around 1,300 casualties, from battle losses and disease...
In the west the reputation of black soldiers in Union service was enhanced by the siege. The advance of the Louisiana Guard had gained much coverage in northern newspapers. The attack was repulsed, due to its hasty implementation, but was bravely carried out in spite of the hopeless magnitude of opposing conditions. This performance was noted by the army leadership: “One thing I am glad to say, that is that the black troops at P. Hudson fought & acted superbly. The theory of negro inefficiency here is, I am very thankful at last thoroughly exploded by facts. We shall shortly have a splendid army of thousands of them.” General Porter, under who command the bulk of negros served, also noted their performance in his official report, stating, “The severe test to which they were subjected, and the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt of their utility as disciplined troops.” These observations did much to support the substantial efforts already underway to recruit free blacks for the Union armed services following the death of General Hunter…
In the west the reputation of black soldiers in Union service was enhanced by the siege. The advance of the Louisiana Guard had gained much coverage in northern newspapers. The attack was repulsed, due to its hasty implementation, but was bravely carried out in spite of the hopeless magnitude of opposing conditions. This performance was noted by the army leadership: “One thing I am glad to say, that is that the black troops at P. Hudson fought & acted superbly. The theory of negro inefficiency here is, I am very thankful at last thoroughly exploded by facts. We shall shortly have a splendid army of thousands of them.” General Porter, under who command the bulk of negros served, also noted their performance in his official report, stating, “The severe test to which they were subjected, and the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt of their utility as disciplined troops.” These observations did much to support the substantial efforts already underway to recruit free blacks for the Union armed services following the death of General Hunter…
Grant’s mind now turned to Vicksburg with Fitz-John Porter’s XIX Corps as a sorely needed reinforcement…”
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Chapter Thirty-Eight Two Brawlers Meet
Chapter Thirty-Eight
Two Brawlers Meet
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
“The Confederacy should have been able to do more to relieve Gardner during the month long siege. Braxton Bragg certainly wished to. However, despite having resolved to defend Vicksburg at the banks of the Mississippi and not from the city’s defenses, Bragg could not completely cast off from the city. While Grant’s army remained by the river, he could move his forces along it faster than Bragg could over land. Bragg could only march so far with so many troops before he exposed himself to a river borne landing in his rear…
Bragg however sought the co-operation of General Joseph Johnston’s command. With Fitz-John Porter having marched out of New Orleans and Baton Rouge with the bulk of his troops Johnston finally saw an opportunity, however slim, to effect the purpose of his Department of the Gulf. That did not involve co-operating with Bragg. Indeed the further Grant took Porter’s XIX Corps north and away from Baton Rouge and New Orleans the better for Johnston. The resulting telegrams and arguments between to the two departmental commanders ultimately meant that Port Hudson fell before either had acted to relieve…”
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
“With the news of the fall of Port Hudson, Bragg order Loring’s Corps back to Vicksburg. Furthermore all reinforcements arriving at Jackson were ordered to remain there for the moment. Magruder’s scouting parties and Van Dorn’s cavalry reported that Grant was moving up the line of the Great Northern railroad towards Jackson…
Confederate Generals Earl Van Dorn and William H.T. Walker
Leaving Walker’s Division in the works at Port Gibson, Magruder marched north east towards Raymond. There he was to meet Bragg with Loring’s Corps. Bragg intended to go on the offensive and met Grant in the field…
There was a serious skirmish at Union Church, south east of Port Gibson, when Van Dorn’s cavalry supported by one of Walker’s brigades attempted to effect an ambush on some Union troops who seemed separated from Grant’s main force. The Union troops turned out to be the leading elements of Brigadier General Paine’s Division of the XIX Corps under Porter. Van Dorn decided to dispute the position along a low ridge north west of the Church and arrayed his men and artillery accordingly. As Paine's men approached, the Confederates opened fire, initially causing heavy casualties. Some Union troops broke (this had formerly been General Rickett’s rather ineffective command), but Fitz-John Porter arrived and rallied a force to hold the line. Confederate troops then attacked but were forced to retire. Additional Union troops arrived in the form of Weitzel’s Division and counterattacked. Heavy fighting ensued that continued for six hours, but the overwhelming Union force prevailed. Van Dorn's men left the field. Although they lost the battle, his cavalry and infantry supports had held up a much superior Union force for a day. More importantly it indicated that Porter was not marching north with Grant but west towards Port Gibson and “the underbelly of Vicksburg”…
Union Generals Halbert E. Paine and Godfrey Weitzel
Despite Porter’s victory, the presence of Confederate forces attacking Grant's left flank was a cause for concern. The Rebels were in greater force in this theatre than he had expected. Furthermore he learned that General Joseph E. Johnston had crossed into the state of Mississippi. Rumor placed him at Meridian, from which he could march to Bragg’s support, or else in Hattiesburg from where he could march to Baton Rouge, New Orleans or perhaps Grant’s rear. In either case Grant’s army could find itself between enemy forces to the front and rear. Grant was not concerned about a descent on New Orleans. The overland approaches were difficult and the navy would pound an attacking force from the sea. But although Johnston’s force was largely made up of Alabamian and Mississippian militia and home guard units, it did include Richard Taylor’s division of regulars. If it attacked his rear or joined with Bragg his position could be become difficult…
The Battle of Crystal Springs - On June 18, Bragg received confirmation that three army corps—Sherman's, McPherson's and McClernand’s—were advancing on Jackson. Bragg resolved to meet him with his two corps. The armies met at Crystal Springs just south of Harpersville…
On June 21, about 7 am, the head of the Union column, Sherman’s XV Corps were engaged by the Confederates of William Wing Loring's Corps, specifically the divisions of Forey and Maury. Loring’s force was drawn up into a defensive line along a crest of a ridge. As Sherman shook out his column into line of battle he was unaware that Magruder’s corps was swinging out on his left against his unprotected left flank. Blair, one of Sherman's divisional commanders, did however spot the Confederate attack in time and refused his left flank. Simultaneously Grant had directed MacPherson’s leading divisions of Quinby and Herron to reinforce and extend Sherman’s left flank. Quinby’s troops were still in column when they were hit by M.L. Smith’s 4 brigades. As a confused (at least on Quinby’s side) firefight erupted, the Union troops quickly got the worst of the fight…
"Prince John" had only two of his divisions - Martin Luther Smith's and Carter L. Stevenson's
Herron did succeed in forming a line of battle before Carter L. Stevenson’s 5 brigades swept towards him, led in person by General Magruder. Just as it looked as though the line had stabilized on the left, General Smith personally lead one of his brigades against Quinby’s wavering regiments. The charge stampeded one of Quinby’s brigades which quickly infected the other two. Suddenly there was a huge gap in Grant’s line with both Sherman’s left and Herron’s right open to flanking fire. Sherman personally steadied his flanking brigade, but Herron’s troops began to withdraw without orders…
Isaac F. Quinby, Francis J. Herron, John A. Logan and John McArthur
Witnesses observed that Bragg was visibly elated as the battle progressed. It looked as though Magruder might succeed in turning Grant’s flank before the Union general got get all his troops into the fight. With Quinby broken and Herron in retreat Bragg urged Magruder to press on. As he advanced with Stevenson’s and Smith’s divisions it was then that Magruder realized that there was a second line. McPherson had formed up Logan’s and McArthur’s Division in the rear. Furthermore a third force, A.J. Smith’s Division from McClernand’s Corps was marching at the double quick to close the gap between this new line and Sherman’s. Logan and McArthur both had their divisions well in hand and there was no question of retreat or withdrawal. The force of Logan’s personality assisted Herron in reforming an element of his command on the extreme left.
Eugene A. Carr, Andrew Jackson Smith, Alvin P. Hovey and Peter J. Osterhaus
What had looked briefly like a supreme opportunity for the Confederates now turned into a stand up firefight between two determined foes. On both sides the senior officers were conspicuous in their example and bravery. “It was a miracle Prince John came through in one piece” according to one Tennessee private “he wore the most owtstandin [sic] gettup covered in gold braid. He was a prime a target for the Yankee. Its lucky for him they’re such bad shots”…
Surveying the left Grant realised neither side were likely to achieve a breakthrough on that flank, so he ordered McClernand’s remaining three divisions to the right in order to launch a counterattack there. McClernand had sought to place Osterhaus at the point of the attack but Grant had vetoed this. “Let Carr lead the attack. He knows what must be done”. Union forces on the right reached the Confederate main line between 12 and 1pm. Marmaduke’s three Arkansas brigades held Loring’s left and until that point had been unengaged. They faced a attack by divisions, led by Eugene Carr supported by the divisions of Osterhaus and Hovey.
Marmaduke’s troops stood the attack bravely for longer than they ought but eventually Carr pulled together an assault that broke Marmaduke’s line and the division retired in disorder. The Federals swept forward, with the aim of capturing the crossroads near Harpersville, in Bragg's rear, and closing the Jackson Road escape route. Bragg had however stripped Stevenson and M.L. Smith, as Carr's attack commenced, of a brigade each and with this hastily formed force formed a new line in Loring’s rear to halt Carr’s advance. But Bragg’s men could not stand this pounding for long so, much to his disgust, he ordered his men from the field towards the Terry Crossroads several miles away where he would have to decide whether to retreat to Jackson or back towards Vicksburg...
Dabney H. Maury, John S. Marmaduke and John H. Forney
Major General Dabney Maury’s division formed the rearguard, and they held at all costs, including the serious injury of Maury before withdrawing. The Union troops were exhausted by Grant maintained a pursuit using elements of XIII Corps for several miles…”
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In OTL they were first deployed by Banks about a month later, again in the siege of Port Hudson. I think my use of African Americans is earlier and more widespread.
This attack by the Louisiana Native Guard on 8th May 1863 was of course preceded by the use of African American Pioneers by Butler up to and during the Battle of Blackwater in April 1863 [Post 107]. The bandsmen of the 1st Maine Cavalry also fought and died at the Battle of Yellow Tavern in mid-May 1863 [Post 161]. The United States Colored Pioneer Battalions fought later with the Army of the Potomac at Fort Winder - 4th & 5th June [Post 190 & 202].
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PS. To follow the Vicksburg Campaign I recommend the standard Wikipedia maps:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VicksburgCampaignDecember62March63.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VicksburgCampaignAprilJuly63.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VicksburgCampaignDecember62March63.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VicksburgCampaignAprilJuly63.png
Chapter Thirty-Nine Encounter on the Big Black
Chapter Thirty-Nine
Encounter on the Big Black
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
"Bragg made a major strategic decision. His army would not retreat to the Vicksburg defenses. Instead Walker’s division of Magruder’s Corps was ordered back to the defenses as it retreated from Union Church to join Bowen’s Division. Bragg meant for Pemberton to hold Vicksburg with just two divisions plus elements of militia, home guard and a regiment of heavy artillery.
While this might seem like a hopeless task, Bragg intended to hamper any siege with his remaining force – Magruder’s Corps of Smith’s and Stevenson’s Divisions and Loring’s Corps of Forney’s, Marmaduke’s and Maury’s (now commanded by Stephen D. Lee) Divisions. Bragg still had hopes of being joined by Johnston’s force and crushing Grant “between the hammer of our united forces and the anvil of the Vicksburg works”. Bragg withdrew the remains of his army to Jackson to await Grant’s move towards Vicksburg and a response from Johnston to his latest request for that officer to join the so called “Army of the Gulf” with Bragg’s…"
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Grant was not to be distracted. XIX Corps under Fitz-John Porter was the first to make contact with the works around Vicksburg from the south. Grant moved slowly with the main body to Raymond, and from there via Edward’s Station across the Big Black River. His force was shadowed the whole way beyond Raymond by Bragg who sought any opportunity to strike.
Bragg seized an opportunity at the Big Black River. Sherman’s Corps had formed the rearguard as Grant crossed with McPherson’s Corps which was followed by McClernand’s Corps. McClernand’s Corps had taken several hours longer than Grant had planned for its crossing and as night fell, Sherman found himself facing the quandary of trying to cross at night or waiting until morning to cross. Bragg did not give him the opportunity to decide. At 11pm Bragg launched three divisions at Sherman’s isolate corps – Smith and Stevenson in front with Forney in reserve.
The fighting was shambolic: an errant brigade of Forney’s division fired into the rear of Stevenson’s. Artillery belonging to McClernand shelled elements of Sherman’s force. Sherman was lucky to survive the night unscathed as reinforcements from McClernand fired at his party as they arrived in his corps rear...
Blair’s and Steele’s Divisions stood up well to the attacks. Tuttle’s Division was badly mauled as elements of Smith’s Division managed, in the dark, to get on both its flanks at one point. Grant rushed troops from McClernand’s command back across the river and by 3am the attack had fizzled out...
While certainly not as large as Crystal Springs, the Battle of the Big Black was to have serious repercussions. It convinced both Sherman, and to a lesser degree McPherson, that Bragg was a serious threat and that any division of Grant’s force to invest Vicksburg would expose it to being attacked in detail by Bragg’s roaming force. If Johnson joined Bragg then a major battle was inevitable but the odds would be against Grant this time…
Stephen Hurlbut’s XVI Corps was already on its way to Grant, or at least three divisions of it were (Smith’s, Dodge’s and Lauman’s). Dodge’s division was the first to arrived and joined Porter’s force already at Vicksburg about this time…"
Chapter Forty Ulysses Caesar Grant
Chapter Forty
Ulysses Caesar Grant
From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
Edison 1953
"Grant did not suffer from the same anxiety that seemed to plague his senior officers. Grant wanted to overwhelm the Confederates before they could fully organize their defenses and intended to order an immediate assault against the Railroad Redoubt. However he could not afford to ignore the risk Bragg posed altogether, but Grant understood that Bragg alone was a painful nuisance. The longer the Union Army sat in front of Vicksburg the more likely it was that Johnson would join Bragg. Together they would be a serious threat…
Grant adopted an interesting tactic, while Fitz-John Porter and McClernand prepared to assault the rebel defenses, Sherman and McPherson were preparing their own outward facing defenses in Grant’s rear. Grant did not believe these would be necessary but Sherman’s pessimism (which had colored Sherman’s advice to Grant throughout the Vicksburg Campaign) and his own previous experience caused him to take these precautions before ordering any assault…"
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Troops from McClernand's corps had a difficult time approaching the position under rifle and artillery fire from rebel Missouri infantry and elements of the city’s heavy artillery regiment. They had to negotiate a steep approach studded with abatis and a “moat” (a 7 foot wide badly drained ditch) before attacking the 15 foot high timber and earth banked walls of the redoubt. Grant expected McClernand to steamroller over “hand fulls of militia and home guard left in the city”. This first attempt was easily repulsed. At Porter’s suggestion Grant ordered a massed artillery bombardment to soften the defenses and at about 3 p.m., Major General Peter Osterhaus tried again, but only a small number of men were able to advance even as far as the ditch below the redoubt. 1st Sergeant William Wesley Kendall, Company A of the 49th Indiana was the only man to breast the redoubt walls where he was seriously injured and captured.His civil war record contains the unusual distinction of containing three written commendations from Confederate officers of the Vicksburg garrison including General Bowen who saw him in action…
The assault collapsed in a melee of rifle fire back and forth…
The failed Federal assaults damaged Union morale, deflating what confidence the soldiers felt (Crystal Rivers, Port Hudson and Union Church were victories, Big Black River was consider by the rank and file to be a draw, and no one had forgotten the unexpected bloody nose at Port Gibson). They were also costly, with casualties of 259 killed, 973 wounded, and 5 missing, versus Confederate casualties of 8 killed and 62 wounded. The Confederates, assumed by Grant to be under strength demoralized militia and home defense force, had retained their fighting edge. The assault itself had been obvious and isolated. General Pemberton had been able to redeploy his limited forces to repel the attack without fear of weakening the line elsewhere…
Grant planned another assault for a week later, but this time with greater care; they would first reconnoiter thoroughly and soften up the defenses with artillery and naval gunfire. The lead units were supplied with ladders to ascend the fortification walls. Grant did not want a long siege, and this attack was to be by three corps across a wide front.
Union forces bombarded the city all night, from 220 artillery pieces and naval gunfire from Rear Admiral David D. Porter's fleet in the river, and while causing little property damage, they damaged Confederate civilian morale. In the morning, the defenders were bombarded again for four hours before the Union attacked once more along a three-mile front at 11am.
Hurlbut, with the divisions of Smith and Dodge on hand, attacked down the Graveyard Road, with 150 volunteers (nicknamed the Forlorn Hope in true Napoleonic style) leading the way with ladders and planks. This attack was to be followed by the division of Logan borrowed from McPherson’s Corps. Hurlbut, formerly a politician, did not concentrated his attack but rather assaulted the works in a long, but solid, line. They were initially driven back in the face of heavy rifle fire. When Hurlbut sent for Logan, as we will see, he was not in position…
Fitz-John Porter's corps was assigned to attack the center along the Jackson Road. On their right flank, the brigade of the Louisiana Native Guards succeeded in advancing to within 100 yards of the Confederate line, but halted to avoid dangerous flanking fire from Green's Redan. On Porter's left flank, the division of Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel was assigned to assault the Louisiana Redan and the Great Redoubt. He was slowing getting into position and his attack was initially poorly handled until Porter arrived and directed the leading elements in person. It was an act of thoughtless courage by that officer that earned him a good deal of respect from General Grant and his westerners."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
"On the Union left, McClernand's corps moved along the Baldwin Ferry Road and astride the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. The division of Brigadier General Carr was assigned to capture the Railroad Redoubt and the Texas Lunette. Carr's men achieved a small breakthrough at the Texas Lunette and requested reinforcements. On receipt of the message Grant is supposed to have exclaimed “I’ll see Carr a Major General before month end if he can give me Vicksburg before nightfall” (Rawlins).
Re-enforcements were ordered by McClernand, but an order addressed to Hovey arrived at A.J. Smith’s headquarters and he failed to either act on it or redirect it. Carr pulled back but was prepared to make a second assault. It was clear that although a breakthrough was not forthcoming yet, Carr had found a weak spot. The dearth of numbers in the Vicksburg garrison was now beginning to show. Pemberton had put every man into the line. Even the hospitals had been emptied."
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Just then, Grant received a message from McPherson, which stated that he was heavily engaged – Bragg had crossed the Big Black River north of Canton and was attacking the rather battered divisions of Quinby and Herron. These divisions were stationed north of the siege lines, behind Hurlbut’s lines…"From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Troops from McClernand's corps had a difficult time approaching the position under rifle and artillery fire from rebel Missouri infantry and elements of the city’s heavy artillery regiment. They had to negotiate a steep approach studded with abatis and a “moat” (a 7 foot wide badly drained ditch) before attacking the 15 foot high timber and earth banked walls of the redoubt. Grant expected McClernand to steamroller over “hand fulls of militia and home guard left in the city”. This first attempt was easily repulsed. At Porter’s suggestion Grant ordered a massed artillery bombardment to soften the defenses and at about 3 p.m., Major General Peter Osterhaus tried again, but only a small number of men were able to advance even as far as the ditch below the redoubt. 1st Sergeant William Wesley Kendall, Company A of the 49th Indiana was the only man to breast the redoubt walls where he was seriously injured and captured.His civil war record contains the unusual distinction of containing three written commendations from Confederate officers of the Vicksburg garrison including General Bowen who saw him in action…
The assault collapsed in a melee of rifle fire back and forth…
The failed Federal assaults damaged Union morale, deflating what confidence the soldiers felt (Crystal Rivers, Port Hudson and Union Church were victories, Big Black River was consider by the rank and file to be a draw, and no one had forgotten the unexpected bloody nose at Port Gibson). They were also costly, with casualties of 259 killed, 973 wounded, and 5 missing, versus Confederate casualties of 8 killed and 62 wounded. The Confederates, assumed by Grant to be under strength demoralized militia and home defense force, had retained their fighting edge. The assault itself had been obvious and isolated. General Pemberton had been able to redeploy his limited forces to repel the attack without fear of weakening the line elsewhere…
Grant planned another assault for a week later, but this time with greater care; they would first reconnoiter thoroughly and soften up the defenses with artillery and naval gunfire. The lead units were supplied with ladders to ascend the fortification walls. Grant did not want a long siege, and this attack was to be by three corps across a wide front.
Union forces bombarded the city all night, from 220 artillery pieces and naval gunfire from Rear Admiral David D. Porter's fleet in the river, and while causing little property damage, they damaged Confederate civilian morale. In the morning, the defenders were bombarded again for four hours before the Union attacked once more along a three-mile front at 11am.
Hurlbut, with the divisions of Smith and Dodge on hand, attacked down the Graveyard Road, with 150 volunteers (nicknamed the Forlorn Hope in true Napoleonic style) leading the way with ladders and planks. This attack was to be followed by the division of Logan borrowed from McPherson’s Corps. Hurlbut, formerly a politician, did not concentrated his attack but rather assaulted the works in a long, but solid, line. They were initially driven back in the face of heavy rifle fire. When Hurlbut sent for Logan, as we will see, he was not in position…
Fitz-John Porter's corps was assigned to attack the center along the Jackson Road. On their right flank, the brigade of the Louisiana Native Guards succeeded in advancing to within 100 yards of the Confederate line, but halted to avoid dangerous flanking fire from Green's Redan. On Porter's left flank, the division of Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel was assigned to assault the Louisiana Redan and the Great Redoubt. He was slowing getting into position and his attack was initially poorly handled until Porter arrived and directed the leading elements in person. It was an act of thoughtless courage by that officer that earned him a good deal of respect from General Grant and his westerners."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
"On the Union left, McClernand's corps moved along the Baldwin Ferry Road and astride the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. The division of Brigadier General Carr was assigned to capture the Railroad Redoubt and the Texas Lunette. Carr's men achieved a small breakthrough at the Texas Lunette and requested reinforcements. On receipt of the message Grant is supposed to have exclaimed “I’ll see Carr a Major General before month end if he can give me Vicksburg before nightfall” (Rawlins).
Re-enforcements were ordered by McClernand, but an order addressed to Hovey arrived at A.J. Smith’s headquarters and he failed to either act on it or redirect it. Carr pulled back but was prepared to make a second assault. It was clear that although a breakthrough was not forthcoming yet, Carr had found a weak spot. The dearth of numbers in the Vicksburg garrison was now beginning to show. Pemberton had put every man into the line. Even the hospitals had been emptied."
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
"The purpose of the huge preparatory bombardment had not been lost on Bragg and he was prepared to attack Grant in the rear in the midst of any new assault. He committed Magruder to attack McPherson’s lines in the north, while Loring, with support from mounted and dismounted elements of Van Dorn’s cavalry, was to apply pressure to Sherman’s position.
McPherson’s message also confirmed he had already reclaimed Logan’s division which was marching to assist Quinby. Sherman also reported a substantial increase of skirmishing on his front (east of the city) and confirmed the presence a large numbers of cavalry (Van Dorn’s command)."
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Grant approved McPherson’s withdrawal of Logan from Hurlbut’s offensive. However he was initially reluctant to abandon the assault and ordered McClernand and Porter to resume the attack, telling McClernand to use his own reserve forces for assistance. Grant was mistakenly under the impression that McClernand had been lightly engaged and Porter heavily, although the reverse was true.
McClernand followed up with a message that was partially misleading, implying that he had captured two forts—"Old Glory is flying over them"—and that another push along the line would achieve victory for the Union Army. Carr had, at great cost to his own division, made a second lodgment in the rebel lines. McClernand ordered Osterhaus to support Carr, but Osterhaus demurred. Night was falling and the path difficult, the lodgment uncertain. A powder stained and bloody Carr returned in person to locate his reinforcements to find McClernand, Osterhaus and Porter arguing over the best course in a hollow near McClernard's headquarters (none wish to suggest to Grant that the attacks had failed)."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
"Porter described Carr as “looking like a wild man”, McClernand called him “an escapee from hell’s inferno”. On learning that Osterhaus had been ordered to support his attack and had failed to do so Carr “struck Osterhaus to his knees before being restrained”. Carr returned to his troops until ordered back to his starting position by Grant. “I could see into the city and there was not a single armed rebel between my foremost man and the Mississippi River. The rebels had spent their men in the defense. Had I been supported by any other man Vicksburg would have fallen that night”…"LSU 1991
"The purpose of the huge preparatory bombardment had not been lost on Bragg and he was prepared to attack Grant in the rear in the midst of any new assault. He committed Magruder to attack McPherson’s lines in the north, while Loring, with support from mounted and dismounted elements of Van Dorn’s cavalry, was to apply pressure to Sherman’s position.
McPherson’s message also confirmed he had already reclaimed Logan’s division which was marching to assist Quinby. Sherman also reported a substantial increase of skirmishing on his front (east of the city) and confirmed the presence a large numbers of cavalry (Van Dorn’s command)."
From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
"Grant approved McPherson’s withdrawal of Logan from Hurlbut’s offensive. However he was initially reluctant to abandon the assault and ordered McClernand and Porter to resume the attack, telling McClernand to use his own reserve forces for assistance. Grant was mistakenly under the impression that McClernand had been lightly engaged and Porter heavily, although the reverse was true.
McClernand followed up with a message that was partially misleading, implying that he had captured two forts—"Old Glory is flying over them"—and that another push along the line would achieve victory for the Union Army. Carr had, at great cost to his own division, made a second lodgment in the rebel lines. McClernand ordered Osterhaus to support Carr, but Osterhaus demurred. Night was falling and the path difficult, the lodgment uncertain. A powder stained and bloody Carr returned in person to locate his reinforcements to find McClernand, Osterhaus and Porter arguing over the best course in a hollow near McClernard's headquarters (none wish to suggest to Grant that the attacks had failed)."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991
LSU 1991
"Hurlbut did not renew his attack. He found himself in the odious position of being the subject of artillery fire from the city and on receipt of Magruder’s overshoots meant for McPherson… Formations with Bragg in the rear and a “hornet’s nest of a fort” in front quickly became confused as conflicting orders arrived from Grant, McPherson and Hurlbut…
In the north Magruder pressed his attack with his now customary firmness. Both Smith, by training a military engineer, and Stevenson, a veteran of 3 wars prior to this, had matured into their divisional roles under Magruder and facing their old foes, Herron and Quinby, quickly had the Federal troops drawing back. Logan’s arrival stiffened Union resolve. The unsophisticated but aggressive response by Logan was the immediate launch of one of his brigades in a bayonet charge which staggered and utlimately stalled Stevenson’s attack and allowed the Union line to stabilize before McPherson had yet brought up McArthur’s Division…
Sherman was well entrenched and Loring was reluctant to launch anything approaching a full scale attack and therefore Sherman did not come under anymore than a very vigorous attack by a cloud of skirmishers. Darkness fell before Bragg could find Loring to try to push him into the attack…"
From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
"Historian Morgan Withers wrote that Grant "did not regret having made the assaults; he only regretted that they had failed." Grant reluctantly settled into a siege. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins issued Special Orders No. 140 for Grant: "Corps Commanders will immediately commence the work of reducing the enemy by regular approaches. It is desirable that no more loss of life shall be sustained in the reduction of Vicksburg, and the capture of the Garrison. Every advantage will be taken of the natural inequalities of the ground to gain positions from which to start mines, trenches, or advance batteries. Furthermore this army will not again be exposed to attack in the rear...".In the north Magruder pressed his attack with his now customary firmness. Both Smith, by training a military engineer, and Stevenson, a veteran of 3 wars prior to this, had matured into their divisional roles under Magruder and facing their old foes, Herron and Quinby, quickly had the Federal troops drawing back. Logan’s arrival stiffened Union resolve. The unsophisticated but aggressive response by Logan was the immediate launch of one of his brigades in a bayonet charge which staggered and utlimately stalled Stevenson’s attack and allowed the Union line to stabilize before McPherson had yet brought up McArthur’s Division…
Sherman was well entrenched and Loring was reluctant to launch anything approaching a full scale attack and therefore Sherman did not come under anymore than a very vigorous attack by a cloud of skirmishers. Darkness fell before Bragg could find Loring to try to push him into the attack…"
From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
Grant wrote in his memoirs, "Porter [Fitz-John] kept referring to some classical siege. [Alesia?] He was unduly impressed with our double lines of works. One facing Vicksburg and the second facing Bragg. It was common sense for I had resolved to incur no more losses in dealing with Bragg."
Federal troops began to dig in, constructing elaborate entrenchments that surrounded the city and moved closer and closer to the Confederate fortifications, with their backs to a second set of fortifications to keep Bragg at bay while they reduced Vicksburg. Pemberton and the citizens of Vicksburg alike were trapped. Pemberton was determined to hold his few miles of the Mississippi as long as possible, hoping for relief from Bragg, Johnston or elsewhere..."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
"In the meant time Grant had to deal with an outraged Osterhaus seeking to press charges against Carr. McClernand tried to mediate the dispute with a perceived bias towards his favorite, Osterhaus. Grant cut through the dispute quickly. Osterhaus was dismissed. His division broken up between McClernand’s other three divisions. “I’d rather have Carr here than Osterhaus. Osterhaus talks and talks. Carr just fights…” (comment of Grant reported by Rawlins)."Federal troops began to dig in, constructing elaborate entrenchments that surrounded the city and moved closer and closer to the Confederate fortifications, with their backs to a second set of fortifications to keep Bragg at bay while they reduced Vicksburg. Pemberton and the citizens of Vicksburg alike were trapped. Pemberton was determined to hold his few miles of the Mississippi as long as possible, hoping for relief from Bragg, Johnston or elsewhere..."
From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
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How do people think its going? When I started I didn't expect to get this detailed. But with the fall of Richmond the butterflies are now starting to go a bit mad...
I will stick through just to find out what three wars Grant is a hero of! Also, I like that Eisenhower is the author of that text
. The other authors don't stick out as much.