A Fitter Italian Military

[Croesus]

The purpose of the Danubian-Balkan countries in the post-Versailles world was to act as a frontier between the Great Powers; primarily between Germany and Russia whose twin pressures from west and east dominated the international relations of the region, but also including the influence of Italy, France and Britain. It was an implication of this purpose that they would in some way coalesce and come together to obtain a degree of self-interested collective security such that they could more readily resist interference by the Great Powers.

On the eve of general hostilities each of these countries, with the qualified exception of Hungary, had developed some form of dictatorial rule, involving domination by monarchist and/or military interests. Two attempts at collective security had been made, the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania and the Balkan Entente between Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey. Each was directed primarily against one of the two revisionist powers, Hungary and Bulgaria, and each was fatally weakened by member powers making exceptions in the governance arrangements such that they were effectively unable to intervene when the status quo was challenged.

The challenge came in 1936 with the opening of the German economic offensive into the region. By this time Italy had become a revisionist power and Britain retreated from direct activity in regional politics, leaving France to construct a series of political structures that, it was hoped, would prevent German expansion eastward while also maintaining the cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union. This was not to be for, as was clear to Berlin, there were no economic, or even military, provisions in the French diplomatic arrangements. Germany provided a way for the Danubian-Balkan states to trade their way out of the Depression by offering a market for their agricultural surpluses. The German economic offensive was structured thus that internal price levels were driven up making it increasingly difficult for the countries to obtain alternative markets and thus to escape the noose that was closing about their necks. By the time limited French and British economic treaties were in place the damage had been done; the region was firmly in the German economic hinterland.

As war approached the German situation strengthened the hand of the three revisionist countries, while the Anglo-French inactivity and weakness progressively harmed that of the remaining Danubian-Balkan countries. As the horse-trading commenced it became clear that these countries would have a significant part to play and, again, the Anglo-French were at a disadvantage. Where the Axis powers were content with Danubian-Balkan neutrality, the Anglo-French were pressing them to make a commitment to stem the eastward flow of Axis influence. The one was easier to provide than the other given the unique nature of the political environment and so it was that when war did come each of the powers held to individual neutrality, if they weren’t already tied by non-belligerence to one of the two warring sides.

The announcement of the German-Soviet pact in August was the first act in a bewildering succession of crises and surprises that fundamentally changed the nature of the carefully constructed Danubian-Balkan political system. The country most immediately affected was Romania. Its fundamental policy was to balance off the interests between Germany and the Anglo-French while keeping the Soviet Union at arms length. Upon learning of the pact the concern became that Germany and Russia had come to an arrangement over the division of Poland and Romania; as events in September unfolded it became clear that in the former this was true, which could only spell trouble for Romania.

Despite recent border tensions, Bucharest felt fairly confident that Hungary would not intervene in Transylvania, as it was not in Budapest’s interest to see Soviet influence increase in the region, given the treatment the Hungarians had afforded the regime of Bela Kun and the significant absence of communist activity in that country. Bulgaria was a different matter as of late it had been noted that relations between Sofia and Moscow were growing warmer and Bulgaria was clear and unapologetic over its ambitions in the Dobrudja.

The Romanian response was to seek to draw Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente by discussing measures with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister in September that would see each of the Balkan Entente powers ceding territory to Bulgaria in return for Bulgaria avoiding ‘adverse movements which might compromise the work of appeasement’. But the main point was that the proposal would not be made until the Turkish Foreign Minister returned from impending talks with his counterpart Molotov in October.

Following the meeting with the Yugoslavs, the Romanian Foreign Minister raised the idea of a Balkan Entente with Rome, but adding the important distinction that such a bloc would naturally follow the lead of Italy in keeping things as they were in the region. This suggestion came parallel to conversations occurring between Mussolini and Ciano where, following the August commitment to war and the resulting decision to fight ‘in parallel’ with Germany, the consideration was given to keeping the Danubian-Balkan region out of the conflict entirely, as a means of preserving limited Italian influence as well as ensuring no collision of interest with the Anglo-French. The idea did not last long in Rome as it was seen that there was more to be gained from war than from leading a bloc of neutrals but, as with much of Italian diplomacy, no real effort was made to discourage the Romanians from promoting the plan.

Following the Soviet role in the partition of Poland, and simultaneous with the Romanian proposal, there occurred several diplomatic and media items that mentioned directly the idea of Italian regional leadership. Partially in response to this, Ciano briefly revived the idea and sought the opinion of Berlin, which, at this stage, wasn’t grappling with the unforeseen consequences of an Italian dominated Croatia. The message was that Germany had nothing against the idea of Italian regional leadership per se, but that it would if such a leadership took on ‘a political character’.

Things came to a head during a meeting with Hitler on 1 October, on the eve of the Italian invasion, where Ciano was informed that Germany approved of an Italian-led bloc of neutrals to ward off Allied influence but that it was the German view that the Italian sphere of influence in the region extended only so far as those countries in direct contact with the Adriatic and Mediterranean. This was a fundamental difference of opinion and, following on from the exasperation of the Ciano-Ribbentrop conversations of August and the announcement of the German-Soviet pact of that month had a marked impact on the view that Rome subsequently took of Berlin; needless to say also that, for the moment, the idea was completely killed off.

However, Rome neglected to inform the Romanians of this development and in spite of the fact that the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia, tacitly supported by Greece, took the Yugoslav influence in the Romanian scheme out of contention, Bucharest retained interest in the plan and, just as the Italian army was drawing up outside of Karlovac, the Turkish Foreign Minister returned with his news. And it wasn’t good. The position of the Soviet Union, who had been seeking to force Turkey into a revised relationship such that Soviet naval power could be extended past the Straits, was that Moscow not only had no interest in the Balkan Entente consolidating its position, but that in fact Molotov had openly taken up the cause of full Bulgarian revisionism. This effectively confirmed that Moscow saw its interests in Bessarabia and Bukovina as unsatisfied and that it would at some point seek to rectify matters.

Further to this it emerged that Istanbul, of its own accord, had approached Bulgaria directly with the Romanian plan. Perhaps unsurprisingly Sofia saw little gain to join the Entente given that its hopes for revision had never been higher; and further to this the Bulgarians made pointed reference to the recent conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement with France and England. The Romanians made a further attempt to revive the idea of turning to Italy to prevent German or Soviet domination by calling upon Rome to accept leadership of an anti-Bolshevik bloc, citing the cautious warming of relations with Istanbul and the encouraging signs of a Hungarian-Romanian border accord. This last effort proved as unsuccessful as the earlier however and with its demise, together with internal problems with the Iron Guard, the Romanian efforts to resist German control was given up leading to a growing and marked pro-German influence within the Romanian government.

With the departure of the Romanian diplomatic initiatives and the destruction of the Yugoslav state, the politics of the region entered into a new phase. Italy proceeded to establish puppet states in Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro while continuing to administer Albania as part of the Italian Empire. Greece ensured its hold on northern Epirus would not be uncontested and, confident of its Turkish and Italian agreements, continued with its avowed neutrality in the wider European war while at the same time furthering its disengagement from the Balkan Entente.

Bulgaria, having taken its slice of Yugoslavia by occupying Vardar Macedonia recognised in the wider developments that its position had abruptly become intensely strategic and began to mobilise its forces in anticipation of either furthering its revisionist agenda at the expense of Romania, or defending itself against Greek and/or Turkish operations. Hungary proceeded to consolidate its gains while building on its suddenly remarkable position; with a resurgence of its relationship with Italy and an understanding with Romania, it began to turn its attention to the smaller matter of Slovakia and the greater matter of its place in the German sphere. Turkey found itself under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Anglo-French in light of the Italian successes and, given a marked cooling of relations with Moscow, found itself unable to prevent the gradual dissolution of the Balkan Entente.

By the end of October tensions in the Danubian-Balkan region were high. Greece and Bulgaria watched each other suspiciously; Turkey was proving unable to avoid the attentions of the Anglo-French at the expense of its Russian relationship; Romania was in the throes of internal upheaval and fundamental failure of its foreign policy; Hungary was becoming increasingly confident of securing its full revisionist aims; and Italy, buffered by a string of client states, was fulfilling its long held policy of a ‘horizontal axis’ by encroaching steadily on the German economic hinterland.

Croesus

 

[Croesus]

The View from Berlin: Aug – Oct 1939

This period was one of three surprises and subsequent rapid change in foreign policy for all the capitals of the great powers. The first great surprise was the Soviet-German pact signed on 24 August. Its announcement removed the fundamental premise upon which the foreign policies of most of the states along the Baltic-Black Sea line was based and took away the option of a second front for the Anglo-French, leaving them to face Germany alone. The second surprise was the abrupt stiffening of Anglo-French resolve leading to their declaration of war on 3 September; where before they had acquiesced over the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, now they abandoned their policies of appeasement and conciliation and opted for war. The third surprise was the behaviour of Italy where it did not declare war in favour of Germany but instead opened a campaign against Yugoslavia, which it won in three and a half weeks, to the surprise of all the military observers in Europe.

The passage of events that culminated in the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of October was not, when considered in sum, a pleasant one from Hitler’s perspective. He had without a doubt lost control of the situation. The value of the Soviet-German pact in his eyes was as a means to present Poland with an irresistible fait accompli such that his territorial demands would be meekly accepted. At no point did he consider that his action would lead to general war and, even if it did, he at least concluded that the Soviet complicity in the absorption of Poland would lead to the Anglo-French having to also declare war on the Soviet Union, or backing down entirely. That the Soviets managed to avoid the declaration baffled him. Once war was declared it became clear that Stalin had different uses for the pact and that, rather than guaranteeing the surrender of Poland, the agreement had removed the German balance of power deterrent for the Baltic, Danubian and Black Sea states. The only advantage accruing to Germany in the end was an opportunity to open accounts with the French with no fear of a Soviet offensive. In short, the Soviet-German pact was a complete diplomatic and political failure.

The Anglo-French declarations of war were, as things transpired, of little consequence insofar as the Polish campaign was concerned. The rapidity of the German campaign and the sluggish and meek Anglo-French response meant that the shooting was over in the east before it could take hold in the west. This at least was good news. What was not so good was the Italian failure to fulfil the obligation of the Pact of Steel. Hitler had seen this agreement principally as a means of keeping Italy out of the clutches of the Anglo-French whom he knew would be considering concessions aimed at drawing Italy away from the German orbit. Its secondary function was as a means, in case of war with the western powers, to ensure that Italy declared in Germany’s favour and subsequently, in light of its geographical position, took the brunt of the Anglo-French response.

Once he realised the depth of Italian frustration at being kept in the dark as to his plans regarding Poland, and their annoying, but correct, perception that a German attack on Poland would lead to general war, Hitler had, regretfully as things turned out, offered the prize of Yugoslavia to further induce Rome to enter the war. The problem was that Italy declared non-belligerency and attacked Yugoslavia as a ‘parallel war’ once the Polish campaign was over. Things would not have been so bad if Italy had attacked in step with Germany as Hitler felt the Anglo-French would not be able to comfortably differentiate between the two invasions; but once Poland had fallen and the weight of the Wehrmacht had been transferred west, the Anglo-French had considerable incentive to give Mussolini more leeway.

Matters worsened when, in spite of the virtually unanimous assessments within OKH, Italy overcame Yugoslavia in less than a month. Granted it was the intervention of Hungary, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, that proved the difference; but that in itself was somewhat worrying and hardly conducive to German interests in the region. Italy and Hungary now effectively had a common border, and Italy had further buttressed its position by establishing a line of dependent states extending from Slovenia to Albania. The economic wealth of Yugoslavia was now passing through Italy and Hungary and their presence, particularly that of Italy, served to provide the other regional states with the alternative markets that they had to date been fruitlessly seeking from the Anglo-French.

Worse still, Mussolini now had a bona fide military success that, when considered relative to his military strength, actually outweighed Germany’s conquest of Poland, which had been accomplished with the intervention of the Soviet Union. No political or military talks were scheduled to take place so it was not known the changes the Italian victory would have on the bilateral dealings, but initial reports from the German ambassador pointedly noted that there was a swagger and confidence within the Italian government circles and, even more worrying, the British and French ambassadors had become increasingly active. Clearly something had to be done and, unfortunately, it was recognised that both Ribbentrops and Hitlers own behaviour in August had seriously damaged the relationship with Ciano, who was clearly an influential figure within senior Fascist circles.

Finally Hitler had to confront the possibility of Anglo-French intervention in Norway and the concomitant threat to his Swedish iron imports. Taken together with the combined threats to the Baltic, Danube and Black Sea states, the disadvantageous situation with the Soviet Union’s exploitation of the terms of the Soviet-German pact and the failure of Italy to enter the war, attract Anglo-French attention or even get bogged down in Yugoslavia, the German position in the second month of the war was not a positive one.

 

[Croesus]

Britain fell into war with Germany in a very poor state indeed. London's policy of deterrance and appeasement had failed and Britain had ended up giving a unilateral guarantee to an eastern European nation with which it had no meaningful ties and to which it could give no real assistance; in April it had been decided by the Anglo-French chiefs of staff that in the event of a German attack on Poland, there would be no real intervention on their part in the west. Britain's war policy rested on the fundamental premise that Germany should be made to fight a long war as that would permit Britain to make the best use of its strategic weapons of Empire and blockade to offset its short-term military weakness and dependence on continental allies.

However the economic strength of Britain was not great; in the absence of recourse to war loans from the US Britain was forced, in large part due to significant pressure from the US Treasury, to finance its war preparations from its rapidly diminishing gold reserve. This meant that, when considering the desired wartime establishment of 55 divisions and monthly aircraft production of 2,550 that Britain would be unable to sustain military operations after two years of conflict. This brought into doubt the wisdom of the 'long-war' strategy and prompted some to suggest a war with Germany at the soonest opportunity would be best as it was understood that Germany would finance her war through conquest, an option clearly not open to Britain.

There were further weaknesses in the British plan for economic warfare; the roles played by the Soviet Union and Italy. Both of these countries were at the very least benevolently neutral towards Germany and, taken with the size and strength of Berlin's economic hinterland in the Danube-Balkan region, greatly decreased the effectiveness of blockade. In fact there was growing evidence from the early weeks of the establishment of the blockade that Britain was suffering more than Germany. Britains' Soviet policy was in tatters: Moscow was suspicious of what it viewed as British attempts to drag it, and other smaller states, into war with Germany, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks had in turn collapsed and been trumped by the Soviet-German pact and belated attempts to use trade talks as a means of reviving relations were not going well.

Considerable amounts of raw and war material were now entering Germany through its eastern border and there was nothing that London could do about it, even where there was an increasing perception that Germany was not going to be living up to its side of the bargain. There was somewhat better news from Rome, where Italy had chosen to declare non-belligerency and at least stay out of the war; while at first there were some, particularly within the Admiralty, that was hoping that Italy would declare war as it was seen as a better military option than attacking Germany, the subsequent performance of the Italian army in Yugoslavia gave pause for thought. While some satisfaction was taken from the fact that Croatian and Bosnian raw materials were now being diverted to Italy, it remained that Mussolini openly considered his non-belligerency as a means of helping Germany beat the British blockade and, so, prevent a repetition of the Great War blockade.

Paris declared war knowing that it fell to France to do the bulk of the fighting on land, while also recognising that it did not have the strength to hold back Germany, let alone launch a successful offensive into Germany itself. It was estimated that the entire French war reserve would be depleted once the full complement of 100 divisions had been mobilised, leaving absolutely nothing for a continuation of operations in the event of setback or breakthrough. Following the systematic dismantling of its eastern diplomatic system of interlinked alliances, France had few options but to work to force Britain to abandon its distance and bring about a full alliance. In spite of Britain and France having similar foreign goals and an increasing sense of being yoked to the same horse, Anglo-French staff talks had been late, intermittent and tardy.

Once these issues were taken together, it became clear that French strategy had to focus on finding means of threatening Germany by direct action against its economic linkages with supporting or neutral powers. In this French and British strategy united and gradually began to coalesce into two cases: a northern Front targeting Swedish iron, and a Mediteranean/Balkan front targeting Romanian oil. The former was difficult in that it involved the probable violation of the neutrality of Norway, Finland and Sweden while also exciting Soviet suspicion at a time when the Anglo-French were anxious to avoid giving cause to a further warming of Soviet-German relations. The latter was, if not easy at least less challenging. In spite of often ridiculous provocation from Rome there remained within Paris a desire to bring about a Franco-Italian rapprochement. Taken with the interlinkage of treaties between Italy, Britain and France with Greece, the Anglo-French treaty with Turkey and the collapse of the Balkan Entente it seemed that the opportunities for improving relations with Rome were good.

As the Anglo-French staff talks grew into the Supreme War Council and planning for military intervention of varying degrees into the Balkans matured during the early months of the war (where, uncomfortably but predictably, no assistance was given to the Poles against the Germans and the Soviet absorption of the remainder of Poland was optimistically explained away as defensive) a joint Anglo-French deputation travelled to Rome to attempt to negotiate a non-aggression pact with Italy on the lines of the Soviet-German one. Headed by the Italophile French ambassador Andre Francois-Poncet and Sir Robert Vansittart, until recently the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the two diplomats proceeded with the combined weight of their respective Foreign Ministers Bonnet and Halifax behind them.

The aim of the Anglo-French was simply to ensure that Italy felt confident enough to retain more of its Croatian gains for its own uses and to replace the German trade linkage with an Anglo-French one, such that Italy could regain its traditional role of equidistance and, by extension, prevent it from providing any signficant support for Germany. Francois-Poncet and Vansittart negotiated primarily with counterpart professional diplomats but also on occaision with the known Germanophobe Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano. It became quite clear during the early rounds of negotiation that the Italian price for sitting the war out would be substantial and that the price would either be borne by France itself and by the Danubian-Balkan neutrals. Helpfully the Italians withdrew claims on Nice and Savoy, though would not be budged from their position on Tunis, which they say, and with some justification, as being more Italian than French.

In the Danube-Balkans Rome wanted recognition of the region as an Italian 'spazio vitale', and subsequent support for Italian economic and political aims in the region. The Italians stopped short of saying they wanted Anglo-French support against Germany, as they knew that would certainly be readily accepted, and also were hesitant about identifying the Soviet Union as a potential threat to the regional interests. The negotiations were hard and intense and went through several stages but progress was being made when the third great 'totalitarian shock' occurred that would so fundamentally change the balance of power in Europe: the Soviet invasion of Finland.

 

[Croesus]

Simply put, Stalin achieved more against the Anglo-French in the first months of the war than did Germany, and technically wasn’t even a combatant. Chamberlain and Daladier were both skating on thin ice following their failure to intervene following the German invasion of Poland and the blind eye turned towards the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia stretched the remaining reserves of public and parliamentary goodwill as far as they could go. The Soviet invasion of Finland was the last straw for a concerned and strained electorate, especially once it became clear that the Finns were putting up both a stiff and successful fight. The vigour of their desire to fight for freedom contrasted with that of the Anglo-French governments and, predictably, both fell within weeks.

Daladier was simply bundled out of office in a cloud of shame, but it was Chamberlains resignation while at the head of a very strong majority that really changed the political landscape. With his departure, and death within the year, the last of the inter-war politicians on both sides of the Channel whom favoured appeasement and deterrence faded inexorably into the background. In one stroke the Soviets had changed the temper of the war and that temper was best exemplified by the increasingly familiar bulldog-and-cockerel spirit of Churchill and Reynaud. Nowhere was this regime felt more intensely than in the tripartite negotiations in Rome.

Vansittart and Francois-Poncet had proceeded with a vigour and purpose both fitting for the times and uncharacteristic of the governments from which they proceeded. Because any lasting Franco-Italian deal rested on French willingness to entertain Italian revisionism, and because the entire point of the exercise was to lure Italy away from Germany, it fell to Francois-Poncet to put before Ciano a proposal that could not easily be dismissed for fear of justifiable accusations of bad faith and the implication thereof that Italy would then face the full force of Anglo-French militarism.

Subsequently Francois-Poncet proceeded along three lines: that the Italian hegemony over both shores of the Adriatic would be recognised; that Italy would be givens seats on the Suez Board; and that Italy would regain its traditional rights with regards to Tunisia. Vansittart fully backed up his French colleague on this bargaining line and both maintained a unanimous and unmistakeable line: that if Italy held to Germany it would gain less than it otherwise would and would concomitantly suffer more.

The directness of the Anglo-French bargaining position discomfited Ciano and Mussolini. Both were acutely aware that Berlin was following matters closely and that the Italian line, that because it was not at war it could diplome and negotiate with whom it saw fit, was quite thin. Faced with the opportunity to realise its Danubian ambitions after a decade of having to play second fiddle to Berlin, it was imperative that Hitler was not encouraged to act pre-emptively and intervene directly or, potentially worse, to draw closer to Moscow and bring the Red Army into play.

The Anglo-French wanted an Italian guarantee that Rome would not materially or morally assist Germany in the upcoming war. It helped that, by declaring non-belligerency Italy had already voided the key article on the Pact of Steel, but there still remained substantial delicacy around how Italy could avoid providing help to its Axis partner. The collapse of the Anglo-French governments therefore came at a most opportune time and it was with relief that Ciano suggested that talks be suspended until the credentials and writ of the Anglo-French negotiators be confirmed. The buck had been passed to Churchill and Reynaud: how would they act?

 

[Croesus]

In spite of the relative success of the Ferrari-Baistrocchi-Balbo reforms and the seemingly easy victory over the Yugoslavs in October, Italy was not prepared for general war. 1943 was the year generally accepted as being when the state of the Italian economy, its industrial capacity and its energy budget would be strong enough to sustain a major war. Until then the army and navy acted as an anchor to the foreign policy ambitions of Mussolini and, although this influence was countered somewhat by the airforce, it could not be ignored.

Somewhat paradoxically given the native belligerence of the Italian leader, there emerged following the Yugoslav victory an increasing desire to preserve the offensive capacity of the army in light of the need to garrison Libya, East Africa, Albania and Croatia while providing sufficient cadre for a progressive increase in the number of divisions. Once Mussolini began to see the value of maintaining the army the impetus to take sides in the conflict was greatly constrained and this military caution informed Italian foreign policy making at all levels.

In light of this caution Italian diplomacy returned to its agenda of promoting a negotiated peace, as it had consistently done since Munich, where Mussolini's intercession had seemingly been decisive. Italy had sought to establish a conference to settle the Danzig crisis and had in part sought to use the Salzburg Conference of August to look for ways to prevent Germany from starting what Italy saw as a general war, rather than the localised conflict that Hitler envisaged.

Of course, as matters had transpired, Mussolini had received a sudden rush of blood to the head and had dramatically declared in favour of Germany as the latter offered up Yugoslavia as an inducement to enter hostilities. Notwithstanding this however, there remained sufficient disagreement between the partners that no joint communique was issued and the Conference broke up with no sense of unanimity. Following the conference Berlin did issue a statement that Italy had undertaken to fall into step with Germany and this tactless piece of politics served to encourage Mussolini towards his concept of a parallel war, which would be so damaging to German interests in the months to come.

In its policy towards Berlin, Rome emphasised that Italy valued its ideological solidarity with Germany and did not wish to be seen as anything other than an ally; but stressed that Italy was not prepared to confront the western powers directly. Mussolini saw the Italian role as preventing the conflict from spreading and acting such that the British blockade strategy would not be able to repeat its success of the Great War, as foodstuffs and materials would continue to flow between the two countries.

When Italy inherited the wealth of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia it continued to portray itself as the economic guardian of German interests although now there was a subtly different tone to its proclamation and the realisation that Rome had obtained such a strong position over German assets led to a number of reappraisals in Berlin which would slowly become apparent as the war progressed. One of the main points borne in mind by Berlin at this time was the sense that, for as long as France and/or Britain would have to satisfy Italian revisionist demands from their own possessions or interests, then Italy would be naturally inclined towards Germany; maintaining that relationship therefore became a significant part of German diplomacy.

Overall the Italian attitude to the war, like most governments, was that it would follow the pattern of the Great War and be a static war of position. This observation was the origin of the Italian position of passively acting to break the British blockade; while it did not consider that Germany would be able to break through in the west, neither did it consider that Germany would be brought to its knees which therefore supported the Italian role as peacemaker. The Italian military did not consider that either Germany nor the Anglo-French had the power to destroy each other, and Rome was simply not interested in any form of total war.

Its interests were a Mediterranean free from British control, a territorial arrangement with France and the establishment of a sphere of influence in Italy's 'horizontal axis' in the Danube-Balkans. These would not be achieved by total war, with or without Italian participation; the current conflict had resulted because of a European failure to conclusively bring about a territorial revision of Versailles Europe and a rearrangement of colonial interests. This diplomatic programme envisaged a return to a Stresa type of containment rather than a Munich type of appeasement as Italy would take up what it saw as its natural role as mediator between the west and the centre-east. The invasion of Yugoslavia fitted the Italian conception of a limited war that worked towards a natural equilibrium without contributing to an out-of-control conflagration.

However Italy was not motivated at all to abandon its role in the Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini felt fundamentally exposed in the Mediterranean to the threat of the Royal Navy and while the recent non-aggression treaty with Greece was encouraging, there was no guarantee that it would hold and the events surrounding the Abyssinian and Spanish campaigns served to constantly remind Rome of its vulnerability in its own immediate naval sphere.

The Anglo-Franco-Italian negotiations that had immediately preceded the fall of the Chamberlain-Daladier governments had to a large extent avoided this issue directly as Franco-Italian problems formed the initial area of negotiation, but they always loomed in the back of the minds of the Italian negotiators and the British were clearly uncomfortable when indirect mention of the Royal Navy came up. So Rome needed its presence in the Axis as much as it needed to keep sending signals about its desire for a long-term negotiated peace, and the tension between these two divergent strands provided significant difficulties in setting Italian policy as events developed.

This need to maintain the Axis was the primary motivation for Italy to follow its policy of non-belligerency over the alternative, 'American', form of disinterested neutrality. It was seen that such a form of non-activity would benefit the Anglo-French and reduce the value of the Axis card during what was envisaged to be lengthy negotiations leading to a stable peace. If Italy was neutral it could not help Germany avoid the effects of the blockade and, while it had not wanted Germany to start the war, it did not care to see Germany defeated as this would render the Italian position as mediator void and lead to a resumption of Anglo-French domination of the Mediterranean. The opposite side of this coin was of course the desire to avoid a German domination of the continent as the same result would occur.

There was also a strong desire to avoid a long running war as the chance of unforeseen events sending the conflict into a dangerous and uncontrollable direction increased; a Soviet penetration of the Danube-Balkan region under the auspices of the Soviet-German pact was of particular concern. In fact Hitler had made mention of 'traditional Russian interests' since the Salzburg Conference and following the unforeseen disruption of German interests in Yugoslavia had gone further by implying that continued Italian disturbance in the region would not be welcome, where the furtherance of Russian interests were not similarly portrayed as being discouraging to Berlin.

Concurrent to developments in the Axis relationship and the Anglo-Franco-Italian negotiations was the Royal Navy blockade of German coal exports to Italy. While there had been promising developments in the use of native natural gas and the exploitation of Libyan oil was as yet uninterrupted, it remained that Italian energy needs were reliant on the receipt of German brown coal (even though there was some easing following the capture of the ex-Yugoslavian seams). The energy blockade proved to be politically damaging for Mussolini and he sought to constantly keep it in the fore-front of negotiations both with Berlin, who had undertaken the overland delivery of coal but the transport of which was increasingly doubtful in light of increasing preparations for war and the Anglo-French.

Indeed it was during a negotiation round with the British that London had offered to stop the blockade in return for Italian arms, a proposal which was flatly declined at the time and was strongly advised against by Berlin. This question of coal quickly became a flashpoint of diplomacy as the Anglo-French were effectively exploiting it as a means of pushing Italy into a de-facto alliance while the threat of German intervention to prevent such an occurrence was made plain. Further pressure was placed on Rome when Washington suggested again that Italy adopt 'American' neutrality, and so have the blockade lifted. In response Italy secretly offered to withdraw fully from its Pact of Steel obligations, which it had already indirectly half-achieved, but this was rejected by the British and here the essential difference between Anglo-French motivations were exposed.

Britain did not see a strong Italy as being in its interests as this would threaten London's interests in the region, given its control of the Gibraltar and Suez exits. While London wanted to split the Axis, its model of what Italy would look like was a Mediterranean Portugal, neutered and incapable of significant threat. Paris on the other hand sought means of extending the line of containment eastwards, as it had done for the last decade, and while it did not welcome a strong Italian navy, it had greater and more direct concerns with Germany.

That Italy quietly continued the sale of arms to France and the construction of defensive positions in the northern alps demonstrated a lingering desire on the part of Rome to make common cause with Paris; yet London took a bargaining line that was much stiffer and while the results of negotiations were pleasing when interrupted by the change in governments, it did not disguise the fact that the Anglo-French were far from unanimous in their approach. That this division of interest failed to capitalise fully on known and suspected differences between Rome and Berlin led to a strong sense of demoralisation on part of the principal negotiators Vansittart and Francois-Poncet, as they could see how close they were able to bring Ciano, and yet found within their own ranks a lack of purpose and good faith.

 

[Croesus]

During an adjournment of the recent Anglo-Franco-Italian talks, one of the negotiators, a Fascist, had remarked offhandedly, if a little exasperatedly, to Francois-Poncet that all Italy was looking for was a small victory. He was referring to the relative intransigence of the British bargaining strategy, which was basically looking for unilateral concessions on the part of Italy before offering up trilateral proposals.

What the negotiator was illustrating however was the subtle change of direction that internal Italian politics had taken following the victory over the Yugoslavs. Mussolini's regime balanced the interests of the Fascist party, the Church, the Monarchy, the military, the landowners and the industrialists; by defeating Yugoslavia ('Vittoria Iugoslavia')the prestige of the military, and by direct extension, the King had been greatly boosted, and by securing significant economic assets the political power of the industrialists increased.

This in turn led to changes within the Fascist party as functionaries attempted to muscle into the administration of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, an effort which was somewhat paradoxically resisted by Mussolini and his inner circle. This resistance formed around the large and well established apparatus of the State bureaucracies, and increasingly efforts by Party officials to grow their influence were thwarted by these professional agencies.

The small victory that was being looked for was not for the benefit of Italy; it was for the benefit of a fracturing Fascist party trying to emulate its National Socialist counterpart as it confronted a grim fate of gradual marginalisation. It would be the activity of some of those marginalised Fascists who had established ties with Nationalist Socialist officials and structures that would in the months to come to be so problematic.

The enemy of the Fascist Party was its leader. Mussolini had overcome the more vigorous, and extreme, elements within the Party and now the Ducismo was the principal governing agent. The Party was conceived as being an organ that linked the people to the State and even prior to the Vittoria Iugoslavia the emasculation of the Party had been subtle and inexorable. Rather than a dominant organism within the ruling structure, the Party was only one of several and its power was declining.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia , which greatly increased the strength of the rival military and business groups, became the final nail in the coffin of the Party and from 1940 onwards its influence in Italian politics declined to eventually being negligible. The small victory needed by the Fascist negotiator had been pre-empted by the great victory provided by the Ducismo and this event was profound in its implications for future Italian foreign policy and Romes relations with the warring powers.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia promoted a growth of support for Mussolini, an increased respect for the military and a general feeling of pride in Italian traditional institutions. 'The Illyrians Are Conquered' was a common slogan found on walls in October and there was a feeling that Il Duce had delivered on the promise that his ascension to power had suggested. The extravagance, corruption and extremism associated with Fascism was portrayed as a necessary but temporary evil required to carry Italy through times of weakness and chaos. Now that the Italian eagle was unfolding its wings once more the more ridiculous trappings of Fascist ideology gradually became the target of satire.

This is not to say that Il Duce permitted the entire erosion of the Fascist ideology, as he still had use for it. It was one of the factors that permitted him to maintain the balance that underpinned his regime. He had no use for an all-powerful Fascist Party, but neither did he want a shrivelled and wasted Party; he needed the Party to retain some degree of potence. By permitting it a fief in Abyssinia he managed to quarantine its forces somewhat while he continued establishing his personal rule.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia strengthened the influence of the military in the handling of foreign policy, but this influence was by no means united. As might be expected two broad groups emerged; those in favour of entering the war on the German side and those in favour of the Anglo-French. While representation within these groups were mixed, on the whole the Regio Aeronautica, with its greater proportion of Fascist officers, was pro-German while the Regia Esercito and Regia Marina were pro-Western.

The RM in particular were strongly opposed to any course of action that would result in a direct confrontation with the Royal Navy under the current conditions as it was seen, with some justification, that with Germany's small naval threat and Japans' distance that the British would be able to concentrate the full weight of their capital ships on Italy, and with easily foreseeable and dire consequences.

The RE was primarily interested in maintaining its prestige by retaining control over Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and enjoyed the increased attention the Vittoria Iugoslavia had brought. Already there were strong representations for meaningful staff talks with the Hungarians and Greeks and few officers remembered the initial German-Italian staff talks with any fondness.

The Chief of Staff Cavallero also found that there was subtle encouragement for him to improve the nature of his relationship with Il Duce and his ties to the Royal Family gradually strengthened. So it was that while the rest of Europe became distracted by the heroic resistance of the Finns, Italian politics was undergoing a fundamental transformation... and one which did not escape the notice of Berlin.

 

[Croesus]

Following the Vittoria Iugoslavia there commenced a series of military reviews examining the relative performance of the armed forces in the campaign. Given that the role of the Regia Marina was both short and conclusive no recommendations were made as to potential changes or improvements; it was however recognised that with the Adriatic firmly in Italian hands the RM might be able to improve its concentration of force in future campaign. Most of the attention was invested into examining the roles of the Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica.

The RA did not lose a single machine to JV fire with the only fatalities attributed to lapses in navigation and difficulties encountered in local flying conditions. It was noted that the RA went essentially untested and as a result the reviewing panels could not determine relative performance. However a number of parallels were drawn with the apparent lessons of the Polish campaign. Both attacks used surprise and targeted enemy airfields with the result that strategic victory in the air was obtained in the opening round of hostilities and it was felt that no significant lessons were available to be taken by the German campaign. Two differences did emerge however; the bombing of urban centres and tactical bombing.

In the Yugoslav campaign the RA were expressly forbidden to undertake operations against civilian centers. There had been some resistance to this as it was seen as preventing the effective dislocation of supply and reinforcement, not to mention lost opportunities to damage morale. However the directive remained firm: there would be no bombing of civilian population and any attacks on infrastructure would be restricted to roads, tunnels and bridges. As the campaign developed thought had to be given to avoiding the destruction along the line of advance, but the rapid collapse of resistance meant that bombing operations were soon suspended.

The second area of difference was in the area of tactical bombing and here it was seen that definite gains could be had from examining the German results. It was noted that the Germans had in the Stuka an excellent weapons platform and that the lack of ground-air radio in the Italian forces had seriously prevented any significant gains from being obtained by the RA as it sought to support the advance of the Third Army as it advanced on Ljubljana. Given the potentially tension around Italo-German relations it was not seen as being likely that the RA would be able to take delivery of Stukas and so efforts were put in place to modernise the Breda BA.65 close to the level of the Stuka.

The Breda was the lighter of the two aircraft and, with a comparable HP engine, was faster; however it was recognised that a longer loiter time over the target was a positive aspect. The Stuka had an edge in range and ceiling, while the bombloads were comparable. Initial improvements revolved around improving the bombload of the Breda, providing increased armor protection, better defensive armament and an improved engine. The question of effective ground-air radio communications proved a little more challenging at first as there was required a level of cooperation between the RE and RA that was not usual, but the project received the support of some senior officers who had been involved in supporting the Third Army and eventually results began to show in this area.

The material performance of the RE received general approval. There were some doubts around the upchambered Mannlicher-Carcano 1891 but given the view that any further changes would necessitate the adoption of an entirely new weapon, for which there was no budget, the rifle was retained and development work focused on cartridge performance. The upgraded artillery had proved to be very effective and its value was well attested by all involved in the campaign. There was considerable relief that the triangular division had been retained and the heavy fighting had by the Second Army confirmed the wisdom of rejecting the two-regimental structure. The majority of concerns centered around the quality of senior and non-commissioned officer leadership.

Once the fighting had died down, likely individuals were combed out of the ranks and sent back to Italy for training in an effort to improve what had been a disappointing area of performance. Similarly all of the Army commanders except Ambrosio were promoted out of the line formations and other officers brought up. The performance of the two tank types committed to the campaign were difficult to assess given the lack of battle, but their crews were on the whole content with their machines and given the general paucity of industrial plant it was decided to continue with their development without major change. Finally it was recommended that four additional divisions be raised and that recruitment could be extended to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Albania in an effort to supplant the somewhat stretched Italian stocks.

In the final analysis it was recognised that the military had not been sorely tested, but also that some important lessons were learnt and that on the whole the armed forces were moving in the right direction.

 

[Croesus]

Following the suspension of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks in November, the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop travelled to Milan to discuss a number of issues with his Italian counterpart. Upon his arrival he was annoyed to find Ciano had been 'held up' and would be unable to join Ribbentrop until the next day. When the two Foreign Ministers did meet the tone was officious, professional but somewhat cold.

Ciano remembered how Ribbentrop had handled their last meeting in August, when he dismissed Italian concerns over the Polish invasion, and treated the whole matter as a fait accompli that Italy would simply have to accept. For his part Ribbentrop was well aware that the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia had changed the relationship somewhat, but was not going to entertain any ideas of bending German policy to accommodate what was widely seen as a simple piece of luck.

The first item discussed was the status of the Alto Adige and the arrangements for the resettlement of the German minority. The German side of the matter was actually being handled by Reichsfuhrer-SS Himmler, who had confirmed on 30 May that the South Tyrol had been given up as volksdeutsche territory and that efforts would be made to clear territory elsewhere for the resettlement of the 'valuable Germanic tribe' such that it retained its identity and did not splinter.

An initial meeting had been held at the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin and here the small Italian delegation heard of the three-stage plan that would see the German minority completely evacuated from the region. The meeting broke up with some difference between the two groups, with the Italians apparently not quite confronting the sweeping changes Himmler was planning. On the Italian side efforts were made to immediately remove those elements of South Tyrolese society whom they saw as primarily responsible for the unrest in the region, the unrest that had prompted increasingly heavy handed police actions.

That such repression was occurring at the hands of an ally before, during and after the Polish campaign, which had been initiated supposedly because of Polish repression of similar minorities, had caused some embarrassment in Berlin and the anti-German Prefect of Bolzano Mastromattei had taken the opportunity to bring to a head differences between the Italian and German ideas of solving the Alto Adige 'problem'. It was at this point that Himmler began dealing directly with the Italian Chief of Police Bocchini in an effort to smooth matters and expedite the resettlement process.

However tension in the province remained, and Ciano became involved by delivering a list of grievances to the German Ambassador von Mackensen. Relations deteriorated and, even following direct intervention by Himmler and Bocchini, distrust over the issue grew to the point that interference on the part of the Italian regional authorities grew to a considerable degree as efforts were made to derail the recently initiated plebiscite process.

In their meeting Ribbentrop came straight to the point and noted that unless Italian incitement in the region be ceased that Hitler might have cause to reconsider his views of the status of the region. Ciano replied that the area was geographically Italian and, as mountains and rivers could not be moved, it must be the dissenting elements of the population that must go.

Ribbentrop responded with the observation that this is exactly what Himmler is attempting to achieve but the resistance to the process is coming from the Italians. Ciano noted that there was considerable difference of opinion over just what constituted the German population and went on to say that German bargaining had become quite tiresome on the issue, with ridiculous issues being debated such as whether or not relocating Germans be permitted to take their locks and latches with them. The situation was not resolved as the two men glared at each other.

Ribbentrop then congratulated Italy on its Yugoslav conquests and noting that matters had developed as Hitler had originally suggested; that the two Axis powers move in complementary directions and taking out the independent Danubian-Balkan states one by one. Ciano agreed that matters had gone well but enquired as to the expectations of the Soviet Union in regard to the region. Ribbentrop replied that Moscow had historic interests in Bessarabia and Bukovina and that its interests are recognised and supported in Berlin and suggested that Rome accept this.

Ciano noted that if Stalin decided to pursue its interests by force that the region would quickly destabilise and that it would be an easy matter for the Soviets to intervene such that they take up the entirety of the Romanian oil supply, which accounted for much of Italian domestic consumption. Given such a threat to its interests surely Berlin would appreciate the importance of Rome acting such as to prevent such a situation developing. Ribbentrop returned with a firm line that Berlin would not support any action that would see Rome give any cause for Moscow to fear that its interests would not be upheld. Ciano ridiculed this by saying that the region is in the Italian backyard now that the eastern shore of the Adriatic was Italian, and went to the greater issue of just how did Berlin expect Rome to react?

Ribbentrop replied by stating that, in fact, the region is firmly in the German economic hinterland and Hitler would look very poorly on any Italian 'adventurism' in the area; and that such a position is final and not for negotiation. Ciano laughed, saying that it was further to Berlin from Bucharest than Rome and that this was perhaps an issue to the two heads of state needed to think more deeply on given such a divergence of interest was of significant consequence for Italo-German relations.

Ribbentrop coldly noted that Italy had already broken the requirements of the Pact of Steel by not going to war in Germany's favour, but Ciano dismissed this with a wave of his hand and said that was old hat. Ribbentrop changed the subject somewhat by confirming the establishment of an independent Slovakia as a German protectorate and announcing that negotiations were proceeding in Budapest as to securing a positive outcome for Hungarian interest in Transylvania. Ciano countered by noting that the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were not labouring under an Italian protectorate, and also that Italy was working to establish a viable Serbian state. This last took Ribbentrop by surprise and he queried the wisdom of such a move. Ciano noted that such a step was a matter for Italian foreign policy and, besides, a stable Serbia could only help keep the region calm.

The conference broke up following a short discussion as to matters of trade and supply. Ciano asked when full delivery of the promised German coal would begin to arrive and noted that the British blockade was begining to bite and, naturally, it would be important for Italy to be able to compensate itself from the resources of the recently 'liberated territories' of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Ribbentrop replied that the coal was being held up by a shortage of locomotives, but that a resumption of deliveries from the 'liberated territories' would provide ample opportunity for a return trip laden with the coal Italy needs. Ciano smiled and assured his colleague that they were in perfect agreement and that no doubt traffic would resume, when other matters were taken care of.

 

[Croesus]

The Churchill and Reynaud governments came into power on the crest of a wave of discontent over the failure of the Chamberlain and Daladier policies of deterrance and appeasement. The implication that both new leaders faced was that they had to take action to forestall questions about their willingness to fight. Given this imperative to action an emergency session of the Supreme War Council was held in early December where a review of the Council strategy was made. In spite of the change in political leadership, the general strategy of the SWC remained largely unchanged as it was the product of established policy and thinking on the problem of achieving the military defeat of Germany.

Both countries considered that their best option for winning the conflict was to make the war a long one as it was felt that economic warfare would ultimately bring Germany to its knees, much as it did in the Great War. This strategy also took into account a degree of unreadiness on the part of the British to take part in land warfare on the continent and an unwillingness on the part of the French to bring the war onto French soil. The result of this general approach was to evaluate options of attacking Germany by interupting its vital economic flows, namely Swedish iron ore, Finnish nickel and Romanian oil, or by targeting those regimes contributing to Germany's ability to mitigate the impact of the Anglo-French economic warfare, namely the Soviet Union and Italy.

In the case of Italy, the previous administrations had sought to placate Rome whereever possible in an effort to give Mussolini options to avoid becoming further entwined in Hitlers political web. The change of governments and suspension of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks at a time when some progress was being made had resulted in an immediate difference of opinion: London favoured increasing the pressure on Rome, while Paris favoured the establishment of direct talks and a programme of concessions.

The first stages of the debate were won by Reynaud and in fact he went further by authorising a secret delegation to approach Ciano with a view to buidling bilateral links, as it was recognised that if any real chance at bringing Italy into the Anglo-French camp, or at least out of the German one, would rely in the first instance on Italo-French relations. This meant for the moment that options involving attacks on Germany via Italy were off the agenda, and this also excluded military landings at Salonika, hitherto a favoured French tactic.

The enlargement of the Italian sphere into the republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, as well as the annexation of Albania and the protectorate over Serbia meant that any action against Romanian oil supply would have to be handled very carefully. Already intelligence reports were noting an increase in Italo-Romanian contacts and a concomitant increase in continuing Romanian resistance against Berlins insistance that the entirety of the Romanian oil supply be given over to Germany. It was felt that any Anglo-French activity in the matter would potentially force the hand of the Romanians, undermine the Italian position and spur the Germans and Hungarians to invade. Consequently attacks on the Romanian oil were taken off as an option.

This left two alternatives: extending the war into Scandinavia by disrupting the iron and nickel supplies or attacking the Soviet Union by interdicting the Caucasus oil fields. There was some discomfort as both plans involved the violation to various degrees of the rights of neutral countries, but each was seen as fulfilling the essential conditions of attacking Germany indirectly. As talks developed the role of the Soviet Union began to be increasingly debated. The two governments were still smarting over the profound diplomatic defeat at the hands of Molotov where the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks collapsed immediately before the conclusion of the Germano-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

Consequent to this event, Moscow was seen as an implicit partner in German aggression. The Soviets supplied the German war effort which directly helped Berlin mitigate the effects of the blockade, had taken part in the partition of Poland and denounced the conflict as an 'imperialist war' and encouraged the international proletariat not to support it. Furthermore the Soviet regime was seen as being more odious than that of Hitlers and long-standing distrust of Stalin's motives ensured a lasting sense of suspicion pervaded both London and Paris.

These feelings were brought to the fore by the Soviet invasion of Finland, which triggered the collapse of the Chamberlain-Daladier governments, and outrage was particularly strong in France. As senior partner in the alliance, as it was the French Army that would be doing the bulk of the fighting, the desire to help the brave Finns was considerable in French public opinion and, given the war-platform of his government, Reynaud was committed to recognising and acting accordingly.

An Anglo-French expeditionary force, or some form of direct intervention, was seen as helping to establish the new governments, and attack Germany indirectly by undermining its Soviet ally, drawing Finland away from any association with Germany and interupting the iron ore supply line. The alternative, a bombing offensive on the Soviet oilfields and, it was hoped, the despatch of a naval flotilla into the Black Sea was seen as being of secondary value as it would not involve French arms and did not help the Finns.

Subsequent to further lengthy debate where the British CIGS argued vigorously against the commencement of land operations in Scandinavia and the Admiralty against large scale operations in the Baltic, the plans to involve the Anglo-French militarily in Scandinavia went through many changes, but the political will did not. The first stand against Hitler would take place in Norway and Finland.

 

[Croesus]

The surprising omission by the Anglo-French to declare war on the Soviet Union following Moscow's part in the partition of Poland forced Hitler to abandon his 'Moscow First' strategy and substitute that of 'Paris First'. Preparations for what was expected to be a long drawn out war on the Western Front commenced from early October. In this era of mass production warfare, and in light of the substantial French defensive system, it was clear that France would have to be ground down. This would require considerable levels of coordination by the respective military and economic planners. While Hitler was certain that he would ultimately prevail, as much on the basis of being able to mitigate the blockade through the Soviet and Italian agreements as through any sense of military superiority, it was by no means considered that France would fall as quickly as Poland had.

Indeed the industrial program was not intended to reach maximum output until the autumn of 1941. Upon notification of the intention to attack France the production budgets were prioritised against expected levels of requirements, which meant that for instance the construction of tanks received only 5% of the steel supply and less than that which was allotted to the manufacture of trench warfare items such as barbed wire and obstacles. Parallel to this industrial preparation were the mobilisation plans that anticipated a lengthy period of positional warfare and for which a mass of third-class divisions were raised, a quarter of whose soldiers were over 40 and half of who had received only a few weeks training.

There was some concern that such a lengthy preparation would play into the hands of the Anglo-French strategists who were known to be following a long-war strategy, but there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the Soviet and Italian agreements, together with the extent of the German economic hinterlands and the relative brittleness of the liberal democratic governments would result in a better German situation than London or Paris anticipated. Hitler still retained some hope that Britain could be encouraged towards a separate peace, but he was prepared to fight a long war if such a situation did not eventuate.

Indeed the whole purpose of the Four Year Plan had been to set up a unified economic system that would provide the necessary industrial base upon which large scale armaments output could be established. As the resources of Austria and Czechoslovakia were taken directly into the Reich their output was coordinated with the Four Year Plan, and it was into this system that the resources of the Danubian-Balkan region were fed. While the disruption brought about by the Italian absorption of a large proportion of the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian production was annoying, it was not decisive as Germany still retained enough of an economic war chest to purchase the supplies from Italy, who was short of hard currency and did not have the industrial capacity to utilise all of the diverted resources.

Unfortunately the outbreak of general hostilities following the Poland invasion occurred when the war economy, or Wehrwirtschaft, was in a transitional phase. Consequently Hitler ordered full mobilisation and pass the War Economy Decree that required that 'every citizen impose upon themselves the necessary restrictions in living standards'. During November and December Hitler, Goering and military leaders consulted extensively to determine how the war economy should be structured. The subsequent decree gave the guidelines for the coordination of war production; 'the war requires the greatest efforts in building up armaments. The High Command recommends guidelines, which have as their goal the strongest mobilisation of all economic resources in the service of national defence. Capacity and labour not concerned with goods essential for war or subsistence was to be freed insofar as it can be put to work for strengthening armaments'.

All planning was to be undertaken under the assumption that the war would last from between five and seven years. Output of all classes of weapons were planned to increase by 200-300 % between 1939 and 1941; the initial budget of 13,700 tons of high explosive per month was later increased to 53,000 tons per month by the end of 1940; expenditure on infantry munitions was to increase from 590m RM in the present year to 2.2b RM in 1940.

It was recognised that the extreme acceleration of the production programme would soon outstrip the productive capacity of the economy and a lot of work was undertaken from September 1939 to establish a practical framework that would take the economy through the transition phase and into full production. Financing the growth was critical and advisors across the German government agreed on the need to restrict consumer spending and to divert the money into savings and government loans. Following debates over the relative merits of direct and indirect taxation it was decided to raise income tax, company tax and the taxation of luxury goods which increased the total tax burden from 17.7b RM to 32.3b RM by 1941.

The labour policy began with the proclamation that businesses must release surplus and non-essential workers, or face severe penalties. However labour allocation was not efficient at this stage as the labour survey commenced in 1938 was not complete and there were a number of competing agencies working at cross-purposes to each other. Similar problems affected the drive for industrial capacity, which was intended to come from the introduction of multiple shift-working, the investment of new plant and the conversion of existing plant to war work.

Problems soon emerged. The disruption of trade placed significant strain on domestic stocks and led to the imposition of a quota system. Industry, expecting a short war, held its labour back as it contemplated a return to peacetime production. Capacity that was released for wartime production was left idle and waiting for armaments orders. Numbers of skilled workers were left underemployed and significant labour disruptions occurred in unforeseen areas. The imperatives of the Four Year Plan and the military were often at odds and initially Hitler did not intervene. What this meant was that gradually a gap between capacity and output began to emerge, although it would not become a problem for some months yet.

Complicating matters further was Germany’s slim energy margin. Only 35% of its oil needs were met by home production of crude and synthetic oil, while 50% of German oil imports came from the western hemisphere and were suspended upon the declaration of hostilities. This meant that Germany entered the war 25% short of its pre-war consumption level. The Russo-German pact provided for delivery of some oil, but the rest had to be made up by the production of synthetic oil from coal. However the hydrogenation plan was both excessively wasteful in terms of coal, could produce only gasoline and was behind schedule. All this meant that coal, even more so than during the Great War, formed the mainstay of Germany’s energy system. The energy limitation on any large scale land offensive further encouraged Hitler to prepare for an energy extensive war on the Western Front, such that Germany could build its liquid stockpiles and so prepare for a long war.

 

[Croesus]

In the meeting of the Supreme War Council on 4 Jan 1940 it was decided to adopt a British plan for an AIF of two brigades landing in Narvik in April. The force was to advance up the railroad to the two centres of the North Swedish ore field, Kiruna and Gallivare, and thence to the Baltic port of Lulea. The force is expected to control the line by late March. Also landing are five British Territorial battalions who are assigned to the three Norwegian ports of Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger.

A campaign into southern Sweden was contemplated; passing through Trondheim the Anglo-French would put 100,000 British and 50,000 French soldiers into the long-term campaign. Forty destroyers were assigned to close support duties and the Home Fleet deployed to ensure the safety of the transports. Six and a half thousand aircraft would be engaged, three squadrons of fighters and four squadrons of home based heavy bombers responsible for aviation operations.

The Supreme War Council ordered the invasion of Norway on 8 Feb. Norway and Sweden were informed that their neutrality favoured the Germans and that Britain reserved the right to act in accordance with the rights of the neutrals against the Germans who have now consumed three. Orders went out to the Royal Navy to mine the approaches to the Vestfjord, off Stadland and a false operation off Molde. In all six cruisers and five destroyers were assigned to this operation, supplementing the destroyers engaged in close in fighting with the German ground forces.

On 16 Feb the destroyer Cossack halted the Altmark to rescue British prisoners of war while the German ship was in neutral Norwegian waters. Churchill and Reynaud immediately leapt on the opportunity for intervention, as there had clearly occurred a cynical use of Norwegian neutrality, the occurrence of which they had identified as sufficient cause to despatch the expeditionary force. There was every reason for confidence. The campaign had to date confirmed the opinions of the Supreme War Council that the Red Army had not recovered from its opening disasters and that their subsequent operations would be slow.

This justification of the Anglo-French intervention came when preparations were yet incomplete. Only one infantry brigade and a light anti-aircraft battery were available for despatch to Narvik, although the five Territorial Battalions were ready for Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Two cruisers took two Battalions each to Bergen and Stavanger, with the fifth expected two days following landfall. French units were also despatched and would, upon arrival bring the Anglo-French force up to 18,000. One fighter squadron and an army cooperation flight were available.

The German decision to intervene into Norway was effectively taken on 16 Dec 1939 once Hitler became convinced of the arguments offered up by Admiral Raeder and Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian National Union Party. The Altmark incident also forced his hand. The planning staffs for the invasion had fortunately been assembled three weeks earlier and were able to quickly assess the situation as it developed. The German force of six divisions was aimed at Oslo, Kristiansand, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger and Narvik. Paratroopers were to land at Stavanger and Oslo to seize important airfields so that the Luftwaffe could establish itself in the area.

 

[Croesus]

The arrival of the war in Scandinavia dates back to 2 and 10 Oct when Britain and Germany respectively first began to seriously examine possiblities of initiating a Norwegian campaign. As First Sea Lord Churchill proposed the mining of the Leads so as to disrupt the beneficial use of Norwegian neutral waters by Germany, while Admiral Raeder spoke with Hitler about the gains to be had for the submarine campaign if bases on the Norwegian coast could be obtained.

On 19 Oct the Foreign Office noted an unsubstantiated report of a planned German-Soviet partition of Scandinavia. On 4 Nov the Admiralty orders the reconstruction of the Northern Barrage of antisubmarine mines, which necessarily involves the mining of the Leads. On 30 Nov Russia attacks Finland, which brings down the Chamberlain and Daladier governments.

On 2 Dec Swedens decides against joint Finno-Swedish defence of Aaland and rejects direct assistance for Finland. On 3 Dec Raeder notes that a German occupation of Norway is the only practical means of disrupting Anglo-Norwegian trade and that any British occupation of Norway would have significant effects on German interests in the Baltic. On 12 Dec Raeder briefs Hitler on the unfortunate fact that the German fleet would not be able to cope with substantial surface warfare off the coast of Norway for any reasonable length of time.

On 14 Dec Raeder, Rosenburg and Quisling meet with Hitler, following which Hitler orders a study be made of the factors involving an invasion of Norway. The League of Nations expells the Soviet Union and the first foreign volunteers arrive in Sweden to help the Finnish war effort. On 19 Dec Prime Minister Churchill convinces the War Cabinet of strategic need to mine the Leads, however a decision is deferred until the Supreme War Council (SWC) can properly examine the issues. On 22 Dec Finland requests Anglo-French military assistance.

On 29 Dec a report is made to the War Cabinet warning of an impending German occupation of southern Scandinavia. The following day a German naval conference considers the risk of Britain occupying Norway under cover of a volunteer force, a risk which is considered to be likely for as long as the Soviet-Finnish war continues. On 6 Jan Britain approaches made to Oslo and Stockholm about the entry of Anglo-French naval forces into Norwegian waters are rejected. On 11 Jan Germany refuses transit for all foreign volunteers to Finland.

On 14 Jan the Red Air Force bombs the Swedish coast and on the following day the Swedish government rejects a Soviet allegation that Stockholm is abandoning its neutrality. The German Foreign Ministry also denies that Berlin is acting to broker peace talks between the combatants. On 17 Jan German naval staff commences planning countermeasures in case of a British intervention in Norway, which involves the occupation of southern and parts of central Norway. The following day the Swedish Parliament debates sending assistance to Finland, guided by public opinion which is strongly in favour of intervening.

On 20 Jan a report is presented to the War Cabinet on an apparent German plan to secure the Narvik-Lulea railway. On 26 Jan the Finnish Prime Minister Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim confer to discuss possible peace terms during which Mannerheim urges concessions to bring about a settlement.

The following day Sweden warns Russia that continued action is likely to bring involvement by the Anglo-French. In Germany Kietel orders full planning for a Norwegian invasion timed for mid-March and calling for six divisions to be deployed against Oslo, Kristiansand, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. On 29 Jan Stalin decides against the original plan of a full reconquest of Finland and Molotov sends signals via Stockholm of a willingness to negotiate. The Finnish Government appeals for Norwegian help. The following day Stockholm passes on the Russian terms which Finland rejects.

On 1 Feb Finland presents counter-terms for a negotiated peace. In London Britain rejects a French plan for a blockade of Soviet ports. On 4 Feb Russia rejects the Finnish peace proposal. The following day the SWC approves a British plan for military intervention in Norway, timed for mid-March, and aimed at supporting Finland while also securing the Swedish orefields. One brigade is to be sent to Narvik, two battalions each to Bergen and Stavanger and one to Trondheim. On 6 Feb Finland informs Sweden and Russia of the SWC decision in an attempt to regain some degree of political initiative.

On 8 Feb Finlands signs a credit arrangement with Britain. On 10 Feb Berlin recieves a report from Oslo about British preparations to occupy Norwegian ports. On 11 Feb Russia offers second set of peace terms to Finland via Stockholm. On the following day Finnish Foreign Minister holds secret talks in Stockholm requesting Swedish assistance, which is declined. On 13 Feb Britain confirms the supply of 45 84mm guns and 45,000 shells which is half of what was originally requested. On the same day Finland issues an international Note criticising Russia for violating the accepted customs of war.

On 15 Feb the Swedish press reveals the presence of Tanner in Stockholm and the Swedish refusal to help. The following day the Swedish, British and French press criticize the Swedish stand. In Norway the Altmark incident causes both the Anglo-French and Germans to decide to intervene/invade. On 17 Feb orders for the Norwegian campaign are approved by the War Cabinet. In Finland the first group of Danish volunteers arrive.

On 18 Feb the battleship Renown sails from Scapa with four destroyers to rendevous with the cruiser Birmingham, four minelaying destroyers and four escort destroyers for mining operations in the Vestfjord. The minelayer Teviot Bank and four escort destroyers also sails from Scapa for mining operations in Stadland. Diplomatic Notes are issued to Oslo and Stockholm explaining the Anglo-French actions. In Stockholm the Swedish Government meets to discuss the Tanner crisis and the King confirms the original decision not to aid Finland.

On 19 Feb Anglo-French military envoys begin negotiations with Mannerheim on details around intervention. On the same day a unit of Swedish volunteers is attached to the Finnish Army. On 20 Feb the Red Air Force bombs the Swedish village of Pajala and the Swedish government issues a stiff Note of protest. Tanner briefs the Finnish Government on details of the second set of Russian peace plans and is encouraged by the Government to accept them. In Berlin a report is received of conversations between French counterparts talking of Anglo-French operations on Narvik.

On 21 Feb Hitler appoints von Falkenhorst to command Norwegian invasion. In Norway the British minelaying operations are undertaken. The Norwegians issue immediate protest Note and prepare for mine-sweeping operations. Upon recieving news of the British operations von Falkenhorst confers with Hitler and Raeder. Further Swedish debates around fears of being drawn into the general hostilities are interrupted by news of the British intervention.

On 22 Feb Hitler gives order to initiate counter-invasion of Norway. Soviets respond to Swedish protest over Pajala bombing as 'malicious allegations. Sweden defers request by Anglo-French for transit of troops to Finnish front. On 23 Feb Tanner meets new British representative and military envoy. In Copenhagen Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Foreign Ministers announce decision not to permit Anglo-French transit rights.

The following day the Foreign Ministers reaffirm neutrality and urge a negotiated settlement. On 25 Feb Tanner arrives in Stockholm to discuss Russian terms and is urged to accept; he forwards terms to Paris and London. In Finland 12 Blenheim bombers are flown in. In Oslo the British Ambassador reports a concentration of German aircraft and shipping; this is seen as providing sufficient evidence of German preparations for invasion and the third phase of the intervention is authorised, the despatch of ground forces.

On 26 Feb the British forces, not yet fully complemented, board their transports for their respective targets in Norway. In Germany the force charged with occupying Trondheim also leaves port. Tanner conducts talks with Stockholm about defensive alliance against Russia, which Sweden declines. In response to Swedish approach Russia refuses to relax its peace terms. The following day the Red Army launches a massive general offensive. In Helsinki Tanner returns with little hope but to accept the Russian peace terms. A majority of the Government agrees but wants to first consult with Mannerheim.

On 28 Feb, following Mannerheims advice to take whatever terms are on offer, the Government votes to commence negotiations by 17 votes to 3. Further deliberations are interrupted when it is learned that a substantial British force has arrived off Narvik. Later news breaks that a German force has arrived off Trondheim. In Germany the nearly fully equipped main invasion force departs. On 1 Mar the British and German fleets meet off Bergen and the British forces for Stavanger are diverted to Aandalsnes. The German invasion forces arrive at Stavanger, Egersund, Kristiansand and Oslo; the German forces for Bergen are diverted back to Oslo. On 2 Mar the British forces for Trondheim are diverted to Namsos.

 

[Croesus]

The 1st Battalion Scots Guards, 24th Brigade (Guards), were loaded onto their transport in Scapa upon receiving the notification of the third phase of Plan R4 on 26 Feb and, escorted by the cruisers Aurora and Ellingham, sailed immediately for Narvik. Over the next two days the Brigades' other two battalions, 1st Battalion Irish Guards and 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, loaded onto two transports in Scapa and, escorted by the cruisers Southhampton and Enterprise and the anti-aircraft cruiser Cairo, left for Narvik.

Also on 26 Feb the Hallamshire Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, 146th Brigade (Territorial), were aboard a transport in the Clyde and, under escort by the cruisers Arethusa and Galatea, departed for Trondheim. On the same day the other two battalions of the 146th Brigade, the 1st/4th Battalion The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment and the 1st/4th Battalion The Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, embarked in Rosyth on the cruisers Sheffield and Glasgow for Bergen. Finally two battalions of the 148th Brigade (Territorial), the 1st/5th Battalion The Royal Leicestershire Regiment and 1st/8th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters, also embarked in Rosyth on the cruisers Devonshire and York bound for Stavanger.

When the Scots Guards arrived off Narvik on 26 Feb they found in the harbour two turn-of-the-century Norwegian coastal defence cruisers Norge and Eidsvold, and the submarine B1, which at the time constituted the main force of the Norwegian Navy. In the town itself was a company of the 13th Regiment, 6th Infantry Division, a company of engineers, a machine gun battery, an antiaircraft gun battery and a mountain gun section and the towns land defences were based on two newly constructed pillboxes.

The British flotilla was led in by the flagship Aurora, the passage of which was spotted by Norwegian watch boats who alerted the two Norwegian cruisers. At this time the Norwegian government had vigorously protested against the fait accompli of the British mining operations, which were being swept by Norwegian destroyers and minelayers. The orders given to the two Norwegian vessels were to resist any British landing so as to uphold Norways rights of sovereignty, but to prevent 'unnecessary escalation'. The British were under orders not to return Norwegian fire, unless it became 'intolerable'.

Upon coming into range the Norge put a shot across the bow of the Aurora and signalled the British to stop. The Aurora slowed, but did not stop, and signalled the Norwegians to desist fire. The Norge put another shot across the Aurora's bow and insisted the British stop, which they did. By signal the two commanding officers arranged a parley. The British explained their mission and the Norwegian explained theirs; the former was to land and prepare to help the Finns while the later was bound to resist any foreign intervention or invasion.

The British noted their preponderance of force, which the Norwegians recognised; for their part the Norwegians noted that it was their responsibility to ensure that the honour of Norway's senior service was upheld, which the British recognised. The parley broke up with both commanders expecting some kind of engagement but neither considering a full-scale fight. However, each recognised the risks associated in trying to keep control of matters and the British commander insisted that fire discipline be maintained and return fire made only on his command; the Norwegian commander issued orders to the effect that each vessel would fire a single broadside salvo of its two 21cm guns and three of its 15cm guns. Further to this the 21cm guns were to fire long and the 15cm to fire short.

The Aurora, followed by the Ellingham and thence the British transport resumed its cautious entry into the harbour whereupon the Norge and Eidsvold commenced their symbolic fire. The exact circumstances of what occurred next is not certain as British and Norwegian sources are contradictory; however the result was that the transport carrying the Scots Guards was hit by a single 21cm shell and immediately began taking on water while the Aurora was bracketed by two 15cm shells, causing significant damage and starting a fire amidships.

All reports note at this point that an eerie stillness settled over the harbour as all eyes were on the British ships; the stillness lasted for some minutes and broken eventually by the Ellingham turning around the burning Aurora and firing all guns at the Eidsvold. The Norwegian ship was hit three times by the Ellinghams main armament of 15.2cm guns, twice by 10.2 cms guns and, after a shudder and internal explosion, rolled over and immediately sank. At this the Norge fired at the Ellingham, scoring one hit by a 15cm shell that put out the British ships after turret. Further fire from the Norge was not forthcoming as the Aurora now joined the battle and put two 15.2cm and four 10.2cm shells into the Norwegian vessel which caught fire and began listing.

Onshore the horrified Norwegian commander immediately notified Oslo as to the dramatic events and frantically sought orders. The immediate reply was to take no further action against the British and to avoid further contact, evacuating the town if need be. However one of the few officers loyal to Quisling, Colonel Sundlo, by happenstance was in command of one of the pillbox posts and immediately ordered the mountain gun battery to fire on the Aurora, now fully ablaze, and for the men under his command to prepare to defend an assault landing.

The battery managed to get off several rounds before the Norwegian commanding officer managed to get control of the situation and arrested Sundlo. However the damage had been done and the Ellingham turned ashore and began bombarding the town and pillbox defences. The wooden buildings were set afire and the Norwegians took significant casualties before managing to retreat beyond fire of the British guns.

Meanwhile the Scots Guards were in serious trouble. Boats were put out and soon filled up as the transport began to settle into the water. The Aurora was ineffective at this time as efforts were being made to control the fire, but some of its boats were able to be put out and further assistance was provided by the Ellingham after its initial fire into the town ceased. By the time the transport slipped beneath the surface about three quarters of the Scots Guards had been taken off the ship or pulled from the water, but all their stores and what little equipment they had sailed with was lost. Casualties on the Aurora were not severe but the cruiser was not considered seaworthy and so drawn up for repairs.

The first stage in Plan R4 had not been particularly encouraging.

 

[Croesus]

The dramatic events in Narvik were soon transmitted to Oslo and a furious exchange of telegrams with London commenced. While the diplomatic situation was being worked out the order went out to all Norwegian military units that the British were landing in strength in northern, and possibly, central Norway, that they were likely to field overwhelming strength and would probably not be inclined to repeat their behaviour of Narvik.

Therefore all units were instructed to remain at their posts but to not engage British units without direct confirmation from higher command. It was in the aftermath of these distressing and confused events that the battlecruiser Lutzow, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers carrying 1,700 men of 138 Gebirgs-Regiment of 3 Mountain Division sailed into Trondheim.

Unaware of the pathos of their action, when the Germans signalled 'Do Not Fire We Are British' they received an immediate response of 'Do Not Fire Please Enter'. Looking at each other for a moment the German commanders immediately ordered the troop carrying destroyers to proceed directly to their landing points. The main defences at Trondheim were the two forst of Brettingen and Hysnes, with a third having recently been stood down. One of the German destroyers landed between the two forts and rushed the Norwegian positions who had only just recognised the shape of the Lutzow as it sailed towards Trondheim and frantically began to arm their guns and switch on their search lights. Aburptly they became aware that German troops had infiltrated the fortifications and following some desultory small arms fire surrendered.

The three other destroyers had proceeded at full speed down Trondheimfjord and disembarked their troops directly into the town and siezing it without significant resistance. The airfield Vaernes was held by troops of the 11th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division and they put up a stiff fight, beating back several attempts by the Germans. By the end of the day the airfield remained in Norwegian hands but the Germans had prepared an emergency landing strip on the ice for their transports, which began arriving within a few hours, and so secured the town completely. This action ended the first days military activity with attention now passing to the naval situation.

To provide naval protection for the convoys the Home Fleet battleships Rodney and Valiant, the battlecruiser Repulse, the cruisers Penelope and B and ten destroyers formed the main element under the Commander-in-Chief Sir Charles Forbes, with the the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, two cruisers and and eleven destroyers and the 18th Cruiser Squadron, two cruisers, also in the region. Upon receiving news of the sailing of the German fleet the Forbes began searching for the German fleet, which had sailed west into the North Sea and thence disappeared from contact.

In spite of their efforts the first contact was entirely by accident as the destroyer Glowworm, part of the Renown's destroyer screen which had remained in the region following the minelaying operations, had fallen behind while recovering a man overboard. As it followed the Renown it ran directly into the path of the Lutzow and Hipper as they made their way out of Trondheim harbour bound for a rendesvous with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. A short sharp encounter followed where the Glowworm, attempting to ram the Hipper was destroyed by the Lutzow and immediately sank.

Upon notification of the contact Forbes detached the Repulse, Penelope and four large destroyers in an attempt to reinforce the Renown which was closer. However bad weather hampered the search and contact with the Lutzow and Hipper was not recovered. While this was occurring however the Polish submarine Orzel torpedoed and sank the German equipment transport Rio de Janeiro which was part of the expedition against Bergen, and hence part of the flotilla led by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Close after this, during a break in the weather, an RAF Sunderland reported a battlecruiser, two cruisers plus escorts sailing west from Trondheim.

Thinking this was the Lutzow and Hipper Forbes immediately gave chase, seeking to trap the German fleet as a French cruiser and two French destroyers were on their way into the area. The most important result of these actions was that the Admiralty became aware that the German fleet was in the immediate vicinity of their troop transports and, with the memory of the Scots Guards at Narvik, so fresh, orders were immediately transmitted to increase the escorts of the Bergen and Stavanger convoy which was now approaching Bergen.

What was about to occur was the first main battleship action of the war. The Renown and her escorting destroyers, the Repulse, Penelope and escorting destroyers sailed towards the four troop-carrying cruisers Sheffield, Glasgow, Devonshire, York and escorting destroyers and came up on Bergen from three different directions. The German fleet was at this time organised into two groups.

The first was the largest, with the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, light cruisers Koln and Konigsberg and attendant destroyers, while the second was the battlecruiser Lutzow, heavy cruizer Admiral Hipper and attendant destroyers. Also shadowing the main German group were several U-Boat groups. The British force was weakened by the four troop carrying cruisers not able to obtain complete freedom of action while the German troops were also aboard fighting ships, though in this case the destroyers were used with the larger ships retaining their freedom of movement.

 

[Croesus]

In spite of the naval action off Bergen and subsequent dislocation of German plans, the remaining operations of their counter-invasion went well. The two pillboxes that constituted the airfields defenses were first suppressed by ME-110's and then neutralised by parties of the 120 Fallschirmjager that dropped soon after. The few Norwegian air force planes managed to get airborne but offered no additional resistance and the airfield was soon fully secured and the first planes airlifting in the 69 Infantry Division began to land. The Norwegians did score a success when the Norwegian destroyer Aegir sank the German transport ship Rota as it sailed into Stavanger harbour with the subsequent loss of much of the heavy equipment for the airlifted troops.

Down the coast at Egersund a small party of the 69 Infantry Division landed to secure the cable station and encountered no resistance. At Kristiansand the German invasion force was repulsed twice by the coastal fortifications during which the light cruiser Karlsruhe was damaged before an unfortunate coincedence of German use of captured Norwegian codes and a Norwegian order restating no resistance to be offered to either 'British or French' units resulted in uncertainty on the part of the Norwegian commander. The resulting pause was sufficient for the German landing parties of the 214 Infantry Division to reach their disembarkation areas and secured the town and its important military facilities.

This left the expedition against Oslo. In the original German invasion plan the force, led by the heavy cruiser Blucher was to have attempted to slip past the Oscarsborg fortifications and take the city by surprise. However this plan was forestalled by the British intervention in Narvik and it was felt that any advantage of surprise would by now have been lost. Subsequently the landing parties of 163 Infantry Division were put down on the east shore of the fjord and down from the Oscarsborg and from there they proceeded to advance on the capital while the Oscarsborg was invested by naval and air bombardment.

While the 163 Infantry were working their way up to the town there was some confusion surrounding the capture of the Fornebu airfield. It was meant to have been siezed by Fallschirmjager but fog delayed their departure. The few fighters the Norwegians could put up harrassed German bomber and transport planes overhead, and some of the latter attempted a landing on the airfield in the expectation of it already being in German hands. These planes came under fire and hastily took to the air again. Matters were not resolved until a ME-110 landed on the northern edge of the airfield and discovered that it was not swept by Norwegian fire. Subsequently the airlandings continued and the airport was taken into German hands.

However the naval base at Horten and the fortifications at Oscarsborg remained in Norwegian hands and it was actions from these two installations that gave sufficient time for the Norwegian Royal Family, government and military command to evacuate the city and so prevent a complete German victory. By the end of Mar 4 therefore Norway had been effectively split in two. The British were in place in Narvik and fully able to reinforce their position as no German units were in the vicinity.

Trondheim was in German hands but for the moment cut off by landward route and only able to be resupplied by the airfield. There was a lot of confusion around Bergen following the naval battle and disrupted landings. However all the key points in the south, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Egersund and Oslo were in German hands. The Norwegian government was completely dislocated and for a time all the Norwegian military units were acting on their last known orders. The skies effectively belonged to the Luftwaffe while the seas remained the province of the Anglo-French navies.

 

[Croesus]

The Battle of Bergen opened before dawn on 1 March when the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailing ENE observed the passage of a British flotilla sailing due E and transporting four battalions of British infantry to landfall in Bergen. The Germans were themselves escorting ten troop-carrying destroyers bound for the same port and immediately the destroyers were ordered to break off and make for Stavanger while the two capital ships engaged what they thought was a cruiser squadron.

Their approach was masked by the periodic snow flurries that swept the sea and so it was that their fire fell on their initial targets, the light escort cruiser Penelope and the transporting heavy cruiser Effingham at the same time that one of the escorting destroyers, the Basilisk, spotted the two battle cruisers. The Scharnhorst engaged the Effingham in the belief that she was the main vessel and sought to press its attack hard.

Full with troops as it was the Effingham managed to manoeuvre such that it avoided the worst of the Scharnhorst‘s fire but still received several strikes that caused some damage and casualties. The Gneisenau had fallen upon the Penelope and, the suddenness of the attack combined with some good gunnery, the British cruiser soon began to lose speed and control.

The Gneisenau did not press home its advantage with the crippled Penelope and instead choosing to coordinate with the Scharnhorst against the Effingham, which by now was fully engaging the Scharnhorst while sailing towards its main escort. This was the battle cruiser Repulse that had turned hard upon realisation of the German presence and was now bearing down on the Gneisenau.

Its opening rounds were not entirely effective, though some effect was had. Its arrival did change the expectations of the German ships however, who broke off their attack on the Effingham, which promptly fled, and turned to face their new adversary.

The second salvo by the Repulse straddled the Gneisenau at the same time as the Gneisenau found its target; while the Repulse knocked out the German fire direction control the German fire damaged the forward turret. It was now the Gneisenau’s turn to bolt but in this instance its flight was covered by the Scharnhorst that had found the Repulses range and now began placing the British vessel under considerable fire.

The Repulse swung around and delivered its own messages to the Scharnhorst which, feeling that it had done enough, also sought to break off. Its passage went unchallenged as the Repulse, now thoroughly battered, was having trouble with its engines and the heavy seas and soon gave up any thought of chasing the German battle cruisers.

Matters onboard the Penelope had not improved but at least the vessel remained seaworthy and it was with relief that the crew managed to bring her home some days later. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had taken a fair amount of damage from the Repulse and were forced to take a circuitous route home; they would soon find themselves back in active service.

For the moment however they were out of the fight and could play no further part in the action, not that the British were to know of this at the time and caution as to the whereabouts of the ugly sisters constrained the Admiralty’s plans for the next phase. The Repulse found itself with rudder trouble from the last fleeting shots of the Scharnhorst and also turned for home. That night the stricken battle cruiser was found by U-51, followed and torpedoed the next morning. She began to take on water, list and finally succumbed in the afternoon following a largely successful rescue of its crew.

All thought of making landfall in Bergen was now given up as the largely escort less British cruisers sought to find safety in the North Sea. The slower Effingham had to deal with battle damage and began to fall behind the rest of the group, which did not slow and pressed ahead. Destroyers fell back to escort the Effingham and, at around the time the Repulse fell beneath the waves the Effingham crossed the path of the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and pocket battleship Lutzow.

Visibility was better and the approach of the German vessels detected, but so was the position of the lone cruiser. The Effingham’s destroyers hurled themselves at the Germans and one rammed the Admiral Hipper, gouging a large gash in its belt. But the result was foreseeable and soon the two capital ships sat out of the Effingham’s range and pounded her such that she too sank.

This was the last action in the battle. The battle cruiser Renown sought to close with the Hipper and Lutzow but could not locate the two German ships that had themselves promptly made for southern Arctic waters. The German destroyers had scattered and made landfall in Stavanger, leaving Bergen in Norwegian hands for the moment. The light cruisers Koln and Konigsberg that had also been in the vicinity did not enter the fight.

All told the Battle had favoured the Germans; while they had not secured Bergen, and this would cause trouble in the battles to come, they had suffered no serious loss while themselves sinking two RN ships. The British loss was significant and the fact that they could not transfer resources to other theatres affected, among other things, Britains naval and diplomatic policy in the Mediterranean.

 

[Croesus]

From the meeting of the SWC in November it had been decided to open up a land front in Scandinavia that would permit the engagement of Russia, the reinforcement of Finland and the chance to interdict German shipments of Swedish iron ore. This was the primary focus of Anglo-French military planning at the time, but it was not the sole focus. There had emerged a front of secondary interest that increasingly came to absorb the attention of Anglo-French planners: operations against the Russian oil fields and infrastructure in the Caucasus.

On 5 Dec the French Premier Reynaud raises with Churchill the matter of the military, and political, need to interdict the German oil supplies. In a strategic sense he sees significant value coming from action that would ultimately cause Russia from being able to use its status of non-belligerence in support of the German war effort; that is to say, the status of Russia vis a vis the Anglo-French needed to be changed so that the scope of the war could be widened.

Five days later the War Cabinet discussed the merits of Reynaud’s proposal. Churchill is in agreement as to the military and strategic benefits from interdicting the German oil and involving Russia in the war. He notes that Baku can be reached by air and Batum by sea and contends that the likely Soviet response would be limited to counter strikes in Persia and Iraq.

On 11 Dec Anglo-Turkish naval talks commenced, one of the questions being the plans and contingencies Turkey had around naval operations in the Black Sea. Turkey noted that it had several plans, none involving war with Russia. Britain enquired as to what Turkey would do in such a conflict; Turkey responded by asking Britain what help would be forthcoming in such a conflict. The talks broke down in mutual posing of questions.

On 16 Dec Reynaud orders Generalissimo Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to prepare a report on Anglo-French military action in the Caucasus. On 26 Dec an influential British COS subcommittee rules that if war with Russia were the only way to intensify the economic war against Germany, and the economic war the only way to bring about a German defeat, then the disadvantages of open hostilities with Russia should be accepted.

On 2 Jan Gamelin discusses practicalities about a Caucasus campaign with the British COS. Five days later France reopens naval negotiations with Turkey aimed at determining the legality of Turkey opening the Straits to Anglo-French vessels by pointing to a precedent with the Montreux Convention that would see access given under League of Nations auspices. On 12 Jan British CIGS in a letter to Admiral Cunningham notes that there is developing an intention to concentrate an Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea, aimed at the bombardment of Batum.

The next day French Air Force planners discuss further potential operations by CinC Middle East General Weygand’s forces on the successful conclusion of a first stage operation in the Caucasus. On 14 Jan the British COS accept the French thesis that the German and Russian military threats were related and that consequent Anglo-French commitments against the Russians would serve to constrain both threats.

On 17 Jan, during wider secret negotiations, French officials raise with the Italian ambassador matters pertaining to division of interests in the Caucasus oilfields in the event of Anglo-French occupation. On 20 Jan Gamelin produces his report on the Caucasus operation and suggests that such would deprive Germany of Russian oil and fundamentally weaken the Soviet government.

He recommended air attacks on the Baku and Batum targets, and notes that air interdiction would be easier to accomplish than naval action given Turkish caution. Two days later a Turkish report indicates that in conditions of war with Russia and an Anglo-French bombing policy which airfields would be made available; significantly Turkey retains those in range of the proposed Russian targets.

On 3 Feb Cunningham presses for definitions of contingencies in which Turkey would open the Straits, either as a belligerent or under threat of imminent war danger. The Turkish reply is that the Straits would be open in those circumstances where the three powers (Britain, France and Turkey) would be belligerent together. It was underlined this did not include a German attack on Romania or allowing for an Anglo-French attack on Russia.

On 5 Feb, the same day as the SWC ruled on the Scandinavian operation, the Royal Navy draws up contingency plans for the insertion into the Black Sea of a force of four eight-inch cruisers, two six-inch cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. Two days later Weygand is contacted by RAF Command Cairo of overflights over the southern Russian oilfields and requesting permission to send detachments to Syria for the purpose of selecting and preparing airfields for the reconnaissance flights.

On 8 Feb the Persian Minister of War approaches the British Military Attaché and suggests a joint attack on Russia. The next day Weygand meeds Air Marshall Mitchell en route to Ankara to request suitable landing grounds for Anglo-French aircraft flying out the principal French base at Djezireh. On 10 Feb Gamelin informs Weygand of the Caucasus study and invites further work. On the same day the British Commander Middle East Wavell had been informed to investigate the prospects of possible action against the Caucasus in the event of war with Russia.

Weygand writes an operational order noting the importance of supporting Scandinavian operations with those in the Caucasus. On 12 Feb British CIGS informs his principal subordinates that in event of hostilities with Russia that the bombing of Baku would occur forthwith and that planning for such should involve a date by mid-April, with further French assistance post-May. He notes that there are increased strategic options in view of the mobilization of the Indian Army and the presence of ANZAC troops in Gaza and Egypt.

On 13 Feb Gamelin advises Reynaud of the importance of pressing quickly on the Caucasus operations to fully complement those in Scandinavia. He also writes to Weygand expressing confidence that in the event Turkey will be brought into the war on the Anglo-French side and take an active part in the Caucasus operations. The following day the French Ambassador commences talks with the Turkish government over practicalities involved in Anglo-French bombing of Baku, Grozny and Batum.

On 16 Feb, the day of the Altmark crisis which prompts the Scandinavian campaign, Gamelin writes a review of the conduct of the war so far and in it recommends the ultimate establishment of Anglo-French bases in Asiatic Turkey and obtaining Turkish consent for the entrance of Anglo-French submarines into the Black Sea. Four days later Churchill is informed of the nature and scope of French plans to push Turkey into war with Russia.

On 28 Feb, the day that the British land at Narvik, the SWC orders a full study to be made on prospects of effective results of Caucasus operation. Available forces for the air interdiction include four Blenheim squadrons of RAFME, one Wellesley squadron out of Basra, 24 Farmers and 65 Glenn Martins out of Syria. Airfields identified as necessary against Baku were Tehran and Tabriz in Iran, and Kars in Turkey; against Grozny Kars and Erezum in Turkey and Tabriz; against Batum, Kars, Erezum and Erzincan in Turkey. The closest British base at Habbaniyah was not in Blenheim range while Mosul could reach Batum and Grozny, but not Baku.

Wellesley’s flying out of Habbaniyah or Mosul could reach all targets, but there was only one squadron available. This meant that bombing operations could only ideally proceed from Turkish airfields, or with longer-range bombers; although with the earlier Turkish assignment of airfields to Britain, Blenheims could just reach Baku. However it was seen as important to provide for the employment of five heavy bomber, three medium bomber and two fighter squadrons, and the preparation of these forces would take time. However, the order is given and both RAF and FAA commence work around the marshalling of a suitably large airfleet. On 3 Mar, following the naval defeat off Bergen, the French War Cabinet approves the Caucasus operation.

 

[Croesus]

For the government in Bucharest the World War had begun with the Anschluss; only recently had it evolved into a shooting war, but before that the principal pattern was discernable. That pattern involved the violation of neutrality and political vassalage in some form, often involving dismemberment.

Austria had been absorbed into Germany; Czechoslovakia split in two, one half a puppet and the other a German protectorate; Albania had been absorbed into Italy; Poland had been divided between Germany and Russia; Yugoslavia had been broken up and the three surviving, if truncated, polities firmly within the Italian sphere of influence; Finland had been attacked by Russia, the campaign of which was clearly one of border revision; Denmark had been occupied and Norway effectively split between the principal warring parties of Britain and Germany.

Three Versailles nations had been overthrown and three Scandinavian neutrals attacked; what hope therefore for Versailles and neutral Romania? The Little Entente was dead and the Balkan Pact toothless. Turkey was preventing any hope of naval assistance from the Western Powers and Berlin had, in no uncertain terms, advised Bucharest that it would be wise to come to whatever arrangement with Moscow could be obtained. Hungary had feasted on its neighbours and its revisionism was open and unashamed, while Bulgaria appeared to all intents and purposes to be biding its time and only constrained by some doubts over the intentions of Greece. It was therefore with a sense of resigned fatalism that Romania grasped at the only straw in reach and on March 2 signed a non-aggression treaty with Italy.

A non-aggression treaty between Romania and Italy was patently absurd and was a clear indication of the return of Italy into international politics as something other than a meek German vassal-ally. The genesis of the treaty was obviously an Italian initiative and by identifying the influences that brought about the treaty it becomes clear what Mussolini and Ciano are thinking.

One of the fundamentals of definitive Italian fascism was anti-Bolshevism and this was one of the consistent elements of Mussolinian foreign policy. The announcement of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was a major blow to Italian political sensibilities as it showed quite clearly the lack of value that Berlin placed in Italian approval; the pact was signed without Italian advisement and Rome informed of it as fait accompli. This political arrogance did not go down well in Italian circles and placed an unnecessary strain on what was already a difficult relationship.

The Soviet attack on Finland had, as in Britain and France and indeed worldwide, brought about a storm of popular indignation in Italy, and this feeling was not acted against by the government. The police did not interfere when large-scale protests were held outside the Russian embassy, thousands of Italians volunteered to fight for Finland and Finnish arms procurement agents met no obstacles when shopping in Rome. The new Soviet ambassador was kept waiting for his formal introduction to the King until, eventually, he returned to Moscow; in similar vein the Italian ambassador in Moscow returned home in January.

It had become known in Rome that there was contained within the German-Russian pact secret protocols whereby Hitler had bought Stalin off, and that one of those protocols involved Bessarabia. Ordinarily Mussolini would not have welcomed Soviet intrusion into the Danube-Balkan region; but following the conquest of Yugoslavia any increase in Soviet presence was a matter of distinct alarm. That Hitler was prepared to take the part of Stalin over Mussolini was a telling sign that in the eyes of Berlin Rome was a small fish. The continuing difficulties in the relationship between Ribbentrop and Ciano did not help either and the common ground shared between Italy and Hungary over Soviet encroachment served to further give boldness to Italian foreign policy.

But it was in the sphere of Anglo-French relations that the decisive impetus for the signature of the treaty with Romania originated. Following the abortive Anglo-Franco-Italian talks there had developed a secret Franco-Italian dialogue promoted largely by the French and Italian military intelligence agencies. This dialogue had over the three months to March managed to find sufficient common ground as to being to disarm the republican vs fascist differences that had hitherto dominated their formal relationship.

What this meant in terms of the war was that there would always be a voice at the Anglo-French Supreme War Council that spoke well of Italy and advised a soft touch. Given that there were still professional diplomats and soldiers identified with the Chamberlain-Daladier policy of giving Rome a foreign policy cushion the stock of Rome had never been higher.

It was however the events of the last few days that really swung the SWC in favour of moving to a policy that definitely favoured Italian interests. The first, and foremost in British eyes, was the change of the balance of power in the North Sea following the sinking of the Repulse and Effingham. Without a commensurate reduction in German naval strength this meant that the Royal Navy was not able to transfer assets into the Mediterranean, which itself meant that Britain could no longer reasonably or realistically continue its hard-line policy towards Italy.

Taken together with the pro-Italian line taken by Paris, London was now obliged to drop many of its objections against Mussolini in general and the rise in Italian power in particular. Finally, the increasing emphasis placed on Anglo-French operations against the Caucasus meant that more than ever Italian goodwill was not just desirable, but necessary.

So it was that the Italo-Romanian non-aggression pact was signed. Ribbentrop was casually advised of it following the announcement in the world press and the following week Mussolini suggested in a short letter to Hitler that perhaps the two leaders should meet and discuss matters of mutual interest.

 

[Croesus]

There were many doubts and questions that confronted Hitler as he grappled with the political and military challenges of the first six months of war. While he had some concerns about the direction and conduct of the war, of one thing he was certain and that was his fundamental dictum: that Germany would be a world power or it would be destroyed. His role in Germany's fate was also firm in his mind; he would either lead Germany to victory or preside over its immolation. This dictum would prove of great use as he grappled with the problems that challenged him.

Perhaps the most significant question was that of Germany's relationship with Russia. The signature of the Russo-German non-aggression treaty had backfired somewhat. What had been seen primarily as a means of forcing Poland to accept the German solution to the Danzig question, and secondarily as a necessary piece of Ribbentrops strategy to isolate Britain from continental influence, had resulted in general hostilities and a complicated identification of German interests with Soviet interests. This had led to strained relations with Italy, the Danubian-Balkan states and the Baltic states which was only partially balanced off by a marked deterioration in relations between Russia and the Anglo-French.

That German destiny was to be found in the East was a given in his opinion, but how and when that would be achieved was a matter open to debate. Ideally he would have neutralised the west so as to attack east but that was no longer possible. He now had to accept the course of having to neutralise the east so as to attack west in order to thence attack east. The tradeoff was therefore between an opportunity to focus on France and knock her out of the war and giving Russia room to capitalise on its relatively increased freedom of movement in northwest and southeast Europe. Since the signing of the non-aggression pact senior military figures had expressed disquiet as to the increased opportunities Russia now enjoyed and that over time Germany would inevitably lose ground.

Complicating matters were two seperate developments; the Anglo-French landing in Scandinavia and the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia and non-aggression pact with Romania. There were two threads running through the Scandinavian intervention so far as Hitler could see. The French wanted to help the Finns beat back the Soviets while the British wanted to interdict the Swedish ore traffic to Germany. In a way Hitler would not be unwelcome to either development. An attack on Russia would serve to divert Anglo-French strength while also acting as a surrogate for German influence that had permitted the Soviet attack in the first place. An attack on Sweden, which the British plan directly implied, meant that Germany could step in as the 'white hat' and, given the Finno-Swedish linkage may well be able to establish a greater control over the Baltic which would serve well for the eventual attack on Russia.

The Italian conquest of Yugoslavia had interrupted the economic flows somewhat but not to a decisive extent and in other ways served to bring Italy further into the German economic sphere, thus supporting Ribbentrops diplomacy around a continental bloc. The conquest had served to enrich Hungary and lure Greece away from an overt identification with the Anglo-French, which had occurred with Turkey, and these two developments were seen as being politically positive.

The Italo-Romanian agreement was problematic in that it could well inflame tensions in the region as it was clearly anti-Soviet; the flip side to this was that Italy would act as a German proxy in the region and either hold up the Russian advance, or give the grounds for a German 'white hat' intervention. In light of this it was felt that acceding to Mussolini's invitation would be premature and so a letter was sent respectfully declining the invitation while expressing Berlin's full confidence that Rome had matters in hand. Thus it was that under two fairly broad sets of circumstances Germany could let other powers do its anti-Russian work before giving Germany the chance to push the other powers off their gains and look good in the process.

However this still left the matter of war with France. While there were suggestions that armoured warfare could be decisive strategically it seemed more likely that there would be some return to positional warfare that would keep the French locked in place while the militarised economy matured to the extent that a final push, or secondary front, could be made to overcome the western front.

The announcement of the invasion of the west was announced on 27 Sep upon the fall of Warsaw, the directive ordering it made on 9 Oct and the initial plan for it issued on 19 Oct. This plan was adjusted on 28 Oct in line with the established aims of destroying the larger portion of the Anglo-French armies while siezing the Franco-Belgian coast. Orders for the invasion to commence were issued on 5 Nov partly to capitalise on the shock of the Yugoslav invasion and resulting political instability in London and Paris but was cancelled two days later in light of caution over weather and preparedness.

The plan had been redrawn again on Nov 15 to take into account opportunities for forcing the Meuse but had not fundamentally changed in nature. Further debate developed around the plan but the next stage was the ordering on 28 Dec for an invasion date of 17 Jan. Weather delayed the launch of the operation and while the forced landing of a Luftwaffe plane which resulted in the capture of the operational plans caused some consternation, no changes were made when a fourth version of the plan was issued on 30 Jan.

At this point the planning for the French campaign began to impinged upon planning for the Norwegian but the latter was firmly conceived of as an economy of force measure and efforts made to ensure it did not impinge on the more important French campaign. Over the first weeks of Feb however there emerged a growing sense that there were greater opportunities to be had from the main operation, where the focus and main striking power would be on the left wing.

Things moved quickly following the Altmark incident and ordering of the German invasion of Norway. For the French operation it meant the production of a fifth version of the plan on 24 Feb taking into account the decision to attempt a strategic action at Sedan and the Meuse and a date set for early May. Four days later the simultaneous landing in Scandinavia occurred, which substantially challenged the rationale of an economy-of-force invasion of Norway.

Three options presented themselves: that the Norwegian campaign is reinforced at the expense of the French, or the French campaign is brought forward and no change made to relative strength, or the status quo is maintained with a wait-and-see attitude. The naval action in the North Sea on 1 Mar complicated the decision making as did the Italo-Romanian agreement. The pressure was enormous and Hitler became increasingly stressed which served to promote the views of those who held to the status quo option. However it was recognised that he might make a sudden decision for an early invasion and the relevant senior military figures began making preparations.

 

[Croesus]

The basis for French defence planning was that the weight of a German attack would come through Belgium and, following the principle that it was preferable to defend France outside of France, the French response would be to advance into Belgium and meed the German advance along the lines of the Rivers Escaut or Dyle, or the Albert Canal. From the middle of November 1939 it had been decided that the practicable courses of action would be the Escaut and Dyle options, E and D respectively.

The choice between the two would be based on how well the Belgian Army, which was not coordinating its actions with the Supreme War Council (SWC)), held up the German advance. It was initially thought following the Polish campaign that the E Plan would be adopted owing to the expected speed with which the German army would penetrate the Belgian defences. However by mid October it was recognised that advances in Belgian fortification and their fielding of an army of twenty two divisions kept the D Plan option viable.

There were some important advantages to the D Plan. The Dyle position gave a shorter and better defensible line and permitted the incorporation of the relatively substantial Belgian Army into the Anglo-French dispositions. Furthermore the North Sea lines of communication were secured, the Germans would be denied valuable air and submarine bases and the French industrial north better protected. If the Dyle could be reached, so much the better and the French First Army and British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were assigned to the task of reaching the position upon the opening of the expected German offensive.

The First Army of twelve divisions would fill out the thirty-seven km front of the Gembloux Gap between the Dyle and Namur; the BEF of nine divisions would cover the line between the twenty km front Wavre and Louvain and the retreating Belgian Army of twenty-two divisions would take the fifty-five km front between Louvain and Antwerp. Under the French conception of colmatage and counterattack, any German penetration of the line would be sealed off by the reserves immediately available to the positional units and then, if the attack was identified as being the main thrust, the strategic reserve would be employed to counterattack the German penetration.

In the D Plan the strategic reserve was comprised of the French Seventh Army and it was massed around Reims where it could react to a German attack through Belgium, Switzerland or between the Rhine and the Moselle. However of late the French Generalissimo Gamelin had been examining the potential of using the Seventh Army in an effort to advance into Holland. There was concern on the part of the British about the possible fate of the Netherlands in the face of invasion as hitherto the Dutch were essentially to be left to their own devices. This plan would see the Seventh Army advance to Breda in an effort to link up with the Dutch and, strategically, protect their vital industrial and population centres. This would bring ten Dutch divisions into the Anglo-French order of battle and deny use of the Dutch airfields to the Germans.

This plan, the Breda variant, soon came under serious criticism from both French and British quarters. The fundamental French view was that the duty of the French Army was to defend France and not save hapless neutrals that would not even look to their own defence; while it was valid to fight the Germans in Belgium, the Netherlands was another story entirely. It was also pointed out that to save ten Dutch divisions seven French ones were to be committed, which was hardly a commensurate return for such a hazardous operation. Other objections were raised that, owing to the need to be moving immediately on news of German operations, the French strategic reserve would be committed before the main German thrust had become apparent. However Gamelin would not be moved and in the face of such doubts the Breda variant was adopted.

His resolution would be shaken firstly upon the news of the twin invasions of Norway and then by the continuing analysis of troop requirements for land-based operations following up on the prospective British bombing operations against Baku and Batum. It was recognised that the British in Narvik would have to be reinforced and that meant stripping troops from the northwestern front. There was already concern that even with the thirty-two battalions originally identified to move up into the Swedish ore fields there would be insufficient strength to hold the Germans and develop the Swedish/Finnish front, let alone recapture southern Norway. The planners involved in the Caucasus operations were calling for a similar sized force to establish a base of operations in Salonika for what would be a long campaign trail northward and this put a further strain on available resources.

The matter was concluded during an extended SWC meeting on 8 Mar following on from a French Cabinet decision on 3 Mar that called for the next stage in planning for the Caucasus operation to commence. The following day came news of further developments in Norway that suggested that combat operations there were about to intensify. Consequently to this Gamelin suspended the Breda variant and confirmed that the Seventh Army were to concentrate centrally for counterattack operations into the Gembloux Gap and await the discovery of the main German thrust, while the remainder of the French strategic reserve to return to its original positions around Chalons-sur-Marne.

This disposition was approved and all that remained now was to make local preparations and await the inevitable German attack, wherever and whenever that would be.