A Fitter Italian Military

[Croesus]

The main concern of Sweden in the last days of peace was the avoidance of a Great Power war in the Baltic and the signature of the Russo-German pact went a long way to allaying this concern. Prior to this the extended Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations and the Russian demands on Finland had placed significant pressures on Swedish neutrality and the sense that Berlin and Moscow would be able to put aside their differences such that war would not break out on Sweden's doorstep was a welcome one. Given the Foreign Ministry analysis that this war would follow the general pattern of the Great War there was an optimistic sense that Sweden would be able to stay out of the hostilities altogether.

The early days of the war saw Stockholm reach trade agreements with both London and Berlin that appeared to satisfy all parties, though it was recognised that Berlin was less pleased and the German mining of the sea inside Swedish territorial waters off Falsterbo was an indication of the German attitude. Stockholm might have taken the opportunity to make a stronger protest than it did if it weren't for the near simultaneous Russian invasion of Finland. Sweden was required in some way to support its northern neighbour and as it was impossible to take on both Great Powers, Germany had to be accommodated especially in light of a report by the Swedish Ambassador in Berlin that Sweden was 'regarded among the leaders of the German Reich as a country unfriendly to Germany'.

The Russian invasion placed the Swedish government in a difficult situation. While it was certainly prepared to go to war to defend Sweden against foreign aggression, it was less willing to embroil itself in a proxy war with the Soviet Union, with whom relations had on the whole been constructive. Consequently Helsinki was immediately informed that Finland should expect no military assistance from Sweden, which would restrict itself to diplomatic support and delivery of war materials. The resignation of the pro-Finnish Foreign Minister in early December, and the lack of protest around the act, was a clear indication that Stockholm would refuse to be drawn into support for its northern neighbour.

As a new government formed there were no parties who advised Sweden taking an active part in the war, although there was a difference of opinion as to how Sweden should aid Finland. There was also a strong sense that Sweden should not declare itself neutral in the Finno-Russian war as that would necessarily constrain the options that Stockholm had for assisting Helsinki in the ways it saw feasible, and an equally strong sense that Sweden should remain strictly neutral in terms of the wider war. The new Prime Minister, Hansson, gave a speech on the formation of government that spelled out to all what Sweden stood for in the current environment: independence, neutrality, cooperation with alliance-free neutrals and Nordic collaboration.

The Soviet invasion shattered any hopes Sweden had of remaining outside the war as its action necessarily prompted the other Great Powers to assess their options in the region. The Anglo-French wanted to exploit the invasion in order to disrupt Germany's iron ore supply and to open a second front; for its part Germany held back but sent clear signals that any Anglo-French intervention would be swiftly met by German counter-measures. Swedish foreign policy thenceforward focused on bringing about a negotiated peace between Finland and Russia as soon as possible before any Anglo-French intervention prompted German involvement; not surprisingly this policy ran counter to that of Helsinki, which was interested in both drawing Sweden into the war and working towards Anglo-French intervention.

As the Winter War developed Swedish efforts proved fairly effective in this regard as Stockholms rigidity and Russian advances gradually broke down Helsinkis desire to continue the fight. On the eve of the British landing in Narvik Stockholm was on the verge of brokering a final deal; while Finnish public opinion remained positive of its long term prospects, there were doubts about the Anglo-French ability to intervene and the position of Stockholm was not encouraging.

Thus it was that the British intervention was an absolute disaster for Swedish foreign policy. The German counter-response was rapid and, even though the Soviet armies were penetrating ever deeper into Finland, Helsinki and the Finnish public were emboldened and refused the admittedly harsh Russian peace terms. Initial British diplomacy explaining the intervention in terms of extending aid to Finland, establishing a war front against Russia and Germany and that the British action was in Swedish interests were rejected by Stockholm. The British intervention was seen as potentially leading to the overthrow of Germany which would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Baltic, which could hardly be in Swedish interest.

There could be no question of permitting British troops passage across Swedish territory to either aid Finland or interdict Lulea (the main source of iron ore to Germany) and when the Swedish Ambassador asked whether the British would consider Swedish sensibilities on the matter or simply order troops across the border no reply was obtained. Stockholm was now faced with the choice of aiding the Anglo-French by permitting passage or by aiding Germany by refusing it; a terrible choice in the circumstances given the long line of fallen neutrals that the war and its extended overture had delivered.

Up till this point Sweden had increasingly been seen as an obstacle by London and Paris, while increasingly positive views of it were held in Berlin. Thus it was that slowly Stockholm had begun to be indentified with a Berlin-Moscow bias, which was certainly not an ideal circumstance for Sweden. Such an identification was seen as encouraging the more aggressive Churchill-Reynaud governments to move into Sweden given a sense of inevitability that Stockhholm would favour Hitler and Stalin and the widely understood strategic importance of Lulea becoming ice free in April: if the Anglo-French were serious about disrupting the bulk of German iron ore then they would necessarily have to be in place there before the Germans could send a naval expedition themselves.

Berlin had made it perfectly clear that as soon as the British crossed the Swedish border, then Germany would intervene militarily, and in strength. Increasingly there was pressure on the Swedish government to walk an increasingly fine line. Even though the Swedish army had mobilised, rearmament hastened and the economy placed on a war footing, the Swedish general staff was kept out of government. Given the crisis the government of national unity ensured that all parties had to abide by the collective decision and as all party leaders were in the government the net result was a general lack of opposition. This meant that the control over policy by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was total for as long as they were able to agree, which prior to the twin invasions was fairly assured. However in such a desperate situation this unity was coming under increasing pressure and cracks were beginning to emerge.

Militarily the twin invasions had shown that Stockholm had greatly underestimated the situation and while Norway was being split Sweden had few forces of any signficant size ready to be deployed; Sweden was essentially defenceless. Fortunately the German seizure of Denmark and the immediate focus on Norway meant that Sweden lay outside the sphere of operations and both warring sides were very keen to see Sweden remain neutral. The pressure from Germany was somewhat more severe and subsequently there was offered no assistance to Norway whatsoever; further to this a very strong message was sent to London that any attempt by the Anglo-French to cross the Norwegian border into Sweden would be fullsomely and violently resisted.

A similar message was despatched to Berlin and soon Ambassadors in the three main capitals reported a similarity of opinion; that Sweden was not seen as acting in accordance with the needs of the hour and that opinions of Stockholm were inexorably worsening. As it became clear that the British were in force in Narvik a request was made to Stockholm to permit the overland reinforcement of German positions in Norway from Sweden. On the heels of this came a more strongly worded British diplomatic approach requesting transit access to help the Finns who had now come out and made a formal request for military assistance.

Things had come to a head and it was hard to see how Sweden could stay out of the war.

 

[Croesus]

The immediate aftermath of the twin invasions of Norway and the naval action off Bergen was that Germany had both air and naval superiority and controlled the two main political centers of Oslo and Trondheim. Bergen remained in Norwegian hands and the British were in Narvik in some strength but neither position could be considered strong. Sweden was showing no signs of accepting the 'we're here to help Finland' line, Denmark had been overrun and Finland was looking to be in some trouble. Both sides now had to review their strategy, particulary with regard to the crucial question of reinforcements.

For the French the area of importance was Narvik and they pressed hard to ensure that the current beachhead be immediately reinforced. They considered it imperative that the oreline be followed to the Swedish border and that if force was necessary then it should be applied to the Swedes who were viewed as being de facto German allies. The British took a somewhat more moderate view of matters and advised against rash actions against the Swedes, instead suggesting that efforts be made to regain Trondheim; however they agreed that the position in Narvik was very important and that it be held in strength.

Following the first engagement in Narvik with the Norwegians only half of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards were fit for action but without their equipment. Two days after arrival, on 2 Mar, two further battalions, the 1st Battalion Irish Guards and 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, of the 24th Guards Brigade made landfall. The Hallamshire Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, 146th Brigade (Territorial), that had been en route to Trondheim were diverted to Narvik and arrived on 3 Mar. Of the remaining original invasion troops the 1st/5th Battalion The Royal Leicestershire Regiment and 1st/8th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters were diverted following the action fought off Bergen and after some efforts to ensure safety from the marauding German ships arrived in Narvik on 4 Mar. The 1st/4th Battalion The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment had gone down with the Effingham and half the 1st/4th Battalion The Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry had managed to return safely to port.

The forces available for operations in Scandinavia included two battalions of the French Foreign Legion and a Polish Brigade of four Battalions that had not been stood down following the cancellation of the Finland operation originally planned by the French and these troops were essentially ready to sail. Also available for despatch was the 147th Territorial Brigade of three Battalions, the remaining Battalion of the 148th Brigade and a Light Division of Chasseurs Alpin consisting of six Battalions. Efforts began combing out from other Territorial units ten Independent Companies but these would not be initially ready for deployment.

Any remaining units would come from France and included two more Light Divisions Chasseurs Alpin taken from the Army of the Alps and units still forming up for the North-West front, the British 126th and 15th Brigades and two Battalions of Canadians and there would be some delay before these units became ready. So it was that Narvik was held by six Battalions, and a total of 16 Battalions were available over the course of the next week to ten days to reinforce the town, push up to the Swedish border and make the planned landings at Narvik and Aandalsnes.

Complicating matters was the doubt around the disposition of the Norwegian government given that the Anglo-French action had violated Norwegian neutrality, had exchanged the first shots and were in strength on Norwegian soil. Contact with the Norwegian government and high command was dislocated owing to the German advance northward from Oslo and the general confusion of the situation. It was thought that the larger concentrations of the Norwegian Army were in the north but it was not known how these units would view the British arrival.

It was decided for the moment to err on the side of caution and advise British units on the ground that the previous assessment of light and symbolic Norwegian resistance might be incorrect and that there existed a danger of combat arising from any encounter with Norwegian army units. When contact was restored on 5 Mar this view was largely confirmed as the Norwegians were very cold towards the British and rejected out of hand a British suggestion that Norway place its forces under British command in an effort to coordinate activity.

The proposed action against Trondheim took two forms: a direct landing in the city itself and two landings to the north and south of the city at Namsos and Aandalsnes. Initially it was thought feasible to undertake the former but gradually there emerged a more cautious view and it was decided eventually that any operations against the German positions should focus on the latter.

Leading the view that a smaller operation was best was the Royal Navy which, following the damaging of the Aurora and Penelope and sinking of the Repulse and Effingham, was very mindful of concerns how any further deterioration in the stock of capital ships would affect future Mediterranean strategy, notwithstanding the necessity of answering the German victory off Bergen with one of their own. They were already gathering the Home Fleet and bringing the capital ships Renown, Valiant and Warspite together with the carriers Glorious and Furious and did not want to be drawn into costly assaults.

It was planned for the French Chasseurs Alpin to land at Namsos and the British 15th and 147th Brigades to land at Aandalsnes. The siege of Trondheim was expected to last for a month and air support provided by the carrier Ark Royal, as well as one of either the Glorious or Furious depending on how operations against the German fleet eventuated. It was planned to reinforce the French with the Foreign Legion and Polish troops and the British with the Canadians while the remainder of the reinforcing troops to be sent to Narvik.

 

[Croesus]

Following many hours of reflection, it was in the early hours of 6 Mar that Hitler was able to summarise the vast array of foreign policy detail that had come to dominate his life since the Polish campaign.

He, like most of Europe, knew to a basic degree of the Anglo-French plans to open up some sort of bombing campaign in the Caucasus. He knew this would lead to open hostilities between the western powers and the Soviet Union. He also knew that the Caucasus campaign was conditional on a German invasion in the west: if Germany attacked France, then the Anglo-French would not attack Russia.

He had no sense as to the timing of the Anglo-French operations, nor the attitude of Turkey, nor the planning around the involvement of Romania, and therefore also Italy. The Caucasus operation was however linked with attempts by the Anglo-French to intervene in the Russo-Finnish war, or rather interdict the flow of Swedish iron ore which was clearly the main object as, apart from reasons of public sentiment, what care did London and Paris really have for Helsinki?

He knew that when Lulea became ice free the Anglo-French would become increasingly nervous about their chances of intervening before Germany did. He calculated that the Swedish would fight to prevent the Anglo-French from crossing the border as Stockholm knew quite well that the German reaction would be sudden and violent. He recognised also that the Swedish forces in the north were few and that, because of the neutrality protocols, it would be unlikely that the Norwegian forces in the region would liaise effectively with the Swedish.

Germany had gained from the perception that it was simply matching the Anglo-French by countering their move into Norway, and that any move on Sweden would also work towards rehabilitating in some way the opinion Europe had of Germany. Therefore the crossing of the Swedish border by the Anglo-French was a good thing as it would enable him to intervene with a white hat, to control directly the Swedish iron ore and probably bring Sweden into the war.

However, such an eventuality would become a drain on German preparations for Case Yellow and the despatch of some ten divisions or so would greatly constrain the ability of the German armies to meet and destroy the Anglo-French in the field, let alone cut their forces off from the French interior and reach the sea. Scandinavia did not seem to be a substitute for France in that he did not imagine any situation where the French would so denude their own homeland such that the German forces could inflict the desired decisive defeat.

It was also dangerous for war to escalate in the region as it would necessarily serve to cause Russia to renew its previous policy of absorbing Finland wholly rather than the present one of enforced border revision. An increased Soviet presence in Scandinavia and the Baltic would not be helpful to German interests; it would also serve indirectly to promote Italian influence into the Danube-Balkans as he did not expect Russia to be able to fight on two fronts at this time.

Then again, if the Caucasus operations went ahead as well as the Swedish intervention then there arose the possibility that the Anglo-French would sufficiently weaken their center to balance off any loss of German strength to Sweden such that the original premise of Case Yellow could be realised. As the Caucasus was conditional on Case Yellow, and the Lulea operations conditional on the Swedish intervention, it seemed to him that instead of the original plan of forcing the decision in the west as soon as possible that Germany could pass over to the strategic defensive, claim that Western response to the Polish campaign was all out of proportion (as, in an effort to redeem Poland they violate the neutrality of Norway and Sweden, and force Turkey into the hostilities) and await events.

He sensed a distinct lack of appetite on the part of the French to open an offensive centrally and knew that their planning was conditional on Germany being the aggressor; whats more the French public in particular were becoming fretful at this drole de guerre. What if he could manage affairs such that Germany held in the centre, transferred the weight of responsibility for fighting the western powers to Russia and then attacked under cover of a negotiated peace sponsored by his erstwhile ally and inveterate schemer Mussolini? He would thereby destroy the credibility of Italy and likely bring it into the war on his side, bleed the strength of both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and still conquer France.

So it came down whether or note he attacks France sooner or later. An intriguing question and one that he would spend further time on as the next few days passed.

 

[Croesus]

The announcement of the Italo-Romanian non aggression pact provided for joint staff talks between the two countries and these soon commenced in Bucharest. One of the first orders of business from the talks was the request from Romania for Italian help in transforming the structure and organisation of the Romanian Army, which was duly accepted. What was not noted was the fact that Italian officers had been in Romania since the middle of January and that much of the preparatory work had already been completed. In fact within a matter of weeks reformed divisions organised on the Italian model began exercising in Bukovina under Italian supervision.

Parallel to this reorganisation was a rearming process that saw a partial modernisation program established, mainly in terms of tanks, artillery and aircraft. These assets were purchased as part of an arms agreement that saw Romania pay partly in cash and partly in oil concessions and so created further leakage in the British blockade. Training cadres were despatched from the 8th Pasubio and 9th Piave Infantry Divisions, two of the more battle-tested divisions in the Regio Esercito with campaign banners from Abyssinia and Croatia. Attached to these cadres were smaller detachments covering matters of supply, air-ground coordination and communications.

By March the four new divisions, the 19th Messina, 20th Venezia, 21st Friuli and 22nd Granatieri di Sardegna, had been established. While the nominal naming of divisions based on geographical catchments was the official policy in reality this had broken down such that naming conventions were largely meaningless. The four new divisions were hardly first-rate. They were ordinary infantry divisions and had not been issued a full-scale of equipment as the pre-war divisions were still being brought up to capacity, replacements for equipment lost in Yugoslavia were taken in and exports to Romania all placed a strain on internal production schedules.

They were also populated by a wide range of recruits with a collection of reservists, young men enamoured with the glories of the Vittoria Iugoslavia and various Slovenes, Croats, Albanians and Montegrins from the Protected Territories (Territori Protetti), as the former Yugoslav states were now termed. It was not seen as being desireable to have these divisions in place in the Territori Protetti and so they were redistributed between the other commands. This contributed to a large scale re-deployment of Italian divisions as Italy responded to the changing political environment.

The semi-motorised 'Libyan' Infantry Divisions 15th Sibelle and 16th Pescatori were transferred from Fifth Army (Libya) to Second Army (Albania/Montenegro) and the 19th Messina and 20th Venezia replacing them. This greatly reduced the ability of Fifth Army to fight the war of movement that hostilities in Libya/Tunisia/Egypt would require and was indicative of the general reduction in tension in the area.

The 3rd Infantry Division Ravenna and 1st Infantry Division Superga were withdrawn from First Army (Valle D'Aosta) and Fourth Army (Piedmont) respectively to Eighth Army (Croatia), with the Superga 'attached' to the reforming Serbian Republican Army in Belgrade. The Regio Esercito now consisted of ten Infantry Divisions, four Autotransportable Infantry Divisions, two semi-motorised Infantry Divisions, six Mountain Infantry Divisions, three Armoured Divisions and four Alpine Divisions. Of these four were concentrated on the French border, four in Libya and four in Italy. This left 17 divisions, the vast bulk of the Italian armed forces spread between Slovenia in the west to Albania and Montenegro in the east.

There were still problems in supplying these forces although the issues around non-commissioned officers were beginning to subside and the deficiency in light AA guns were being made up. Transport was still difficult with even the Autotransportable Divisions fielding a wide array of civilian and military trucks and the supply of tanks to the three armoured divisions was proceeding at a snails pace. The air-ground radio problem had been solved but the supply of sets was poor and difficulties were being encountered about their effectiveness; however there was an increasing emphasis being placed on this issue and it was hoped that sufficient sets would be available by the end of the year.

Following the Vittoria Iugoslavia staff talks had also been taking place with the Hungarians and there were some promising developments stemming from this, principally around issues of fighting cooperatively against a theoretical invasion from the north, as well as a small section studying issues around pushing operations to the east. Finally lines of communication had been secured from Albania up to the Romanian border and the sight of Italian military engineers became commonplace throughout Albania and Montenegro.

 

[Croesus]

Following the collapse of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks in November had quickly been overshadowed by other events. However there remained as a direct consequence of the talks formal contact between representatives of the French and Italian intelligence services, the 2e Bureau and the SIM respectively. There was initially no diplomatic representation in the liaison which had developed largely in response to a chance conversation at a higher level as to the practicalities involved in preventing German and/or Soviet intelligence obtaining details of the talks then in progress.

Once the talks were broken off the negotiation apparatus was dismantled and all concerned went their seperate ways, except the two intelligence attaches. Once it became clear to Reynaud and Mussolini that they had a covert and active link they quickly moved to ensure that it was formally closed off, but informally continued.

It was this conduit that had contributed to the March redeployment of second-rate Italian troops into Libya, which had surprised some observers. Over the five months of its existence the liaison had slowly grown to include political trustys of Reynaud and Mussolini and had contributed towards both the French confidence about despatching forces to Norway, which were taken from the Army of the Alps, and the Italian confidence about despatching forces into Albania/Montenegro and Romania, which were taken from Libya.

The liaison also helped soothe British concerns about the implications of reducing the scale of the Mediterranean fleet as the Admiralty prepared to return to the offensive in the North Sea. Equally important was its use as a means by which France tested Italian attitudes and expectations around the proposed Caucasus operations.

At the time of the March redeployment the liaison first began talking in terms of formal political arrangements. While there was initially a great deal of difference about how such an arrangement should look like and what sort of concessions would be involved, the parties involved were confident that their work over the last five months had set a positive framework.

At any rate it was understood that if the wider sensibilities of the British and Germans could not be safely provided for then at least neither France nor Italy would find themselves in a position whereby they would find themselves escalating irresistably and uncontrollably into direct confrontation with each other. Finally the liaising parties were instructed to be ready to work through any political or military matters that might arise from the visit to Europe by the US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and the as yet unannounced meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass.

 

[Croesus]

There were two different threads to the Anglo-French strategy in Scandinavia. The British were concerned about the longer term implications of their having violated the neutrality of Norway in order to protect Norway while the French were interested in means of drawing Germany away from France. As the Anglo-French relationship developed and it became clear that it would be France that would do most of the fighting on land, it became equally clear that in matters of land strategy it would be the French that would do the talking and the British the listening. In some ways this suited the British approach to the war and so it was that the Scandinavian campaign became increasingly a French affair.

Following the British landing and German counter-invasion of 28 Feb, and the Battle of the Bergen Leads on 2 Mar, the next Anglo-French move was an attempt to regain Trondheim by landings in Namsos and Andalsnes. The German strategy in contrast was to avoid escalation and avoid increasing commitment into the theatre. Control of the air and temporary control of the seas permitted the Germans to reinforce the Trondheim garrison and within a matter of weeks the Anglo-French abandoned their beachheads in central Norway and concentrated solely on northern Norway, Narvik and the Swedish border. The Germans sought economy of force measures and made a series of small seaborne hops up the coast without bringing the Anglo-French into battle.

Holding Narvik meant controlling the rail link into Sweden and that meant sending troops to the border; these troops were French chasseurs, with the British units enlarging the Narvik base and pushing south to meet the slow movements of the Germans north. As the French were on the border and the French dominated the strategy, and as they were strongest in their desire to help the Finns and dominate the Swedish ore fields it was entirely unexpected that their forces crossed into Sweden on 8 Mar. The Swedish army was very thin on the ground in the area, with only two battalions in place holding positions in depth. While they maintained patrol contact they did not prevent the continued progress of the French up the rail line.

The remaining Norwegian redoubt of Bergen, which the British had sought to reinforce in vain, fell to the Germans on 18 Mar, and ensured the final extinguishment of Norwegian sovereignty as the two sides now held the entire country. The same day saw a decisive breakthrough by the Soviets in the Karelian isthmus and the Finnish defensive positions fundamentally breached. 18 Mar was the turning point of the Scandinavian campaign.

The French advance into Sweden was slow in the face of uncertain politics, bad weather and awful terrain and it was only on 29 Mar that they reached Kiruna. Following a reorganisation period the French soldiers, undergoing considerable privations clashed with Swedish patrols on 4 Apr, leading to casualties on both sides and a temporary withdrawal by the French troops. Two days later the Germans escalated the conflict by conducting a parachute assault onto the Baltic port of Lulea, thus ensuring the bulk of their iron ore supplies. The protestations from Stockholm to Paris were repeated to Berlin, with similar results, though at least the Germans promised not to push to meet the French following news of the Swedish resistance.

The German action prompted an immediate, if controlled, sabotage of the Swedish hydro-electric power stations that brought the delivery of iron ore to a temporary halt. This was the Swedish response that Berlin had to respect the most, but it was telling that the sabotage wasn't widespread nor decisive in terms of future supply. The Swedish sabotage was followed on by what was a major setback by the Finns and it now became clear that they had lost their Winter War.

The next stage of the conflict occurred on 21 Apr where the French had pushed forward once more and took Gallivare, a strategic seizure. Their forward movement could not be ignored by the Germans who sent a kampfgruppe northwards to contain any further French penetration. The Swedish forces held back entirely, although gathered strength by the week. On 2 May the French and Germans met at the Ostersund and Boden crossroad, but each was sufficiently weary or cautious to prevent a large scale battle from developing. By 9 May German bombing was beginning to make life in Narvik increasingly difficult and the British response was to invest even more heavily into ensuring the long-term viability of the port, which was itself a challenging prospect.

The Finns finally made terms with the Russians on 14 May which signalled the withdrawal of Sweden by the French by 30 May. The Battle of Scandinavia was over but by then the attention of the Anglo-French was on the Battle of the Meuse where the Germans were just being held following the opening of the long anticipated western campaign on 10 May.

 

[Croesus]

The weight of the German plan was on the less-favored right flank of the Anglo-Franco-Belgian line which, while increasingly anchored by the Maginot Line , did not have sufficient first grade troops to conduct what they thought would provide a successful defense of the Meuse.

The Belgian retreat from 11 May shaped the advance of Blanchards First Army which had begun taking up positions only after Prioux was forced from the field at Hannut and whose subsequent retreat in turn caused the retreat of Blanchard on 16 May.

Giraud's Seventh Army was based on Reims and on 12 may begins moving in two directions, on Montherme against Reinhardt, and on Sedan against Guderian. Concurrent to this advance is the arrival of French Army reserve units, 3 DCR and 3 Mot Div at Sedan on the afternoon 13 May. Their arrival coincided somewhat unfortunately with Guderians assault, as 3 Mot Div drove into a German predicted fire pattern covering the Grossdeutschland assault.

55 Inf Div could not hold the line in the face of the German assault but at least retained their positions in part. 71 Inf Div however loses full coherence and breaks apart, its retreat disrupting the arrival of 3 DCR, most of which ended up near the Marfee Heights, but some manage to find 3 Mot Div that took up makeshift positions in Cheveuges. 3 North African had managed to hold largely in place. By evening confused fighting developed and neither side could claim Sedan but for the moment the German assault is held.

The following day Reinhardt's attack at Montherme had been held fairly well by 42 Inf Div, and the reinforcing 43 Inf Div had proved sufficient to hold the Germans in place. Further north at Dinant Hoth took Givet and widened the German bridgehead. 1 DCR arrived to counterattack and retakes the town. Rommel breaks off and advances down the Phillipeville road. At this time 4 North African Div arrives and makes its presence felt. By nightfall the strategic village of Anhaye is held by Hoth but he is pressed from both north and south.

14 May also saw the failure of the counterattack by 3 DCR at Sedan which did some value at least in disrupting Guderians reinforcement of the bridgehead in time for the arrival of the last of strategic reserve in the area, 3 DCR and 1 North African Div. Another French infantry division marching in on foot, 53 Inf Div, also arrives to assist in the reduction of Hoth at Montheume.

On the whole, after two days fighting, the German offensive was partially successful; it had made serious lodgements in Sedan and Dinant with useful pressure at Montherme, but had failed in obtaining an immediate breakthrough.

 

[Croesus]

The German invasion prevented the dismissal of General Gamelin at the hands of Reynaud who had determined that, following the Norwegian debacle, France was not well served by the subtle but aging generalissimo. Gamelin was therefore able to return to his command post at Vincennes on the edge of Paris and commence command of what might well prove to be the greatest feat of arms in French history.

His command of events was quite unique; he felt that, if he were in his subordinate General Georges’ (commander of the north-west front) place, he would feel humiliated and threatened to find Gamelin arrive to direct the fighting. Further to this Vincennes was not served by radio, there was no teletype, the military telephone network was as poor as the civilian and telegrams took a hazardous trip by motorcycle and more than a few despatch riders would be found dead in ditches.

In order to maintain whatever contact with Georges that he felt acceptable Gamelin would drive the 35 miles to the formers command post in La Ferte-sous-Joarre, or the 45 miles to Georges residence, a trip that took an hour each way on the cluttered and confused roads. As events unfolded the time elapsed between orders issued by Gamelin or Georges and its receipt at the front would generally take 48 hours.

This in the era of blitzkrieg was hardly encouraging. Complicating matters further was the position of the GQG staff headquarters at Montry, halfway between Vincennes and Ferte with the chief-of-staff General Doumenc splitting his time between Gamelin and his own staff, if the latter weren’t already split between the two other command posts.

In spite of all this Gamelin was feeling confident, if not complacent. He had every confidence that the French Army could handle the German and every confidence in his plan of meeting the German thrust on the Dyle. The earlier decision to abandon the Breda variant in favour of maintaining Giraud and his Seventh Army as strategic reserve was confirmed when the Dutch withdrew into Fortress Holland on the second day of battle and henceforth played little part in the wider conflict.

This sense of relief was tempered somewhat by the baffling behaviour of the Belgians who held up units of the BEF, withdrew too fast in the south and who had managed to lose Eben Emael, supposedly the strongest fortification in the world.

On the plus side Prioux and his Cavalry Corps of 2 and 3 DLM had made a fine showing in the Gembloux Gap and managed to halt the advance of Hoepners’ XVI Corps in spite of the startling lack of Belgian defensive positions that were meant to be in place. The Germans retained the field and hence their tanks, but Prioux had given a sufficiently strong account of himself to give Gamelin cause for continued optimism.

Given that Gamelin conceived of the German main thrust coming through this area this tactical victory was seen as a favourable portent of the battle to come. When news of the German lodgement on the Meuse came he considered it a diversionary move and, while permitting the use of local and Army reserves to commence the colmatage, ordered Giraud’s movement towards Montherme and Sedan to halt.

 

[Croesus]

At dawn on Friday May 10 General Georges, CinC North-West Front telephoned his subordinate General Bilotte to move the French Army Group One into Belgium in reaction to the German opening moves. Soon after Generalissimo Gamelin telephoned Georges and shared the following momentous conversation;
‘Well, General, is it the Dyle operation’ asked Georges.
‘Since the Belgians are calling on us, do you see what else we can do?’ replied Gamelin.
‘Obviously not’ responded Georges.
And with that the Battles of the Dyle and Meuse commenced.

The French plan was to move headlong into Belgium and take up positions along the line Antwerp-Louvain-Wavre-Namur, along a substantial stretch of the River Dyle. This plan presented many advantages: it would keep Germans distant from airfields that might threaten England and kept the Channel Ports safe, it also kept the Germans away from the industrial centres of France; it shortened the front by 35 miles and potentially added up to 20 Belgian divisions to the Anglo-French total. There were difficulties such as the perils of a meeting engagement with the Germans and the troubles involved in integrating the Belgian forces. But the credits outweighed the debits and the Dyle Plan was the only plan.

The Anglo-French line was organised such as to wheel upon the hinge of Sedan and the disposition of units, taking into account the expectation that the ultimate contest would occur in or around the Gembloux Gap, recognised that the further units would have the farthest to travel. The extreme left flank, the Channel Coast, was covered by the independent XVI Corps (Fagalde), detached from Giraud’s Seventh Army, and consisted of the 9th Motorised Infantry Div (Active), the 21st Infantry Division (Active) and the 4th Infantry Division (A). [Note that Active divisions were the best available, A and North African divisions the next best while B divisions and Fortress divisions the least capable].

Fagalde’s right flank was anchored by the BEF (Gort) that disposed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th & 50th divisions in three corps. The British section extended from around Steenvorde in the west to Orchies in the east and was to take up position along the Dyle Line between Louvain and Wavre. Gort’s right flank was held by Blanchard’s First Army, the most numerous and best equipped of the French forces, consisting of the Cavalry Corps under Prioux (2nd and 3rd DLM, the French analogue of the Panzer Division), de la Laurencies’ III Corps (1st Moroccan Infantry Division, 1st Mot Inf Act and 2nd North African Infantry Division), Aymes’ IV Corp (14th Mot Inf Act & 32nd Inf A) and Altmayers’ V Corps (5th Nth Afr Inf, 12th Mot Inf Act & 101st Fortress Infantry Division). Blanchard’s role was to fill out the area between Wavre and the River Sambre.

Blanchard’s right flank was covered by Corap’s Ninth Army, which had the longest frontage of the French line moving forward. It consisted of a Cavalry Corps (1st and 4th Light Cavalry Divisions) that was pushed into the Ardennes upon commencement of hostilities, Bouffets’ II Corps (5th Mot Inf Act), Martin’s XI Corp (18th and 22nd Inf Div A) and Libaud’s XLI Corps (61st Infantry Division B and 102nd Fort Inf). Corap covered of Namur to just west of Sedan and included the best tank country of the Meuse sector.

Corap’s right flank was fixed by Huntziger’s Second Army, the poorest of the French armies and the one that was the hinge upon which the entire movement was based. It consisted of a Cavalry Corps (2nd and 5th Light Cavalry) that was also ordered into the Ardennes, Grandsard’s X Corps (3rd Nth Afr, 55th Inf B, 71st Inf B) and Doyen’s XVIII Corps (1st Colonial Infantry Division and 41st Inf A). Corap’s right flank was held by Conde’s Third Army, from which extended the Maginot Line.

Giraud's Seventh Army, less Fagalde's Corps, was held at Phillipeville such that it could retain it's strategic reserve role. It consisted of two B Infantry divisions (60th and 68th) held directly and Sciards I Corps (1st DLM and 25th Mot Inf Act). Since the cancellation of the Breda Variant, Girauds role was to provide the counterattack to the colmatage of other Corps in the event of the main German thrust being identified. Further reserves existed around Chalons-Reims, consisting of 1st, 2nd and 3rd DCR and the 1st and 4th Nth Afr Inf.

This then was how the Anglo-French sought to hold the German advance; to advance into Belgium on a hinge at Sedan. The Germans for their part sought to draw the Anglo-French into Belgium and attack the hinge at Sedan.

 

[Croesus]

The two extreme flank positions, Fagalde in Belgium and Doyen at Montmedy played no part in the momentous events of May 10 – 14. From the left the BEF reached their positions on the evening of May 12 and contacting Reichenau’s 6 Army at both Louvain and Wavre. A small breakthrough near Wavre was contained and repulsed while the 3rd Division (Montgomery) cleared the Louvain rail yards following their infiltration by two divisions of the German XI Corps.

The First Army Cavalry Corps under Prioux reached the Gembloux Gap on the evening of May 10 and held up the advance of 3 and 4 Pz under Hoepner, along the line of Firlemont-Hannut-Huy from May 12 with the culmination of battle on May 13 whereupon he withdrew. Blanchard’s’ main body had reached its positions by the evening of May 12. All was going well so far along the Dyle position.

The Ninth Army Cavalry Corps did not fare so well as they moved into the Ardennes on May 10. While they did not engage the enemy they retreated back behind the Meuse on May 12, in response to the retreat by the Second Army Cavalry Corps that had run straight into 10, 1 and 2 Pz Div on the evening of May 10 and morning of May 11. Both Cavalry Corps were back behind the Meuse by May 12.

Only one division of those moving forward from Corap’s Second Army, 5th Mot Inf Act at Namur, was fully in place by the time the first German units arrived at the Meuse. Of the other two, 18th Inf A had only half of its battalions in place by evening of May 12 with the remainder arriving on May 13, while 22nd Inf A had five battalions in position on the morning of May 13, but without their AT Guns. Corap’s other two divisions were not required to move and already in place, though in the case of the 102nd Fort Inf there was no transport for movement, nor artillery, with the majority of the division made up of static machine gun battalions.

At Sedan, the focal point of both campaigns, the French had in Grandsard’s X Corps the weakest concentration of force. From the morning of May 13 extremely heavy air and artillery fire pounded the positions of 55th Inf B. By the afternoon two German assault crossings had taken crucial positions at the heights of the Bois de la Marfee and Croix Piot. By the evening the German bridgehead was five miles deep and three miles wide and the 55th collapsed. The 71st Inf B had been in reserve 40 miles behind the front and had reached their positions to the right of 55th Inf B on the evening of May 12. They managed to hold up the attack of 10 Pz and denied the Germans the heights of Noyers. However the collapse of the 55th led to their retreat and, in turn, disintegration on the morning of May 14. Two French divisions had been driven from the field.

Upstream further German attacks went in on May 13. The sector of 18th Inf A was breached at Houx by elements of 7 Pz and the high ground taken. A local counterattack was called off and the Germans rapidly began to reinforce their position, command being taken by their dashing General Rommel at the secondary crossing point at Bouvignes. By noon 13 the German pocket was three miles wide and two miles deep. Another counterattack by 18th Inf A was successful on the evening of May 13, but the infantry did not accompany the tanks and gains could not be held. The Germans continued to reinforce and the 18th began to waver.

To the right of the 18th Inf A, 22nd Inf A became engaged by an assault crossing of the German 32 Inf Div at Givet on May 14 and the French began to withdraw. Also engaged in the same general movement was the 102nd Fort Inf which managed to hold in the face of pressure by Reinhardt’s XLI Corps and at the least succeeded in keeping the Germans on the far bank. Where matters were going well on the Dyle, they were not on the Meuse.

It was at this point, this crucial time, that the benefit of not committing to the Breda Variant was felt. Giraud’s Seventh Army was close at hand to the hard pressed 18th Inf A and its I Corps under Sciard was despatched, arriving at the northern end of the German pocket at Dinant by noon of May 13. The Germans, only just bringing their tanks across, were unable to prevent the overrunning of the northern end of the pocket by the tanks of 1st DLM, having only recently beaten off counterattacks launched, albeit shakily, by 5th Mot Inf Div from Namur. On the following morning of May 14, supported by the arrival of 4th Nth Afr, Sciard rolled up the remainder of the German pocket even as their tanks were coming across. The brave General Rommel was taken prisoner, gravely wounded.

Equally in strife, the 22nd Inf A was beginning to fold as German reinforcements sought to follow up on their success at Givet, and had begun to collapse upon the arrival of 1st Nth Afr and 1st DCR. The North African Infantry managed to hold the German pressure and it was the arrival of the ‘infantry tanks’ of the DCR on May 14 that finally and completely sealed off the German bridgehead on the lower Meuse. No counterattacks were forthcoming of course as that was not within the French capacity, but for the moment the threat of a German breakout was relieved.

At Sedan, where two French divisions had been destroyed, coincidence decided the day. Following the loss of Grandsard’s Corps, Huntziger transferred sector responsibility to Flavigny’s XXI Corps on May 14, consisting of the reserve units of 3rd DCR, the 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act. Flavigny was unable to launch his planned counterattack as the DCR had arrived out of fuel and it was only at 4.00PM that he was able to marshal his forces. He had doubts, and they were serious, and if he had not had the benefit of a third division it is likely he would not have gone through with the attack. But he did and his units, hitherto unknown to the Germans, commenced their attack half an hour after Guderian commenced the westward wheel that would put the Manstein Plan into action. Guderian had argued with Von Kleist about the vulnerability of the southern flank this would expose to the French and had eventually got his way. At this point the German pocket was 10 miles deep on a front of 15 miles and it was at this point, when the panzers were aiming for the interior that the three French divisions struck the vulnerable German flank and following a burst of heavy if unequal fighting completely dislocated the German movement and Guderian found himself cut off from his lines of supply.

The first attempt at breakthrough had failed. Losses on both sides were severe, more so for the French. But the colmatage was beginning to take hold and two prime exponents of panzer warfare were absent from the chain of command.

 

[Croesus]

Rome was not, like the rest of the world, looking west from May 10 when Germany and France finally took up direct arms against the other. The unofficial liaison established between the 2e Bureau and SIM had given Mussolini cause for encouragement with respect to fears of Anglo-French intervention in another peripheral front, that is the Mediterranean, as they had done in Norway and planned to do in the Caucasus. His gamble in moving the semi-motorised 'Libyan' Infantry Divisions 15th Sibelle and 16th Pescatori from Fifth Army (Libya) to Second Army (Albania/Montenegro) and the 3rd Infantry Division Ravenna and 1st Infantry Division Superga from First Army (Valle D'Aosta) and Fourth Army (Piedmont) respectively to Eighth Army (Croatia) seems to have paid off as all three of the North African powers found it worthwhile to look over their shoulders and concentrate on other matters.

There were still concerns regarding what Ciano saw as warmongering elements in the Admiralty and their interests in seeing a weaker Italy in the Mediterranean, and these concerns were reinforced by the accession of the ‘naval’ Churchill to Downing Street on the eve of the German attack. However, as the Germans attacked it was considered that he would have other matters to deal with rather than giving thought to placing pressure on Italy. Diplomatic advances with regards to the blockade were rebuffed but it was noted that the blockade, hardly watertight at even its most rigorous, seemed to slacken off over time and it was hoped that the Franco-Italian rapprochement contributed to this.

The visit by US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had gone well, with the American given substantial cause to believe that Italy stood for peace and would continue to do so; but also sending the signal that the arbiter of peace in Europe was Hitler and that, clearly given the disparity of strength between Germany and Italy, there was not much that Rome could accomplish if Berlin did not want to contribute. And the recent events on the Dyle and Meuse only supported this position. Italy was, like all Europe, a tragic hostage to Anglo-Franco-German fortune, and such a shame it was that innocent Italians were suffering as a result. The meeting with Hitler at the Brenner Pass had also gone well. Hitler had rambled and Mussolini listened and the Fuhrer had left congratulating himself on the results of the harangue, while the Duce had managed to avoid any further commitments, moral or material, to the German war effort. Italy was slowly pulling away from Germany and Hitler, intoxicated with war and focused on the developments in France, was too drunk to notice.

Rome was not, like the rest of the world, looking west; it was looking east. There were two threads to this. The first was as a natural extension to Italian foreign policy. First the Vittoria Iugoslavia and then the treaty and staff talks with Romania, both following on from the resumption of the non-aggression pact with Greece and the new working relationship with Hungary. Italy was looking to expand economically, militarily and politically along its horizontal axis and was making a fairly good fist of things. Eastern and Southern Europe had reacted poorly to announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and in Italy they saw a means of preventing the expansion of Bolshevism into the region. Italy knew this and capitalised upon it.

The second thread was the Anglo-French determination to bomb Baku and Batum, and by extension, bring Turkey into the war on their side. Operations had been scheduled for the beginning of June and naval, air and ground assets were being gathered at the same time as increasing pressure being placed upon Istanbul (of course in the event of Turkish obduracy, the operation would proceed regardless). It was only the commencement of hostilities in France that cast a shadow on the operation, although it was not cancelled, a fact soon appreciated by SIM. The Black Sea was becoming increasingly politicised and it seemed only a matter of time before it was either drawn into the Anglo-Franco-German conflict, or became imperilled by the growing threat of an Italo-Soviet one.

The most significant outcome of the Anglo-French planning for the bombing of the Baku and Batum was in fact the alerting of Moscow to the threat to its interests in the area and the associated provision of more generous peace terms to Finland. The idea in Paris had been to help the Finns and their planning had achieved this; but not by dealing Russia a blow, rather by giving Russia an incentive to make peace. Upon the conclusion of the Finno-Russian war large sections of the Red Army began relocating to the wider Black Sea region, and at the same time as joint Italo-Romanian exercises began to increase in tempo.

 

[Croesus]

Hopefully we can see a map...

 

[Croesus]

Soon after the German attack on France an exclusive and high-level conference took place at the remote hotel on Campo Imperatore, Gran Sasso d’Italia. Attending were Guarnieri, of late the Minister for Exchange and Currency and now Mussolini’s personal advisor on economic and fiscal matters, Marshall Cavallero, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and hence de facto representative of the King, Ciano, as Foreign Minister but as importantly Mussolini’s right hand man, and of course the Duce himself.

Notable by their absence were any prominent Fascist dignitaries, as sure a signal as any that the mood in Rome was changing and Mussolini was well on his way to establishing a government by cult of personality. The agenda in the empty hotel guarded by Libyan paratroopers, overseen by SIM agents and maintained by Mussolini’s personal staff, was the prosecution of Italian foreign and military policy over the foreseeable future.

First to speak was Guarnieri. The Italian economy was transitioning to a war footing but it was taking time and the significant challenges it faced were proving in parts too much for its industrial base to withstand without experiencing difficulty and delay. The energy situation was easing; the uninterrupted flow of Libyan oil together with the slow take up of natural gas fired furnaces had gone some way to mitigating the effects of the now shakily enforced British blockade of German brown coal.

The supply of Mosul oil, previously interrupted, looked liable to resume following the subtle changes of British policy as evidenced by encouraging reports by Italian negotiators, and also encouraged by French industrial interests. The industrial base remained small but some contracts had been taken up by Croatian industry and construction and conversion of Italian plant was proceeding, albeit slowly. The foreign exchange situation was improving as exports otherwise taken up by Germany were re-routed through Italian ports and an additional foreign currency source had stemmed from the recent links established with Romania. Italy remained an agricultural economy, but it was changing and at a reasonably manageable rate.

Cavallero followed. The Regio Esercito now could field 22 infantry divisions, three armoured divisions and four alpine divisions. Its artillery was strong and its tank force reasonable. Its morale was good and recruitment rates increasing, supplemented by taking up portions of the ex-Yugoslav army that were not able to find places in the new Slovenian and Croatian armies. In the eight months since the Yugoslav war efforts were being made to further increase the army’s efficiency and cadre, but it was slow going. Certainly there could be no thought of opening a second front, especially if the recent reports of Soviet redeployment from Finland were correct.

In fact there were signs of growing Serbian-Croat tension that might undermine the Italian position, and there was always the issue of the region undergoing further trauma from unresolved Greco-Bulgarian issues. The Regia Aeronautica and Regia Marina were both undergoing refit programs with the former taking into account lessons learned in Yugoslavia as well as some of the lessons from Poland, Norway and, now, Belgium. The RM was still not capable of safely taking on the Royal Navy, though recent political developments had helped matters somewhat, especially the evacuation of the main British base from Malta to Alexandria. The RA for its part was busy establishing new bases or taking over Yugoslav ones and was as yet still only partly modernised.

Ciano concluded. Germany was sorely tested by the Vittoria Iugoslavia and were it not for Hitler’s wandering eye, he was sure Italy would be dealing with some sort of consequence over its ‘presumption’ into an area that Berlin has specifically identified as an economic hinterland. However, busy as Berlin now was in the west, it could be expected that other events would overshadow the Italian conquest and help to make it a fait accompli. The Anglo-French clearly do not want Italian belligerence and there is some strength to the thought that the French in particular would be willing to make a significant investment to secure Italian friendship.

Fortunately the British blockade is preventing matters from having to be confronted sooner than preferred but there is a sense that London will drop, or at least mitigate, the blockade at which time Italy would have to make its position clear. Relations with Russia could go both ways; there could be war if Moscow choses to push into Romania and Italy becomes entangled, or there could entail some sort of division of spoils or uneasy peace as each meets the others. The smaller nations such as Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Hungary have differing relations with Rome, with Hungary being the strongest partner, but in no way is Italy in a particularly vulnerable political situation.

Mussolini listened and liked what he heard. His lengthy pronouncement indicated where he thought things should now go and he hoped the others would see to it that his wishes were enacted. Following further discussion the conference broke up, each of the three main forces within Mussolinian Italy now cognisant of Italian direction and their respective roles.

 

[Croesus]

At the end of the fourth day of fighting along the Dyle/Meuse the honours had been more or less shared between the two sides. The Germans had attacked along the length of the line from Louvain to Sedan and the Anglo-French had held them. Gort’s BEF had held Louvain to Wavre, Blanchard’s First Army had held the Gembloux Gap, Corap’s Ninth Army had held Namur to Mezieres and Huntziger’s Second Army had contained the initial German bridgehead at Sedan. Gamelin felt that his confidence in the Dyle Plan in particular, and the French Army in general was justified, and once he heard that the Dinant pocket had been closed and the Sedan bridgehead contained, he returned his attention to the Gembloux Gap and Belgium. It was a grave miscalculation.

GQG had come to the erroneous conclusion that the Meuse actions were economy-of-force measures designed to draw the French reserves southwards. After action reports from Ninth Army had wrongly concluded that the Dinant Pocket had been forced, not by Panzer divisions, but by motorised and regular infantry, supported by independent tank battalions (as they themselves would tend to deploy their own tanks). Because of the proximity of Giraud’s Seventh Army the two attacking German Corps of Stauss (II) and Hoth (XV) had only managed to establish elements of the accompanying infantry of 12, 32 and 62 Inf Div, rather than the panzers of 5 and 7 Pz. The few tanks that made it across the Meuse confirmed the French in their view that this was a local attack only. What they did not realise was that over the period of initial fighting, and just afterwards, the remainder of von Kluge’s Fourth Army had drawn up on the far bank and were preparing, with the bulk of the two panzer divisions, a second crossing.

The second attempt was going to utilise the extreme bombing of the French as used in the successful Sedan attack and focusing this time not on the centre where the previous attempts failed, but on the flanks. Hoth would attack with 5 Pz and 62 Inf further down the Meuse and close to Namur, between Yvoir and Bois de Villiers while Stauss would attack near Givet with 7 Pz, 12 Inf and 32 Inf, at the place where 32 Inf got across on the first attempt. Ruoff (V Corps) would be strengthened from Army reserve and attack north of Stauss near Hermeton with 211 and 251 Inf, while Heitz (VIII Corps) would make a demonstration in the centre with 8 and 28 Inf. The remaining two infantry divisions would be held in reserve and ready to reinforce success.

During the first round the 102nd Fortress Division had successfully contained the attacks by 6 and 8 Pz by Reinhardt (XXXI Corps) and GQG had again failed to correctly identify the attacking troops. That the 102nd, a mere Fortress Division, had been able to hold its own indicated that the Germans did not consider the sector important, again being seen as confirming that the real push would be coming further north. While the French were congratulating themselves List was bringing up further elements of his Twelfth Army and preparing for a much larger attack along the length of the Meuse between Revin and Mezieres. This time Reinhardt would combine with Haase (III Corps) giving a strong force of 3 & 23 Inf, 2 Mot Inf and 6 and 8 Pz attacking on both sides of Montherme. Accompanying this main attack would be Beyer’s strong (XVIII Corps) of 5 Inf, 21 Inf, 25 Inf and 1 Geb that would attack on both sides of Revin. The remaining divisions of Twelfth were still arriving but it was hoped that they would be in place in time to reinforce the crossing or exploit any breakthrough.

However the main German attack would be through the Sedan bridgehead in an effort both to enlarge it and to recover contact with the strong elements of 1 and 2 Pz that, along with Guderian himself, had been cut off by the French counterattack at the moment of the westward wheel. This attack would see the strong reserves of Busch’s Sixteenth Army diverted to assist the assault of 10 Pz together with surviving units of 1 and 2 Pz to attack towards Guderian. Together with 13 and 29 Moth Inf, a total of six infantry divisions (6, 15, 26, 33,52 and 71 Inf) would shoulder through the bridgehead seeking to wrest the initiative from the French.

For the second push at the Meuse to work OKW still needed the Anglo-French to see danger between Louvain and Gembloux and for this von Reichenau’s Sixth Army was required to hurl itself once more upon the British at Louvain and the French at Gembloux. To attract as much French armour as possible 4 Pz was transferred from von Schwedler’s IV Corps into von Hoepner’s XVI Corps so that as vigorous a tank attack could be made upon the Gembloux Gap as possible. Prioux’s cavalry Corps of 2 and 3 DLM had been withdrawn but it was hoped they and other French tank reserves could be lured into the fight. Von Reichenau was able to concentrate ten divisions along the Anglo-French line and drove the attacks hard. The very heavy fighting that followed proved persuasive to the French self-deceit.

 

[Croesus]

At Sedan Flavigny’s XXI Corps, consisting of the 3rd DCR, 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act had dislocated Guderian’ westward turning movement and separated strong elements of both tank and infantry of 1 and 2 Pz from the German bridgehead. The only remaining division of Grandsard’s X Corps, 3rd Nth Afr that had been holding the right flank of the corps frontage, was advancing towards Sedan and encountering blocking positions set up by 10 Pz and 29 Mot Inf. The impetus of Flavigny’s counterattack had carried the French into the Bois de la Marfee, the dominating position at Sedan; however the stiff German resistance bolstered by the first units of the second attempt arriving at Sedan piecemeal, served to break up the unity of the French movement. This led to considerable confusion in the area, with neither side really having complete control.

Guderians’ mixed battle group had meanwhile arrived at and was seeking passage across the Bar. It was here that occurred one of the few great moments of the French defensive campaign. As the battle of the first phase had developed, Libaud, commander of the French XLI Corps of Ninth Army, seeking to hold the line from Dinant to Montherme, had deployed the 53rd Inf B to hold the line of the Bar and prevent exactly the sort of movement that Guderian was seeking to obtain. The French infantry had themselves rallied some of the artillery of the now disintegrated 55th Inf B following its destruction at Sedan earlier and had only reached its positions when Guderians advance guard appeared. Astride the road that the Germans were advancing down was a particularly pugnacious regiment and its stand went a long way to reversing the rot that was the greatest threat facing the French army at this point.

The battle for Sedan, or more particularly the Bois de la Marfee and River Bar became now a game of numbers. The French could muster five, and were counting on the arrival of 14th Inf Act which was detraining but could not feasibly reach the area for another day. The Germans also fielded five, but could expect reinforcements of as many more. Admittedly the French had more in the form of reserves moving up to the front in general, but their deployment depended on the whim and will of GQG and their ability to control the battle. This was dependent on their attention not being drawn to the Dyle and given the news of a ferocious battle that was developing for the BEF around Louvain, keeping attention on the Meuse was not proving easy.

This is not to say that the French were entirely oblivious to the threat on the Meuse. On the contrary, when news broke that the 102nd Fortress had been overwhelmed between Revin and Montherme, where it had in fact been blasted out of existence by a shocking display of force that outdid even the bombing of the 55th Inf B at Sedan, it was clear that trouble was afoot in the area. The opinion that the Meuse and not the Dyle should receive the bulk of reinforcements might have been unanimous had not von Kluge been held up again at Dinant and Givet, where the seven French divisions that had won the day on the first German attempt were still in situ and not at all inclined to move.

It was felt that this attack demonstrated the effectiveness of the French defensive system and that Giraud could shift his more mobile units southwards to link up with the 44th Inf Act that was at present moving into the area. Where Sedan was a game of numbers, Montherme was a game of timing, as it had been on the first German attempt at the Meuse. Would the Germans establish their pontoon bridges before the French colmatage developed, or would the French arrive in time for the bursting of the dam.

 

[Croesus]

The essence of the Manstein Plan was a fast moving thrust severing the lines of communication of the Anglo-French in order to annihilate their armies in the field. The decisive arms in this offensive conception were the panzer divisions, their attendant motorised infantry and the tactical support provided by the Luftwaffe. The bulk of the army was as it was in the Great War, restricted to speed of boot and hoof, and ultimately vulnerable to fatigue and loss of momentum. The point of the Manstein Plan was to provide an opportunity for strategic victory that was otherwise missing; the alternative to blitzkrieg was the war of the continuous front. Hitler had effectively hedged his bets: he would give the panzers every opportunity to deliver a knockout blow, but was equally prepared to sustain another western front. Which of the two would transpire was a matter of fate and luck.

Of the ten German panzer divisions available for the attack, three were deployed away from the intended breakthrough area: 3 and 4 Pz with Reichenau’s Sixth Army and 9 Pz with von Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army. Of the remaining seven, two (5 and 7 Pz) were arrayed against Namur/Dinant/Givet which, while admittedly excellent tank country, was also closer to the expected main direction of the Anglo-French advance and, hence, their reserves. While it was hoped these two would contribute materially to the breakthrough, they were not concentrated in decisive strength. The main thrust would come at Sedan and Montherme, through the Ardennes, and field five panzer divisions (1, 2 & 10 Pz at Sedan, and 6 and 8 Pz at Montherme). It was these divisions that would provide the breakthrough, accompanied by the three motorised infantry divisions (2, 13 & 29 Mot Inf) and preceding the inexorable advance of the infantry divisions as they drove a wedge between the French Second and Ninth Armies.

No plan survives first contact with the enemy. Where the Guderians and Rommels of the Panzer Corps envisaged sweeping all the way to the sea before turning and annihilating a retreating and confused mass of Anglo-French soldiery in the first week of fighting they had to accept a more prosaic result. At Sedan 1 and 2 Pz had been split, the larger group running up against the blocking position of 53rd Inf B at the Bar, the smaller group getting ground down by the remorseless advance of 3rd DCR, 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act at the Bois de la Marfee. Also at Sedan 10 Pz had been held up first by 71st Inf B and thence, following that division’s collapse, the arrival of 3rd Nth Afr such that it was not able to influence the developing battle.

At Montherme Reinhardt’s 6 and 8 Pz had on their second attempt overcome the surprisingly stout 103rd Fortress but were yet to get sufficient bridges up to permit their tanks to cross. Here it was still an infantry battle, as it was at Dinant and Givet where Hoth and Stauss were again prevented from getting 5 and 7 Pz across, the latter still feeling the loss of their influential commander Rommel. In fact the entire second movement of the German attack was developing into an infantry action as the bulk of the German force arrived and, while there was still hope for a breakout, it was not seen as being led by the panzer divisions, rather developed by them. At the end of the first week there was no German breakthrough; this was by no stretch of the imagination a French defensive victory, but the there was less anticipation now for the ‘race to the sea’.

 

[Croesus]

The intersecting, and conflicting, interests of the triad of revisionist powers, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, dominated the Danubian-Balkan region following the dissolution of Versailles Yugoslavia.

Of the three there was a definite unity of purpose exercised between Rome and Budapest, particularly towards ensuring that Serbia remained quiet and that further German economic expansion eastwards was halted. In fact talks had commenced from December 1939 in Novi Sad discussing measures of ensuring that Berlin’s influence was progressively reduced. In February staff talks commenced examining a range of issues ranging from counter-insurgency operations against the growing Serbian discontent at the combined Italo-Hungarian occupation to means of preventing any form of Russo-Bulgarian cooperation against Romania.

The issue of Slovakia had been prominent in Budapest since the taking up of the Yugoslav provinces in October 1939. Planning around the creation of a border incident and organisation of military resources had commenced around the same time as the talks with the Regio Esercito; in fact two Italian staff officers were present in an advisory capacity, and additional Italian regiments brought into Serbia to take up the slack while Hungarian units were discreetly moved up to the Slovakian border. It was felt that it would be an unnecessary risk to create the incident while Germany still had freedom of movement while France remain unengaged, especially in light of the deterioration in relations between Ribbentrop and Ciano and the suspicions of the former about the intentions and motivations of the Hungarians.

So it was that while Rommel was being captured Hungary accuse Slovakian police of mistreating Magyar minorities and proceed to crash across the border, the advance units notably using freshly painted Italian-made tanks. The attack led to the expected crisis in the Slovakian government and the Hlinka Guard took to the streets in Bratislava. Germany could not, and would not, intervene on behalf of the Slovakians and within a short time a deal had been done between Berlin and Budapest that led to the dissolution of the short-lived Slovakian state. Hungary took over large parts of ‘claimed’ territory directly while permitting a continuation of the authoritarian-clerical Tiso regime ruling in Hungarian interests. Germany obtained transit rights to Romania and a renewed pledge of Hungarian loyalty but the sorry tale did not reflect well on Berlin in general, and Ribbentrop in particular.

While Hungary was involved in Slovakia and Italy increasingly concerned with counter-insurgency in Serbia and its staff talks and manoeuvres with Romania, Bulgaria and Greece began to move towards armed conflict. The initial battlefield was not Macedonia, but the Dobrudja. The two shared a new border between their new positions in ex-Yugoslav Epirus and Macedonia, and the relationship was not a pleasant one. But Athens, emboldened by its gains and perhaps misreading the Italian diplomatic and military ploy of the Romanian non-aggression pact, declared that any Bulgarian move into the Dobrudja would be seen as initiating forced revision and that, claiming the likelihood of Bulgaria then turning its attention to the remainder of Macedonia, and as a result would lead to Greek intervention in the Romanian interest.

This of course was met with a thundering denunciation from Sofia and a fresh set of solicitations to Moscow for arms and advice. This clumsy piece of Greek diplomacy was not particularly welcome in Bucharest, but at least they had recourse to Italian support. As the war of words escalated and tempers began to be lost, small clashes began in Epirus/Macedonia and Bulgaria, Greece and Romania began to mobilise forces along their respective borders.

 

[Croesus]

The Belgian army had commenced its retreat from the Albert Canal on the night of May 11 and only agreed to come under the overall command of the French the following day, at which point the Cavalry divisions of the French Second and Ninth Armies had been driven back to the west bank of the Meuse. The Queen and government of the Netherlands had fled on May 13, around the time when the French were closing in on the Dinant/Givet pocket and the Belgians were withdrawing under fire into the northern sector of the Anglo-French front, and the fighting in Holland began to die down soon after. The Dutch surrendered on May 15 although, for them, the war was over the previous evening.

Things were not going well in the north, but the cost was not being borne by the Anglo-French and so was not so bad as to be disastrous. A German attack across the Meuse had been held up by May 14 and another attack at Louvain-Wavre-Gembloux had been similarly held up by May 15. The Anglo-French were holding and, while the Dutch had surrendered, the Belgians were still in the field and protecting Brussels and Antwerp. This was the news despatched from Paris to London and the newly installed Prime Minister, Churchill, was relieved that his first act of office was not to have to preside over a disaster in France. There was a disaster coming, which he could not know, and it would be in France; but it would not be a disaster for the French.

The task initially given to von Reichenau’s Sixth Army was to cause the Anglo-French to over-commit to the Belgian lowlands such that the breakout from the Ardennes would be made easier. The Sixth Army had fought an inconclusive action with Prioux’ Cavalry Corps in the Gembloux Gap and made two small breakthroughs at Louvain and Wavre but had otherwise been held in place. When the second German attempt to break the Meuse began, von Reichenau’s orders were the same; except this time he had more divisions at his disposal following their exhausting march westwards. Subsequently at the end of May 17, when a full scale battle was raging at Sedan and Reinhardt only just beginning to bring tanks across the Meuse at Montherme, von Reichenau launched a much stiffer attack at the Louvain rail yards, where he had been bested three days prior.

Louvain was defended by the BEF 3rd Division, and Wavre the BEF 2nd Division and in the previous phase of fighting both units had been successful in holding their ground due to the deployment in depth of substantial artillery assets. In this second German attack one of the salient features of the German campaign, a devastating concentration of tactical air power, was brought to bear on the Louvain-Wavre front. It had previously been used at Sedan on May 13, thence at Dinant/Give on May 15 and now at Louvain/Wavre on May 17. Each time the result was the same; dislocation, demoralisation and destruction. The RAF were at least in the air but, following the severe losses attempting to bomb the Belgian bridges, were not as coherent as the Luftwaffe and certainly not able to bring the same level of concentration as their opponents.

With the otherwise excellent artillery unable to properly secure them, the 2nd and 3rd divisions were unable to match the German force of numbers and by the end of May 18 von Reichenau had fought his way across the Dyle in four places and was holding his ground while behind him Montgomery’s 3rd was trapped in Louvain and the 2nd only just managing to extricate itself from Wavre. Von Reichenau had, rather than acting as a simple foil to the main effort, managed to obtain a significant concentration of German forces on the French side of the Dyle-Meuse line and, given the large amount of infantry at his disposal, was very optimistic about his ability to widen the gap. As his success began to develop he pulled from the front the near-exhausted 3 and 4 Pz in an effort to capitalise on his unexpected success.

 

[Croesus]

Following the German lodgement across the Dyle on the previous day, Lord Gort demonstrated the wisdom of his deployment in depth and moved forward the supporting 4th and 48th divisions, as well as the two divisions in reserve, the 5th and 50th. The 3rd division was still trapped in Louvain and the 2nd being forced back from Wavre, but the 1st still held in place. However the British movement was not swift enough to prevent von Reichenau from reinforcing his bridgeheads and by the end of 18 May had the bulk of four divisions, 7, 11, 18 & 223 Inf, across the river albeit without much of their heavy equipment. The German advance forced the retreat of some of the British artillery units as they became exposed to German observation, which helped cement the German hold on the far bank.

The German move gave considerable cause for alarm for the Belgian King and government and assurances were immediately sought for the defence of Brussels being given the utmost priority. Lord Gort could, or would, not give an unequivocal guarantee and this led to a furious telegram to London demanding that the British government ensure the Belgian position. Churchill assured King Albert that Britain indeed gave a high priority to Belgian sovereignty, as it had in the Great War, and would demonstrate this by the despatch of additional fighter squadrons. These units had been earmarked for home defence but, with the savage losses suffered by the Anglo-French air forces and the havoc wrought by the Luftwaffe on Anglo-French ground positions, it was thought expedient to move some of the valuable fighters into Belgium and northern France.

Heavy fighting continued in Louvain which was now completely sealed off from friendly lines, although night patrols were still able to maintain contact and there an effort to move south down the line of Dyle by Belgian troops attracted much hope. However the 3rd Division was slowly being shelled to pieces and in the early hours of May 19 Montgomery lost control of the rail yards, permitting a large scale German infiltration of the British positions and splitting their line. As the Belgians in the north reached German blocking positions and the counterattacking British divisions impacted upon von Reichenau’s units on the west bank it became clear that Louvain was lost. Faced with the choice of a bitter fight to the death which would undoubtedly destroy much of Louvain and cause major civilian casualties, Montgomery gave the order for his command to make their way to friendly lines as best they can, but to surrender where there was no choice. With his staff he surrendered in the late afternoon of May 19 and with him von Reichenau obtained an invaluable launching point across the British main line and aiming directly at Brussels.

A day earlier the heroic resistance of the French 53rd Inf B at the River Bar was broken and Guderians panzers, now only a large battle group, finally was able to move inland towards Mezieres and there meet up with the panzers of Reinhardt. The town itself had been occupied that same day by two regiments of the French 38th Inf A and while they were unable to prevent Guderians movement, they were equally unmoved by German attempts to dislodge them. For his part Guderian had for the moment lost much of his fire and, with broken communications, was unsure of where to direct his next stroke. On the other side of Mezieres Reinhardt was concentrating his strength for an attack towards Rocroi while also ensuring his hard won bridgehead held. It was at this point that the French 2 DCR and 44th Inf Act arrived in the area in the evening of May 19 and immediately confused fighting erupted. This development was quite unexpected for the French who had not fully comprehended the scale of the German breakthrough following the pulverisation of the 103rd Fortress. Belatedly units from Giraud’s Seventh Army were despatched south from Dinant/Givet, where further if not weaker German attempts to get across had been again held.

As he was moving south the French positions at Sedan were reinforced by the arrival of the 14th Inf A, although by this time the front lines were very fluid and there was no real conception of where the German positions extended. This was due in part to the heavy and sustained fighting that had occurred in the area since May 13, but also because finally the full weight of the German infantry were now arriving and making their presence felt.

 

[Croesus]

Following the loss of Louvain the character and tone of the Battle of France changed. It was not entirely due to the loss of the Belgian city, nor the surrender of a British general, nor the dissolution of his command. It was as a result of a range of factors that had developed so swiftly since the conflict accelerated on May 10.

Luxembourg had been overrun, the Dutch had surrendered, but the Belgians were still in the fight, albeit nervously. Belgium was the latest neutral to be attacked by a great power and joined the long list of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, Denmark and Norway; yet Belgium was also the only one to have on its soil Anglo-French forces arrayed in depth and strength. Belgium became, as Finland was so recently, a rallying point and continental line in the sand; a role that she had taken up in the Great War and now in this war. The loss of Louvain meant that Brussels would become a bastion, and one defended as staunchly as possible. Louvain combined the violation of Belgian statehood with an insult to British arms and from the date of its loss the British became increasingly belligerent and deliberate in their actions.

Where Louvain was the rallying point for the British, so Sedan was the rallying point for the French. It became clear upon the arrival of the 14th Inf A that the Germans were attacking in hitherto unguessed strength and Sedan, site of an inglorious past, gave opportunity for the sons of the heroes of Verdun to reprise the roles of their fathers. The shameful collapse of the 55th Inf B and 71st Inf B were taken firstly as a result of the shock of the impact of the dashing and impressive German army and then as an example not to be followed; and the doomed performance of the 103rd Fortress and 53rd Inf B became the exemplars of the French war effort.

This being as it was did not change the inevitability of the outcome at Sedan. The town was lost again and this time irrevocably as sheer weight of numbers told and the French defenders were forced back. The 53rd Inf B had been destroyed, 43rd Inf Act spent, 3rd Nth Afr overstretched and 3rd DCR and 3rd Mot Inf largely reduced to isolated pockets of defenders in the face of increasing numbers of fresh German divisions. Sedan was lost but with its loss the French army found its honour.
In the centre the French still held the important ground at Namur/Dinant/Givet, though not without the Germans trying their utmost to breakthrough. As the overall battle developed and the French retained this position, German attention began to turn to the possibilities of a battle of encirclement. Louvain had fallen and Wavre threatened to the north, while to the south Revin/Montherme was the site of a significant German breakthrough – although the important town of Mezieres had not fallen. Given that Hoth and Stauss were nearly exhausted the order to cease offensive operations in the area was welcomed. The German attention would now turn to developing the promise of the bridgeheads at Revin/Montherme.

Such attention was not solely theirs, as the French also came to the realisation that in this area there was a grave threat. Georges acted with an alacrity that belied his utter exhaustion and brought to the aid of the 2nd DCR the rested and replenished 2nd and 3rd DLM of Prioux’ Cavalry Corps, as reinforced by the 1st DLM which was moved south from Dinant. The scene was here set for the largest tank battle of the war to date. Where the clash between 2nd and 3rd DLM and 3 and 4 Pz at Gembloux was essentially a draw and inconclusive in terms of either side forcing a decisive result, the looming battle between four French and three German (the Guderian kampfgruppe of 1 and 2 Pz, plus Reinhardt’s 6 and 8 Pz) was taking on a sense of great anticipation.

Finally the air battle began its second stage. In the first the Luftwaffe swept the sky of its opponents while also obtaining an extremity of tactical force in support of the Wehrmacht. However the recent arrival of reinforcing RAF fighters, a reorganisation of the Armee de l’Air and a change of approach forced largely by the grievous losses suffered by the Anglo-French tactical bombers would see a strong challenge thrown down to German air superiority.

This then was the form the Battle of France would henceforth take. And Mussolini was extremely pleased.