A Fitter Italian Military

[thread=67267]Discussion thread[/thread]

Il Duce said many things. Some he meant, others he did not. He liked to say one thing and then another; it confused issues and attracted attention. However there were things that he consistently said over the years that he consistently meant. One of those things, and certainly the most significant thing, was that he meant to make war. His sometime rival and sometime ally Adolf Hitler knew this; “So long as the Duce lives, one can rest assured that Italy will seize every opportunity to achieve its imperialistic aims”. Whatever the situation that confronted him, there was no doubt in Il Duce’s mind as to who was in charge; "You must all understand that I am not be contradicted because it only raises bouts in my mind and diverts me from what I know to be the right path, whereas my own animal instincts are always right".

Il Duce preferred a foreign policy of making a nuisance of himself by small-scale provocation in the hope that a situation might emerge that he could exploit. He saw war as a path to glory, as a means to an immortal end, as a right of passage that would transform Italy, and by extension himself, into something great and powerful. He would say that “… war alone could make a people truly noble…” that “"... [Italian] policy would continue to be based on a strong army and on the fact it was war and not peace that would bring the necessary change to Europe..."

He saw the challenge that faced Italy in very clear terms; “Italy… is bathed by a landlocked sea that communicates with the oceans through the Suez Canal, an artificial link easily blocked even by improvised methods, and through the straits of Gibraltar, dominated by the cannons of Great Britain. Italy therefore does not have free connection with the oceans. Italy is therefore in truth a prisoner of the Mediterranean, and the more populous and prosper Italy becomes, the more its imprisonment will gall. The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunis, Malta, Cyprus. The sentinels of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez. Corsica is a pistol pointed at the heart of Italy; Tunisia at Sicily; while Malta and Cyprus constitute a threat to all our positions in the eastern and western Mediterranean. Greece, Turkey, Egypt have been ready to form a chain with Great Britain and to complete the politico-military encirclement of Italy. Greece, Turkey, Egypt must be considered virtual enemies of Italy and of its expansion”.

On May 22 1939 Italy and Germany joined in the ‘Pact of Steel’, a purely offensive alliance that was the culmination in an often stormy relationship that extended back to the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 and the mutual interests in the Spanish Civil War, not to mention the commonalities between Fascism and National Socialism, and the personal relationship between the two dictators. In August 1939 Il Duce was invited to get in step with the Fuhrer as he prepared for the invasion of Poland; in the event Il Duce balked because he knew that Italy could not make war as it’s army was at that time incapable.

This TL sets out to examine how a more capable Italian army might have developed and what it may have looked like; it looks at the impact such an army would have had in those dangerous years of 1939/40 as well as seeing how things might have resulted. It is not a 360-degree look at Fascist Italy and focuses primarily on the fundamental direction of Italian foreign policy, the nature and makeup of the army, and economic issues affecting the military’s ability to make war.

It is appropriate for a moment to pause and remember that Il Duce was removed from power in 1943 by his generals after only three years of general war before considering closely, what might have happened if there had been a Fitter Italian Military?

The First Half of the 1920’s

Italy asserted a right to special responsibility in the Balkans because she had a common frontier with the newly created state of Yugoslavia and had ambitions over Albania; control of Albania was seen as giving effective control of the Adriatic by virtue of holding both shores of the Strait of Otranto. Strategically and economically this area was full of promise to anyone who thought imperially and it was there that Il Duce first began to show his hand. He confessed that his long-term aim to win political primacy in the Balkans and called the Adriatic by rights Italian.

In keeping with this he first negotiates the transfer of the border port Fiume from Yugoslavia to Italy and then seeks to control the mouth of the Adriatic by annexing the strategically placed island of Corfu. Obliged to back down he would call his attack on Greece Italy’s most important action since 1860.

Another issue of importance for him was his frustration with the Italian reputation for a disinclination to fight and he became determined to change this, and make the Italians less nice, more hateful and more violent. He held that “only blood could turn the bloodstained wheels of history.” During his tenure as Prime Minister he told Italians to consider themselves in a permanent state of war and remarked that his first priority was to increase military readiness to the very maximum.

1925

Il Duce creates the post of Chief of General Staff in an effort to circumvent the position of the King as commander of the armed forces. IOTL Marshal Badoglio held this post. ITTL Badoglio is not summoned back from his posting-in-exile of Ambassador of Brazil and the position goes to his rival Marshal Cavallero.

A series of campaigns is launched to reduce the semi-independent north of Somalia. It will not be until 1927 until the region is brought into line.

1926

Albania is made into an Italian satellite. The geopolitical aims for this are to create a threat along the Yugoslav frontier; to counter French influence in the Balkans; and to extend Italian economic and political influence in the region before Germany was strong enough to compete.

The establishment of the Italian state hydrocarbons agency Azienda Generali Italiana Petroli (AGIP) challenges the market dominance of the large multinational oil companies (primarily SIAP, Standard Oil & Shell). While there are no large hydrocarbon reserves present, Italy was one of the first countries in the 1860's that established an industrial level search for oil. AGIP concentrated its efforts on acquiring its own oil supplies in other countries considered promising as sources of oil.

1927

In a speech Il Duce held that set himself ten years to militarise Italy so as to be able to force a war upon Europe and obtain for Italy what he called her due.

Il Duce separates the roles of Army and General Chief of Staff in an effort to curtail the power of the incumbent Marshal Cavallero, reducing him to the role of 'technical consultant to the head of government', with some role in war planning.

By this time the revision of the Treaty of Versailles had become the major theme of Italian foreign policy. Italy signs a treaty with Hungary and makes common ground as ‘unsatisfied powers’ with regard to the Versailles settlement and henceforth tends to take up position against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, both of whom had gained from the settlement. It was considered that Italy could undermine both countries such that they would split and give way to Italian influence along and south of the Danube.

Italian diplomats began to keep in touch with separatist movements throughout all the Balkan states. Italy provided weapons for insurgent groups in Hungary and Austria, and sent arms to Greece. The Balkan policy was to encourage irredentist movements that might help to multiply tension.

With Yugoslavia the aim was either to replace France as patron, or that if exposed to sufficient pressure it might disintegrate, in which case Italy was ready with her claims on Croatia and the Dalmatian coast. Plans were formed for a possible invasion as a means of asserting Italy’s position as chief power in the Balkans and Danube basin, which Il Duce called Italy’s hinterland. Soon, Italian officers would begin training the Albanian army in expectation of a war with Yugoslavia.

AGIP enters the Rumanian oil market through a major share purchase of the national company Prahova. Some fields were discovered and by 1930 production had risen to 130,000 tons. The Rumanian government required refinement in Rumania, which cut out the margins AGIP sought for it's product and so the Rumanian oil could not satisfy the need of the Italian refineries for raw product. However important technical competencies were obtained as a result of exposure into the industry and these techniques were imported back into the Italian industry.

1928

The Italian Army Chief of Staff, Giuseppe Ferrari, confronts Il Duce with evidence of the parlous state of the Italian military. IOTL Il Duce would choose a tank by looking at a collection of drawings and, with a wave of his hand, say, "Build that one". ITTL, when Gen Ferrari outlined several options as to what was needed to modernise the armed forces, Il Duce waved his hand and commanded his Chief of General Staff to 'build that one'. General Ferrari did not leave the Palazzo Venezia with increased confidence in Il Duce but at least he left with a writ to begin some reforms.

The Ferrari Reforms imparted fresh energy into the Supreme Defence Commission (SDC) which had until now idled. The SDC over the next decade gradually manages to reduce, although not eliminate, the administrative confusion, jurisdictional conflict and dispersal of effort that so characterised Italian military procurement. Marshal Cavallero also heads the National Research Council and imparts some degree of military reality to the Council’s technical development work.

Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Abyssinia. Mussolini intends this as one stage towards establishing an economic protectorate over the country.

1929

Il Duce relinquishes personal and direct control of the three ministries of army, navy and air force and thereby permitting the ministries to greatly increase the quality of their work. Where before nothing could be done without his immediate presence, which was usually lacking given that he had seven ministerial responsibilities, now a professional momentum began to develop. IOTL Il Duce would reassume control in 1931: ITTL he does not. However he resists to the end the establishment of a genuine tri-service general staff; that would be going too far.

The Ferrari Reforms began with the artillery. New plans are made, dismissed, remade and approved; budgets were given, if grudgingly, and training commenced. When it was time to bring the 'necessary change to Europe', the Italian artillery would be more than capable of holding it's own. Over the next twelve years the Italian artillery regiments would gradually be able to field a useful range of light, medium and heavy pieces; of mortars, howitzers and guns; for mountains, desert and air defence. The Italian artillery liked to site and fight well forward, more so than any other power. It was aggressive, well controlled and willing to take casualties.

It was with a wry smile that Fate decreed the Ferrari would, in addition to being the fountainhead of Italian military reform, be an early proponent of mechanized warfare. While most certainly a general of the old school he recognised that something went wrong at the Isonzo in the Great War and that, if available, sufficiently evaluated alternatives may have resulted in more success. He saw what the tank did on the Western Front and wondered as to its application in Italian military doctrine. It was not for him to develop, but the Italian tank industry secured it's future with his impetus. Swept away were the multitude of designs submitted by rival designs and crafted on a haphazard and artisan basis: Italy would build three designs and they would be constructed along the lines of the Soviet model by semi-skilled labour according to the principles of mass production.

The reoccupation of Cyrenaica commences. To accelerate the process the governorships of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are placed under the direct control of Marshal Cavallero.

AGIP enters into a consortium, the British Oil Development Company (BOD), in an effort to obtain leverage into Iraq and move into an area previously controlled by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). Legal and negotiation problems ensued, lasting several years.

1930

From this point Mussolini’s speeches became less careful and more extravagant; “Words are beautiful things, but rifles, guns, ships, aeroplanes are still more beautiful. When tomorrow dawns the spectacle of our armed forces will reveal to the world the calm and war-like countenance of Fascist Italy.” and “The Italian people will eventually constitute a single human mass and, more than a mass, will become a shooting star that could be hurled against anyone, anywhere”.

AGIP introduces the rotary drilling process, permitting exploitation of the deep Po Valley reserves, as well as the large natural gas fields near Lodi

June. Marshal Cavallero and his henchman-in-chief General Graziani instigate the policy of forced resettlement of the population of Cyrenaica.

1931

Il Duce continues to rant on about war, as his army steadily grows, declaring "... war alone can carry to the maximum tension all human energies and imprint with the seal of nobility those people who have the courage to confront it: every other test is a mere substitute". He predicts that within ten years the whole of Europe would be fascist, and the Regio Esercito (RE) is instructed to be ready for a surprise attack on France or Yugoslavia.

The reforming of the Army benefits further by the Army Chief of Staff that succeeded Ferrari. General Baistrocchi was an organiser and administrator of considerable skill and manages to navigate Il Duce through the minefield of his own capriciousness, especially with regard to several important, and very short sighted, decisions Il Duce sought to take around the Abyssinian and Spanish conflicts. While he did eventually succeed in having himself dismissed with such an indelicacy, as "You, Duce, will lose the empire you have created" he was able to extend the hand of moderation into most areas of the Army. He even managed to establish a system of accelerated promotion on the basis of merit to supplement the traditional system of seniority: while heavily opposed at the time it did ensure that a few of the senior Italian officers in the coming war were only partially incompetent. He even established the open collar tunic into the army and gave his name to the new military jacket. Unfortunately following Baistrocchi there were no great reformers serving as Army Chief of Staff; Il Duce had had enough of their kind.

Under his counterpart General Valle the Regio Aeronautica (RA) finally commences it's reorganisation. Hitherto RA investment had largely been into matters of style over substance such as formation flying and propaganda flights. His is a slower reform than that of Baistrocchi, but at least it moves in the right direction. Primary reforms involve the rejection of trimotor airplanes (aside from the S.79 design which is developed as a land based torpedo bomber), biplanes, and air cooled engines. Much of the impetus to modernise is led by General Amadeo Mecozzi. Fighters become significantly better as the RA moves away from the Douhet doctrine, and both maritime reconnaissance craft and torpedo squadrons (using the excellent Fiume torpedo) are established.

In Cyrenaica General Graziani builds a four metre thick belt of wire between Bardia and Jarabub to prevent the resupply of the Senoussi from Egypt.

Mussolini begins financing and sending arms to various opposition groups in Spain.

1932

The official long arm of the RE, the Mannlicher-Carcano 1891 begins rechambering from the 6.5mm to a 7.35mm.

AGIP commences drilling operations in Iraq. IOTL when BOD found favourable conditions in the Mosul region AGIP could not meet it's share capital contributions and had to pull out: ITTL it could, and remained, adding an increase in oil supplies to further gains in technical and human competencies.

Pacification of Libya is now largely complete. Ardito Desio commences preliminary work in the Sirte basin and locates evidence of substantial oil deposits.

In a speech celebrating Fascism’s first decade Il Duce would say, “Today with a quiet conscience I tell you, this vast crowd, that the twentieth century will be the century of Fascism. It will the century of Italian power; it will be the century in which Italy will return for the third time to be the leader of human civilisation, for outside our faith there is no salvation either for individuals or for peoples”.

1933

The Italian fleet has now increased to 550,000 tons, and work commences on refitting two pre-Great War battleships, the Cavour and Cesare.

Italian supplies substantial quantities of arms to various, and often rival, Austrian separatists groups. Later in the year Il Duce sends an ultimatum to the Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss that further support from Italy would be conditional on Austria introducing a fascist regime on the Roman model and eliminating other parties, if necessary, by force.

Il Duce secretly appoints Marshal de Bono to command an Italian Expeditionary Force against Abyssinia.

1934

Il Duce declares that the year would mark a decisive step in the spread of fascism throughout the civilised world. Democracy and liberalism were no longer dying, but dead. So was any question of disarmament. Also declares that Italy's historical destiny now lies in Africa.

The measured moderation of Baistrocchi is in contrast with the enthusiastic extravagance of Marshal Balbo, and it is fair to say that Balbo's contribution was the more visible and immediate of the two great post-Ferrari reformers. Traditionally the RE had a mobilised complement of thirty divisions. Balbo recognised that the constraints of modern war were such that it would be extremely difficult to properly equip thirty modern divisions, and proposed halving that number. This of course did not go down well with many in the army and his plan was violently opposed by a group headed by General Pariani who declared that Italy needed more, not fewer, divisions and proposed to double the number.

Il Duce had little concept of industrial warfare and had a tendency to confuse quality with quantity... and somewhat unsurprisingly, he adored Pariani's plan. Given to such rhetoric as the eight million bayonets and the air force that would blot out the sun, he was most enthusiastic for an army of sixty divisions. Just where Pariani lost control of his run for influence is not certain, but the combined force of Balbo (who still carried considerable weight in the Party), Baistrocchi and the put-to-pasture Ferrari managed to convey to Il Duce the fundamentals of the matter. While still not convinced as to their arguments, which were largely economic and hence of only passing interest, he eventually acquiesced. Italy would enter a general war with a mobilised complement of 22 divisions.

It was possibly the second main contribution of Balbo that swayed Il Duce; he liked the panoply of office, the visibly compelling instruments of war, the new and fantastic. What can be more fantastic than grim parachutists falling from the heavens with their guns blazing; what can be more compelling than grizzled marines charging ashore and directly into the teeth of the enemy, carrying all before them? Both these regimental sized units were to be employed initially on that frustrating island, that brazen British port, Malta. When war came there would be fury falling from the sky and pouring from the sea. Il Duce liked that. There were of course substantial issues around coordination with the RA and Regia Marina (RM) that had to be overcome and to a significant degree this is why the airborne and amphibious forces were still working through their operational details when war began. Mistakes would be made, and needless ones at that, but it would still be Balbo's name that was remembered primarily when future discussions of the combined operations against Malta were made.

Since the early work undertaken by Ferrari, Il Duce had restricted himself to general bombast with regard to military matters, but he was only ever biding his time. In what was recognised at that time as his 'rearmament' speech, where he sought cast aside the shackles of the League of Nations and repudiated all the disarmament treaties he had so quickly signed, he began to fully develop his own unique oracular style and somehow, somewhere, the tone began to subtly change. His "war is to man what maternity is to women" speech charted the commencement of his descent of fantasy, where the liquidity of words finally overcame the solidity of substance, "It is the plough that traces the furrow, but it is the sword which defends it, and both plough and sword are made of tempered steel like the faith in our hearts". Il Duce was building up to something and that something was Abyssinia.

The Abyssinian War was not something that just happened. Since 1929 Italian troops had been bending the frontier to their will and establishing themselves in Abyssinian territory. Nor was this purely an enterprise by Il Duce: in fact he was initially suspicious and had to be sold on the idea, although admittedly the price of sale was not great. Abyssinia was seen by the armed forces as a proving ground, initially for the artillery and the new divisional structure, but later also for the new light tank, not to mention operational issues around poison gas and air-ground cooperation. Abyssinia was also an important step in the militarisation of Italian society and it was with invasion in mind that Il Duce enacted the law that stated that every Italian citizen was a soldier and should be educated militarily from the age of eight. While not specifically useful for the impending war, such a measure would capitalise handsomely on the glorious successes of his armies, helping overcome social resistance to war and associating the military with Italy, and victory.

The murder of Dolfuss catches Mussolini off guard and, unfortunately, he had to break the news to Dolfuss’ wife who was the guest of Il Duce at the time. Italy announces that four divisions (the Ravenna, Cosseria, Superga & Sforzesca) are poised to occupy the Austrian Tyrol. RE planning is adjusted to include operations against Germany.

Croat refugees, who had been living in Italy and whose arms and funds had been provided by the Italian government, murders King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles.

Mussolini signs agreement with two Spanish monarchist groups aimed at destabilising the Spanish government.

The RM laid down the battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, together with an additional 17 submarines.

1935

The Minister for Exchange and Currency Guarnieri advises the SDC that Italy faces bankruptcy. Il Duce imposes import quotas to prevent an excessive drain on currency reserves, which also bites into rearmament. Although Il Duce remained an economic imbecile there builds a gradual groundswell within the military interests of the regime that seeks to ensure the RE’s funding. IOTL there was a 15% decline in funding for the army between the Abyssinian war and the eve of the World War: ITTL there was no such shortfall.

The SDC meets to discuss the progress of eight years of Italian military reform and rearmament. Following five days of sometimes absolutely frivolous discussion, such as choosing between cabbage or beans as the main basis for soldier’s rations, widespread approval is returned as to the nature of the artillery and infantry reforms, though with some substantial qualifications and caution over tank developments.

In May RM forward planning calls for the laying down of four new battleships, three aircraft carriers, four cruisers, twenty frigates, 12 corvettes and 54 submarines (for an additional 360,000 tons. Construction is envisaged as proceeding slowly in order to avoid international complications.

AGIP receives considerable political direction, greatly stretching it's resources that, but for the increasing revenues from the Mosul operations, would have proven too great to surmount. Increased geological and technical expertise is put to use developing the Po basin, exploitation of methane deposits as an alternative fuel source, and exploratory drilling operations in Eritrea, Abyssinia, Somalia and Libya. The creation of AGIP's scientific unit and government financing leads to increased levels of human competency and the importation or development of new exploratory techniques, of which the most notable is the technique of seismic reflection from the United States. A drilling operation is sent to Libya to follow up Desio's work and to apply the new technical developments to reach the deeper Libyan reserves.

February. Two divisions of regular infantry (the Pasubio and Piave) are despatched to Eritrea.

May. Two further divisions of regular infantry (the Bergamo and Sassari) and four ‘divisions’ of Blackshirts despatched to Eritrea.

September. The British Mediterranean Fleet despatched to the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforced by the Home Fleet. Britain is seen as being "fundamentally inclined to oppose" Italy's Mediterranean and African aspirations. One of the responses to this sabre rattling is the establishment of the General Commissariat for War Production, which builds upon much of the earlier work around war economics, and the overall efficiency of military production is maintained.

October. Following a lengthy build up Italy invades Abyssinia and the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions a few days later. The Abyssinian War is intended as being a prestige building effort for the regime. The Blackshirt led offensive under de Bono just runs out of steam; the army under Cavallero and Graziani finishes the conquest. This marks a subtle shift of the balance of power where the army demonstrates it's professional skill and indispensability.

December. Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Cavagnari proposes the immediate renovation of the old battleships Duilio and Doria, construction of two more Littorio class ships, one aircraft carrier and more submarines. Construction is delayed until the League of Nations sanctions lift.

1936

January. Il Duce informs Hitler that the Abyssinian sanctions had created a definite breach between Italy and France and hence, although he was not ready to permit Anschluss, he would recognise that Austria is a satellite of Germany and no longer of Italy.

May. The Abyssinian War is declared won, the ‘greatest colonial war known to history’ and that the population of Abyssinia had turned against their government and joyfully welcomed Italian rule.

July. Franco's rebellion catches Il Duce by surprise and against the advice of the RE Italy intervenes.

July 4. League of Nations sanctions on Italy lifted.

September. RA commences operations in Spain.

December. Abyssinia is declared completely pacified, although opposition was growing and had even spread to Eritrea. Italian rule progressively becomes harsher. The Italian Expeditionary Force arrives in Spain to conduct ground operations; gain it is seen as a Fascist war and largely untrained militias (together with substantial numbers of the unemployed from the south) are despatched, with a smaller regular army contingent of two divisions (the Cuneo and Livorno).

1937

Advance planning for an invasion of Egypt commences, aiming firstly at a seizure of the Mersa Matruh railhead and adjacent airfields and thence an advance to the Suez. Significant obstacles were encountered in liaison with the RM concerning just how the formidable forces of the Royal Navy were to be overcome.

March. Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia, temporarily ending Italy's long-standing support for Croatian separatism.

March. The Battle of Guadalajara results in an embarrassing Italian defeat. Crucially for the upcoming war, European military experts associate the Italian army with the Blackshirt rabbles in Abyssinia and Spain.

August. Italian submarines begin campaign against Soviet resupply shipping, leading to confrontation with Britain.

November. Italy withdraws from the League of Nations and the takes part in the establishment of the Axis; Il Duce boasts that "Italy is at the end of the most formidable politico-military combination that has ever existed’

December. The hardline policies of Graziani in Abyssinia are finally recognised as having failed and he was brought home, being replaced by the more moderate Duke of Aosta. The damage had however been done and the new viceroy can do little better.

Encouraging developments lead AGIP to consider natural gas as a substitute not for gasoline but for the imported coal fed industries of northern Italy. A positive result from the Sirte fields in Libya leads to an increase in operations and work begins to determine how best to develop and exploit the wider reserves. Investment in plant and construction of facilities begins apace but large-scale exploitation is not achieved before the commencement of general hostilities in 1939.

1938

From the Abyssinian War onwards Il Duce had increasingly taken on the role of Supreme Commander: in a March speech he publicly claimed the role. Naval planning for a North African conflict confirmed as operations to support the landward drive, the reduction of Malta and operations around Suez. Il Duce says that war with Britain is inevitable. Economically things are still tight. The costs of the Abyssinian war, the Spanish campaign, the costs associated with the colonies and military rearmament is draining the budget. Leading up to war there are still issues around senior and junior leadership, and supply... but the military is undoubtedly more proficient.

As a compensation for letting Hitler into Austria, Italy decides to invade Albania and finally extend full control over the Adriatic.

February. RA bombs Barcelona against wishes of Franco.

June. RE instructed to prepare invasion plans for Albania.

November 5. Italian foreign policy sets out to create 'an insurmountable abyss between Italy and France'

1939

Il Duce informs the Grand Council of Fascism that war with France is unavoidable. The RE for the moment puts aside the Suez plan and begins to focus on French contingencies.

Rumania seeks Italian protection against the Soviets, Germans and Hungarians.

Jan. With general war seemingly inevitable Mussolini decides to establish a formal military alliance with Germany. In the belief that the Anglo-French alliance holds no threat, the RE is told to exclude Britain from their war hypotheses, while the public was simultaneously told that war against France was inevitable and victory certain.

March 21. Il Duce explains to the Grand Council of Fascists of the need to adopt a policy of uncompromising loyalty to the Axis.

29/30 March. Madrid & Valencia falls, ending Italian involvement in Spain. Large amounts of equipment are left behind, much of which is secretly sold by Spain to Yugoslavia.

April. Advance talks for joint German/Italian operations commence. German planning for the invasion of Poland also commences.

April 7. Italian forces land at Durazzo and Valona in Albania.

May 22. Following the signing of the Pact of Steel, Il Duce begins to take renewed interest in Yugoslavia and Greece. Yugoslavia is seen as the primary conquest, with Greece a secondary one, or even client state. Mussolini has in place invasion plans for Greece and destabilisation plans for Yugoslavia. He feels it important to be ready to assert Italian claims to predominance in the Danube/Balkans while Germany was preoccupied with Poland.

May 30. The 'Cavallero Memorandum' is despatched to Berlin explaining that Mussolini recognises that war is inevitable and that in the first moment of hostility the Italian aim is to seize the Balkans as far as the Danube and to put Greece, Rumania and Turkey hors de combat.

May 31. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention to ease relations with France.

June. Ciano signs an agreement with the Croat leader Vladko Macek that provides for a rising against Belgrade in 4-5 months, Italian military intervention and a Croat puppet state. Italy had now ‘acquired new continental objectives of a European territorial value’.

June 22. Orders for invasion of Poland signed and concealed mobilisation commences.

July. The British plan in the event of Italy joining Germany in a war is for the RN to sweep the Eastern Mediterranean of Italian submarines, attack Libyan bases, and launch carrier strikes on Taranto. The French are to bombard the Italian coast from Palermo to Genoa while also invading Libya from Tunisia. However the French war party cannot overcome the Italophiles within cabinet, nor the French army's desire to reduce risk in light of German military might.

July. Mussolini assures Hitler that should he decide to fight, then Italy would be behind him 100% and mobilise at a moments notice.

August 11/12. In Salzburg Hitler (which TTL Mussolini attends) refuses to reconsider the planned Polish invasion that Italy has by now caught wind of and urges Italy to take the opportunity and attack Yugoslavia. IOTL Il Duce pulled back because the RE was not ready - not so ITTL. Hitler explains that the best thing for the Axis would be to liquidate the neutral states of Europe one after the other; just as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania had already been invaded; each partner should cover the other in turn as they took their pick. Yugoslavia is mentioned in this context.

August 15. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

August 25. IOTL Il Duce orders a mobilisation decree to be prepared: ITTL it is a full mobilisation order

September 1. Germany attacks Poland

Croesus
 
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Regio Esercito Strategic Disposition and OOB

Upon receipt of the full mobilisation order of August 25 the Army Chief of Staff General Graziani [IOTL this position was filled by General Pariani; ITTL Pariani’s career does not survive his defeat at the hands of the Reformers in 1934] had four operational plans on his desk. Each had been initiated, discarded, updated and discarded again as the mercurial foreign policy of Il Duce waxed and waned. It was a curious aspect to the RE’s preparation for war that the constant upheaval of planning had in fact resulted in four fairly well conceived strategies; the hiatus between the rejection and resumption of planning permitted the strategies to be updated to current conditions while remaining true to their essential features.

The plans for the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece had the longest maturation period, having been laid down in the early 1920’s. The plans for a war on two fronts with France and the invasion of Egypt were more recent and were laid down from 1931 and 1935 respectively. Of the four the French conflict was considered the most difficult given the challenges involved in forcing the French defences in Savoy and the large military concentration in French North Africa. The invasion of Egypt was regarded more favourably in the RE than the RM as the latter had significant concerns around how the Royal Navy would be dealt with. The invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece were inter- linked, giving a certain degree of flexibility and commonalities in the case of hostilities.

The RE could conduct either an African or a European war, but not both. Il Duce had signalled that a European campaign was the preferred option in the mid 1920’s, had then moved on in favour of an African campaign in the mid 1930’s and recently returned to giving priority to the European. This inconstancy had led the RE to conceive the Libyan forces-in-place as either an advance or a rear-guard; while Fascist ideology held Libya as a first colony, there were more Italians in New York than in all the Italian colonies combined, and RE planning took this into account. Complicating matters somewhat was the recent investment of AGIP into the Sirte oilfields but as yet the infrastructure there was not considerable and AGIP advised that present advances in the exploitation and commercial use of liquid natural gas in Italy was more advanced, and as promising, than the Sirte developments.

Libya was of course caught between two fires: the French in Tunisia and the British in Egypt. Of the two the former had the more substantial army and the latter the more substantial navy. RE planning in Libya followed three basic directions: an attack on Tunis, an attack on Mersa Matruh or a defensive action facing the French (the British military investment in Egypt was not considered substantial to warrant significant concern). In each of the two offensive options a portion of the RE would by necessity have to guard the other flank and no reliance was placed on the capacity of the RM to obtain naval supremacy, although it was thought that the RA would be able to control the skies. The defensive option had a smaller force occupying hardened positions around Halfaya Pass and the bulk of the Libyan force along two lines placed forward to the Tunisian border.

Malta was considered a priority target irrespective of there being an African or European focus to Italian wartime strategy. It would have to be eliminated to ensure either the effective reinforcement or evacuation of the front. To this end the Landing Troops and Parachutists had been training since their inception. Based in Sicily both units found themselves regarded with jealousy when it came to funding and personnel assignment (which was the principal reason why both arms were initially dominated by Libyan personnel), and substantial inter-service obstacles were met, as both units had RE personnel and organisation yet had to work very closely with the RA & RM. There was no great confidence in their ability to force the British from the island and all three services had contingency plans in place should the initial assault be defeated. As it was considered that a war upon either France or Britain would bring the other, the attack on Malta would proceed as a first priority in the event of hostilities against only one.

The Greek action suffered from widespread confusion as to war-aims and ranged from a reoccupation of Corfu to an annexation of Epirus/Tsamouria to a full-scale invasion of the whole country. In the large scale operation landings in Salonika were to complement an eastwards push from Albania. The Salonika landing was considerably fraught with danger and was seen both as a diversionary and sacrificial measure, with the main emphasis placed on the advance from Albania. Two forms of plan existed for the Albanian advance: a large scale operation involving eleven divisions and a lesser version involving nine, although the substance was the same. Five/four divisions were to attack into Epirus, three/two were to hold the Yugoslav border, two were to hold the Koritsa region and one was to reoccupy Corfu. Options around the intervention of both Bulgaria and Turkey had also to be considered.

The Yugoslav invasion was somewhat more complicated. Political efforts were to be made to destabilise the Croat elements in the Royal Yugoslav Army and support given to Macek's establishment of a Croatian puppet state. Five invasion points were identified with four divisions advancing out of the Fiume & Zara beachheads, four divisions advancing out of Albania, four divisions pushing through Slovenia and two guarding the Greek boarder. The numbers of divisions deployed also varied with the Slovenian or Dalmatian fronts enjoying predominance in turn, although no less than ten divisions were considered; and some versions asked for eighteen. There was substantial complication around the involvement of foreign armies with Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and even Greece considered.

The RE Order of Battle on 25 September 1939 reflected the divergence of strategic options and confusion around foreign policy. Four corps with four infantry divisions were disposed along the French border; two corps with two mountain infantry and one alpine division were based in Albania; four corps with two mountain infantry, two alpine, one regular infantry and one armoured division were arrayed along the Yugoslavian border; four corps with three autotransportable infantry, two mountain infantry, one alpine, one regular and one armoured division were held in reserve in Italy; two corps of two Libyan infantry, one regular infantry, one autotransportable infantry and one armoured division held Libya, in addition to three Fortress garrisons; and four Sectors with 25 native infantry brigades held Italian East Africa.

Details of specific dispositions are as follows;

FIRST ARMY CO: Gen. P.Pintor [French border]
Army Reserves
Army Art.Reg (mot)
4 A.A. Reg (mot.)
1 Ber.Reg
6 Cav.Reg Cavalleggeri di Monferrato

III Corps CO: Gen. A. Aymonino
3 & 112 M.G.Btls.
Corps Art.Reg
2 & 24 Border-Guard Sectors + 16 & 58 Border-Guard Art.Regs
3 Inf.Div Ravenna

XIII Corps CO: Gen. G.Gambara
15 & 111 M.G.Btls.
Corps Art.Reg
1 & 5 Border-Guard Sectors + 11 & 24 Border-Guard Art.Reg
5 Inf.Div Cosseria


FOURTH ARMY: CO: Gen. V. Ambrosio [French border]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg (mot)
1 AA.Reg (mot)
4 Ber.Reg
1 Cav.Reg Nizza Cavalleria

I Corps: CO: Gen. C.Vecchiarelli
1 & 113 M.G.Btl.
Corps Art.Reg
8 & 9 Border-Guard Sectors + 19 & 23 Border-Guard Art.Reg
1 Inf.Div Superga

IV Corps: CO: Gen. C.Mercalli
4 & 104 M.G.Btl.
Corps-Art.Reg
7 & 49 Border-Guard Sector + 8 & 92 Border-Guard Art.Reg
2 Inf.Div Sforzesca


SECOND ARMY CO: Gen. V.Ambrosio [Albania]
Army Reserves
Army Art.Reg
2 Cav.Regs Piemonte Reale & 3 Cav.Reg Genova Cavalleria

X Corps CO: Gen. C. Rossi
108 & 115 MG.Btls
2 x Corps Art.Regs
2 Ber.Reg
14 Inf.Div (Mtn) Bergamo

V Corps: CO: Gen. R.Balocco
Corps-Art.Reg
25 & 37 Border-Guard Sectors + 10 & 62 Border-Guard Art.Reg
11 Inf.Div (Mtn) Sassari
2 Alp.Div Tridentina


THIRD ARMY CO: Gen A. Guzzoni [Yugoslav border]
Army Reserves:
10, 56 & 93 Border-Guard Sector + 12, 88 & 51 Border-Guard Art.Reg
9 Inf.Div Piave

VII Corps CO: Gen M. Arisio
2 x Corps Art.Reg (mot)
3 Ber.Reg, 5 Ber.Reg & 6 Ber.Reg
1 Arm.Div Centauro

Alpine Corps: CO: Gen. L.Negri
102, 103 & 110 M.G.Btl.
Corps Art.Reg
10 Border-Guard Sector + 12 Border-Guard Art.Reg
1 Alp.Div Taurinense


SECOND ARMY: CO: Gen. V.Ambrosio [Yugoslav border]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg
2 Cav.Reg Piemonte Reale & 3 Cav.Reg Genova Cavalleria

X Corps CO: Gen M. Roux
108 & 115 MG.Btl
2 x Corps Art.Reg
2 Ber.Reg
14 Inf.Div (Mtn) Bergamo

V Corps CO: Gen. R.Balocco
Corps-Art.Reg
25 & 37 Border-Guard Sectors + 10 & 62 Border-Guard Art.Reg
11 Inf.Div (Mtn) Sassari
2 Alp.Div Tridentina


SEVENTH ARMY CO: Gen. C.Geloso [Italy]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg
4 Cav.Reg Lancieri di Aosta & 5 Cav.Reg Lancieri di Milano

VI Corps CO: Gen. S. Visconti Prasca
33 & 58 MG.Btl
Corps Art.Reg
22 Border-Guard Sector + 13 Border-Guard Art.Reg
13 Inf.Div (Mtn) Isonzo

XI Corps: CO: Gen. M. Vercellino
Corps-Art.Reg
21 & 23 Border-Guard Sectors + 9 & 17 Border-Guard Art.Reg
12 Inf.Div (Mtn) Re
3 Alp.Div Julia.


SIXTH ARMY: CO: Gen. M.Berti [Italy]
Army Reserves:
Army-Art.Regt. (mot)
2 AA Reg (mot)

IX Corps CO: Gen. A Bergonzoli
6 & 120 MG Btl (mot)
2 x Corps -Art.Reg (mot)
4 Inf.Div (Auto) Livorno & 10 Inf.Div (Auto) Brenner

II Corps CO: Gen. F. Cola
Corps Art.Reg (mot)
6 Inf.Div (Auto) Cuneo
3 Arm.Div Littorio


FIFTH ARMY: CO: Gen. I.Gariboldi [Libya]
Army Reserves:
Army-Art.Reg (mot)
3 AA Reg (mot)

VIII Corps CO: Gen. L. Dalmazzo
20 & 105 MG Btl (mot)
2 x Corps -Art.Reg (mot)
8 Inf.Div Pasubio
15 Inf.Div (Lib) Sibelle & 16 Inf.Div (Lib) Pescatori

XII Corps CO: Gen. E Patessi Manella
Corps Art.Reg (mot)
7 Inf.Div (Auto) Lupi di Toscana
2 Arm.Div Ariete

Fortress Tripoli
30 Coastal Art.Reg.
33, 34 & 35 Border-Guard Sectors + 33, 34, & 35 Border-Guard Art.Regts.

Fortress Benghazi
30 Border-Guard Sector + 30 Border-Guard Art.Reg.

Fortress Tobruk:
31 & 32 Border-Guard Sectors + 31 & 32 Border-Guard Art.Reg.


EAST AFRICAN COMMAND CO: HRH Amedeo di Savoia – duca d’Aosta

Northern Sector CO: Gen. L.Frusci
3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22 & 41 Colonial Bde.

Eastern Sector CO: Gen. G.Nasi
2, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15 & 17 Colonial Bde.

Southern Sector CO: Gen. P.Gazzera
1, 9,10, 18, 23 & 25 Colonial Bde.

Giuba Sector: CO: Gen. C.de Simone
20 Colonial Bde.

Croesus
 
Notes to Previous

An error in the OOB: there are two Second Armies. Second Army is correctly in Albania: the Second Army on the Yugoslav border is now Eighth Army and commanded by Gen. R. Balocco.

I also neglected to note as to the deployment of the Blackshirt [Camicie Nere, or CCNN] divisions. ITTL the RE is stronger and more able to resist CCNN penetration of their combat formations. Given that Il Duce was the de facto CCNN Commander-in-Chief, and that Abyssinia had been envisaged as a Fascist campaign, rather than a regular army one, I've placed the three CCNN divisions in the AOI.

The RE would support this as the CCNN units very quickly become someone elses problem and, in case of general hostilities, the AOI is a difficult territory to defend. The MSVN [political arm of the Camicie Nere] would also support it as the AOI becomes a Fascist fiefdom. From an alt-his pov this makes for some future fun as the AOI campaign can run concurrently but divergently to the main thread.

Croesus
 
Mobilisation

Following Il Duce's mobilisation order of 25 August Marshal Cavallero attended a meeting in the Palazzo Venezia to learn of the intended direction of the war effort. He arrived to find Il Duce, Ciano and a gaggle of fawning sychophants excitedly discussing victory parades and triumphal arches. He was informed that Italy would invade Yugoslavia at the first opportunity; that Greece was to be guarded against but not attacked; that Savoy was to be invaded; that Malta was to be reduced; and that an advance into Tunisia commenced. Cavallero wondered to himself if Il Duce had been paying attention during their recent meetings.

He reminded Il Duce that, following the Balbo reforms, Italy only fielded sixteen infantry divisions. It was proposed that the Army should forthwith detach a regiment from each division and form new divisions; and that the three Blackshirt [Camicie Nere, or CCNN] Divisions would be released to Army control. Cavallero informed Il Duce that detaching regiments from divisions at this stage was not even remotely a possibility under the circumstances, but that he would gratefully accept the generous offer of such crack troops as the CCNN. He did note however that it would take time for the CCNN divisions presently deployed in the AOI to be transferred to Italy, and that the British might have reservations about such a move through the Suez Canal.

Il Duce considered this and declared that, in fact, the CCNN had a mission of the utmost importance to play in the invasions of Kenya and Egypt and, while he would certainly wish that he could use them to stiffen the RE, unfortunately it could not be done. He conferred with his advisors and then commanded Cavallero to hold in Libya and Savoy, but instead to attack Greece as well as Yugoslavia. After all they were right next to each other and in Albania Italy held a strong bulwark from which it could launch an all-conquering offensive that would carry Italian arms all the way to the Danube.

Cavallero was then asked how long would full mobilisation take. He explained that in Libya all Fifth Army units except the Libyan Sibelle and Pescatori were already under arms; that in Albania the Second Army was also fully mobilised; and that on the French and Yugoslav borders the First and Third Armies were already in position. This left the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Armies requiring mobilisation, which he expected would take about a month to complete. This meant that the Yugoslav and Greek invasions would commence around the middle or end of September.

Il Duce thought on this for a moment. He enquired as to launching an attack on Malta. Cavallero informed him that the Parachutists and Infantry Landing Force were ready for deployment but enquired as to the intention to declare war on Britain... or was the attack to be an undeclared act of aggression? Ciano intervened and reminded Il Duce that the plan was to mask the Italian intention to invade behind the cloud of 'non-belligerency' and invading Malta would defeat that purpose. Cavallero asked what was this thing, 'non-belligerency; surely a nation is either a belligerent or a neutral? He was informed that a power of the magnitude of Italy in these times could never be neutral, as Italy was at the nexus of European geo-politics; because Italy could not be neutral, but was not at war, it was therefore a 'non-belligerent'.

The smiles all round informed Cavallero at the pride with which the concept of non-belligerency was regarded; never mind the fact that it had no basis in international law. At any rate it appeared that Cavallero was to oversee the mobilisation, under the pretext of ensuring Italian sovereignty remains safe from sudden aggressors (and could he please make some effort to conceal the scale?), with a view to launching an invasion into the Balkans while Ciano held off the Anglo-French with the nebulous status of 'non-belligerency'.

Cavallero informed Il Duce that he would do all that was asked, but noted that a concealed mobilisation would take a little longer and set Sep 30 as the first available date for the twin invasions. He also offered to share with Il Duce a recent RE planning document that held a twin invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece as impossible without certainty over the intervention of two of Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria.

Il Duce did not see why Cavallero was insisting on creating doubts in his mind and dismissed such talk as unnecessary and defeatist. Ciano intervened and noted that the three powers in question could not be approached because then the invasions would not be surprises. Cavallero noted that tensions had been rising between Italy and both countries over the last few months and surely an invasion would come as no surprise. Il Duce employed a few choice sarcasms to ensure that Cavallero was appraised of his ignorance as to the subtleties of foreign policy and sent the Marshall on his way.

A concealed mobilisation? Cavallero doubted as to the efficacy of this given the present state of tensions. He particularly doubted the ability of the RA to prepare for hostilities. However, that was a minor concern relative to the headache of invading both Yugoslavia and Greece. He suspected that the latter was in no doubt as to the likelihood of coming to blows with Italy and that while Gen. Metaxas was proficiently walking a line of neutrality he would be ensuring his own mobilisation schedule close at hand, not to mention the issue of opening up facilities to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy who were almost certain to offer assistance.

He was somewhat more confident about the Yugoslav operation as the the Italian destabilisation of the Royal Yugoslav Army and sponsorship of an independet Croatian state was well advanced; not to mention the likelihood of further Hungarian action aimed at redressing the losses it suffered by the Treaty of Trianon. He wondered as to how much the Germans knew of the Il Duce's plans as his recent meetings with Gen. Keitel had only just begun to work through operational issues of joint action and was some time away from completion.

Croesus
 
The Other Side of the Hill: France

The bulk of any Anglo-French land operations against Italy in the event of a general conflict would be undertaken by the French colonial forces in North Africa; the Franco-Italian border was not favourable for the offensive and the British held few forces in Egypt. The French fleet would also play a significant role. What, therefore, were the French preparations?

France was hit by the Depression later than other western powers and only began recovering in 1939: the differential for industrial production over the period 1929-38 for Britain was +20%, for Germany +16% but for France was actually –24%. It was only between Oct 1938 and June 1929 that industrial production returned to 1928 levels. France was most assuredly not strong.

The resolution to avoid a repetition of the Great War tragedy (where 25% of all people under 30 died) was one of the main determinants of French diplomacy. Unfortunately for the French, the years 1935-40 would be thin in terms of military conscripts due to the slump in birth rates during the Great War. Having had two wars in living memory, Germany was seen as the fundamental adversary and this naturally dominated French policy.

The population disparity between Germany (60 million) and France (40 million) was insuperable and gave France little realistic alternative than to adopt a defensive posture. The French dilemma was thus to give into German demands and risk humiliation and second power status; or to resist and risk either a Pyrrhic victory or annihilation. Some choice.

During the 1930's France forged a group of alliances in central and eastern Europe, gathering together Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. However this policy of linked alliances clashed with her increasingly defensive war plans. As a result, these pacts, aside from the Polish, were not military alliances. They had no teeth and this would prove decisive as first Czechoslovakia, then Poland and, ITTL, Yugoslavia were attacked by the Axis.

The Little Entente was a French sponsored pact consisting of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and based on three bilateral agreements aimed at containing Hungary. France itself only had bilaterals with each of the parties, rather than relating to the Little Entente as a group. While France did have a military alliance with Poland, full staff talks didn't commence until May 1939, and without which a military alliance is shorn of much of it's strength. France's treaties with the Little Entente pledged consultation and assistance in the face of a common threat, but even in 1938 there no formal staff talks between France and Czechoslovakia, and never any between France and Yugoslavia/Romania.

With the Rome Agreements of Jan 7 1935 France sought to use Italy as a counterweight against Germany. Italy exploited this Agreement, and the subsequent Stresa Front, to further it's own policies in Abyssinia and to maintain it's policy of equidistance between Germany and the western powers.

After Munich the aims of French policy were unchanged; firstly the preservation and consolidation of the Entente, secondly the defence of the Mediterranean and the Empire; and thirdly the search for an understanding with Berlin and Rome as a prelude to a wider European detente. French attitudes to Italy vacillated over the years and the inherent weaknesses within the Third Republic ensured that this vacillation was never conclusively resolved. There would always be a pro-Italy faction within the Cabinet and, OTL as well as TTL, they were never overcome until Italy initiated hostilities.

Oct 12 1938. French Army Chief of Staff Gamelin examined French strategy. Faced with Axis solidarity and de facto German predominance in central and eastern Europe, he felt France should maintain a close partnership with Britain and defend the Mediterranean theatre. If Hitler reopened colonial claims they must be refused. Gamelin did not advocate a general withdrawl of French policy in the east. further German pressure there had to be resisted, otherwise the French position in western Europe would be undermined.

For Gamelin the way to renewed influence was through the Mediterranean. The first objective was a favourable settlement of the Spanish question. Once secure in the west, France would then consolidate her position in the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Relations with Turkey might be improved and the maintanence of the Balkan entetne was essential.

Oct 25 1938. Air Chief of Staff Vuillemin responds to Gamelins analysis, who had expressed confidence of France's ability to stand on the defensive in the early stages of a conflict until allied help was available. Vuillemin stated that although a defensive stance against the Axis might be possible for the army, it would be disastrous for the air force. There was nothing to oppose the estimated 5,000 Axis aircraft; by 1 April 1939 France would have less than 500 modern fighters.

He felt that France must decide on a policy that the state of the military forces imposed. While Gamelin had only hinted at the need to secure Italian neutrality, Vuilleman insisted that this must be the first priority of policy. The Air Chief suggested that this might be obtained by the observation of strict neutrality towards Republican Spain and a radical break with the Soviets. Germany, seeing the defection of Italy and aware that France, Britain and Poland are closely united, would then be less tempted to expand in the east.

12 Nov 1938. French economic mission despatched to Romanian, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to study the possibilities of French investment and trade to counter German influence. They reported to the Govt with a range of recommendatiosn on 19 Dec and another committee met on 30 Jan to discuss further measures. However by Feb 1939 nothing had been done to follow up this work and this would be all the help Yugoslavia received from France, it's supposed guarantor.

February 1939. France by now is planning for an Italian offensive in the Mediterranean. It is predicted that an attack would be made in late March or early April. However the British government's reading of Italian intentions is more optimistic and it was believed that Il Duce was worth placating because of the moderating influence he supposedly had on Hitler. Time and again Britain would soften French resolve at this juncture, until the French themselves began to relax. Britain felt that Italy "had further to go now than she had in 1914 before she would be induced to throw in her lot with us". This was a persuasive argument.

7 April. The Italian invasion of Albania nevertheless introduces a new policy of French and British guarantees in eastern and southeastern Europe. France begins to receive numerous reports of Italian operations against Corfu, Egypt and Gibralter; however the British felt that Italy had shot it's bolt and would not attack elsewhere. Somewhat belatedly, France and Britain commence full staff talks. France estimates that, against the 120 Franco-British divisions, the Axis disposed of 240; that Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia could bring in 110 and Greece and Turkey 50. While there is a sense of superiority with regard to the Italian army (based on the observations in Abyssinia and Spain), there were concerns about relying on the 160 poorly equipped central/southeastern European divisions.

9 April. Greece reports an imminent Italian attack on Corfu. Britain asks France if she would join in promising help to Greece. Concurrently, the Permanent Committee of National Defence confirms the 1937 strategy of, in case of general war, that France would attack Italy first. The fleet would be mobilised and transferred to the Mediterranean and the air force placed on alert and concentrated against Italy. Such were the plans for war.

10 April. Britain decides to concentrate fleet around Malta to reassure France. [At this point the Regia Marina is positively crapping itself]

June. French sensitivities towards Italy now subside, with Paris coming to the British view that Italy had 'shot it's bolt' in Albania and would not take the initiative in a general war as part of the Axis. From here until the German invasion of Poland, Italy disapprears somewhat as a concern to Paris and, encouraged by Britain, commences general negotitations with Italy on all matters, excepting Corsica, Nice and Savoy.

September 3. France and Britain declares war on Germany following the invasion of Poland.

This is the period of Italian 'non-belligerency', where Il Duce and Ciano play their greatest double game of all. Il Duce has committed to general war, yet Ciano assures the British in absolute point blank terms that Italy will not attack Britain or France. That she was planning and mobilising to attack Yugoslavia and Greece was not mentioned. During that long, stressful month spent in Rome Il Duce watched in amazement as the Western Powers did nothing... France even forbade it's troops to fire on their German counterparts.

As the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece approached, Il Duce began to sense a turning point, a critical moment, an opportunity to be seized. Manifest destiny was upon him and, on Sep 25, five days before the invasion, he made another of those few decisions of his that actually made sense: he cancelled the Greek operation. He would attack only Yugoslavia, he would drive towards the Danube, he would capitalise on the initiative afforded him by French timidity and would claim by right of conquest his historical heritage.

Cavellero was not impressed... but glad nonetheless.

Croesus
 
The Italian Road To War

The Italian passage into WWII was not smooth, nor consistent, nor part of a wider Axis unity. Much of what follows is OTL, with TTL changes marked: it's remarkable how little needs to be changed when dealing with such a mercurial figure as Il Duce.

1 Jan 1939. Il Duce seeks to transform the anti-Comintern Pact into a formal alliance.

3 Jan. Ciano despatches a letter proposing a Triple Alliance to Ribbentrop.

6 Jan. Ribbentrop despatches drafts of a Triple Alliance with secret military clauses to Rome.

8 Jan. Following Japanese hesitation to join a triple, Il Duce counter-proposes an Italo-German alliance.

March. Italy proposes combined staff talks.

5-6 April. Italo-German staff talks held between Generals Kietel and Graziani [TTL Army Chief of Staff is Graziani, not Pariani]. German approaches the talks with reserve and no effort is made to have serious discussions concerning operational or strategic matters in the event of a general European war. Graziani notes the general readiness of the RE [in OTL Graziani notes the Italian unreadiness], to the secret bemusement of the German staff mindful as they were of the less-than-ideal performance of the CVF in Spain. No mention of the Albanian invasion is made, even though it launches within a few hours of the conference's completion; similarly no mention is made of the prospective attack on Poland, which had been established in a directive by Hitler two days previously.

16 April. Goering attends ceremony of the presentation of the Albanian crown to the Italian King and makes strong remarks with regard to Poland, reminding Ciano of similar tones leading up to the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises. Il Duce notes that he is looking forward to being able to settle accounts with France and mounts blackout and anti-aircraft demonstration for Goering.

20 April. Italian ambassador to Berlin Attolico reports impression that German attack on Poland is imminent. Il Duce remains unchanged in his resolve to enter into formal military alliance with Germany. He prepares a memorandum where he recognises that war is destined to break out between the 'rich nations and the poor'. [In OTL he appends this with the observation that Italy is unready for hostilities; not so TTL]. The memorandum forms basis of Cianos instructions for upcoming meeting with Ribbentrop.

6 May. Ciano meets Ribbentrop in Milan. [OTL both men talk long of the unreadiness for war, one truthfully, one not so]. Ribbentrop assures Ciano that Germany will be following a path of conciliation with regard to the solution of the Polish problem. Ribbentrop also promotes the inclusion of the Soviet Union to the Axis and noted that a draft military treaty would be forthcoming soon.

7 May. A joint statement is issued confirming the solidarity between Italy and Germany and in keeping with this to formalise the relationship into a political and military alliance.

13 May. Ciano recieves text of the Italo-German alliance: "I have never read such a pact: it contains some real dynamite". It was in fact virtually the same text that Italy had rejected in October 1938, although two changes were made: the indefinite time period was adjusted to ten years and the Italo-German border considered permanently fixed. Notwithstanding these changes, the text bound Italy inextricably to Germany. Il Duce was by now so committed to entering into alliance that the text was signed forthwith, without further scrutiny from anyone else in the Italian government, nor even the various exports and advisors in the Foreign Ministry.

20 May. Ciano travels to Berlin for formal ratification of the treaty, christened shortly afterward by Il Duce as 'the Pact of Steel'.

27 May. Il Duce gives new British Ambassador an icy reception.

30 May. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention of easing relations with France. Cavellero travels to Berlin to further discuss military matters [OTL he notes the Danubian focus of Italian war policy and the unreadiness of the Italian military; ITTL simply mentions the Danubian focus]. However, no mention is made of the German intention to attack Poland. Italy continues to labour under the impression that an early war will not occur [while ITTL the RE is ready for war, it is not to say that Italy would prefer less rather than more time to prepare], while Germany is taking the exactly opposite approach.

June. Work commences around the practicalities of fomenting a Croat revolt and establishing an independent Croat state in confederation with Italy.

10 July. Following concerns around the increasingly inflammatory position taken by Germany around the Polish issue, and an official British representation to be careful of inciting matters further, Attolico is instructed to meet with Ribbentrop to determine if Berlin was planning to undertake military action; he did not receive any assurance that Germany would not attack and continued to be alarmed at the mood within the German hierarchy. Attolico advised Ciano to press for an interview with Ribbentrop himself and Ciano replied to the effect that while he saw value in such a meeting he would leave the date up to the German government and would not expect an interview before 1 September. Attolico rejoined that Rome is substantially underestimating the German position and that he expected military action to be taken by the end of August.

22 July. Il Duce meets with officials to discuss the Italian response to what was seen as a premature entry into war, and mainly stressing the point that a war of nerves served the purposes of the PoS powers better than risking general war and suggesting a conference to work matters through.

23 July. Italian officials meet with Ribbentrop and explaining the Italian position. Ribbentrop agrees to raise the matter with Hitler, but suggests a conference is not in Germany's interest and expresses confidence that Poland is isolated and well in hand. Italian officials suggest a meeting between Hitler and Il Duce.

31 July. Hitler declines offer to meet with Il Duce.

6 August. Following intelligence reports noting German troop concentrations on the Polish border, Ciano and Il Duce meet to discuss wider situation. Il Duce by now a little uncomfortable at being so tightly bound to Germany in an offensive military alliance. Il Duce prepares memorandum to guide Ciano's negotiations in a proposed meeting with Ribbentrop and arguing that in 1939 the PoS would have no more than an even chance at victory while in three years the odds would be four to one, and again repeating a proposal for a conference. It was further decided that Il Duce would simultaneously meet with Hitler [OTL this did not occur].

11 August. Ciano and Ribbentrop meet in Salzburg. Ribbentrop now shows his hand and declines to entertain the Italian proposals. He notes that matters have developed such that precipitate action must be taken and further declines to confirm any details of the German plans, claiming they are known only to Hitler. Ciano leaves in a furious mood.

12 August. Il Duce meets with Hitler, who is more conciliatory, but as unbending. Hitler notes the comparative strengths of the Western Powers and the PoS; of Germany and Poland; and how he believes the war will remain localised. It is at this point that he suggests that Italy attack Yugoslavia. Il Duce regains his swagger and impetuously agrees; he requests that Hitler postpone his attack on Poland so that Italy can mobilise and invade Yugoslavia in step with Germany's invasion. Hitler agrees, but warns that he cannot postpone for more than a few days (as a result of this the original deadline of 26 August is moved back to 1 September). Il Duce leaves in a triumphant mood and, when confronted with the contradictory tones of Ciano, insists that his is the rightful and correct attitude to take in the face of such a decisive moment of history. While his position would vacillate over the coming days, the war faction within his cabinet was sufficiently strong to ensure that he maintained the attitude developed in the meeting with Hitler.

15 August. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

20 August. Following efforts by Attolico and Ciano to forestall events, Il Duce sticks to his intentions and a formal announcement that Italy will enter the war on Germany's side is despatched to Berlin.

22 August. Il Duce sends personal telegram to Hitler: "As soon as you cross the fronteir, I will be at your side".

23 August. Il Duce authorises Ciano to approach the British government with a compromise plan around the Danzig crisis, so as to forestall general war. This marks the beginning of the Italian diplomatic campaign of 'non-belligerency' to mask it's invasion intentions.

25 August. In a high level conference Il Duce orders a concealed mobilisation with a view to invading Yugoslavia and Greece, with a tentative readiness date of September 30. Hitler writes Il Duce a long personal letter explaining the reasons behind Germany's inscrutable strategy of late and why he has not kept his partner informed. He lays out the German vision of the coming war and hopes that Il Duce can appreciate the background behind the German caution.

31 August. Ciano informs the British government that Italy will not enter into a general war.

1 September. Germany invades Poland.

3 September. France and Great Britain declare war on Germany; Italy declares non-belligerency. The Italian invasion of Yugoslavia is scheduled to occur within the end of the month.

Croesus
 
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Balkan Soup 1934 - 39

It is so easy to get lost reading Balkan history. What follows is a rough TL that gives the main event sof 1934-9 as they relate to the Balkan states. On the eve of the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia the following broad points can be seen:

1. Italy is hiding behind it's non-belligerency statement. Britain is encouraging the placation of Italy against the better judgement of France, whose strategic plan involves attacking Italy before Germany in the event of general war.

2. Following the German economic penetration of Yugoslavia and its occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente is no more. Both remaining partners are members of the Balkan Pact, but of this group Greece is working to create distance and Turkey will not be intervening.

3. The Revisionist Powers of Hungary and Bulgaria each seek in their own way to avoid become the plaything of Germany. Bulgaria is more successful in this regard. Both powers have interests in Yugoslavia territory.

4. The Italian invasion of Yugoslavia will occur less than one month after the establishment of limited Croatian self-governance, with Greece bought off to the south, with the Yugoslav army only partly mobilised, the Revisionist Powers still biding their time and the Anglo-French disunified and not interested in angering Italy...


1934.

January. German-Polish pact signed.

February. Barthou becomes French Foreign Minister and embarks on a program of binding the Soviet Union, Poland and the Little Entente to France as a means of containing German revisionism. He places importance on reconciling Yugoslavia and Italy.

9 February. The Balkan Pact (Greece, Turkey, Romania & Yugoslavia) is formed following a series of successful Balkan Conferences and along the lines of the Little Entente, in order to safeguard the status quo against Bulgarian revisionism and to form a bloc that would be able to hold it's own against the great powers. Bulgaria, which views the Balkan Pact as the resumption of the 2nd Balkan War Alliance, is encouraged to join as a signatory power, but declines out of fear of the reaction of the Macedonian revolutionary/independence/terrorist organisation IMRO. Bulgaria henceforth holds aloof from the Balkan Pact and the latter subsequently becomes a forum against Bulgarian claims of revision, rather than as a basis for Balkan collaboration.

12 February. Clashes break out between Austrian government forces and banned national-socialist paramilitaries.

16 March. Austro-Italo-Hungarian protocol is established in Rome.

19 May. Bulgarian army launches a coup, led by Colonels Velcher and Georgiev, with the latter becoming president. The new government heralds a process of warming relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; future relations will be encouraged by a Bulgarian military campaign against the heartland of IMRO. An extension of this action sees Bulgaria look for better relations with the Anglo-French. Velcher considers France as a replacement for Italy as the power on whom Bulgaria can rely for support in international affairs.

Jun. Barthou visits Belgrade for initial talks and invites Yugoslav King Alexander to Marseilles in October as a first step in improving relations between the King and Mussolini.

July. Nazi putsch in Austria is put down.

25 July. Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss assassinated by Austrian Nazi's.

5 October. Encouraged by Barthou, Mussolini speaks well of Yugoslavia in a speech. As he gives the speech, a group of assassins organised by IMRO and the Croatian Ustase assemble in Marseilles. Each organisation receives funding from the Italian state and maintains strong links to the Italian Military Intelligence Service (SIM).

9 October. King Alexander of Yugoslavia killed by Macedonian/Croatian assassins, French Foreign Minister Barthou accidentally killed by French police. At Alexander's funeral Goering gives assurance that 'Germany will never support any activity that aims at the break up of Yugoslavia'. As events transpire Germany pressures Italy to withdraw its support of the Ustase and focus it's energies towards Africa rather than the Balkans.

November. Yugoslavia agrees to permit German access to minerals such as copper, lead, zinc and bauxite. In exchange Germany provides finished industrial products.

1935.

Jan. In Bulgaria Col Velcher is outmanoeuvred and Col Georgiev is replaced.

7 January. French Foreign Minister Laval visits Rome, Franco-Italian relations improve.

1 March. Military uprising launched in Greece but soon collapses.

April. Bulgarian King Boris takes control of state from military government. By this time Italian pressure on Bulgaria to subvert Yugoslavia has eased. Boris' non-revisionism further increases links between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and facilitates further economic penetration of the region by Germany; although the Bulgarian request to Germany for war materials is refused. Bulgaria looks to appeal to France and Britain for assistance to avoid economic vassalage to Germany but is disappointed.

May. Franco-Italian military convention for the defence of Austria signed.

2 May. Franco-Soviet pact is signed.

16 May. Soviet-Czech pact signed.

July. First secret meeting between Yugoslavia’s Prince Paul and Hitler is held.

September. The British Mediterranean Fleet despatched to the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforced by the Home Fleet.

29 September. Hungarian Premier Gombos meets with Hitler. Hungary is encouraged to drop it’s revisionist demands towards Romania and Yugoslavia and concentrate on Czechoslovakia.

October. Relief in the Balkan Pact as Italy invades Abyssinia, indicating safety from Italian designs for the moment, and the Pact takes part in League of Nations sanctions. Following the invasion Yugoslavia offers the use of its naval facilities to Britain in the event of an Anglo-Italian war.

December. Greece, together with Yugoslavia and Turkey, affirm to Britain that they will take action if Italy undertakes military operations in light of League sanctions. Greek confidence in Britain subsequently shaken as Britain's position softens.

1936.

January. Il Duce informs Hitler that the Abyssinian sanctions had created a definite breach between Italy and France and hence, although he is not ready to permit Anschluss, he will recognise that Austria is a satellite of Germany and no longer of Italy.

May. Germany commences sale of low-quality military equipment to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Shipments balance off the trade deficit with Germany and are accompanied by German advisors and instructors.

4-6 May. The Balkan Pact meets in Belgrade. Greek General Metaxas reduces to a minimum its obligation under the Pact, noting that no action will be taken in case of aggression by Italy, Bulgaria or Hungary.

June. Germany and Greece conclude economic agreement aimed at balancing trading accounts between the two powers.

July. Austro-German agreement signed. Romanian King Carol II removes Foreign Minister Titulescu. Until now Titulescu had succeeded in obtaining a precarious balance between Germany, France and the Soviet Union. By the time of his removal Romania was the least economically dependent country on German influence. King Carol II now began to work towards the establishment of a personal dictatorship. Simultaneous with this the fascist Iron Guard resumes its program of destabilisation.

4 August. Metaxas launches coup and seizes power on eve of general strike.

October. Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg disbands the national paramilitary organisation.

8 October. Second secret meeting between Yugoslavian Prince Paul and Hitler held.

25 October. Axis agreement between Italy and Germany announced. Over the last three years southeastern Europe has become heavily dependent on the German economy, is hemmed in by totalitarian states on three sides and finding it difficult to sustain Anglo-French interest.

November. Rome-Berlin Axis is announced. Germany and Japan sign anti-Comintern pact.

1937

January. Bulgar-Yugoslav pact of Friendship is signed.

February. The Balkan Pact in Athens expresses approval of growing closeness between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

March. Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia.

May. Turkish Premier Inonu warns Metaxas that his pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist leanings are causing alarm amongst his supporters in Turkey. Chamberlain becomes British PM.

September. Mussolini visits Germany.

November. In the Romanian elections the Iron Guard secure 16.5% of the vote, becoming Romania's third largest party. Italy leaves League of Nations and joins anti-Comintern pact.

1938

January. Following the failure of the Romanian government, civil disorder grows as rival mobs of Iron Guard increase agitation against the state.

28 Jan. Plot to remove General Metaxas fails. Further unrest and arrests in May and July.

February. Balkan Pact in Istanbul recognises Italian suzerainty over Abyssinia; Romania and Yugoslavia have already recognised this.

12 February. Romanian King Carol II intervenes in civil disorder and establishes authoritarian regime. The entire leadership of the Iron Guard is arrested and the principal members executed. Schuschnigg visits Berlin.

9 March. Schuschnigg announces Austrian plebiscite.

11 March. Schuschnigg forced by Berlin to resign.

12 March. Germany occupies Austria.

16 April. Anglo-Italian agreement negotiated.

27 April. Greco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed.

20 May. A partial Czechoslovak mobilisation follows border tension with Germany.

July. Balkan Pact Naval staffs hold talks.

31 July. Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact sign a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, recognising the right of Bulgaria to rearm and abrogate the limitations of armaments clause in the Treaty of Neuilly. Bulgaria is not required to guarantee existing frontiers but undertakes not to modify them by force of action and to submit disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement. The clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne that provides for the demilitarisation of the frontiers between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in eastern Thrace are allowed to lapse.

7 September. Czech Minister Benes offers to meet Sudeten Germans’ demands.

13 September. Rioting in Sudetenland.

20 September. Czechs refuse French compromise-for-peace proposal.

21 September. The Anglo-French issue an ultimatum to Benes.

26 September. Britain promises aid with Russia if France defends Czechs.

27 September. Royal Navy mobilises.

28 September. Hitler accepts Mussolini’s proposal of Four-Power talks.

29 September. Four-Power Agreement signed.

30 September. Polish ultimatum delivered to Benes.

October 1938. Ciano receives and refuses text of proposed Italo-German alliance

5 October. Benes resigns.

November. Balkan Pact military staffs hold talks.

2 November. Vienna award gives southern Slovakia and part of Ruthenia to Hungary.

16 November. Anglo-Italian agreement is ratified.

6 December. France and Germany issue declaration of friendship.


1939.

January. Germany and Italy encourages Yugoslavia to secure portage access in Salonika in face of Greek resistance to arms being shipped to Yugoslavia from that location. Yugoslav Premier Stojadinovic agrees but is relieved of his position two weeks later by Prince Paul. Bulgaria rejects joining the Balkan Pact unless here territorial claims are satisfied.

1 Jan. Il Duce seeks to transform the anti-Comintern Pact into a formal alliance.

3 Jan. Ciano despatches a letter proposing a Triple Alliance to Ribbentrop

6 January. Chamberlain visits Rome. Ribbentrop despatches drafts of a Triple Alliance with secret military clauses to Rome.

8 January. Following Japanese hesitation to join a triple, Il Duce counter-proposes an Italo-German alliance.

13 January. Hungary joins the anti-Comintern pact.

March. Italy proposes combined Italo-German staff talks.

15 March. Germany occupies Prague and remainder of Bohemia-Moravia. Hungary occupies remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine.

19 March. Britain rejects Soviet plan for Five-Power talks on Romania.

23 March. Germano-Romanian signs an economic agreement.

31 March. Anglo-French issues a guarantee of Poland.

5-6 April. Italo-German staff talks held between Generals Kietel and Graziani. German approaches the talks with reserve and no effort is made to have serious discussions concerning operational or strategic matters in the event of a general European war. Graziani notes the general readiness of the RE to the secret bemusement of the German staff mindful as they were of the less-than-ideal performance of the CVF in Spain. No mention of the Albanian invasion is made, even though it launches within a few hours of the conference's completion; similarly no mention is made of the prospective attack on Poland, which had been established in a directive by Hitler two days previously.

7 April. Italy invades Albania.

10 April. Italy assures Greece that her territorial integrity will be absolutely respected.

13 April. British guarantees Greece, which becomes more confident of its position, especially with regards to its experiences during the Great War. Greece is however by now tied to Germany economically, making its relations with the Axis powers delicate.

14 April. Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union recommence.

16 April. Goering attends ceremony of the presentation of the Albanian crown to the Italian King and makes strong remarks with regard to Poland, reminding Ciano of similar tones leading up to the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises. Il Duce notes that he is looking forward to being able to settle accounts with France and mounts blackout and anti-aircraft demonstration for Goering.

20 April. Italian ambassador to Berlin Attolico reports impression that German attack on Poland is imminent. Il Duce remains unchanged in his resolve to enter into formal military alliance with Germany. He prepares a memorandum where he recognises that war is destined to break out between the 'rich nations and the poor'. The memorandum forms basis of Ciano’s instructions for upcoming meeting with Ribbentrop.

28 April. Hitler denounces Anglo-German naval agreement and Germano-Polish pact.

6 May. Ciano meets Ribbentrop in Milan. Ribbentrop assures Ciano that Germany will be following a path of conciliation with regard to the solution of the Polish problem. Ribbentrop also promotes the inclusion of the Soviet Union to the Axis and noted that a draft military treaty would be forthcoming soon.

7 May. A joint statement is issued confirming the solidarity between Italy and Germany and in keeping with this to formalise the relationship into a political and military alliance.

8 May. Britain refuses Soviet proposal for a Three-Power alliance

12 May. Anglo-Turkish pact is announced.

13 May. Ciano receives text of the Italo-German alliance: "I have never read such a pact: it contains some real dynamite". It was in fact virtually the same text that Italy had rejected last October, although two changes were made: the indefinite time period was adjusted to ten years and the Italo-German border considered permanently fixed. Notwithstanding these changes, the text bound Italy inextricably to Germany. Il Duce was by now so committed to entering into alliance that the text was signed forthwith, without further scrutiny from anyone else in the Italian government, nor even the various exports and advisors in the Foreign Ministry.

20 May. Ciano travels to Berlin for formal ratification of the treaty, christened shortly afterward by Il Duce as 'the Pact of Steel'.

22 May. Pact of Steel signed.

30 May. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention of easing relations with France. Cavallero travels to Berlin to further discuss military matters. However, no mention is made of the German intention to attack Poland. Italy continues to labour under the impression that an early war will not occur, while Germany is taking the exactly opposite approach. During discussions around PoS practicalities Mussolini proposes that Germany and Italy are to occupy the whole of the Balkans and the Danube basin. Hitler opposes the plan. Germano-Soviet negotiations commence.

June. Work commences around the practicalities of fomenting a Croat revolt and establishing an independent Croat state in confederation with Italy.

10 July. Following concerns around the increasingly inflammatory position taken by Germany around the Polish issue, and an official British representation to be careful of inciting matters further, Attolico is instructed to meet with Ribbentrop to determine if Berlin was planning to undertake military action; he did not receive any assurance that Germany would not attack and continued to be alarmed at the mood within the German hierarchy. Attolico advised Ciano to press for an interview with Ribbentrop himself and Ciano replied to the effect that while he saw value in such a meeting he would leave the date up to the German government and would not expect an interview before 1 September. Attolico rejoined that Rome is substantially underestimating the German position and that he expected military action to be taken by the end of August.

22 July. Il Duce meets with officials to discuss the Italian response to what was seen as a premature entry into war, and mainly stressing the point that a war of nerves served the purposes of the PoS powers better than risking general war and suggesting a conference to work matters through.

23 July. Italian officials meet with Ribbentrop and explaining the Italian position. Ribbentrop agrees to raise the matter with Hitler, but suggests a conference is not in Germany's interest and expresses confidence that Poland is isolated and well in hand. Italian officials suggest a meeting between Hitler and Il Duce.

31 July. Hitler declines offer to meet with Il Duce.

August 1939. Greece commences concealed mobilisation. The Balkan Pact becomes nervous about German intervention in Poland, fearing it will bring Italy into the war.

4 August. Polish-Danzig customs crisis commences.

6 August. Following intelligence reports noting German troop concentrations on the Polish border, Ciano and Il Duce meet to discuss wider situation. Il Duce by now is a little uncomfortable at being so tightly bound to Germany in an offensive military alliance. Il Duce prepares memorandum to guide Ciano's negotiations in a proposed meeting with Ribbentrop and arguing that in 1939 the PoS would have no more than an even chance at victory while in three years the odds would be four to one, and again repeating a proposal for a conference. It was further decided that Il Duce would simultaneously meet with Hitler.

9 August. Mutual Germano-Polish warnings over Danzig occur.

11 August. Ciano visits Berlin. Ciano and Ribbentrop meet in Salzburg. Ribbentrop now shows his hand and declines to entertain the Italian proposals. He notes that matters have developed such that precipitate action must be taken and further declines to confirm any details of the German plans, claiming only Hitler knows them. Ciano leaves in a furious mood.

12 August. Hitler reverses previous attitude towards Yugoslavia, urging the Italian invasion. Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks commence. Il Duce meets with Hitler, who is more conciliatory, but as unbending. Hitler notes the comparative strengths of the Western Powers and the Pact of Steel; of Germany and Poland; and how he believes the war will remain localised. It is at this point that he suggests that Italy attack Yugoslavia. Il Duce regains his swagger and impetuously agrees; he requests that Hitler postpone his attack on Poland so that Italy can mobilise and invade Yugoslavia in step with Germany's invasion. Hitler agrees, but warns that he cannot postpone for more than a few days (as a result of this the original deadline of 26 August is moved back to 1 September). Il Duce leaves in a triumphant mood and, when confronted with the contradictory tones of Ciano, insists that his is the rightful and correct attitude to take in the face of such a decisive moment of history. While his position would vacillate over the coming days, the war faction within his cabinet was sufficiently strong to ensure that he maintained the attitude developed in the meeting with Hitler.

15 August. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

16 August. Polish-Danzig customs talks commence.

20 August. Following efforts by Attolico and Ciano to forestall events, Il Duce sticks to his intentions and a formal announcement that Italy will enter the war on Germany's side is despatched to Berlin.

21 August. Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks are suspended.

22 August. Il Duce sends personal telegram to Hitler: "As soon as you cross the frontier, I will be at your side".

23 August. Germano-Soviet pact is announced. Il Duce authorises Ciano to approach the British government with a compromise plan around the Danzig crisis, so as to forestall general war. This marks the beginning of the Italian diplomatic campaign of 'non-belligerency' to mask its invasion intentions.

24 August. Polish-Danzig talks broken off.

25 August. Anglo-Polish agreement signed. Il Duce orders a concealed mobilisation with a view to invading Yugoslavia and Greece, with a tentative readiness date of September 30. Hitler writes Il Duce a long personal letter explaining the reasons behind Germany's inscrutable strategy of late and why he has not kept his partner informed. He lays out the German vision of the coming war and hopes that Il Duce can appreciate the background behind the German caution.

26 August. Yugoslav premier Cvetkovic signs agreement with Croat leader Macek, establishing Croatia as a territorial unit and some degree of self-government, with the latter serving as Vice Premier.

31 August. Ciano informs the British government that Italy will not enter into a general war.

1-3 September. Germany invades Poland: the Anglo-French declare war. Following Italy's declaration of non-belligerency, Italy proposes to Greece a withdrawal of military force from Albania. Italy also proposes a treaty of non-aggression, to which Greece agrees; northern Epirus is the price of Greek peace. The Anglo-French commences economic warfare measures aimed at disrupting German attempts to obtain Romanian oil supplies. Germany threatens invasion on grounds that Romania is violating its neutrality if it doesn't resist Anglo-French efforts (not until OTL March 1940 does Romania cave into German pressure). Hungary declares non-belligerency; Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece declare neutrality.

3 September. Yugoslavia commences partial mobilisation; Britain works to ensure that Italy is not provoked to abandon it’s status of non-belligerence by cautioning against Yugoslav preparations and moves to create closer links with Bulgaria.

11 September. Il Duce: "Greece does not lie in our path, and we want nothing from her. I have full confidence in Metaxas, who has restored order to his country."

20 September. Il Duce: "War with Greece is off. Greece is a bare bone and is not worth the loss of a single Sardinian Grenadier."

25 September. Il Duce cancels Greek invasion.

Croesus
 
The Italian Path To War

The first intimation that Marshal Cavallero had as to the Italian intention to enter the war came on August 15 following Il Duce’s visit to Berchtesgarden. He was informed that Germany would be attacking Poland before the month is out and that Italy has a free hand to attack Yugoslavia. Cavallero pointed out that since October 1934 Yugoslavia had clearly become part of the German sphere and doubted that Hitler would so willingly give up five years of preparation.

Il Duce responded by frankly assessing the situation as he saw it; that Germany needs a distraction from it’s endeavour in Poland, that the Anglo-French are by no means a unified coalition and that unless Italy does something now it will forever find itself living in the German shadow. The time for war had come: he reminded the Marshal that not for nothing had Il Duce suspended his better judgement when the likes of Ferrari, Baistrocchi and Balbo came calling with their impossible plans. He expects the Italian military to take its place in the annals of history, and for all the right reasons. He expects victory parades and long lines of prisoners-of-war; and it is the Marshal’s task to deliver this.

When Cavallero enquired as to the Italian war aims, Il Duce gave an exasperated sigh and explained to him that he, Il Duce, started the wars and it was not his task to look after the details. Upon recognising the look of incredulity on his Marshal’s face he suggested that Cavallero consult his planners and be available to provide a summary in a weeks time. Until that time Il Duce advised the Marshal to count his soldiers and collect his guns and look after all those things he was paid to look after.

Marshal Cavallero knew quite well the state of the Italian military. The Regio Esercito was small; the Regio Aeronautica was fascist and the Regia Marina timid; hardly the stuff with which to confront the Anglo-French in the event of general war. The RM was positively cowed by the problems posed by the British Mediterranean Fleet and its French counterpart. RM Chief of Staff Admiral Cavagnari was a battleship admiral of the old school and positively miserly about deploying his precious capital assets. Cavallero was resigned to the fact that the RM would be fighting its own war for most of the time and he had to take that into account when examining the problems associated with supplying and supporting the Fifth and Sixth Armies in Libya.

RA Chief of Staff General Valle was made of sterner stuff, but at times too stern, and certainly given to too much bombast than his actual military strength justified. The RA was still transforming itself away from the Douhet doctrine of high level strategic bombing. The two arms of the RA that Cavallero was mainly interested in were not fully capable; the ground attack capability was tied to the limitations of older machines (although they had over the last year improved their record following their experience in Spain) and the torpedo strike capability had encountered significant difficulties in obtaining modern craft, having only obsolete air-cooled engined trimotors (although they at least had an excellent torpedo). On the other hand air superiority looked competent and the RA had also taken over development of radar from the RM.

RE Chief of Staff Graziani was not confident about Italian chances in North Africa, nor about holding back any French push through the Alps; and as for projecting force, the less said the better. Cavallero took a more measured view. Certainly Libya looked weak and he doubted being able to hold on to it unless it formed the focus of Italian efforts; which wasn’t in itself unreasonable, as Italy had looked increasingly towards Tunisia and Egypt since 1934. Malta was a complicating problem of some magnitude, especially since it was the home of the British Mediterranean Fleet, and here Cavallero could sympathise with Cavagnaris unease. However the Italian artillery was strong, the newer anti-aircraft guns were becoming increasingly available and the tanks seemed promising. It seemed to him that as long as economy of force was maintained, the conflict was short and a little bit of luck was had, Italy might do well.

The next stage in the preparations for war came when Marshal Cavallero attended a meeting in the Palazzo Venezia on 25 August with a view to setting war aims, commencing definitive planning and organising mobilisation. Cavallero's idea for economy of force was clearly not shared by the gathered fascisti: attacks into Savoy and Tunisia, assault on Malta and invasion of Yugoslavia were to be conducted simultaneously. The Marshal managed to focus attention sufficiently to have the French attacks cancelled but these gains were lost when Greece was to be invaded in tandem with Yugoslavia and while no specific mention of Malta was made, Cavallero had a suspicion that the original idea of assaulting the island was still being entertained. At any rate he was expected to be ready for an invasion tentatively dated for 30 September.

Returning to his planning, it became clear to the Marshal that there was no feasibility at all for attacking Yugoslavia and Greece. It would have to be one or the other but the final decision for which would rest with Il Duce and so he had to have two invasion plans prepared. Planning documents for invading each of the two countries dated back to the mid-twenties and had gone through several evolutions. The essential form of a Greek invasion called for landings in Salonika to complement an eastwards push from Albania. The Salonika landing was considerably fraught with danger in light of the presence of the Royal Navy, and the main emphasis was placed on the advance from Albania. Two forms of plan existed for the Albanian advance: a large scale operation involving eleven divisions and a lesser version involving nine, although the substance was the same. Five/four divisions were to attack into Epirus, three/two were to hold the Yugoslav border, two were to hold the Koritsa region and one was to reoccupy Corfu. Options around the intervention of both Bulgaria and Turkey had also been considered.

The Yugoslav invasion was somewhat more complicated. Political efforts were to be made to destabilise the Croat elements in the Royal Yugoslav Army and support given to Macek's establishment of a Croatian puppet state. Five invasion points were identified with divisions advancing out of the Fiume & Zara beachheads, Albania and Slovenia. The numbers of divisions deployed also varied with the Slovenian or Dalmatian fronts enjoying predominance in turn, although no less than ten divisions were considered and some versions asked for eighteen. There was substantial complication around the involvement of foreign armies with Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece considered likely to become involved at some point.

Having obtained a degree of certainty over Libya, Cavallero immediately sought to discover what the minimum force was required to put up a stiff defence in the event of a French push from Tunisia. He had no intention of fighting a stand-and-die battle in the colony, regardless of political or economic sensitivities. Of course, it might be forced upon him but he at least took heart from Il Duce's mention of placing more strategic value on Yugoslavia than Libya. Libya could not be considered without also pondering the problem of Malta. Cavallero could not see how he could either sustain a defence of Libya, evacuate the colony or even reinforce in the unlikely event of victory for as long as the British Mediterranean Fleet was able to maintain the island.

Complicating things somewhat was the Italian smokescreen of non-belligerency: he could not simply just attack it for as long as there was a sense in Rome that Britain could be mollified. In the cancellation of the French attacks he could see the logic behind the Italian positioning around non-belligerency and the concept of a 'parallel war'. By no doubt manufacturing some local issue Il Duce hoped to invade Yugoslavia while remaining aloof from the wider conflict. He was hoping that the appeasement party in Britain would continue to keep France from following up on its war strategy of 'Italy first'. This meant that Malta could not be attacked pre-emptively, but rather had to be attacked once it became clear that Italy and Britain would be coming to blows. The other alternative of course was to neutralise the island from the air and the Douhet factions within RA were confident of their ability to do so.

It was only the next day, on 26 August, that the surprising news of the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic announcing the formation of the semi-autonomous Croatian Banovina Hrvatska. In a single piece of diplomacy Italy had lost its main justification for intervening into Yugoslavia and bringing about the Kingdoms fall by the establishment of a Croat puppet state. Cavallero's planning was now in tatters and he took the development as an indication that an invasion of Greece was now the more likely of the two events. Initial enquiries to Ciano and Il Duce reinforced this consideration as clearly they had not taken such an eventuality into account. Simultaneous with this news came a report from SIM that the Greek army had in fact already been conducting its own concealed mobilisation and may have up to a fortnight's lead on the Italian mobilisation. As there was a fair degree of reliance being placed on catching the Greeks off guard planning changes had to be made and the first major departure from previous thinking was the cancellation of the Salonika landing.

Events now began to move very quickly. Ciano gave his guarantee to Chamberlain on 31 August that Italy would not enter the war against France or Britain, and the desired result was had over the coming weeks where the British intervened with both the French and Yugoslavs in an effort to keep Italy out of the war. This desire to keep a lid on a European general war seemed to be very sincere and Cavallero greatly valued having a blind eye turned his way at such a critical stage of his mobilisation plans. On 1 September Germany invaded Poland, and in the intervening two days the member of the Balkan Pact declared neutrality, the Hungarians and Italians declared non-belligerency and the Anglo-French declared war. On 3 September Yugoslavia began mobilising but was pressured by the British to avoid full mobilisation, and to also desist efforts to further the Bulgar-Yugoslav detente. Italy also offers Greece a treaty of non-aggression and, following several days of negotiation and to the surprise of many on the Italian side of the table, the Greeks agree; their price being the return of northern Epiros from Albania. This treaty was not immediately announced but word soon reached Cavallero who by now was at his wits end with the implications of the shifting political tide for his war plans.

Seeking direction from Il Duce on 10 September Cavallero was surprised to learn that both invasions were still considered to be live issues. In a decision that illustrates well the cold-blooded tenor of Italian foreign policy at the time Cavallero learnt that efforts were underway to organise the fascist Ustase leader Ante Pavelic as a counter-force for the more moderate regime of Macek, and to attack the infant Croatian state before it had a chance to properly secure its position. It was considered likely that the Serbian interests in Yugoslavia would hesitate a little in the event of a sudden Italian invasion, especially in light that it was Serbia that would have to deal with any Hungarian or Bulgarian incursions. The Greek action was also still on because, rather in spite, of the newly signed treaty which was seen as an excellent means to prompt Metaxas to drop his guard. When the gathered fascisti learnt from Cavallero that there was no way a twin invasion could occur there was an extended period of silence followed by a clamorous uproar as the pro-Yugoslav and pro-Greek interests each began to harangue Il Duce about the relative merits of each invasion option. Cavallero was dismissed at this point and was told to continue planning for both eventualities.

An unexpected benefit to the Italian interests was received at this point when it was learnt that the British Mediterranean Fleet was due to steam out through the Straits of Gibralter to link up with the French fleet. It seemed that the Admiralty was confronting a wide range of planning challenges itself and vacating the Mediterranean was seen as being an extension of the British efforts to keep Italy calm and out of the war. This meant that Malta was largely undefended in terms of the British surface fleet, which itself meant that the RM could venture forth from it's bases with confidence as to obtaining local superiority. Subsequently the Libyan Airborne Regiment was placed on alert and the transport and air superiority planes began to be assembled. The Libyan Landing Force which had already been despatched to prepare for landings along the Dalmatian coast was hurriedly instructed to make port and await further instructions.

On 20 September Cavallero was contacted by the Palazzo Venezia and informed that Il Duce was now increasingly in favour of the Yugoslav invasion over the Greek and that Cavallero should commence final planning to that effect. Five days later the Greek operation was definitively cancelled. This suited the Cavallero's deployment schedule as the Second Army in Albania had had it's reinforcements held back until more certainty was had, not to mention as part of the general desire to lull the Greeks into a false sense of security. By this time the Fifth and Sixth Armies in Libya had been stripped of no less than four divisions with one withdrawn to Sicily, and three to the invasion force; a single division was arrayed against the British while the remaining three faced the French. First and Fourth Armies on the Savoy front had retained their strength of four divisions with numerous supporting units and were by now well prepared in defensive positions.

That gave the invasion force a total of 10 full divisions with attached units that, taken together, formed another three. While it was a squeeze and less than ideal, it was all that could be had. Cavallero took heart from what seemed to be a self-interested Greece, the vacating of the Mediterranean by the British Navy, the smokescreens of non-belligerency and parallel war, the partial state of Yugoslav mobilisation and the revisionist interests of Hungary, and finally the impression he had gained over the last year that, based on the efforts in Abyssinia and Spain, foreign military interests considered the Italian army a paper tiger.

Croesus
 
The Rival Dispositions

Following the creation of the autonomous Croatian Banovina under Vice-Premier Macek the Serbo-Croat schism within the Jugoslovenska Vojska became pronounced. Never an easy relationship, professional jealousies came to the fore and an Italian fund of 100,000 Swiss francs had been disbursed prior to the establishment of the Croatian state as Rome sought to advance it's agenda of destabilising the Kingdom. Subsequently the cooperation between the Croatian dominated 1st Army Group and the Serb dominated 2nd and 3rd Army Groups was not well established and did not perform well under the twin pressures of external war and internal rivalry.

Matters were complicated by the British government advising against full mobilisation that had commenced on 3 September but soon after scaled back, resulting in only 11 divisions being effectively under arms at the time of the Italian invasion. Furthermore those divisions able to take the field were only up to about 80% of their establishment strength and the allocation of war material (which itself was of poor quality and consisted of Great War era weapons, intermingled with recently supplied second-rate German arms and supplemented by a miscellany of pieces from other European producers) both lagged behind the call up of men and was biased towards the Serb dominated units.

The Croatian 1st Army Group consisted of the 4th and 7th Armies, the former disposed in the west of the Banovina and the latter in the east. The 4th Army (Nedeljkovic) was relatively well advanced in it's mobilisation schedule and could field two divisions, the 27th Savska (Maric) and the 40th Slavonska (Raketic), although each was only at 70% of establisment and under-strength in heavy weapons. The Slavonska had been concentrated on the capital Zagreb to ensure security of the new regime which meant that only Savska was in place to contest any Italian movement over the border.

The 7th Army (Trifunovic) fielded only a single division, the 38th Dravska (Stanojlovic), although it was fairly well reinforced with both Alpine and Machine Gun units and up to 90% of its strength. The Serbian 3rd Army Group consisted of the 3rd Army and guarded the Albanian border. The 3rd Army (Brasic) also fielded two divisions, the 13th Herzegovacka (Petrovic) and the 31st Kosovska (Milenkovic), with each division around 80% of strength and two of the better equipped Yugoslav divisions. The Kosovska was centered on the region from which it took its name while the Herzegovacka was based on Montenegro.

The overall weaknesses in heavy weapons within the JV were substantial. The artillery was on the whole obsolete and entirely horse-drawn; AT and AA pieces were scarce and held centrally in Belgrade, which inevitably meant that the Croatian divisions were particularly deficient; and automatic weapons were not plentiful and greatly monopolised by the Serbian divisions. The 1st Armoured Battalion consisted of 48 old French FT-17's and M-28's, fielded only a single operational company and was also held centrally; a full platoon of FT-17's from an Independent Company stationed in Zagreb formed the only armoured complement available to 1st Army Group when the Italians invaded. Available air support was spread throughout the Kingdom and Zagreb could field a single fighter and single bomber regiment, although the quality of machines was poor and heterogenous.

Facing these five understrength divisions were 10 full-strength Italian divisions and associated units that combined for a total of three divisions. The broad strategic idea is to advance along narrow corridors on Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade under cover of air superiority. Belgrade was seen as the more significant obstacle, with the other two capitals targeted first and of the two Zagreb would be given operational priority. Surprise was given a high priority in view of the capacity of the defending units to fall back along their lines of communication and, by blowing roads and culverts, slow down the Italian advance.

The Albanian forces were to make contact with and draw in the Serbian 3rd Army Group such that any attempts to reinforce the 1st Army Group would either be constrained, or lead to a breakthrough by the Italian units. The Libyan Landing Force was initially scheduled to sieze Split but had since been diverted in light of possibilities opened up around the assault and capture of Malta. The main strength was to be launched from Fiume directly at Zagreb and the coastal defence units along the Dalmatian coast were to be largely ignored, beyond being caught up in Regia Marina suppressing actions against the Yugoslav naval bases and the supporting actions for the short coastal advance of Sixth Army. The Fiume operations were conceived as being a first phase that forces the roads and flanking high points and thence pushes up to the first major obstacle at Karlovac and the Kupa bridges, and a second phase either exploiting to Zagreb and Sava, or beyond.

On the Albanian front, Second Army (Ambrosio) fielded two alpine divisions (the 2nd Tridentina and 3rd Julia), two mountain infantry divisions (11th Sassari, a veteran Abyssinian division, and 14th Bergamo), four artillery regiments, two cavalry regiments, one bersaglieri regiment, four border-guard units and two machine gun battalions. V Corps (Frusci) was tasked with watching the Greek border and was stripped down to the Sassari and the border-guard units, while it fell to the reinforced X Corps (Rossi) to force their way forward (and through) the defending units of 3rd Army Group.

Their task was considered to be quite onerous given the poor state of the local roads, the likelihood of inclement weather and the difficulties posed by taking on the well-regarded Serbian infantry in terrain ideally suited to defensive warfare. In Trieste was the Third Army (Guzzoni) tasked with the capture of Ljubljana and consisting of a single mountain infantry division (13th Isonzo), a single alpine division (1st Taurinense), three regiments of artillery, four border guard units and three machine gun battalions. It was not certain if Slovenia would be defended in any signficant way and if so Third Army was to cross the Sava higher up from Zagreb and turn around behind the city.

In Fiume were the units of Eighth Army (Balocco) tasked with forcing open passage into the Croatian hinterland, and comprising two infantry divisions (8th Pasubio and 9th Piave, both veteran Abyssinian divisions), one mountain infantry division (12th Re), one armoured division (1st Centauro), six artillery regiments, one bersaglieri regiment, one AA regiment, four border-guard units and four machine gun battalions. XV Corps (Roux) was tasked with the hard fighting and deployed all three infantry divisions and three of the machine gun battalions, while VII Corps (Arisio) consisted of the Centauro and the bersaglieri.

Behind the Eighth were the breakthrough units of Sixth Army (Berti) and concentrated the bulk of the Italian motorised units with three autotransportable infantry divisions (4th Livorno, 6th Cuneo, both of which are veteran Spanish divisions, and 10th Brenner), one armoured division (3rd Littorio), four motorised artillery regiments, two motorised machine gun battalions, and one motorised AA regiment. While the Eighth was to fight it's way along the Fiume-Karlovac road, the Sixth was to advance a short way down the coast, supported by the guns of the RM, to Senj before taking it's road to Karlovac.

The Regia Aeronautica had three main roles in the invasion plans; local air superiority, the strategic bombing of Zagreb and the tactical bombing in support of each of the three fronts. There remained considerable controversy about the deployment of the heavy bombers as it was seen, somewhat justifiably, that the puppet government of Pavelic would not appreciate inheriting a bombed out city, notwithstanding the professional concern of the RA airmen about avoiding large scale bombing of civilian populations. Consequently the bombers were only permitted to fly missions when cleared directly from Rome.

The establishment of local air superiority was considered a fairly easy task and it was considered likely that by the end of the second week of operations the skies would be cleared of JV aircraft. The tactical bombing missions aroused considerable concern within the RE as no real work had been done in the area of combined operations and the soldiers recognised that any errors made while learning on the job would be borne largely by them. However it was considered an important opportunity to try out the techniques as demonstrated by the Germans in Poland and the RA were very keen to get involved.

Croesus
 
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Oct 3-4: Opening Round

The Italian invasion ran behind schedule from the beginning. The transport and logistic system was hard pressed to move such a large amount of men and materiel under conditions of semi-secrecy. There was significant confusion as the Italian forces concentrated and few divisions commenced the campaign with their full complement of equipment, many without even their full establishment of men. It fell to the men of the Pasubio to open the invasion on the ground by pushing directly up the road to Karlovac; there was little attempt to hide or mask the advance. The Piave would follow behind with the Re was held in reserve while the Centauro was not intended to be committed to this stage of the battle.

The Italian build up had not gone unnoticed by the Yugoslavs. The first reports of the RE concentrating around Fiume were received by the third week of September and by the fourth its presence was unmistakeable. While there was at yet no conception of the size of the RE presence there was a distinct sense of something being amiss. Complaints to London were politely received but ultimately dismissed and the advice to not provoke Mussolini was reissued. This left the JV with the difficult task of preparing to defend without giving cause for accusations of aggression, a challenge that Poland had itself recently faced, and lost.

The JV plan was simply to dig in behind the Kupa at Karlovac and buy as much time as possible in the event of an Italian advance. The 27th Savska had upgraded the existing fixed defences somewhat but were still woefully short of artillery and heavy infantry weapons. As mobilising units continued to rally these were formed into a loose battle group ‘Hacovar’ which was tasked with throwing out advance pickets down the Zara, Senj and Fiume roads and thence holding up any Italian advance. These units would typically be reinforced by small groups of engineers who would place explosives along the roads before retiring to the nearby ridgelines where the few available machineguns were sited. It was one of the Hacovar companies that the advance guard of the Pasubio encountered on the second day of the invasion, October 4th.

The Italian operations had commenced on the 3rd when the light cruisers Bari and Taranto of the Ionian and Lower Adriatic Department, and the heavy cruiser Pola of the Upper Adriatic Department bombarded the Yugoslav naval bases at Sibenik, Split and Kotor while the 2nd and 15th Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons provided additional screening for the capital ships. These naval actions were largely successful in neutralising the small Yugoslav navy, although the Pola hit a mine after steaming away from the burning facility at Sibenik and was immobilised. An attack by surviving Yugoslav torpedo boats came to nothing and with that action the naval component of the Italian invasion ended.

The Regio Aeronautica opened their account by bombing the Zagreb, Nova Topola, Bosanski Alexandrovac and Banja Luka airfields. The 4th Bomber Division Drago, flying BR.20’s out of Novara, bombed the first two targets while the 6th Bomber Division Falco flying Z.1008’s out of Padova hit the second two. Fighter sweeps by the 2nd Fighter Division flying MA.200’s out of Torino escorted the attacking bombers. The RA had a very easy time of it. They departed for their missions before even the RM began its bombardment and flew careful flight paths to help conceal their approach. They were on target before the Yugoslavs could react and those pilots who struggled into the air with their hopelessly outclassed IK-2’s were soon despatched. By the end of the first day the Yugoslav air force in Croatia was largely destroyed.

As the advance guard of the Pasubio moved up the Karlovac road they could hear the echoes of the Yugoslav detonations reverberating down the valleys towards them. Their pace, already somewhat cautious, slowed even further as they turned their first corner to be met by the plunging fire of the Hacovar rearguard units. The Pasubio shrank back before commencing the first of many such actions; traversing down to the stream below before scaling the heights while under the rifle fire of the Hacovar only to find the Yugoslavs already gone onto their next firing position. Eventually substantial forces were thrown out on the flanks as the Italians struggled through the terrain in a vain attempt to catch their persecutors. Meanwhile back on the road engineers were brought forward to span the yawning gaps and as they toiled the entire momentum of the Pasubio and Piave slowly wound down.

Croesus
 
The Immediate Political Situation

While the British were able to conveniently ignore the Yugoslav warnings about the Italian military build up in Trieste and Fiume, they were not able to ignore Il Duce’s summons of their ambassador to the Palazzo Venezia on the evening of 3 October. They arrived to find Mussolini in a good mood; the initial reports from the RM and RA were on his desk and the Pasubio had yet to encounter difficulties on the road to Karlovac. He also knew that the British Mediterranean Fleet was presently in the Atlantic as Britain sought to find the best way to cover its widespread interests and that the French had begun to move divisions away from the Franco-Italian border to reinforce the Maginot Line and Belgian border positions.

Upon the arrival of the ambassadors he drew himself up to his full height and commenced a lengthy diatribe against Yugoslavia in general and Croatia in particular. He was incensed that Yugoslavia, already a virtual German vassal state, could conceive of creating a Croatian state without thinking to consult Italy who clearly had significant interests in the region. He regarded the Macek government as illegal and saw a much darker motivation than mere self-direction for the Croats. He declared that the Macek government did not even represent the Croatian people; how could he when Pavelic still sheltered in Italy and, even though the government was now supposedly Croatian, would not return for fear of imprisonment or execution.

He intimated strongly that Italy had had enough of German economic influence in the Balkans, Italy’s backyard, and that this move by the pro-German Yugoslav regime was just too much. He realised that there was significant pressure on Romania to formally enter the German orbit on account of the Romanian oil, and that the Anglo-French were understandably concerned about this. He reiterated that Italy had no thought whatsoever in fuelling the fire of war by entering on the German side and, while he would also refuse to join the Anglo-French in fighting Germany, would work towards halting the inexorable tide of German economic pressure into the Balkans and Danube basin.

He recognised that the Anglo-French guarantee of Greece signalled an important piece of policy for the western powers and noted also that, given the similarity to the guarantee given to Poland, that meeting the Greek guarantee would be significantly easier with Italian cooperation. Subsequently he announced the existence of the recently concluded Italo-Greek Treaty of Non Aggression and the generous statesmanship exhibited by Italy in solving the problem of northern Epirus in the Greek favour: it is the least he could do for peace. He could thus with considerable confidence assure London that the Balkans at least would remain a bulwark against Germany and that Italy had already commenced the next stage of ensuring that Romania too would be safe from German depredation. The provocative Yugoslav creation of its proxy Croatian state would not be tolerated as Italy saw it for what it really was; and as a result Italian forces are already encountering joyful welcome as liberators from the illegal Macek regime.

Daladier was not impressed when he received the news of the Italian invasion and less of Il Duce’s justification. He felt that the British were being played for fools. However his annoyance was tempered by other considerations. Primarily he took heart from the opinion of Gamelin that the Italian army was a ramshackle affair fit only to overrun Abyssinian tribesman. Noting the debacle that was the battle of Guadalajara it was the considered opinion of the GQG that when confronted with what was widely regarded as some of the best infantry in Europe the Italians would quickly bog down. This would mean that Italy would not be able to assist Germany in the event of an attack on France. He could see additional political advantage accruing in the likely event of Chamberlain continuing his policy of appeasing Mussolini: if France went along with British policy they would clearly be demonstrating good faith as an ally and be thus positioned to make further requests of London.

Chamberlain saw the Italian invasion as a serious blow to his foreign policy but, like Daladier, saw a positive in that at least this would keep the Italian busy. He did not see any need to intervene on the Yugoslav side and would pressure Daladier to agree, using the latter’s own motto of the importance of unity to ensure France would stay out of what was portrayed as a localised, and parallel, conflict. However he could foresee that the unexpected development would be used as fuel by his parliamentary enemies and certainly agreed with the Admiralty advice to return a substantial portion of the Mediterranean Fleet as well as accelerate plans to move the homeport of the fleet from Malta to Alexandria.

Soon after the first Italian bombers flew towards their targets the Italian ambassador to Budapest conveyed an official letter from Il Duce calling for Hungary to act in accordance with its interests as a revisionist Versailles power and take possession of the territory so shamefully taken from it by the Treaty of Trianon. Italy was finally acting in exasperation to Yugoslav provocation by occupying Croatia and urged Hungary to take part in reconquering its Slavonian territory. Similarly the ambassador to Sofia was urged to take part in this historic reorientation of the region by returning to Greater Bulgaria its lost territory of Vardar Macedonia. Here was a great opportunity to reclaim what was lost and to regain their place in history.

The situation was clearly attractive to the Hungarian Premier Teleki and would be a natural development of its recent gains, through the Vienna Awards, of southern Slovakia, Ruthenia and northern Transylvania. With the recent shift to the right of domestic politics and the clear need to increase the strength of the Hungarian state in view of the fundamental change in the balance of power the Italian proposal was given immediate consideration. The view from Sofia was less straightforward. The recent warming of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations had proceeded apace and the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kyoseivanov had sought to establish the alliance as a means of sidestepping the Balkan Entente, isolating Romania and as a means to returning Bulgaria as the pre-eminent local power. However he could hardly ignore the sea-change that had occurred and there was probably more to lose by supporting the Yugoslavs than by betraying them.

Croesus
 
Yugoslavia Oct 5 -11

The original plan had the main effort of the Eighth (Balocco) and Sixth (Berti) Armies in the centre jumping off two days before the Second Army (Ambrosio) on the Albanian front and Third Army (Guzzoni) on the Slovenian front. The idea was that doing so would encourage the JV to commit its reserves to the centre and so permit Ambrosio and Guzzoni to make good gains on the flanks. In practice what happened was that the undefended Slovenian front was reinforced by another of the soon-to-be ubiquitous scratch JV units, in this case a formation of artillerymen without guns, an alpine unit and a machinegun detachment, the Battle Group Krstic which was able to get astride the Ljubljana road between Postojna and Vrhnika. The presence of the machine gun unit would prove telling in the days to come as Krstic was able to establish mutually supporting positions on adjacent highpoints and greatly slow the advance of Guzzoni’s vanguard, the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo.

Ambrosio had even greater cause to rue the delay. His plan had been to take the ridgeline between Plav and Andrijevica and isolate the former so as to support a push on Pec with the objective of seizing the road junction at Rozaje. For this operation he committed the 2nd Alpine Tridentina and 14th Mtn Inf Bergamo which would ordinarily have been enough except that, just as Plav was being occupied by the Tridentina and both sides of the River Drin taken, the Bergamo was hit in its left flank by the advance guard of the JV Herzegovacka, stopping it completely in it’s tracks and forcing the Bergamo to disjointedly deploy along its line of approach. Subsequently by the end of the 5th both Ambrosio and Guzzoni were halted and having to shake out along the lines of advance in the case of the former or having to fight a meeting engagement in the case of the latter.

By this time Berti had managed to struggle clear of Balocco’s supply line and commenced his own advance down the Dalmatian coast towards the Senj road head. Held up briefly by a brave but doomed contingent of Yugoslav naval personnel at Novi Vinodolski, Senj was reached on the morning of the 6th. Following a period of readjustment of units Berti was aghast to learn from his reconnaissance units that the Senj-Karlovac road was entirely unsuited to passage by the great majority of his subordinate units. The entire Sixth Army was thus held up in Senj as Berti consulted with both Graziani and Cavallero as to what the next step should be: a return to Fiume and thence to follow up on Balocco, or a push onto Zara and to follow it’s road to Karlovac. Here was exposed the slovenly nature of Italian communications and delay mounted upon delay as the various commanders prevaricated, leaving Berti stranded in Senj for five full days before finally the decision was taken to advance on Split.

When, on the 10th Berti commenced his sluggish advance on Zara, Balocco had finally managed to make full use of his numbers and the better of JV Hacovar, sending the battle group falling back to positions on the high ground behind Vrbovsko where they were joined by a detachment of infantry. Fixed positions were hurriedly prepared as Hacovar sought to make as strong a stand as could be had. Unfortunately for Hacovar by this time both the Piave and Pasubio had adjusted to the conditions and, in conjunction with the increasingly effective Italian artillery, the Yugoslav positions were fixed, pounded and flanked such that by the 11th Hacovar was trapped and forced to surrender what was left of his command. This defeat meant that Balocco had a clear run out of the highlands and towards the lower ground at Karlovac.

In the meantime a pitched battle had been raging between the Bergamo and Herzegovacka along the entire stretch of the Drin between Plav and Andrijevica. Ambrosio had sought to use the Tridentina to turn the flank of the Herzegovacka but had instead run headlong into the JV Kosovska: clearly the Yugoslavs were not reinforcing their centre but seemed to even fancy their chances at dealing the Italians a bloody nose. In Ambrosio’s favour was the Italian superiority in artillery and, following early concerns of the Bergamo’s’ ability to hold its position let alone engage the Herzegovacka on its own terms, the crisis passed and by the 10th the Bergamo had itself fixed the Herzegovacka in place and Ambrosio had committed his Bersaglieri to turn the JV western flank. The Tridentina had on its own initiative managed to find a gap in the Kosovska’s line of advance and was turning in on the Yugoslav division, splitting it’s disposition and setting up for the destruction of the JV regiment caught between it and the Bergamo. This permitted Ambrosio to continue to hold the 3rd Alpine Julia in reserve for maintaining the intended push onto Rozaje.

Guzzoni had been completely held up by JV Krstic just out of Postojna and was in all sorts of trouble. Loath to commit his only other division, the 1st Alpine Taurinense, he had sought to use his comparative advantage in machine gun battalions by using the tactics of the Krstic against. However this played directly into the hands of the Yugoslav commanders and every day saw fresh arrivals in Ljubljana, further increasing Guzzoni’s problems. By the 11th the Third Army had only reached the halfway point between Postojna and Vrhnika, although the last two days had seen the first appearance of the RA in its ground attack capability. On the whole the combat missions flown by the BA 65 pilots were absolutely unconvincing as to the military effectiveness although it could be seen how they could work and this realisation on the part of both RE and RA would bear dividends later on in the campaign, and particularly for the Third Army as the problems and possibilities of air-ground coordination began to get sorted out.

Croesus
 
Belgrades Strategy

Things went rapidly from bad to worse for the Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetkovic. His career as Prime Minister started well enough as he negotiated the fine print of a federal structure for Yugoslavia and seemingly created a positive solution to the long running issue between Serb and Croat in the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement of 26 August that created the semi-independent Banovina of Croatia.

The divergent politics of his predecessor Stodjanovic and the regent Prince Paul was no longer an issue and the neutralist position of Stodjanovic could be replaced by the role of Yugoslavia as a quasi-German satellite: certainly this was seen as an effective means of keeping Italy and Hungary at bay. When war came on 1 September he could clear point to the paucity of his resources and the complexity of his situation when defending Yugoslav neutrality to the German ambassador and, indeed, there was never an issue in that regard. There was also some doubt in both his and the regent's minds as to the capacity of Germany to win the war and it seemed best to be prudent about any hasty involvement and certainly important to retain ties with the Anglo-French.

The first sign that events were taking a turn for the worse was when the British government strongly advised against Yugoslavia completing the mobilisation that it commenced on 3 September, as well as cooling the impetus to establish closer ties with Bulgaria. The former was discouraged in view of the strong Anglo-French desire to keep Italy out of the war and Cvetkovic could understand that, although he was not comfortable with it and did not place much faith in either the existing French guarantee or the unwillingness of the British to provide one themselves. The latter was discouraged as part of a darker, more slippery British diplomatic agenda tied up somehow with the recent treaty with Turkey and the guarantee of Greece and the whole thing left Cvetkovic feeling uneasy.

However it would not be prudent to annoy the British at this point and so he let the matter go. He recieved the first reports of Italian military build up in Fiume and Trieste on 22 September and definitive evidence of the presence of front-line divisions plus supporting units was obtained by 27 September. Taking his concerns to the British ambassador and thence to London he was informed that there was no indication of widespread Italian mobilisation and that the concentration of force was probably just a politically motivated reaction to the earlier Yugoslav partial mobilisation. At any rate it would not be wise to place Yugoslavia in a position where Rome could accuse Belgrade of aggression or provocation, and it would therefore be wise to not fuel the flames any further.

Once the first Italian attacks had developed Cvetkovic immediately convened a war council and was briefed on events by the JV Chief of Staff Simovic. The naval bases and airfields had quickly been neutralised, not so much because of any devastating attack by the Italians but rather because the military assets therein were not at all substantial. However Simovic was not too worried about such events. He had been advised through military channels in London, Paris and Berlin that the Italian army was no great threat; that they had been given a reverse at the Battle of Guadalajara by a rabble and only conquered Abyssinia with overwhelming numbers and technology. When confronted with the widely recognised excellent Serbian infantry, fighting on their own soil and for their own sovereingty he was confident that the Italians would be held and defeated.

He therefore proposed a plan that used the existing regular divisions in Croatia to hold the main Italian advance; to use the divisions facing Albania to attack the Italian positions vigorously in an effort to both relieve Belgrade of any threat and to force the Italians to reinforce this front; to maintain only a covering force facing Hungary and to direct the passage of reserves at the Italians before the Hungarians entered the battle. He further demonstrated how Poland had failed to give itself the best chance at defending itself by seeking to cover all points and not making good use of natural obstacles. So, instead of being forced to fight a defensive war, Yugoslavia would in fact rapidly reinforce the units in Croatia and Kosovo/Montenegro and give the Italians such a bloody nose that the Hungarians would think twice about attacking and send a strong signal to the Greeks that they have more to gain by holding to the Balkan Pact than by keeping to their non-aggression agreement with Italy.

This was important as early indications from the Balkan Pact powers were not encouraging. Turkey would do nothing at all; Greece claimed that it was busy reoccupying it's lost province of northern Epiros in the event of Italian treachery and, while in the medium term it would be able to assist in an attack on Albania in the short term it had to make sure it's gains held; and Romania was still in turmoil following the Axis assisted assassination of the pro Anglo-French Romanian Prime Minister Calinescu. the week long ministry of Argesanu and the present government of Argetoianu who, amongst other things, was promoting a Romanian-Soviet rapprochement. In short no assistance would be forthcoming to Yugoslavia from the Pact, leaving only Bulgaria as a potential source of aid.

Bulgaria by this time was the most effective of the Balkan royal dictatorships and the Italian invasion raised some uncomfortable issues for the King, Boris III. On the one hand he was, as were all Bulgarians, in regaining their losses of the Treaty of Neuilly, namely Greek and Yugoslavian Macedonia. On the other hand he was wary of pressures within the government to forge closer ties with Germany and complicating matters further was the benefits accruing from the recent warming of relations with Yugoslavia. In the end Boris promised that Bulgaria would not attack Yugoslavia, but by the same token would not intervene until Hungary did.

Finally the protestations to Berlin were met with a stony sympathy: while Ribbentrop understood the perils faced by Yugoslavia, he did remind Cvetkovic that Yugoslavia had declared it's neutrality which made it difficult for Germany to interfere given it was at war with the western powers; furthermore he noted that the creation of the Croatian Banovina was a politically clumsy action that would of course incite indignation in Rome, although he did promise to write a letter to Ciano suggesting that Italy and Yugoslavia negotiate over the issue.

Croesus
 
The Anglo-French Position

Following the German invasion of Poland the Anglo-French surprised themselves and each other by quickly getting in step. Surprising because the Anglo-French relationship could not by any stretch of the imagination be called friendly. The mesentente cordiale was amply demonstrated by both sides in the interwar years; Haig "I have no intention of taking part in any triumphant ride with Foch, or with any pack of foreigners, through the streets of London"; Lord Curzon [on Poincare] "I can't bear that horrid little man. I can't bear him! I can't bear him!" and later, smiling through the window of his carriage at Poincare "... and you sir can go to hell".

Phipps "Veracity is not, I regret to say, the strongest point of the average politician, but there is a rather better chance of extracting the truth from him when he is not in the precence of another French politician"; Bullitt, the US ambassador to Paris and a confidante of Daladier "He [Daladier] fully expected to be betrayed by the British and added that this was the customary fate of allies of the British. Daladier went on to say that he considered Neville Chamberlain a dessicated stick; the King a moron; and the Queen an excessively ambitious woman who would be ready to sacrifice every other country in the world in order that she might remain Queen of England. He added that he considered Eden a young idiot and did not know a single Englishman for whose intellectual equipment and character he had respect. He felt that England had become so feeble and senile".

However they felt about each other, each power commenced hostilities with some semblance of a warlike spirit. The French launched a limited offensive against the Saar on 5 September, the British announce the presence of the BEF on 11 September and together they establish the Supreme War Council (SWC) on 12 September; which incidentally is also the time when the French cancelled further operations against the Saar. Diplomats and bureaucrats on both sides became very busy as negotiations commenced for an Anglo-French Purchasing Committee, an Anglo-French Coordinating Committee and an Anglo-French financial agreement.

In the midst of all these busy and professional scurrying about came the first signal that this war was going to be a little different to the previous; the first SWC meeting ended with not a single decision of any importance having been made. Matters picked up somewhat during the second meeting on 22 September where Daladier proposed the opening of a Balkan front by sending Allied troops presently stationed in the Levant to either Salonika or Istanbul to pre-empt any German advance into south-eastern Europe, as well as to encourage the Balkan Pact powers into the Allied camp. Chamberlain with some difficulty persuaded Daladier that Italy would find such an event decidedly aggressive and would subsequently remove any chance that the Allies had of weaning Mussolini away from Hitler.

The next scheduled meeting was for 17 November but the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia was considered sufficiently important to warrant an interim meeting of staff with a view to briefing their respective governments on their diplomatic and military options. The French generalissimo Gamelin noted that he had already ordered the movement of the first class divisions from the Army of the Alps in order to reinforce the Maginot and Belgian border positions, and that he had no intention of countermanding the order. Already there were strong signs of a build up of German forces in the Saar region and he anticipated that recent artillery exchanges in the region presaged some form of action there. He was perfectly confident that the French defenses would hold in light of any attack by Italy and, given that he had been given no indication of a likely Italian departure from its policy of non-belligerency, had made no provision for attacking Italy in this theatre.

He advised that the existing French plans for an offensive war against Italy consisted in the first instance of naval interdiction of the Italian Tyrrhenian Sea coast, particularly Genoa, and in the second with an advance into Libya from Tunisia; however at the moment the naval assets were mostly out in the Atlantic and the North African divisions were in no state to undertake an offensive at short notice. The British CIGS Ironside explained that the British arrangements in the event of a war with Italy were focused on controlling the Eastern Mediterranean, holding Malta, interdicting Sicily and contributing to the conquest of Libya. On the whole this was to be a navy affair; unfortunately most of the Mediterranean Fleet was at present also in the Atlantic while the Admiralty sorted out its priorities. Furthermore the British presence in Egypt was not substantial and in the process of being brought up to scratch, all of which essentially meant that there was little British could or would do if Italy became an enemy power.

The advice that reached Daladier and Chamberlain therefore encouraged a continuation of the British policy of treating Mussolini with kid gloves; while Daladier made another attempt to promote a Balkan front, he soon gave up as, given the evident collapse of the Balkan Pact, the Turkish Treaty and the Italo-Greek non-aggression pact, he realised that Allied intervention here would not prove to be a positive commitment and a potentially wasteful and divisive move. The two leaders discussed whether to issue a joint statement to Italy but quickly came to grief over the wording; Daladier favoured a strongly toned communique condemning the recklessness of the Italian action, while Chamberlain promoted a more moderate statement warning of unforeseen consequences.

As both countries were now bound by the requirements of the SWC the eventual statement was entirely bland, did not go so far as to condemn the Italian action and essentially gave Italy a free hand in determining its Danubian policy, as long as neither Greece nor Romania were directly affected. In any other situation the invasion of Yugoslavia would have aroused significant indignation in France and Britain; but the former was menaced on it's northern border and had far greater worries, and the latter was for the moment still digesting the implications of yet another continental war. Both governments were in some way pleased that Mussolini had committed yet another error of judgement and, as long as any Yugoslav victory did not bring the German army into the region, were quite content to have Italy busy with it's own problems and left Italy to its parallel war.

Croesus
 
Oct 12-15

Following the destruction of the Yugoslav air force, or rather what passed for an air force, in the first few days of the invasion, the reserve divisions despatched to Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo by Simovic were forced to move by night in order to avoid detection by the wide ranging Italian reconnaissance aircraft. This slowed them down quite considerably; particularly as the increasingly confident Regia Aeronautica were beginning to interdict the roads leading from Belgrade and Osijek/Novi Sad, as well as the Sava bridges. This is why it took so long for the reserve divisions to reach their respective areas of operation.

Of the eleven mobilised divisions on the first day of invasion two were already in Croatia and two in Montenegro/Kosovo. The remaining seven belonged to the 2nd Army Group, which was responsible for defending the entire line of the Drava-Danube. A scant three divisions were retained facing Hungary and Romania (the 3rd Dunavska, the 7th Potiska and the 49th Sremska) and of the remainder the 3rd Cavalry Division and 30th Osjecka were despatched to Croatia, the 17th Vrbaska to Slovenia and the 10th Bosanska to Kosovo. Each of these four divisions were at nearly full strength and as well equipped as any of the JV divisions, so representing a significant up scaling of JV commitment to the battlefronts. An additional gain to the JV at this time was the scraping together of the 12th Jadranska of the Coastal Army which had gathered a number of surviving units from the Regia Marina bombardments plus various garrison and battle group units, and had formed up at Sibenik.

The first of the reinforcing JV divisions to arrive was the 10th Bosanska, force-marching from Belgrade and it arrived in the crucial town of Rozaje just as Ambrosio (Second Army) committed the 3rd Alpine Julia to attack Pec and thus seeking to isolate and destroy the JV Kosovska as it was being split by the 2nd Alpine Tridentina. While the Julia was taking the trouble to bring up its extended supply train its forward units moving up the road to Rozaje were contacted and then thrown back by substantial detachments of the Bosanska moving down from Rozaje. Whereas the Julia was taking its leisure in organising it’s push northwards the Bosanska was simply arriving in the area ad hoc and before the Italians realised it they were encountering JV forces in the outskirts of Pec. Confused house-to-house fighting began to spread along the northern line of the town and several company sized of the Bosanska managed to seize sections of the town before the Julia could seal it off.

While Ambrosio’s push onto Rozaje was rudely interrupted, the fate of the Kosovska was not altered. It had been decisively split by the Tridentina, the Italians had managed to fix the majority of the division in place and had commenced both an artillery bombardment and bomber missions flown by the BR.20’s of the Drago in an effort to completely destroy the Yugoslavs. The survivors managed to fall back in fairly good order, but split into two groups one heading towards Rozaje and the other towards Pec. As it became clear that the Kosovska had encountered significant trouble the Herzegovacka sought to disengage from its slugging match with the Bergamo and was fairly successful in doing so, retiring under cover of darkness to Andrijevica where it proceeded to dig in and prepare for the next stage in the campaign. By the end of the period therefore Ambrosio had managed to destroy a large part of the Kosovska, but the JV had established a strong position in Andrijevica and there was a confused and bloody fight raging for Pec.

In the centre Berti (Sixth Army) had finally sorted out its new deployment and started out on the Zara-Karlovac road. This road had earlier been covered by a small Yugoslav battle group comprised entirely of infantry, JV Svajger, but after a week of no activity along the road and, following the destruction of JV Hacovar at Vrbovsko, Svajger had retired northward to be in a position to threaten the flank of Balocco (Eighth Army) at the Petrova Gora. This meant that Berti had a clear run northwards, although he was not to know this and following conversations with Balocco took extra care to ensure he put troops on the high ground of his flanks as his valuable motorised and armoured detachments moved slowly up the road.

It was in this situation that the hitherto unsuspected 12th Jadranska first made contact with Sixth Army as it moved up from Sibenik, taking the rearguard 6th Cuneo in the flank as it moved slowly up to Obrovac. This was entirely unexpected and led to heated arguments between the RA and RE as the latter somewhat naturally demanded to know how a JV division could find its way into the rear area of the invasion force ten days after the first shots were fired. It was the incident that eventually prompted a greater efficiency in RA reconnaissance that would bear fruit later on in the campaign. But for the moment the Cuneo was extremely discomfited to find that the Jadranska was not just in Obrovac but was able to bring fire on both exits. Deploying under very difficult circumstances the Cuneo soon found themselves in more urban warfare, which would be one of the hallmarks of the campaign and bring considerable loss to the RE units. However Berti felt that the Cuneo were up to the task and, not wanting to suffer further delay, detached an artillery and machine gun unit to support the Cuneo and proceeded up the undefended road and, under the thickening presence of the RA Berti was able to get up to Slunj without being seen by JV Svajger.

On the other road to Karlovac Balocco (Eighth Army) had sought to press on as quickly as possible after despatching JV Hacovar at Vrbovsko. This he did by bringing the 9th Piave up to replace the somewhat worn 8th Pasubio and sending the 12th Mtn Inf Re across to Ogulin where it would turn northwards and dominate the Senj-Karlovac road from the other side of the valley from the Petrova Gora. This movement was observed by JV Svajger and the Yugoslavs moved in stages over successive nights to infiltrate the Re positions south of Ogulin while maintaining observation from its original positions.

The Piave meanwhile pushed directly on towards Karlovac. Upon debouching from the mountains they immediately were contacted by the screening forces of the JV 3rd Cavalry and their momentum was sufficiently held up to force their deployment. The Pasubio came up on their left flank and worked around to cut the road to Metlika, and thus Ljubljana. Balocco now began preparations for a set piece battle aimed at forcing the Kupa, for the purpose of which his attached engineer units had brought up bridging and assault crossing equipment. He was not to know it at this time but he was in fact facing three full JV divisions, two infantry arrayed on the far bank in depth and one cavalry screening Karlovac and maintaining a counterattack force on the Vojnic road. Things were about to get very messy.

Guzzoni (Third Army) finally reached Vrhnika on Oct 15 having finally gotten the better of JV Krstic, mainly through increasingly successful air support missions flown by the BA.65’s. It was clear to both army and air force commanders that the sort of combined force cooperation the Germans exhibited in Poland could be replicated in the Yugoslav operations. While the fundamental handicap of no air-ground radio communications could not be surmounted at such short notice, RA observers began to move forward with Isonzo as they slowly rolled the Yugoslavs back.

Armed with an appreciation of conditions on the ground the RA operations began to yield promising results and, happily for the hard-pressed Isonzo, Krstic had no answer. Guzzoni was now a scant 10 miles or so from his target Ljubljana and he had as yet managed to retain the 1st Alpine Taurinense as his reserve. Unfortunately for his hopes of a push past the Slovenian capital and the crossing of the Sava upstream of Zagreb it became clear from his own patrols and reports from the RA that a regular JV division had taken up positions in front of Ljubljana and were clearly preparing for a stand up fight. Realising that here was his first stern test he commenced planning a set piece battle and for the moment the Third Army operational area calmed down.

Croesus
 
Oct 15 - 18

After nearly two weeks continually engaged against the JV 13th Inf Herzegovacka the RE 14th Mtn Inf Bergamo was in no fit state to pursue the Yugoslavs to Andrijevica. The Bergamo had been pinned in its positions fighting an often desperate battle against a committed foe that would use the terrain to best advantage, emerging from draws and re-entrants to harrass and overrun Italian positions, maintaining heavy pressure on vulnerable sections of the lengthy Bergamo line and interdicting the Italian supply lines. Consequently Ambrosio (2nd Army) ordered the ragged division off its ridge and to take the place of the fresh and Abyssinian veteran 11th Mtn Inf Sassari who had been kicking its heels in frustration on the Greek front; the Greeks had so far been busy consolidating their hold on northern Epirus and had avoided any activity along their line with the Italian troops.

It took three full days for the two divisions to pass through each other and the Sassari advanced through the old Bergamo positions right up to the outlying defensive positions of the JV Herzegovacka in Andrijevica, who had made solid use of the time afforded them by the Italians and converted the village into as strong a fortress as was possible. They had been reinforced with some more infantry as well as a battalion of pack artillery, the latter a most welcome addition and the former largely replacing their losses to the Bergamo.

The RE 2nd Alp Tridentina, having defeated and driven from the field the JV 31st Inf Kosovska, was thrown out in a long outpost line to cover the movements of the Bergamo and Sassari, and, aside from calling in harrassing artillery fire and conducting patrolling operations took no part in the heavy fighting that was occurring in Pec. The exhausted and depleted regiment of the Kosovska that had retreated to Pec entered the battle there from entirely an unexpected direction and the RE 3rd Alp Julia, already heavily engaged with the reinforcing JV 10th Inf Bosanska, found its positions untenable and were thrown out of Pec, retaining only a few advanced positions on the outskirts. Ambrosio couldn't accept such a situation given the pressure this put on the Tridentina line and in view of the threat the Bosanska and Kosovska posed to the retiring Bergamo.

He subsequently moved up one of the MG Btl and the 2nd Reg Bersaglieri to make a night assault on Pec while sending the Piemonte Reale Cav Reg to infiltrate the left flank and rear of the JV forces. With the MG Btl firing on fixed lines marked out by the forward units of the Julia, the Bersaglieri charged straight into the fight and some furious hand to hand fighting regained the lost Italian positions. The Julia were able to reinforce the Bersaglieri after dawn once it became clear where their counterattack had taken them, and just in time to help beat off a Bosanska counterattack. In their first action the Bersaglieri had lost a full quarter of their strength but had sent a clear message to the other Bersaglieri regiments about how they should comport themselves when their time came.

The Spanish veteran RE 6th Auto Inf Cuneo, having been surprised in Obrovac by the JV 12th Inf Jadranska, had assimilated the artillery regiment and MG battalion left to them as Berti (6th Army) advanced on Karlovac, and had chosen to withdraw completely from the town. Recognising that they would not profit from getting drawn into costly urban warfare where their mobility could not be used to effect they chose instead to encircle the town, cut the Jadranska off from the lines to Sibenik, and proceed to pound the town into dust.

The scratch units of the Jadranska which had only rallied to their staff and cadre units three days ago put up a staunch resistance but simply lacked the cohesion to conduct an effective and organised resistance. By the 18th the division broke up and sought to exfiltrate through the Italian cordon; some succeded, but most were captured and afforded the RE with its first propaganda opportunity and the Cuneo with its first battle honour of the campaign.

During the reduction of Obrovac Berti had painstakingly advanced the Sixth Army up the Zara-Karlovac road with such tardiness that the watching units of JV Svajger had returned to the main body of the unit. Without recourse to aerial reconnaissance, Belgrade was therefore blind to the threat posed by Sixth Army as it moved inexorably through the uplands and towards the flat ground beyond. Crucially for the Yugoslav defence this meant that there was only a single regiment of the 3rd Cavalry between the entirely mechanised Sixth Army and the strategic bridges at Glina and Sisak.

For the moment there was no threat as Berti made his pedantic progress past Slunj but the chances for disaster grew with each day. Part of the problem for the Yugoslavs was that the front was lengthening northwards along the line of the Sava. This was because the 8th Inf Pasubio, as it turned north to cut the road to Metlika -Novo Mesto - Ljubljana, encountered no resistance and was even able to get detachments across the Sava. This had the effect of drawing the JV 40th Inf Slavonska from its position in Zagreb as well as the screening cavalry of the 3rd Cavalry. The commitment of the Slavonska had the flow on effect of the sole remaining reserve JV division, the 38th Dravska, had to relocate westwards from its covering position in Nasice, further uncovering the Yugoslav flank.

Another development that caused the Yugoslavs to look westward was the engagement of the RE 12th Mtn Inf Re by JV Svajger at Ogulin. The Italians suddenly found their supply lines cut and outposts being cut off as Svajger made excellent use of the terrain and night conditions to counter the overwhelming Italian advantage in numbers and heavy weapons. The Re responded well and made changes to their dispositions to ensure the flank of the remainder of Eighth Army (Balocco) was covered but was effectively removed from operations during the period as they struggled to tie down and eliminate the stubborn Yugoslavs.

The main positions of the Eighth Army were however not bothered by this conflict and the RE 9th Inf Piave, together with most of the artillery and machine gun units, commenced the slow matter of brushing off the remaining JV cavaly screen, working up to the line of the Krupa and preparing for a set piece with the JV 27th Inf Savska and 30th inf Ojecka, who had by now established a solid line of resistance and weren't moved to counter the movements of the Pasubio upstream. They had even managed to gather some AA pieces and, initially at least, were able to mitigate the effects of RA aerial reconnaissance. Balocco despatched the 6th Reg Bersaglieri to reinforce the Pasubio and ensure the JV cavalry did not pierce the Eighth line and also brought up the 1st Arm Div Centauro to exploit north to Ljubljana as it was recognised that the assault crossing of the Krupa would be largely an infantry affair, and there was more than a hint of good gains to be had by turning the JV flank.

The movements of the Pasubio and Centauro towards Ljubljana obviously changed the situation faced by Guzzoni (Third Army). He kept the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo in place in front of the JV 17th Inf Vrbaska but did not commence any substantial operations beyond patrolling and artillery harrassment. He was under orders to prevent large scale fighting in the city as Rome had plans for some sort of semi-autonomous Slovenian puppet state and also didn't want to turn the town into a more significant defensive position than it already was. He had heard of the fighting in Pec and Obrovac and, noting the paucity of his resources, did not want to place his future operations in jeopardy. He did however despatch the 1st Alpine Taurinense on a long passage around the right flank of the Vrbaska in an effort to force the JV to retire or, if not, to be able to cut the Yugoslavs off and coordinate operations with the Pasubio and Centauro.

Croesus
 
Oct 18 - 23

A map of the battleground:

http://encarta.msn.com/map_701511901/Croatia.html

Ambrosio (2nd Army) had managed to fill his line out such that he could contemplate the reduction of Andrijevica. The impetus to do so was pronounced as the RE 3rd Alp Julia was only making slow progress against the ragged remnants of a regiment of the JV 31st Inf Kosovska and the reinforcing JV 10th Inf Bosanska in the blasted ruin of Pec. Even though the Piemonte Reale Cav Reg had managed to cut the road to Rozaje the Yugoslav forces trapped in Pec simply would not give in. In the end Ambrosio had to move up much of his artillery and reduce the Yugoslavs into blood and dust.

On the afternoon of the 23rd Pec was finally in Italian hands, ten days after the Bosanska first clashed with the Julia and such was the ruin that the village was not able to be used as a supply base for several days yet. It was in Pec that the Italian forces, much to their grudging respect, first encountered the extreme stubbornness of the Yugoslav infantry. Of the Bosanska much of their number remained behind buried in the rubble or lying in bits in the street; approximately a regiment of Yugoslavs of both shattered divisions retreated on Rozaje where they were taken gratefully and admiringly in by the regiment of the Kosovska that had originally retired to the strategic town.

While Pec was being reduced the eager 11th Mtn Inf Sassari and 2nd Alp Tridentina prepared for operations against the JV 13th Inf Herzegovacka in Andrijevica. Following the experience in Pec, the idea was for the Sassari to turn the flank of the JV units by advancing to cut the road to Matesevo while the Tridentina kept the Herzegovacka pinned. This worked surprisingly well and the Sassari were astride the road in short order. Leaving behind a regimental sized blocking force the remainder of the division struck north towards Ivangrad with the idea of completely isolating Andrijevica.

However their intentions were plain to the Yugoslavs who had no intention of losing another precious division and the Herzegovacka were drawn back to Ivangrad. There were clashes between the two divisions near Trepca but the Herzegovacka were able to hold the road open and the remainder of the division passed through safely. This action brought to an end the initial, and quite successful phase of Yugoslav operations; 2nd Army had only managed to move some 20 miles northwards in some 18 days of fighting, although the loss of the Bosanska was painful and could not be easily replaced.

The crucial area of the campaign was, as originally envisaged in the centre and, again as originally envisaged, the crucial units were that of 6th Army (Berti). His striking force consisted of two autotransportable infantry divisions (the veteran Spanish 4th Livorno and 10th Brenner), one armoured division (3rd Littorio), three motorised artillery regiments, one motorised machine gun battalions, and one motorised AA regiment. This was a massive preponderance of force when compared to the single regiment of JV 3rd Cavalry which was operating between Vojnic and Tusilovic. Berti had finally realised that the passage of his forces did not seem to be observed let alone opposed. Abruptly recognising that in spite of all his tribulations the breakthrough might actually have fallen to him, he commenced a hurried planning session.

The key target in terms of cutting the Zagreb-Belgrade line of communication was Sisak, which first required the seizure of Glina that was approximately fifty miles of road distance from his positions outside Slunj. A sudden tension filled the 6th Army as it was recognised from rank to file that they were on the verge of a significant event. The plan that emerged was fairly simple: the Livorno would advance up to Karlovac-Vojnic crossroads, stop and hold that position; the Littorio and Brenner would thence turn eastwards and seek to drive through Vojnic to Vrginmost and thence to Glina, where the Littorio would pause while the Brenner pushed ontowards Marinbrod and Petrinja; finally the Cuneo would come up from Obrovac and relieve the Livorno who would then push on to reinforce the Littorio and Brenner in a final push to Sisak.

When the Livorno began rolling towards the crossroads they drove straight through the JV cavalry screen without pausing to stop. The Yugoslavs were in the process of closing up behind the Livorno when they caught sight of the interminable lines of the Littorio and Brenner following up behind. They immediately withdrew in the direction of Vojnic and, having relayed the unpleasant news to Belgrade began to frantically fortify the village against the expected Italian attack. Their efforts were in vain however as the Littorio came barrelling down the road and following some light skirmishing broke clean through the thin Yugoslav line.

The road to Vrginmost was open and the Littorio reached it on the morning of the second day of their attack, cutting the rail and road link to Karlovac, which could now only be resupplied directly from Zagreb. Leaving behind a regiment of the Brenner the Italians pushed on to Glina which was reached in good order, although the town had been abandoned and some effort at dislocating the lines of communication had been made. By the end of the second day the Brenner were moving up on Marinbrod and the Cuneo had relieved the Livorno. The JV defensive structure was in complete disarray; RA interdiction along the line of advance and the general breakdown in communications had blinded the JV command in Belgrade and there was disbelief when it became known that Glina had fallen. Providentially the JV 38th Inf Dravska was en route to Zagreb and was able to be detrained at Novska, leaving one regiment behind while the remainder marched on Potok. Still, this was remarkably thin and there was little confidence in the ability of the division to hold the armoured Italian units for long.

6th Army's breakthrough caused a significant shift in emphasis by the JV command. The Karlovac position was still considered to be a strong one and defensible, but the JV 17th Inf Vrbaska was not seen as being in a strategic position in Ljubljana and was subsequently ordered to retire down the Zagreb road and take up blocking positions in Dobruska Vas so as to prevent a general outflanking movement by the 8th Inf Pasubio and 1st Arm Centauro who were moving up the road to Novo Mesto. The JV 40th Inf Slavonska was halted in its move west and split in two, one regiment staying in place and two regiments entraining to join the Dravska at Potok.

Finally the forces defending against 2nd Army in Montenegro were ordered to commence retrograde actions and hold up the pursuing Italian forces as much as possible. Belgrade briefly entertained the idea of sending another division southwards but increasing reports of Hungarian military concentrations put paid to any thought of further reinforcement to the Italians. It was from this point that the hitherto unified Serbo-Croat front in the face of the Italian invasion began to crack; secret planning commenced around the likely scenarios that would result if the Serb forces pulled back to defend Belgrade, leaving the Croatian forces to fend for themselves. While not an official plan at this stage, sufficient detail would begin to leak out through unofficial channels, greatly constraining the efforts to defend Zagreb.

The withdrawal of the Vrbaska from Ljubljana proceeded smoothly as the 3rd Army (Guzzoni) was not fully in contact with the Yugoslavs, with the 1st Alp Taurinense maneuvering around the JV right flank and the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo simply holding in place and the intercepting Pasubio and Centauro from 8th Army (Balocco) were to slow to cut the Ljubljana-Zagreb road. By the time it became clear that the Vrbaska had slipped away all Guzzoni could do was bring his two divisions up to the Slovenian capital and commence a short period of reorganisation while accepting the keys of the city and establishing various aspects of Italian military government.

With the fall of Ljubljana Mussolini had his first success and he was quick to make political capital of it, particularly with the Hungarians and Bulgarians, suggesting that the longer they held off the more likely it would be that not just Croatia but Serbia would be under Italian jurisdiction. The message did not fall on deaf ears in Budapest and Sofia and each approved plans for intervention; the Hungarian preparations were further advanced than the Bulgarian, but the Bulgarians were not faced by any significant Yugoslav forces. The fall of Ljubljana therefore signalled the full resumption of revisionism in southern Europe and presaged a new period of political developments in the region, which hitherto had been dominated by the interplay of Soviet-German tensions balanced off by the defensive alignment of the clearly toothless Balkan Entente.

In front of Karlovac Balocco had been working on his approaches on the main Croatian defense line on the far bank of the Kupa and this work continued. the 12th Mtn Inf Re had finally chased and dispersed JV Svajger and could rejoin the main positions being developed by the substantially reinforced 9th Inf Piave and engineer and artillery units. The developments in the the 3rd and 6th Army fronts had prompted Rome to command Balocco to hang back on his preparations as it was felt that retaining military force was more important than seeking a premature attack on well defended positions if it transpired that the general strategy of retreats observed in Albania and Slovenia were to be repeated in Karlovac.

When it became clear that Ljubljana had been vacated Balocco recalled the Pasubio to rejoin the main positions, thus giving him a strong offensive grouping of three divisions allowing him to develop the battle at Karlovac in whatever form was appropriate. His force was further bolstered by the presence of the Cuneo near Vojnic, though it was not certain if that division would remain in place or reinforce the exploiting 6th Army.

Croesus
 
The Italian Invasion: the View from Budapest.

The Hungarian government of moderate conservatives led by Count Pal Teleki did not welcome the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia. The unifying aspect of Hungarian politics was a consensus around the revision of the Treaty of Trianon and the reclamation of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, Transylvania from Romania, Croatia-Slavonia from Yugoslavia and the Burgenland from Austria. The difference was in how such revision would be obtained and the difference was substantial. The moderate conservatives whom, aside from the tenure of Gombos of 1932-36, had maintained that avoiding close ties and commitments in European politics would give Hungary a ‘free hand’ in attaining its revisionist goals.

The radical right, with its power base in the military and fascist organisations, believed it important to ally closely other radical right-wing powers and obtain revision directly, and by force if necessary. The views of the Regent, Admiral Horthy, combined attitudes of both parties: inherently conservative, he was also given to some sympathy with the radicals. On the whole he had consistently come down on the side of the moderate conservatives whenever the radicals had pressured him to take direct action, but as the decade of the 1930’s passed and the successes of first Italy and then Germany became apparent, his mediating influence came under increasing pressure.

The attack on Yugoslavia meant an effective end to Hungarian efforts to foster a Third Europe, whereby Rome, Belgrade, Bucharest and Budapest would combine to prevent increased German influence in the area. Even before Italy’s signature of the Anti-Comintern pact in November 1937, Italy had signalled favourably to Polish-Hungarian efforts to coordinate their foreign policy. Official contact was made when Rome invited the Polish Foreign Minister Beck in March 1938 to discuss matters around the strategic issues around German economic and political penetration of the Danube basin. Upon realisation of the Anschluss Germany obtained a common frontier with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy and its influence was substantially facilitated.

During the Czech crisis and subsequent Munich agreement, Poland and Hungary, supported by Italy, sought to obtain a common border, which was seen as an important step leading towards the consolidation of the Third Europe. Prior to this Hungary had not only refused the German invitation to participate in a military invasion of Czechoslovakia, but it had concluded the Bled Agreement with the Little Entente powers where the two sides renounced force in its territorial dealing with each other and Hungary was permitted to rearm. However the Polish-Hungarian efforts were rebuffed as it was clearly recognised in Berlin that this would entail an anti-German bloc. Taking the Bled Agreement, the Polish-Hungarian efforts to coordinate policy and the gains Hungary made from the Munich settlement and subsequent Vienna Award, it certainly seemed that the free hand policy of the moderate conservatives was successful.

However the invasion of Poland changed this. Taken with the German protectorate in northern Slovakia, the Polish invasion saw considerable popular and official sympathy shown for Warsaw. Hungary remained neutral during the conflict, refused the German request for transit rights and harboured fleeing Polish troops. While a serious blow, the idea of a Third Europe remained, though in a modified form and now as a neutral bloc of countries under Italian leadership. The Yugoslav invasion changed this and signalled the ultimate failure of the free hand approach: first Vienna, then Prague, then Warsaw and now Belgrade had fallen to the encroaches of radical right wing governments and Regent Horthy could no longer mollify the indignant military who pointed to the iciness of German relations, the collapse the Polish diplomacy and the imminent occupation of Croatia as a clear and patent failure of government policy.

With misgivings Horthy felt constrained to ask for Teleki’s resignation and subsequently swore in Laszlo Bardossy as Prime Minister. The change in regime was a clear signal to Berlin that the period of Hungarian equivocation was over; what it didn’t communicate was a slowly growing realisation that closer Italo-Hungarian ties might as easily satisfy Hungary’s revisionist agenda as well as serve to deflect, if not block, further German penetration of the Danube basin. The establishment of an Italianate policy took time to develop but gradually developed into a principle of the Bardossy regime; taken with the Italo-Greek non-aggression treaty, it seemed to Budapest that there was a genuine alternative to outright identification of Hungary as a German satellite. This was important as it was a long-held view of Horthy, the last Admiral of the Austro-Hungarian crown after all, that Britains fleet would eventually prove decisive in any European conflict and it would hardly be beneficial for Hungary to pay for revision with its sovereignty.

It was against this background of a seemingly fundamental shift of the temper of Hungarian government from the moderate-conservative right to the military-radical right that saw the Hungarian Army intervene in the Yugoslav conflict when the 3rd Army under General Novak struck over the border from Pecs. The prime strategic goal of the 3rd Army was the occupation of the Serbian Backa, from Subotica in the north down to the principal centre of Novi Sad. 3rd Army was principally an infantry force comprising of eight infantry, two cavalry and two motorised divisions in four corps and it was envisaged that as the advance extended divisions would drop off the route of advance to hold key positions and ensure the land was conclusively. The Hungarians were to proceed with caution and maintain close communications with Budapest but their intention and technique was unmistakable: forced revision.

Croesus
 
Oct 23 - 28

The entry of Hungary into the Italo-Yugoslav war produced an abrupt collapse of the united Serbo-Croat front, which saw the emphasis pass from the military to the diplomatic and led to a perceptible cessation of hostilities by all parties. The passage of the Hungarian 3rd Army (Novak) to Novi Sad was rapid and, aside from two small actions fought near Subotica and Srbobran, uncontested. Novak was greatly assisted by the general southward passage of JV units in accordance with the strategic plan as laid out by the Yugoslav Chief of Staff Simovic. Preceded by his motorised and screened by his cavalry divisions, the Hungarian infantry simply marched directly to their target areas, drew up outside and commenced encircling operations.

The rapid success of the Hungarians brought about the resignation of Simovic and the formal notification to the Hungarian minister in Sofia that Bulgaria was to seek border revision ‘lest Serbia and Croatia fall entirely into Italian hands’ led to the resignation of Prime Minister Cvetkovic. The subsequent crisis of government left Prince Paul in a hopeless position and, following a failed attempt to enrol Ribbentrops’ aid against the Italo-Hungarian attacks, authorised the despatch of letters to Rome and Budapest requesting an armistice with a view to obtaining a peace settlement.

News of this quickly circulated through Belgrade within two days of the proposal a group of nationalist Serbian army officers overthrew the Prince in a bloodless coup. This only served to paralyse the functioning of government in Serbia and contributed significantly to the events that followed. For the moment however Belgrade and its approaches began to be hurriedly fortified and all available divisions ordered to move back immediately to assist in the city’s defence. Given the questionable nature of the new military government, not to mention the problem of having to disengage from their respective fronts, not all commanders gave the order to retire.

In Zagreb the government of Macek looked on with dismay as the catastrophe unfolded; first the Italians broke into the centre while pushing in the Croatian right wing, then the Hungarian and Bulgarian intervention and lastly the collapse of government in Belgrade. Macek had no alternative but to sue for peace, which he did immediately and directly to Rome, offering a full surrender and trusting to the support he hoped he could count on within Rome, on account of the lengthy contact he had had with the fascist regime over the last ten years.

He also gambled that, if given a choice, the Italian government would find it easier to deal with Macek and his clearly popular government than with the alternative, the extreme Pavelic and his group of Ustase terrorists. He also took care to enlist the support and good offices of Athens in his approach, further considering that the Metaxas government would help pave the way for a more generous treatment. As the diplomatic channels were being opened, so were the military being closed, with all artillery fire being stopped, all movement to the front prevented and strict instructions issued that all Croatian soldiers should remain in place and under no circumstances provoke the Italians.

For Cavallero the news of the Serbian collapse and Croatian surrender came at an opportune moment. He had on his desk a growing series of reports concerning the supply situation and they did not make for pleasant reading. Essentially the Regio Esercito had run out of steam. It had become apparent within the first week of hostilities that the logistics of the invasion had not been well provided for and now, three weeks later, increasing rates of exposure related injuries, lengthening delays in ammunition and petrol resupply and deepening problems of food and medical supply had led him to the conclusion that there was at most another weeks worth of fighting in his army before it simply stopped.

He had in fact in his hand a report from Berti (6th Army), whose force it was that had produced the breakthrough and who was meant to be exploiting deep into Yugoslavia, that he had only two days fuel remaining. Given this litany of woe, Cavallero gratefully sent out the stop order to all units and commanders and, while there were many within the Comando Supremo that Italy had been robbed of a victory, he knew only too well that it had been spared a humiliation.

While the governments of Rome, Budapest and Sofia grappled with the immediate problems of carving up the Yugoslav corpse, initial findings by foreign military attaches on the performance of the Italian armed forces were mixed. They fell into two camps and both camps were represented in all the capitals interested in determining the impact Italy would have in the ‘German war’. The first group, and substantially the larger, dismissed the results obtained by the Italians. It was noted that the British had curtailed the Yugoslav mobilisation and hence prevented Belgrade from defending itself against what was demonstrably a surprise attack, and the fact that Italy had cleared its way with Greece and allowed itself therefore to concentrate its scanty resources against the depleted Yugoslavs was seen as doubly important.

The difficulties the Italians had when confronting the Serbian infantry in pitched battle at Andrijevica and Pec, rather than pounding makeshift units at Obrovac and Vrbovsko, was held up as proof that the Italians were still a second-rate army. Finally the obvious supply problems that had developed in the latter stages of the campaign did not escape attention. The second camp pointed out issues such as the demonstration of air-ground cooperation in the drive to Ljubljana, the use of mobile troops in searching out flanking opportunities and the point that the Italians actually won the opening stages of the Andrijevica and Pec battle.

However their words of caution were insufficient. Rather than confront their prejudices against the capacity of the Italian army to wage war, foreign military staffs noted that the Italians were still a long way behind their larger neighbours and, while they obtained a meritorious result in Croatia, victory came to them due to a political collapse rather than a military breakthrough.

Croesus
 
Italian Croatia

When Italy invaded Yugoslavia two broad justifications were used by Rome to give some degree of respectability to what otherwise was an act of pure aggression. The first was the annexation of the Dalmatian coast, which was portrayed as both a natural extension of the prior annexations of Fiume and Zara, and the recent absorption of ‘Greater Albania’ into the Italian Empire. The establishment of Italian hegemony in the Adriatic was a long standing aim of Italian diplomacy and not a surprise to foreign capitals. The second was the position that the semi-autonomous regime established by the Peasant Party under Vladko Macek without consideration for Italian sensitivities was an affront to Rome and, further to this, not entirely representative of Croatian nationalist politics; that the interests of the Croatian right went unrecognised as the leader of the Ustase movement, Ante Pavelic, remained in exile in Italy.

So it was the Italian army was ostensibly intervening to provide a more representative form of independent Croatian government and, in keeping with this, the several hundred members of the Ustase took part in the invasion as a paramilitary unit attached to Balocco’s Eighth Army. Although it took no part in the set piece fighting the Ustase became increasingly active in ‘insurgency operations’ conducted behind the advancing Italian front. It became quite clear early on that Pavelic was fulfilling a unique political agenda totally removed from the broader Italian interests; namely the deliberate massacre of Serbian minorities in the countryside. During the last week of hostilities matters were brought abruptly to a head when a company of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment happened upon an Ustase action near Barilovic while moving up to the front. Abruptly confronted with the seamier side of Yugoslav politics the no nonsense Bersaglieri confronted the Ustase unit and chased them from the village.

The Bersaglieri intervention into ‘domestic Croatian politics’ brought a stern protest from Pavelic to Balocco; the latter however issued a stern denunciation of what he saw as terroristic and criminal behaviour. Pavelic declared that he would go straight to Rome with his concerns and Balocco declared that he would welcome such a move; given the attention it would bring to the Ustase activities. Unperturbed Pavelic immediately left the front and travelled to Rome to demand a cessation of Italian involvement in the affairs of the government-in-waiting. Upon his arrival he found however that the mood had changed somewhat since his departure of a month before. Mussolini declined to see him, instead despatching a distant and distracted Ciano to conduct a short interview. Increasingly uncomfortable, Pavelic laid down his complaints. He was however interrupted in mid-flight as Ciano informed Pavelic in no uncertain terms that the Ustase activities were creating significant problems for the Italian army and that at no time did Rome consider the massacre of minorities an activity to which it would lend its support. He informed Pavelic that Mussolini was extremely angry at what he saw a betrayal of Italian good will and that as a result Pavelic should consider himself under arrest and his unit of ‘bandits and cutthroats’ disbanded and impressed into the Italian military penal system. And so ended the inglorious career of Ante Pavelic.

The turning point had come soon after the Barilovic confrontation with the Bersaglieri. Following the abandonment of the Zagreb regime to its own fate by the JV following the Hungarian intervention and the subsequent collapse of the Belgrade government, the Croat Premier Macek had requested an armistice and terms through the good offices of the Greek government. Negotiations had proceeded apace as Italy did not wish for the war to continue as it became clear that the Macek government was popular, the Italian army about to run out of steam and the fundamental sense of betrayal and general dissatisfaction with the Belgrade regime combined to make Rome keen to consolidate its sudden, and surprising, gains. The Ustase incident came at a time when the Italian negotiators were trying to find ways of distancing Rome from Pavelic and was immediately seized upon. The Macek government was then reinstated, though with some significant Italian appointments to promote the achievement of Rome’s objective of ‘increased representation’. While there were a number of freedoms and autonomous rights accorded to Zagreb there was no doubt that the new state, the Nezavisna Crzava Hrvatska, was a puppet state and that there was a fundamental expectation on the part of Rome that Zagreb would take a full part in the wider political and economic interests of Italy.

Dalmatia was annexed, which finally delivered up full Italian control of the Adriatic, not to mention various vessels and facilities of the Yugoslav navy. While direct control was seen as of great benefit, the wider implications of Italy being the destination for Croatia’s exports was quickly appreciated. In agricultural production significant gains were made. Yugoslavia was Europe’s third largest producer of corn and of that, three-fifths is concentrated in Croatia; furthermore the Croatian wheat crop is of particularly high quality. Widespread areas of livestock, timber and vine and olive cultivation are now taken into the Italian economic system. Important manufacturing centres in the forestry, foodstuffs and textile industries have also been taken up. It is however the mineral gains that most interest the Italian industrialists. Significant output of brown coal from Slovenia and Bosnia will make a welcome addition to the energy tight Italian economy, while the output of the rich Bosnian and Croatian iron gives a substantial boost to Italian heavy industry. These two aside, it is probably the large quantities of quality copper that will have the most immediate impact on the Italian economy, with no fewer than seven of the thirteen deposits now within the Italian sphere. Other important metals include chrome, manganese, lead, zinc, pyrites, antimony, bauxite, gypsym, petroleum, silver and Portland cement. Where prior to the invasion half of Croatia’s exports were going to Germany, now most of it is going directly into Italy. In this sense alone the Italian invasion has proven to be a great success.

Croesus
 
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