Depends. You seem to be long winded, which isn't a bad thing, I like your style of writing. There's a lot about the feeling and aura of the country, and reads more like a textbook. I really want to see how the rest of Ford's foreign policy goes, he doesn't get enough credit in that field.
A Duty to be Done
- Thread starter Usili
- Start date
Its been a while since I really went to the public Library for anything. I might have to find time to this.
I like the current level, but if you feel you are getting bogged down do what you think is best.
While it's all up to you, I think we should get some detail and in-depth looks, but not too much where it's just long.
XII: The Glow of Arms
XII: The Glow of Arms
Ford's victory in a second term would continue the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) without interruption by the transition of administrations. Much of the complications in SALT II had been slowly agreed upon and negotiated between both sides (such as the 'forward based systems' for the United States, which for example was referred to that of forward based bombers and missiles in Western Europe), but still one of the biggest issues remained in that of the view between cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber. Throughout 1976, negotiations had stonewalled on it in part because of the drastic views on the Backfire (and cruise missiles) but also that of the climate of the 1976 Presidential Election, as President Ford faced a challenge from both his right (that of Governor Ronald Reagan in the Republican primary) and from his left (that of Governor Jimmy Carter in the general election). This in doubt was aided by President Ford having discarded the term of 'detente' to handle that of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China in the Republican primaries, insisting of “a policy of peace through strength.”
Despite the events that had occurred, it had seemed that the Ford Administration was moving towards a hopeful stance of concluding SALT II, it was the opposite within the Administration in a growing divide. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger along with National Security Adviser Scowcroft were in favor of the treaty, while that of Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Clements, and the Joint Chiefs had been growing in their opposition of it, most particularly over the limitation of cruise missiles and none on the Backfire. For Rumsfeld, Clements, and the Joint Chiefs they had felt it was an explicitly damaging impact against the United States by a limitation of a weapon system that also had conventional uses, while at the same time refusing to have a Soviet bomber capable of intercontinental strikes available. The internal release of Paul Nitze's Team B Report provided additional fuel for Rumsfeld, Clements, and the Joint Chiefs in terms of the growing dangers hidden in SALT II and the likely implications of it all. For President Ford, it provided a continued series of problems as Secretary Kissinger departed to Moscow in early February, once more to try and resolve the impasse over cruise missiles and Backfires to hopefully get SALT II moving into some kind of passable treaty.
The view on cruise missiles had to shifted to a degree over a year in part from European allies and a matter of influence within the Administration. The member-states of NATO had been saying in private channels of an increase of supports towards maintaining a cruise missile force in Europe as a deterrent to the Soviets with the recent news of the development of the 'SS-X-20' ICBM. This was also aided by private remarks made by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, “... of shoring up its own, narrowly defined security at the expense of its allies' security.” Within the Ford Administration itself, it was partially shaped by the results from the Team B Report and then the authorization for the continuation of development on cruise missiles within the Ford Administration explicitly by President Ford. The approach and development of cruise missiles was in part as a growing response to the lack of ability in American bombers being able to penetrate the Soviet triad, alongside that of as another element of deterrence in Western Europe, and finally that of as a growing development to the counter of the Backfire for some.
Secretary Kissinger's retirement and Commerce Secretary Richardson's succession added a new dimension into the SALT II battle within the Ford Administration. Secretary Richardon's position on SALT II vis-a-vis the matter over the cruise missiles and Backfires was unknown, with the Secretary remaining supportive of SALT II otherwise. For Richardson, a trip through Western Europe in early April (replacing a trip that had already been scheduled for Secretary Kissinger prior to his heart attack and retirement), the Secretary rapidly learned of the situation as how the member-states of NATO viewed the loss of land-based cruise missiles if passed at the range limit they were at. Following the trip back, Secretary Richardson would explain to the President the sharp loss of faith that would be had by those member-states of NATO if the United States bargained away land-based cruise missiles. He expanded the point arguing that cruise missiles should be considered as 'forward-based systems' and that if the Soviets were desiring to limit such weapons, it would only be fair if the United States pushed harder on 'heavy' ICBMs (this was from an informal agreement that the United States would not push on heavy ICBMs in exchange for the Soviets leaving forward based systems out of it).
The decision as made by Secretary Richardson had grown to set a clear point on the path of where SALT II was heading towards. The American public (along with the Senators of both parties) viewed it as either not far enough in terms of the limits set for both the United States and Soviet Union or too far on the limitations imposed by granting the Soviets a sharp advantage over the United States. Ford's own rhetoric had contributed to the growing crisis that SALT II was starting to find itself under in the negotiations. For Ford, he had recognized the paramount issues needed in that of an arms control treaty but the issues present in the treaty had to be solved, lest it fail to pass the Senate (and in turn land the administration a major defeat—if it had failed the Senate, President Ford could choose to make it as an executive agreement, although this presented its own issues on it). The next meeting of the National Securityy Council would discuss the matter at length and would finally settle on a course of action to hopefully prod the Soviets into moving along with SALT II in terms of trying to solve both the Backfire and cruise missile question. The decision would be transmitted to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, head of the American SALT II delegation to information the Soviet delegation in late April:
“The United States will consider submarine, sea, and land based cruise missiles as a forward-based system, and will not stand under such limits for them unless the Soviets shall agree on limits for the Backfire and/or additional limits on heavy ICBMs to match.”
Ford's victory in a second term would continue the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) without interruption by the transition of administrations. Much of the complications in SALT II had been slowly agreed upon and negotiated between both sides (such as the 'forward based systems' for the United States, which for example was referred to that of forward based bombers and missiles in Western Europe), but still one of the biggest issues remained in that of the view between cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber. Throughout 1976, negotiations had stonewalled on it in part because of the drastic views on the Backfire (and cruise missiles) but also that of the climate of the 1976 Presidential Election, as President Ford faced a challenge from both his right (that of Governor Ronald Reagan in the Republican primary) and from his left (that of Governor Jimmy Carter in the general election). This in doubt was aided by President Ford having discarded the term of 'detente' to handle that of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China in the Republican primaries, insisting of “a policy of peace through strength.”
Despite the events that had occurred, it had seemed that the Ford Administration was moving towards a hopeful stance of concluding SALT II, it was the opposite within the Administration in a growing divide. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger along with National Security Adviser Scowcroft were in favor of the treaty, while that of Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Clements, and the Joint Chiefs had been growing in their opposition of it, most particularly over the limitation of cruise missiles and none on the Backfire. For Rumsfeld, Clements, and the Joint Chiefs they had felt it was an explicitly damaging impact against the United States by a limitation of a weapon system that also had conventional uses, while at the same time refusing to have a Soviet bomber capable of intercontinental strikes available. The internal release of Paul Nitze's Team B Report provided additional fuel for Rumsfeld, Clements, and the Joint Chiefs in terms of the growing dangers hidden in SALT II and the likely implications of it all. For President Ford, it provided a continued series of problems as Secretary Kissinger departed to Moscow in early February, once more to try and resolve the impasse over cruise missiles and Backfires to hopefully get SALT II moving into some kind of passable treaty.
The view on cruise missiles had to shifted to a degree over a year in part from European allies and a matter of influence within the Administration. The member-states of NATO had been saying in private channels of an increase of supports towards maintaining a cruise missile force in Europe as a deterrent to the Soviets with the recent news of the development of the 'SS-X-20' ICBM. This was also aided by private remarks made by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, “... of shoring up its own, narrowly defined security at the expense of its allies' security.” Within the Ford Administration itself, it was partially shaped by the results from the Team B Report and then the authorization for the continuation of development on cruise missiles within the Ford Administration explicitly by President Ford. The approach and development of cruise missiles was in part as a growing response to the lack of ability in American bombers being able to penetrate the Soviet triad, alongside that of as another element of deterrence in Western Europe, and finally that of as a growing development to the counter of the Backfire for some.
Secretary Kissinger's retirement and Commerce Secretary Richardson's succession added a new dimension into the SALT II battle within the Ford Administration. Secretary Richardon's position on SALT II vis-a-vis the matter over the cruise missiles and Backfires was unknown, with the Secretary remaining supportive of SALT II otherwise. For Richardson, a trip through Western Europe in early April (replacing a trip that had already been scheduled for Secretary Kissinger prior to his heart attack and retirement), the Secretary rapidly learned of the situation as how the member-states of NATO viewed the loss of land-based cruise missiles if passed at the range limit they were at. Following the trip back, Secretary Richardson would explain to the President the sharp loss of faith that would be had by those member-states of NATO if the United States bargained away land-based cruise missiles. He expanded the point arguing that cruise missiles should be considered as 'forward-based systems' and that if the Soviets were desiring to limit such weapons, it would only be fair if the United States pushed harder on 'heavy' ICBMs (this was from an informal agreement that the United States would not push on heavy ICBMs in exchange for the Soviets leaving forward based systems out of it).
The decision as made by Secretary Richardson had grown to set a clear point on the path of where SALT II was heading towards. The American public (along with the Senators of both parties) viewed it as either not far enough in terms of the limits set for both the United States and Soviet Union or too far on the limitations imposed by granting the Soviets a sharp advantage over the United States. Ford's own rhetoric had contributed to the growing crisis that SALT II was starting to find itself under in the negotiations. For Ford, he had recognized the paramount issues needed in that of an arms control treaty but the issues present in the treaty had to be solved, lest it fail to pass the Senate (and in turn land the administration a major defeat—if it had failed the Senate, President Ford could choose to make it as an executive agreement, although this presented its own issues on it). The next meeting of the National Securityy Council would discuss the matter at length and would finally settle on a course of action to hopefully prod the Soviets into moving along with SALT II in terms of trying to solve both the Backfire and cruise missile question. The decision would be transmitted to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, head of the American SALT II delegation to information the Soviet delegation in late April:
“The United States will consider submarine, sea, and land based cruise missiles as a forward-based system, and will not stand under such limits for them unless the Soviets shall agree on limits for the Backfire and/or additional limits on heavy ICBMs to match.”
I'll make a comment on this chapter for a moment.
SALT II as compared to SALT I had found itself as a much more complicated affair, in part based off of defining measures (for example, what was as defined for a 'heavy' ICBM and what was as defined for a 'light' ICBM). In addition to that, it was also a period of differences based off American and Soviet views on it, with the Soviets viewing it (from how I understand it correctly) in that the United States had finally recognized them as a equal in terms of parity. Of course it was the differences in view over 'detente' which played a part in arguably its eventual breakdown through the late 1970s under Carter, even though it had already begun in the 1976 primary and general election.
In terms of writing this chapter and drafting out some of the coming ones? The hardest issue by far is how to reconcile the matter of cruise missiles and the Backfire. I've honestly been reading a lot on this to parse views over it, primarily from that of the American side but also on that of the Soviet side (unfortunately there is a fair bit less on this than that of the American side). I've also undergone a fair amount of revisions and changes in terms of thinking about it in reading, and so if this chapter sort of seems a bit awkward in flow, it is partially because of that reasoning in terms of the changes to try and make it seem that of a realistic nature from how I could guess in terms of the decisions that could probably be made. Ford's decision was based off what had happened IOTL, including that of the authorization of continued development of cruise missiles (including a longer ranged variant of the ALCM) in January of 1977 and what seemed a slowly shifting position of it alongside that of likely a combined aspect of the release of the Team B Report and the likely impacts of the Soviets refusing to handle Backfire alongside that of the sharp concern of our European allies on it.
SALT II as compared to SALT I had found itself as a much more complicated affair, in part based off of defining measures (for example, what was as defined for a 'heavy' ICBM and what was as defined for a 'light' ICBM). In addition to that, it was also a period of differences based off American and Soviet views on it, with the Soviets viewing it (from how I understand it correctly) in that the United States had finally recognized them as a equal in terms of parity. Of course it was the differences in view over 'detente' which played a part in arguably its eventual breakdown through the late 1970s under Carter, even though it had already begun in the 1976 primary and general election.
In terms of writing this chapter and drafting out some of the coming ones? The hardest issue by far is how to reconcile the matter of cruise missiles and the Backfire. I've honestly been reading a lot on this to parse views over it, primarily from that of the American side but also on that of the Soviet side (unfortunately there is a fair bit less on this than that of the American side). I've also undergone a fair amount of revisions and changes in terms of thinking about it in reading, and so if this chapter sort of seems a bit awkward in flow, it is partially because of that reasoning in terms of the changes to try and make it seem that of a realistic nature from how I could guess in terms of the decisions that could probably be made. Ford's decision was based off what had happened IOTL, including that of the authorization of continued development of cruise missiles (including a longer ranged variant of the ALCM) in January of 1977 and what seemed a slowly shifting position of it alongside that of likely a combined aspect of the release of the Team B Report and the likely impacts of the Soviets refusing to handle Backfire alongside that of the sharp concern of our European allies on it.
Honestly as I said before I hope SALT II fails. There really is no way to get the Soviets to backdown over the Backfire. They want it badly as its the first bomber that could work and have equals in the west without being insanely behind in timeframe. Or as I see. Good stuff.
I'm enjoying this timeline, especially its focus on specific policies rather than electoral politics or 'important events'. However, if I could offfer one point of criticism, I'd urge you to work on your grammar and sentence structure. It's not terrible, but it's just that tiny bit away from perfect that only annoys one more. Sometimes it also seems like you're trying to say the same thing in several separate sentences, especially in part XI.
Other than that, keep on writing, eager to see how SALT II turns out, and how this might affect US-Soviet relations.
Other than that, keep on writing, eager to see how SALT II turns out, and how this might affect US-Soviet relations.
That's admittedly probably one of my more weaker points on my writing in general (in terms of grammar and sentence structure). I admit this entirely, but Chapter XI was a very very weird one to write. Since on one hand, I wanted to go through some of the aspects and connotations from what the effects of the election were in more detail in terms of the popular vote and electoral vote not matching up, especially in this time period and how the views on the electoral college were. But I admit that some of the stuff I wanted to expand on, didn't necessarily fit the chapter in the right way as I saw it (for example it doesn't fit the right 'timeframe') or took out portions of what I was thinking about for future chapters. I'll give an example being that of the reforms to the primary system. I wanted to discuss it a bit more, but I felt it was too early for that (considering historically, the kind of changes to the times for when the primaries happened usually happened just before the midterms or after that, in the gearing up for the presidential primary), and tried in a way to compromise it with leaving open plot-threads for the future (which I admit to a degree that is what XI was).
But thank you very much for that criticism on it, especially on that of saying the same thing in several separate sentences on it. I'll try and see if I can work that out for the upcoming chapter.
No need to thank me 
Interesting to hear the background of writing certain chapters. Based on what you say, I think it might be interesting to arrange chapters by theme within a certain period, instead of making sure every update follows chronologically from the previous one. This does mean you have to plan ahead more, but if you keep the cycles short, like 2 or 4 years, it wouldn't take that much more time I'd guess.
Interesting to hear the background of writing certain chapters. Based on what you say, I think it might be interesting to arrange chapters by theme within a certain period, instead of making sure every update follows chronologically from the previous one. This does mean you have to plan ahead more, but if you keep the cycles short, like 2 or 4 years, it wouldn't take that much more time I'd guess.
Well, it's more a mixture of theme and time period. I'm not having each chapter go chronologically from the previous one, but what I'm trying not to do is to go too far ahead on certain subjects without making it clear of what else is happening. So in part, it's kind of having to weigh that of how to handle both theme and a relative period of time for chapters in trying to balance them out, but also how it all fits together.No need to thank me
Interesting to hear the background of writing certain chapters. Based on what you say, I think it might be interesting to arrange chapters by theme within a certain period, instead of making sure every update follows chronologically from the previous one. This does mean you have to plan ahead more, but if you keep the cycles short, like 2 or 4 years, it wouldn't take that much more time I'd guess.
Like for example, the Panama Canal negotiations might be going on in the background with a focus on SALT II as it stands now, so would that mean when I finish SALT II, I start off with from where it concluded with the discussion on where the Canal is? Not particularly, since I'd go and start off with the background of it and what happened over such a period that it was among the background but also that after covering such a background it would continue on to keep the pace moving. I admit, some chapters might be more of those that don't cover too much in additional time, but more serve to flesh out what is going on. Because in the late 70s, there is a lot of stuff going on concurrently; you have SALT II, the Panama Canal Treaty, that of Egypt-Israel, and also that of how to handle the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in foreign policy and arguably that of just in 1977 and 1978! That ignores any kind of legislative effort that would tried to be pushed by the Ford Administration with a Democratic supermajority.
And that is arguably the biggest challenge for doing this timeline. Having to balance out what happens in terms of the timeframe, but also cover the kind of issues in depth. I admit, if I was doing a TL if say Dukakis won in '88, I'd be having the same problems to a certain degree considering the events that were happening both in domestic and foreign politics and how to mold them together to keep it moving. There are just certain points when you need to think about (at least for myself) in how to mold them together and keep it moving, but also to lay down mentions of what will be happening in the future as the slowly growing warning signs ahead. But in that way, it's also very much a fascinating experiment for myself since I've never done a TL facing those kinds of issues and also upon this point in time as the Cold War begins to shift at a slowly quickening pace from that of the breakdown in the New Deal Coalition and the short-lived warming of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 70s into that of the unknown waters of the 80s...
I never knew the late 70s were a period of such political turmoil, but you explain it elegantly, so I'm eager to read more of it
XIII: The Hanging Mushroom Cloud
XIII: The Hanging Mushroom Cloud
The Soviet response to the American statement in SALT II was nothing short of outrage at it. In the minds of the Soviets, the United States had backtracked entirely on what the negotiations had been, and it seemed like the United States had no intent to actually get such a treaty finished in negotiating, let alone it actually being signed. The Soviet Union had articulated after two days of internal debate that the United States had negotiated in bad faith and was now threatening to unravel all of SALT II with that single statement on the cruise missiles. It continued explicitly along those lines, and further stated that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would be dispatched to Washington immediately for a further discussion on this.
For the Ford Administration, in the finalizing of the preparations for the upcoming trip through the Middle East (and that of the trip to the G7 in the UK just before), they found themselves forced to contend with the arrival of that of Foreign Minister Gromyko and that of the leak of the reversal at the negotiations in SALT II. The Administration found itself battered and supported in the change of fortune, with figures such as Senator Hubert Humphrey and former Governor Jimmy Carter blasting President Ford for his outrageous decisions in trying to restart an arms race, while that of Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson and former Governor Ronald Reagan applauded the President's moves in terms of the changes on SALT II. Alongside the political side, came the public in both criticism and support for the Administration's moves, although it was much more of criticism than support, with a poll by Harris in March showing the American public supporting by 77% a new SALT treaty to limit that of warheads and missiles. The criticism on the Ford Administration on SALT II combined with that of the public pressure, had begun to result in that of political results with an amendment passing the House Armed Services Committee cutting funds for the development of the M-X until the Department of Defense formally presented all available basing options for it, along with associated costs and survivability.
The meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Ford and his principals, Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, was that of one of a tense hostility. In principal, the focus of the meeting was intended to be on a discussion of a variety relating to SALT II and a hope of getting them handled, but in reality the meeting found itself focused on that of the issue of cruise missiles and the American statement of them being implied as forward-based systems. What would be sought by President Ford was that of a compromise to maintain American capability to be able to counter the Soviets in Europe. President Ford explained specifically that the limitations on cruise missiles ranges at land, sea, and underwater represented limitations on the aspects of American forward-based systems. Foreign Minister Gromyko responded harshly in the negative, accusing the United States of explicitly trying to undermine that of SALT II and the whole entirety behind detente. The principal concern for the United States as articulated was that of the Backfire bomber, which as an unrestrained quantifier in the treaty left the Soviets with a bomber capable of striking the United States which was entirely uncontrolled and represented a significant strategic threat. As was specifically articulated in the discussions, the United States could agree to bring back a 600km limit on cruise missiles for ships and submarines (with the raised possibility of even banning cruise missiles on submarines, although it was expected that the Soviets would entirely refute this considering their use of anti-ship missiles which could be considered as cruise missiles per SALT II), in exchange for once more establishing that of a 'hybrid' system, with a total of two hundred land based cruise missiles (with up to a 2500km range) and two hundred Backfires being kept under a separate limit, with any such further cruise missiles or Backfires falling under the regular and normal limits of SALT II. As a sweetener, President Ford promised to decommission the Titan II ICBMs and that of six SSBNs by 1981, to represent an American commitment for detente and nuclear arms limitation. Nonetheless, the rest of the meeting would continue at a back and forth pace over that of cruise missiles, and the meeting would be forced to be concluded with Foreign Minister Gromyko intending to return to the Soviet Union following the meeting. For President Ford, it had been felt that failing to cover that of the SS-X-20 in any of the negotiations was that of an issue, but Foreign Minister Gromyko refusing to immediately deny that of the hybrid systems had felt like that it was something that could be seen as more attainable per the conditions as sought out.
The 'sweetener' as offered by President Ford had been intended in the spirit of SALT II, in truth it was that of the ongoing modernization within the American nuclear forces and the retirement of older systems. Case in point to that was the retirement of the 57 Titan II ICBMs which were supposed to have been retired starting in the early 70s, and suffered increased maintenance issues and costs because of their age (they had been expected to be retired after 7-10 years), and on paper were supposed to be replaced by M-X. The same situation applied to the that of the five George Washington-class and a single Ethan Allen-class SSBNs, which were intended to be decommissioned because of their age and to comply with the commissioning of the first four Ohio-class SSBNs (the USS Ohio was expected to be commissioned by the start of 1980 now, rather than 1979, but it was deemed to be appropriate if there was a four to six month fall shortfall of boomers in the Pacific Ocean if SALT II could be finalized with it).
On May 6th, President Ford would communicate to both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense would begin the process of decommissioning the remaining fifty-eight Titan ICBMs in the strategic nuclear force, and urging the inclusion of additional funds to M-X to maintain the continued pace of development for a modernized nuclear force that could be ready to start entering service into the 1980s. What was also stated was that of the continued inclusion of funding to maintain a steady pace on that of cruise missiles, the B-1A Lancer, and the Ohio-class SSBN. For this to be sent out on the day prior for President Ford's departure was that of an indication the United States was willing to stand by its own words in order to get SALT II hopefully finalized with this compromise.
The Soviet Union would not provide an official response to that of the proposed compromise of SALT II, before the start of President Ford's first major trip of his second term; his trip encompassed that of a visit to the United Kingdom for the G7, to be followed by a trip through the Middle East, going from Israel to Egypt to Saudi Arabia to Iran and then finally to Syria before returning back home to the United States. The trip would to a degree be overshadowed by that of SALT II, with sharp questions and criticism continuing to be leveled against President Ford by Democrats in the House and Senate. Arriving in Israel on May 10th, President Ford's arrival found itself met by harsh protests, with some of the consistent accusations calling that the President was intent on selling Israel down a river where the Arab states could 'finish the job'. President Ford's arrival had also thrown that of a landmine into the beginnings of the general election season (with it being scheduled for September, 1977), with the leaks and rumors coming from within the Administration suggesting that they were preparing to host a conference to secure a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. This would be signified by President Ford's address in front of the Knesset on May 11th, with some members of the National Religious Party and Likud refusing to attend the address. His departure would once more be met by protests, with gunfire in the crowd forcing the Secret Service to get the President, Secretary of State Richardson, and National Security Adviser Scowcroft to Air Force One much faster. His trips to both Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be much calmer by comparison, with that of a lessened hostility and calmer meetings with heads of states. Sadat himself would state that Egypt would follow behind whatever the United States had decided to do, with one of the bigger pieces of discussion being on the possibility of American usage of Ras Banas for American aircraft. The discussions on the usage of Ras Banas were of a complicated status, with Sadat fearful of reprisals against Egypt for their full-staging of American hardware and aircraft from Ras Banas at a permanent stage. Sadat however had agreed to maintained a continued discussion on it with the United States.
President Ford's trip to Iran however, would be highly cautioned by that of both Secretary Richardson and National Security Adviser, warning about the possibility of a tumultuous stay in there considering what had happened in Israel at the start of their arrival into the Middle East. President Ford would acknowledge such concerns, but the arrival into Iran would signify that of a stance with that of their other staunch ally in the Middle East (despite what had happened with the 1973 Oil Crisis...). The meeting between President Ford and the Shah would be quite productive, with discussions over the ongoing political environment within Iran and that of the military nature. The Shah would particularly take note of it, with an urging to work on picking up the pace in terms of delivery of hardware and training to the Imperial Iranian Air Force, in order to maintain a staunch American ally against the Soviets. Protests to President Ford's visit would echo in Qom and to that of Tehran, and would be met by action from police forces. None had died in the response from the Shah, although he had found it to have been done by that of Ayotallah Khomeini, with pressure being placed on the Shah against Iraq to expel Khomeini, and by the end of May, Khomeini had been expelled to that of Kuwait...
President Ford's meeting in Syria however had found itself of a much less productive stance considering the still pro-Soviet view within the government and demands for the return of the Golan Heights by Israel. For President Ford, his first major trip had been to a degree of a productive nature, but while to a degree he was buoyed by that of a hope to secure a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East once the Israeli Labor Party won their reelection, but also had found himself concerned by what he had seen in the protests against him in Israel which had been near copies of that by Kissinger in 1975. Alongside the concerns about the protests seen in Israel was still the lack of any kind of Soviet reply to the compromise he had proposed to Foreign Minister Gromyko on SALT II. But for now, the President was in a point of relaxing following his 11-day long foreign trip to the United Kingdom and the Middle East...
The Soviet response to the American statement in SALT II was nothing short of outrage at it. In the minds of the Soviets, the United States had backtracked entirely on what the negotiations had been, and it seemed like the United States had no intent to actually get such a treaty finished in negotiating, let alone it actually being signed. The Soviet Union had articulated after two days of internal debate that the United States had negotiated in bad faith and was now threatening to unravel all of SALT II with that single statement on the cruise missiles. It continued explicitly along those lines, and further stated that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would be dispatched to Washington immediately for a further discussion on this.
For the Ford Administration, in the finalizing of the preparations for the upcoming trip through the Middle East (and that of the trip to the G7 in the UK just before), they found themselves forced to contend with the arrival of that of Foreign Minister Gromyko and that of the leak of the reversal at the negotiations in SALT II. The Administration found itself battered and supported in the change of fortune, with figures such as Senator Hubert Humphrey and former Governor Jimmy Carter blasting President Ford for his outrageous decisions in trying to restart an arms race, while that of Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson and former Governor Ronald Reagan applauded the President's moves in terms of the changes on SALT II. Alongside the political side, came the public in both criticism and support for the Administration's moves, although it was much more of criticism than support, with a poll by Harris in March showing the American public supporting by 77% a new SALT treaty to limit that of warheads and missiles. The criticism on the Ford Administration on SALT II combined with that of the public pressure, had begun to result in that of political results with an amendment passing the House Armed Services Committee cutting funds for the development of the M-X until the Department of Defense formally presented all available basing options for it, along with associated costs and survivability.
The meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Ford and his principals, Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, was that of one of a tense hostility. In principal, the focus of the meeting was intended to be on a discussion of a variety relating to SALT II and a hope of getting them handled, but in reality the meeting found itself focused on that of the issue of cruise missiles and the American statement of them being implied as forward-based systems. What would be sought by President Ford was that of a compromise to maintain American capability to be able to counter the Soviets in Europe. President Ford explained specifically that the limitations on cruise missiles ranges at land, sea, and underwater represented limitations on the aspects of American forward-based systems. Foreign Minister Gromyko responded harshly in the negative, accusing the United States of explicitly trying to undermine that of SALT II and the whole entirety behind detente. The principal concern for the United States as articulated was that of the Backfire bomber, which as an unrestrained quantifier in the treaty left the Soviets with a bomber capable of striking the United States which was entirely uncontrolled and represented a significant strategic threat. As was specifically articulated in the discussions, the United States could agree to bring back a 600km limit on cruise missiles for ships and submarines (with the raised possibility of even banning cruise missiles on submarines, although it was expected that the Soviets would entirely refute this considering their use of anti-ship missiles which could be considered as cruise missiles per SALT II), in exchange for once more establishing that of a 'hybrid' system, with a total of two hundred land based cruise missiles (with up to a 2500km range) and two hundred Backfires being kept under a separate limit, with any such further cruise missiles or Backfires falling under the regular and normal limits of SALT II. As a sweetener, President Ford promised to decommission the Titan II ICBMs and that of six SSBNs by 1981, to represent an American commitment for detente and nuclear arms limitation. Nonetheless, the rest of the meeting would continue at a back and forth pace over that of cruise missiles, and the meeting would be forced to be concluded with Foreign Minister Gromyko intending to return to the Soviet Union following the meeting. For President Ford, it had been felt that failing to cover that of the SS-X-20 in any of the negotiations was that of an issue, but Foreign Minister Gromyko refusing to immediately deny that of the hybrid systems had felt like that it was something that could be seen as more attainable per the conditions as sought out.
The 'sweetener' as offered by President Ford had been intended in the spirit of SALT II, in truth it was that of the ongoing modernization within the American nuclear forces and the retirement of older systems. Case in point to that was the retirement of the 57 Titan II ICBMs which were supposed to have been retired starting in the early 70s, and suffered increased maintenance issues and costs because of their age (they had been expected to be retired after 7-10 years), and on paper were supposed to be replaced by M-X. The same situation applied to the that of the five George Washington-class and a single Ethan Allen-class SSBNs, which were intended to be decommissioned because of their age and to comply with the commissioning of the first four Ohio-class SSBNs (the USS Ohio was expected to be commissioned by the start of 1980 now, rather than 1979, but it was deemed to be appropriate if there was a four to six month fall shortfall of boomers in the Pacific Ocean if SALT II could be finalized with it).
On May 6th, President Ford would communicate to both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense would begin the process of decommissioning the remaining fifty-eight Titan ICBMs in the strategic nuclear force, and urging the inclusion of additional funds to M-X to maintain the continued pace of development for a modernized nuclear force that could be ready to start entering service into the 1980s. What was also stated was that of the continued inclusion of funding to maintain a steady pace on that of cruise missiles, the B-1A Lancer, and the Ohio-class SSBN. For this to be sent out on the day prior for President Ford's departure was that of an indication the United States was willing to stand by its own words in order to get SALT II hopefully finalized with this compromise.
The Soviet Union would not provide an official response to that of the proposed compromise of SALT II, before the start of President Ford's first major trip of his second term; his trip encompassed that of a visit to the United Kingdom for the G7, to be followed by a trip through the Middle East, going from Israel to Egypt to Saudi Arabia to Iran and then finally to Syria before returning back home to the United States. The trip would to a degree be overshadowed by that of SALT II, with sharp questions and criticism continuing to be leveled against President Ford by Democrats in the House and Senate. Arriving in Israel on May 10th, President Ford's arrival found itself met by harsh protests, with some of the consistent accusations calling that the President was intent on selling Israel down a river where the Arab states could 'finish the job'. President Ford's arrival had also thrown that of a landmine into the beginnings of the general election season (with it being scheduled for September, 1977), with the leaks and rumors coming from within the Administration suggesting that they were preparing to host a conference to secure a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. This would be signified by President Ford's address in front of the Knesset on May 11th, with some members of the National Religious Party and Likud refusing to attend the address. His departure would once more be met by protests, with gunfire in the crowd forcing the Secret Service to get the President, Secretary of State Richardson, and National Security Adviser Scowcroft to Air Force One much faster. His trips to both Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be much calmer by comparison, with that of a lessened hostility and calmer meetings with heads of states. Sadat himself would state that Egypt would follow behind whatever the United States had decided to do, with one of the bigger pieces of discussion being on the possibility of American usage of Ras Banas for American aircraft. The discussions on the usage of Ras Banas were of a complicated status, with Sadat fearful of reprisals against Egypt for their full-staging of American hardware and aircraft from Ras Banas at a permanent stage. Sadat however had agreed to maintained a continued discussion on it with the United States.
President Ford's trip to Iran however, would be highly cautioned by that of both Secretary Richardson and National Security Adviser, warning about the possibility of a tumultuous stay in there considering what had happened in Israel at the start of their arrival into the Middle East. President Ford would acknowledge such concerns, but the arrival into Iran would signify that of a stance with that of their other staunch ally in the Middle East (despite what had happened with the 1973 Oil Crisis...). The meeting between President Ford and the Shah would be quite productive, with discussions over the ongoing political environment within Iran and that of the military nature. The Shah would particularly take note of it, with an urging to work on picking up the pace in terms of delivery of hardware and training to the Imperial Iranian Air Force, in order to maintain a staunch American ally against the Soviets. Protests to President Ford's visit would echo in Qom and to that of Tehran, and would be met by action from police forces. None had died in the response from the Shah, although he had found it to have been done by that of Ayotallah Khomeini, with pressure being placed on the Shah against Iraq to expel Khomeini, and by the end of May, Khomeini had been expelled to that of Kuwait...
President Ford's meeting in Syria however had found itself of a much less productive stance considering the still pro-Soviet view within the government and demands for the return of the Golan Heights by Israel. For President Ford, his first major trip had been to a degree of a productive nature, but while to a degree he was buoyed by that of a hope to secure a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East once the Israeli Labor Party won their reelection, but also had found himself concerned by what he had seen in the protests against him in Israel which had been near copies of that by Kissinger in 1975. Alongside the concerns about the protests seen in Israel was still the lack of any kind of Soviet reply to the compromise he had proposed to Foreign Minister Gromyko on SALT II. But for now, the President was in a point of relaxing following his 11-day long foreign trip to the United Kingdom and the Middle East...
Actually, to point out in terms of polling, that was not the case at all. A majority of Americans in terms of polling had always remained opposed to that of the Iran nuclear deal. For SALT II however? That was anything but. As I mentioned in the chapter, 77% of all Americans per a poll by Harris in March of 1977 supported that of a SALT treaty to limit nuclear warheads and missiles. Per NBC/AP polls done from January of 1978 to October of 1980, the lowest it ever went in terms of support for a treaty to limit nuclear weapons was 62% in September of 1979. In terms of actually ratifying that of the SALT II treaty per polling however? From Roper, from October-November of 1978 to November of 1980, it went from a peak of 42% for and 20% against to that of 22% for and 42% against in January of 1980.
There was also additional polling in 80 and 81, showing that approval and disapproval of SALT II was roughly equal and in the mid-thirties for both. In general, the public did agree with that of the view of disarmament and a reduction of nuclear arms (this is also sort of supported by polling from 81-82 with about half of all respondents supporting nuclear disarmament with the Soviet Union).
I'd argue that while SALT II might have troubles in terms of passing the Senate (if so necessary I would imagine it being able to be done per an executive agreement), I'd imagine the public to a degree would be supportive of it if set earlier over an attempted passage of it in the Senate (although the questions and challenges over it alongside that of whatever happens with the Panama Canal could prove be another question the Administration would be forced to handle, in part because of how to time it all together).
The geopolitical gears are slowly turning, let's hope they're turning in the right direction! Good update.