1944-54: RAF, FAA and UK civil aviation sanity options?
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
Was defence industry consolidation a good thing? Certainly BAE is successful now, but it took a while to find firm footing, to say nothing of the merged monstrosities* that proceeded it (though tbf that may have more to do with the fact that they operated in a period when the British defence establishment was wandering around aimlessly and the treasury was out for blood).
*ok, Hawker-Siddeley was good
*ok, Hawker-Siddeley was good
Develop Hawker p.1052 as Seahawk mk 2.
The government tells BOAC that they WILL buy British and any of the management that even mentions US products is fired. This would mean Vickers VC7 should fly. The cancellation was the biggest civil aviation own goal of the decade.
The government tells BOAC that they WILL buy British and any of the management that even mentions US products is fired. This would mean Vickers VC7 should fly. The cancellation was the biggest civil aviation own goal of the decade.
No Spiteful - have Supermarine make a jet-powered fighter.
No Attacker - have Supermarine make a swept-wing jet-powered fighter.
Mixed feelings about the De Haviland jets past Vampire - perhaps they nick Lippisch from the Americans in 1945? But then the instances of German scientists that ended up in the UK are as rare as hen's teeth.
I'd avoid the Bristol Brabazon idea.
What about Gloster products?
No Attacker - have Supermarine make a swept-wing jet-powered fighter.
Mixed feelings about the De Haviland jets past Vampire - perhaps they nick Lippisch from the Americans in 1945? But then the instances of German scientists that ended up in the UK are as rare as hen's teeth.
I'd avoid the Bristol Brabazon idea.
What about Gloster products?
1. Have a Defence Review in 1955 that does not believe that missiles will replace manned aircraft within a decade.
2. Display greater urgency in turning projects into prototypes into production aircraft.
3. Encourage consolidation amongst aircraft manufacturers. The UK needs at most three or four large scale aircraft manufacturers and two producers of jet engines.
4. Only give contracts to companies with their own airstrips. Force some to move where necessary to end the practice of taking prototypes apart to truck them to an airfield for reassembly. ( See 2)
5. In general, stick with a few projects rather than replace them with new specs within a year. Difficult at a time of rapid technological changes but a good design will still be useful even if not perfect
6. As noted , tell the Boards of BOAC and BEA they are buying British civil aircraft or they can find new jobs.
7. Buy the HS Buccaneer for the RAF as a Canberra replacement. TSR2 can be a longer term option.
8. Revise the SR-177 specifications to use an Avon engine instead of the mixed rocket and Gyron (?) Jet. It can also replace the Hunter in the Ground Attack role and supplement the Lightning as an interceptor.
2. Display greater urgency in turning projects into prototypes into production aircraft.
3. Encourage consolidation amongst aircraft manufacturers. The UK needs at most three or four large scale aircraft manufacturers and two producers of jet engines.
4. Only give contracts to companies with their own airstrips. Force some to move where necessary to end the practice of taking prototypes apart to truck them to an airfield for reassembly. ( See 2)
5. In general, stick with a few projects rather than replace them with new specs within a year. Difficult at a time of rapid technological changes but a good design will still be useful even if not perfect
6. As noted , tell the Boards of BOAC and BEA they are buying British civil aircraft or they can find new jobs.
7. Buy the HS Buccaneer for the RAF as a Canberra replacement. TSR2 can be a longer term option.
8. Revise the SR-177 specifications to use an Avon engine instead of the mixed rocket and Gyron (?) Jet. It can also replace the Hunter in the Ground Attack role and supplement the Lightning as an interceptor.
Oops, misread the dates.
Consider the above as an opener for the 1954-64 challenge
Points (2) to (6) are still valid, even more so in fact.
So
1) Don't give up on research into supersonic flight.
-------- see above for 2) to 6)
7) Don't fart around with rubber decks on aircraft carriers. Move to angled decks for the Centaur, Hermes and Eagle by 1952/3
8) Push ahead with the Hawker P1040 Sea Hawk and the follow on P1052. And Hunters by 1952 please.
Consider the above as an opener for the 1954-64 challenge
Points (2) to (6) are still valid, even more so in fact.
So
1) Don't give up on research into supersonic flight.
-------- see above for 2) to 6)
7) Don't fart around with rubber decks on aircraft carriers. Move to angled decks for the Centaur, Hermes and Eagle by 1952/3
8) Push ahead with the Hawker P1040 Sea Hawk and the follow on P1052. And Hunters by 1952 please.
Fuzzy Dunlop
Banned
Get civilian aircraft manufacture to be global looking . . . . instead of just BEA/BOAC orientated.
Putting designs on to the market just for a single airlines specification isn't going to sell you many units.
Putting designs on to the market just for a single airlines specification isn't going to sell you many units.
Riain
Banned
In policy terms don't adopt the rule that 1957 is the year of maxiumum danger, keep more of an even development programme going. Also have the RN choose to deal with emerging Soviet submarine and cruiser threat with offensive means using carrier strikes on bases, therefore the RN puts more effort into finishing carriers than it does converting frigates for the reserves.
In particular keep the Miles M.52 programme going at all costs.
In particular keep the Miles M.52 programme going at all costs.
Switch to using British built transport aircraft in 1944. The Avro York was a fine aircraft and they should have built more than 200 of them, they also should have take advantage of the development of the Avro Lincoln to further improve it. The Hamilcar X twin engine version of the Glider had real potential as a military transport but was underpowered, change the two outdated Bristol Mercury engines for at least Hercules engines and preferable Centaurus engines.
Forget the Bristol Brabazon monstrosity, and any further flyingboat airliners the Bristol Britannia is a potential world beater.
Jet Airliners are a new and not fully understood concept, tests, tests and more tests are essential before putting them into service and don't let the accountants put cost cutting before sound engineering.
Forget the Bristol Brabazon monstrosity, and any further flyingboat airliners the Bristol Britannia is a potential world beater.
Jet Airliners are a new and not fully understood concept, tests, tests and more tests are essential before putting them into service and don't let the accountants put cost cutting before sound engineering.
Riain
Banned
So true. The BEA spec'd trident and the BOAC spec'd VC10 were commercial failures whereas the BAC-111 was spec-d at what BAC thought would sell, was bought by BUA Britain's largests private airline in the 60s and sold almost double the combined number of VC10 and Tridents.
De Haviland and BAC both wanted to make their planes bigger but were dissuaded by BEA/BOAC which then didn't buy the resulting aircraft in reasonable numbers.
Shut down the Ministry of Supply by the end of 1945. That bunch of incompetents/traitors did far too much damage in the post war period.
Put a law in place stating that where a suitable British aircraft exists nationalised British companies will not buy the foreign alternative.
Put a law in place stating that where a suitable British aircraft exists nationalised British companies will not buy the foreign alternative.
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Fuzzy Dunlop
Banned
Let the Gov't pen pushers . . . . and MOD listen to the experts from the off and make this a 'still born' from the start
And save the ££££££ on a fleet of around 12 of these instead, replacing the Shackleton on a one to one basis.
We could've had a few in service by at least early 1980 . . . . and would've been just the ticket for 'Down South' in 1982!
Much obliged!
And save the ££££££ on a fleet of around 12 of these instead, replacing the Shackleton on a one to one basis.
We could've had a few in service by at least early 1980 . . . . and would've been just the ticket for 'Down South' in 1982!
Much obliged!
And replace with a Sea Hunter no later than 1957 for use on the Centaurs instead of the larger Sea Vixen and Scimitar in the Indian Ocean.
Riain
Banned
The problem with the 44-54 time-frame is its the 're-fight WW2 with the odd nuke' era, as well as planes with mostly less than 10 year service lives and rapidly advancing aircraft technology. That means it's hard to get something good in this time-frame that will serve well for a long time.
A lot of common sense is being shown so far, but there are (to my mind) intractable problems with the UK aviation industry in the time frame mentioned.
1. On average, UK aviation firms were too small, so mergers are a must.
2. Ministry of Supply has to be killed ASAP.
3. Merge the Air Ministry, Admiralty and War Office into the MOD.
4. The UK had no real concept of what its role was globally post WW2. Despite the 'retreat from Empire' its defense establishment and civil service appeared unable to understand that a new, European focus was needed.
5. Senior Civil Servants with double firsts in classics are not experts in aviation technology and should have no part or hand in making decisions about aviation technology (or about anything technological).
6. Remove the Anti Aircraft defense role from the Army and transfer it to the RAF.
7. Remove Coastal Command from the RAF and transfer to the RN.
8. 'Perfect is the enemy of just good enough' - get aircraft/weapons into service that are 'good enough' - vast sums were spent on projects/prototypes that never actually became anything due to what were either slight specification shortcomings or for fankly pedantic reasons.
9. Understand that while the USA is an ally, it is also a competitor. A modicum of common sense in this regard would go a long way.
10. Nationalised companies 'Buy British', no ifs, no buts.
1. On average, UK aviation firms were too small, so mergers are a must.
2. Ministry of Supply has to be killed ASAP.
3. Merge the Air Ministry, Admiralty and War Office into the MOD.
4. The UK had no real concept of what its role was globally post WW2. Despite the 'retreat from Empire' its defense establishment and civil service appeared unable to understand that a new, European focus was needed.
5. Senior Civil Servants with double firsts in classics are not experts in aviation technology and should have no part or hand in making decisions about aviation technology (or about anything technological).
6. Remove the Anti Aircraft defense role from the Army and transfer it to the RAF.
7. Remove Coastal Command from the RAF and transfer to the RN.
8. 'Perfect is the enemy of just good enough' - get aircraft/weapons into service that are 'good enough' - vast sums were spent on projects/prototypes that never actually became anything due to what were either slight specification shortcomings or for fankly pedantic reasons.
9. Understand that while the USA is an ally, it is also a competitor. A modicum of common sense in this regard would go a long way.
10. Nationalised companies 'Buy British', no ifs, no buts.
Hopefully, that means the Britannia is started in 1944 instead of 1947, which in turn may advance its first flight from 1952 to 1949 and its service entry from 1957 to 1954.
And while your at it I'd avoid the Saro Princess.
No Brabazon and Princess means the Proteus doesn't have the reverse-flow layout that Gunston (writing in The Encyclopaedia of Aero Engines) said caused the flame-extinction problem due to ice accretion that led to BOAC delaying it's acceptance of the type for two years. So could that put the Britannia's service entry forward to 1952? I'm sceptical because the engine didn't run until 1947 and AFAIK it had a lot of problems that weren't solved until after Hooker joined the firm in 1950. So I'm going to be cautious and say that it entered service with BOAC in 1954.
Gunston writing in Rolls Royce Aero Engines said that the Lord Hives made a big mistake by abandoning the Clyde turboprop. (It's safe to say that at the very least that the Wyvern would have been in service sooner.) He wrote that the only thing wrong with the Clyde (which first ran in August 1945) was the overloaded LP, but with 2 or 3 stages power & efficiency would have improved producing an engine in the 5,000hp class. He continued that this engine would have been outstanding for large civil transports and that it also had the swift fuel/propeller control that was essential for military aircraft, especially when flying from aircraft carriers. He concluded by writing that had the Clyde been put on Britannia in 1950 it would have been in service many years earlier and many more sold.
However, the Britannia's started in 1944 instead of 1947 ITTL the Clyde is selected for the aircraft in 1947 because it is well ahead of the Proteus in development and the aircraft enters service in 1952.
IOTL...
£6.45 million was spent on the Bristol Brabazon to February 1952
£9.10 million was spent on the Saunders Roe Princess to May 1954
£4.00 million was spent on the Vickers V.1000 to December 1955
I agree that the V.1000 should not have been cancelled (although that happened in 1955 and this thread is about the period 1944-54). What should be done with the money spent on the Brabazon and Princess?
One possibility is a more ambitious Brabazon Type I specification. That is make it a large turbojet powered aircraft for the North Atlantic route instead of a large turboprop powered aircraft for the North Atlantic route. As it will take time to develop the engines the Type I (Brabazon) and Type III (Britannia) are still started in the opposite order to OTL. The contract to develop the TTL version of Brabazon Type I is given to Vickers in the late 1940s so it effectively means the V.1000 (or an aircraft of similar capability) is started several years sooner and makes it's first flight around the same time as the Boeing 367-80. (That is, July 1954). One problem that I can see with that course of action is that Vickers might not have the design capacity to make an earlier start on the aircraft without delaying the Viking family, Viscount & Valiant which will be given priority so the first flight of the ALT-V.1000 may not be until 1956 and it's service entry around 1959-60. So the earlier start might not result in the V.1000 entering service with BOAC, TCA & the RAF any earlier.
Therefore, I think that the money & design resources saved on the Brabazon should be used to design military derivatives of the Britannia. So perhaps a LRMP version to be procured instead of the Neptune and compliment the Shackleton which ITTL might have Clyde tuboprops instead of Griffon piston engines. (As I've mentioned a LRMP version of the Britannia the licencing agreement with Canadair would be signed 3 years earlier so the Argus is likely to be in service 3 years sooner too and so will the CL-44 but the latter aircraft might have Clydes instead of Tynes.) Or develop an equivalent to the Britannic/Belfast that could be put into service in the middle of the 1950s.
Another possibility is that the resources not put into Brabazon and Princess are put into the two firms helicopter projects.
I also think that the rocket fighters were a dead end. Therefore, the the resources that were put into the Avro and Saro rocket fighters (including their engines) and the Princess flying boat might have been used more profitably to make an earlier start on ballistic missile research and a stand-off bomb for the V-bombers . This effectively means an earlier start on Blue Steel and Black Knight.
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