1861-1862 Western Theater and probabilities?

[ReconGuy02]

For some time now, a question been irking me.
Was there any possible way to significantly improve CSA performance in KY/TN in 1861 and up until 1863? Sure, they won't win war, they were doomed since they failed to knock out Union psychologically with string of loud defeats in 1861-1862 on the East, which had very low chances of happening anyway.
They'd be able to prolong war into 1866, and with enough stupid luck, probably into early 1867, which could create butterflies in history down the line, like Lincoln living on, Radical Reconstruction enforced, different internal US politics in 19th and 20th century, and moreover, butterflies towards the history as we know it overall.
So here is some PoDs I thought about.
A) No Grant for any reason, Confederates hold off in Southwestern KY and Western TN for much longer.
B) Johnston doesn't overextend his forces in KY in 1861, allowing him to be outflanked from the West by strategic Union manoevres and overall decides that fighting for KY is not worth it, better to defend Tennessee, and Nashville especially.
C) Obviously, Antietam of the West, Shiloh. What if simply, Sherman and Prentiss fold on the first day, like most of the Army of Tennessee did? Johnston isn't shot meanwhile, and decides to push forward before nightfall
D) Other than that, some miscellaneous stuff around October 1861 - Summer of 1862? My knowledge of ACW is far from sound.

Anyway, waiting for your input too. Let's discuss any possible scenarios of Confederates performing better on the West
I'll be glad to hear anyone willing.

 

[Hydra1234]

Easiest way to get no Grant would be a decisive Union defeat at Shiloh (which goes with point c). If no reinforcements (either from Wallace's late division or Buell's Army of the Ohio) arrived by the 2nd day, I think it would be possible for the Confederates to rout the entire Union force present there on the second day. Grant was already on thin ice with Halleck even with the victory he pulled off OTL, so a defeat could mean he's shuttled off to defend Minnesota or something.

Similarly, shuffling around a few casualties at Shiloh could improve Confederate prospects, even if the outcome remains the same. For instance, swapping Bragg with Johnston, or having Sherman in the center, in the Hornet's Nest, instead of Prentiss, would have significant ramifications down the line.

But yeah, Shiloh is probably the key to improving Confederate prospects in the west.

Beauregard instead of Floyd at Fort Donelson is the only non-Shiloh POD that I can think of. An actually experienced commander could bloody the Union's noses at Donelson and possibly withdraw in good order, saving thousands of Confederate soldiers that would have otherwise been captured. It would also have another benefit of hurting Grant's career a bit.

 

[Dude-a-Buck]

Easiest way to get no Grant would be a decisive Union defeat at Shiloh (which goes with point c). If no reinforcements (either from Wallace's late division or Buell's Army of the Ohio) arrived by the 2nd day, I think it would be possible for the Confederates to rout the entire Union force present there on the second day. Grant was already on thin ice with Halleck even with the victory he pulled off OTL, so a defeat could mean he's shuttled off to defend Minnesota or something.

Similarly, shuffling around a few casualties at Shiloh could improve Confederate prospects, even if the outcome remains the same. For instance, swapping Bragg with Johnston, or having Sherman in the center, in the Hornet's Nest, instead of Prentiss, would have significant ramifications down the line.

But yeah, Shiloh is probably the key to improving Confederate prospects in the west.

Beauregard instead of Floyd at Fort Donelson is the only non-Shiloh POD that I can think of. An actually experienced commander could bloody the Union's noses at Donelson and possibly withdraw in good order, saving thousands of Confederate soldiers that would have otherwise been captured. It would also have another benefit of hurting Grant's career a bit.

How do you think Halleck does as commander in the west?

 

[Hydra1234]

How do you think Halleck does as commander in the west?

Halleck was a very good administrator and staffer, but a pretty bad field commander. His performance at Corinth was horrendous, where with a 2-1 numerical advantage and a cadre of extremely talented subordinates, he moved all of 5 miles in 3 weeks. Halleck neglected Buell's drive to Eastern Tennessee in the winter, resulting in that region not being liberated for months, although Buell shouldn't be absolved of his own inaction either.

I'm of the opinion had Halleck properly capitalized on Shiloh and coordinated with Farragut, Vicksburg could have fallen in 1862.

If Halleck somehow stays in command of the west longer, I definitely think the Western Front, and by proxy the entire Civil War, would be prolonged.

 

[dcharles]

Limited Grant (killed in my tl) and limited Braxton Bragg (wounded) are what I did. I couldn't think of a way to make the Confederates win otherwise. Deprives the Union of a military genius and deprives the South of a military dunce.

 

[Valentinian]

If the Donelson garrison was able to retreat, Johnston would have an extra 12-15,000 men at Shiloh in a Corps commanded hopefully by Buckner and not Pillow or Floyd. That many more men at Shiloh would have probably been enough to win on the first day.

With the destruction of the AotT, Buell retreats to Nashville. If reinforcements are not brought up quick, Johnston can replace his losses by joining with Kirby Smith and defeat Buell or force a retreat, probably to Munfordville. The next Union offensive in the West won't be until 1863, prolonging the war significantly.

For bonus points. Bragg gets wounded bad enough at Shiloh to be disqualified from field command (yes, I know about Hood...). Davis, helping his friend, replaces the criminally negligent Lucius Northrup as Commissary General. Bragg, an effective administrator, could significantly improve the Confederacy's food situation for the rest of the war.

 

[ReconGuy02]

If the Donelson garrison was able to retreat, Johnston would have an extra 12-15,000 men at Shiloh in a Corps commanded hopefully by Buckner and not Pillow or Floyd. That many more men at Shiloh would have probably been enough to win on the first day.

With the destruction of the AotT, Buell retreats to Nashville. If reinforcements are not brought up quick, Johnston can replace his losses by joining with Kirby Smith and defeat Buell or force a retreat, probably to Munfordville. The next Union offensive in the West won't be until 1863, prolonging the war significantly.

For bonus points. Bragg gets wounded bad enough at Shiloh to be disqualified from field command (yes, I know about Hood...). Davis, helping his friend, replaces the criminally negligent Lucius Northrup as Commissary General. Bragg, an effective administrator, could significantly improve the Confederacy's food situation for the rest of the war.

How long this could prolong a war? Around 12-14 months?

 

[tallthinkev]

Got to hold the Mississippi, or at the very least blockade it in a few places

 

[SWS]

If the Army of Tennessee had been organized and consolidated in August 1862, instead of having formally-independent Kirby-Smith manipulate 'Old Porcupine' and run-off on some inane glory-hunting expedition into the Bluegrass, Bragg might have been permitted to win the race to Louisville, if Bull Nelson can be destroyed at Munfordville and Buell decisively-repulsed along the south-bank of Green River. The Army of the Ohio would likely have to resupply and regroup at some Ohio River port, perhaps Owensborough, to the west.

 

[Valentinian]

How long this could prolong a war? Around 12-14 months?

I certainly could. The problem is that there are so many butterflies. Who leads the Vicksburg campaign, if there is one at all? Does Halleck stay in the West? That could have the knock-on effect of Burnside getting his pontoons on time, butterflying away the Battle of Fredericksburg, and putting Richmond under threat.

 

[daveg1967]

If the Donelson garrison was able to retreat, Johnston would have an extra 12-15,000 men at Shiloh in a Corps commanded hopefully by Buckner and not Pillow or Floyd. That many more men at Shiloh would have probably been enough to win on the first day.

With the destruction of the AotT, Buell retreats to Nashville. If reinforcements are not brought up quick, Johnston can replace his losses by joining with Kirby Smith and defeat Buell or force a retreat, probably to Munfordville. The next Union offensive in the West won't be until 1863, prolonging the war significantly.

For bonus points. Bragg gets wounded bad enough at Shiloh to be disqualified from field command (yes, I know about Hood...). Davis, helping his friend, replaces the criminally negligent Lucius Northrup as Commissary General. Bragg, an effective administrator, could significantly improve the Confederacy's food situation for the rest of the war.

This is a butterfly point. No surrender at Donelson means a very different campaign leading to Shiloh.

 

[daveg1967]

For some time now, a question been irking me.
Was there any possible way to significantly improve CSA performance in KY/TN in 1861 and up until 1863? Sure, they won't win war, they were doomed since they failed to knock out Union psychologically with string of loud defeats in 1861-1862 on the East, which had very low chances of happening anyway.
They'd be able to prolong war into 1866, and with enough stupid luck, probably into early 1867, which could create butterflies in history down the line, like Lincoln living on, Radical Reconstruction enforced, different internal US politics in 19th and 20th century, and moreover, butterflies towards the history as we know it overall.
So here is some PoDs I thought about.
A) No Grant for any reason, Confederates hold off in Southwestern KY and Western TN for much longer.
B) Johnston doesn't overextend his forces in KY in 1861, allowing him to be outflanked from the West by strategic Union manoevres and overall decides that fighting for KY is not worth it, better to defend Tennessee, and Nashville especially.
C) Obviously, Antietam of the West, Shiloh. What if simply, Sherman and Prentiss fold on the first day, like most of the Army of Tennessee did? Johnston isn't shot meanwhile, and decides to push forward before nightfall
D) Other than that, some miscellaneous stuff around October 1861 - Summer of 1862? My knowledge of ACW is far from sound.

Anyway, waiting for your input too. Let's discuss any possible scenarios of Confederates performing better on the West
I'll be glad to hear anyone willing.

The victory conditions for the Confederacy are simple. They need to not be obviously losing the war in the fall of 1864. Lincoln expected to lose the election. Sherman capturing Atlanta and Sheridan's success in the Shenandoa changed that outlook. The strategic outlook in the West is difficult for the Confederacy. The terrain actually allows the Union to actually benefit from superior numbers. Better Confederate commanders and poorer Union commanders change things a bit. I can't say if Albert Sydney Johnston was a good enough commander to make a difference. He might have been. Is there a Union commander who rises if Grant isn't there? It's not Sherman. It may be Thomas.

 

[Valentinian]

The victory conditions for the Confederacy are simple. They need to not be obviously losing the war in the fall of 1864. Lincoln expected to lose the election. Sherman capturing Atlanta and Sheridan's success in the Shenandoa changed that outlook. The strategic outlook in the West is difficult for the Confederacy. The terrain actually allows the Union to actually benefit from superior numbers. Better Confederate commanders and poorer Union commanders change things a bit. I can't say if Albert Sydney Johnston was a good enough commander to make a difference. He might have been. Is there a Union commander who rises if Grant isn't there? It's not Sherman. It may be Thomas.

Thomas was a little cautious. In a battle, he was a world-beater, but I don't see him pulling a March to the Sea (no knock on him, most people thought Sherman was nuts to try). Pope may be left in the west, and he wasn't bad (Second Bull Run was not all his fault).

I think Rosecrans still gets the Army of the Ohio/Cumberland. But you still need an army along the Mississippi. Ormsby Mitchell would have been a good choice, but he died in October 1862. Samuel Curtis could be brought from the Trans-Mississippi, not sure how he would do. Thomas W. Sherman was probably the best bet under the circumstances for this army. He was a good commander and Halleck thought well of him.

Worst case scenario, Lincoln gives it to McClernand. That would be entering Union-screw territory.