Part XXI
Unknown Unknowns
Desert Badger Continued- Day 2
Within the span of 24 hours, the United States had undertaken a major military operation against Iraq with very little warning as to its actions. An initial barrage of missiles and jet strikes targeted a long list of Iraq's military, political, industrial and logistical sites all to “
reduce the Iraqi ability to wage war”. All this was in retaliation for the disappearance of an American Jet which the Iraqi state media and some sources inside the Department of Defence attributed to an Iraqi attack. To put the situation lightly it was a stunning set of events and few people felt confident guessing where things would end.
Throughout the night, American forces (with British aid) ran sorties over the region where the plane had been lost, to hopefully find the missing aviators (a pilot and weapons officer) and trigger a corresponding rescue mission. Time was of the essence, two Americans could not hope to survive in Ba’athist Iraq for long, but since the disappearance and assumed crash, U.S. command had only radio silence. Still, Desert Badger continued, while strikes on Iraq’s major cities and population centres slowed after the initial wave, all across Iraq bombs attempted to disrupt (and possibly destroy) Iraqi command and control to squeeze more time out of the situation to find the men and damage the Saddam regime in general.
A U.S. aircraft carrier in the 5th fleet launches jets into Iraq
The world awoke to observe the aftermath of the first day's attack, what they saw was a much more destructive operation than the 2001 or 1998 bombings as the Americans struck far many more targets than expected, the country's airfields, main communications structures, supply bases and fuel depots had been attacked to scramble any Iraqi response. The U.S. attacks were launched with extremely minimal preparation time for the Iraqi military and citizens alike, hundreds of casualties in Baghdad alone by some estimates numbered more than the entire 4-day Desert Fox campaign.
The American public was broadly supportive of the exercise and Bush’s administration's explanations satisfied many, but questions still swirled especially regarding potential escalation, should the President take further action and escalate to more than just an air campaign? There was no real stated policy goal, other than for Saddam to demilitarize and comply with all U.N. resolutions, and to end attacks on allied aircraft. These demands were shared by all domestic politicians, but critics of the administration were aware of the tough talk and defence department leaks regarding Saddam and Iraq and feared that the current conflict was being set up as a pretext for a wider war to remove Saddam Hussein by force. It wasn’t too much of a stretch, considering stated U.S. policy for regime change and depending on how long the bombing campaign was to last it could result in the U.S. on a path toward war. However, the House of representatives showed its support for the ongoing military action by supporting a resolution to support the ‘
men and women in our armed forces carrying out their missions’ only 11 representatives opposed the vote including Democrats Barbara Lee and Cynthia McKinney amongst others, Independent Bernie Sanders and the sole Republican detractor Ron Paul.
(Left to Right) Representatives Lee, Sanders and Paul, all critics of the strikes
On the second day, as questions continued to be raised, the Bush administration made some clearer pronouncements as to its aims in Iraq. Rumsfeld was out touting the success of the operation with a map of anti-air bases, terrorist training camps and supposed WMD production facilities that had been hit. From the way Rumsfeld was phrasing it the operation could wrap up any day, satisfied at the
“tremendous progress of our air and naval forces in disarming Saddam of his offensive weapons, sustaining zero casualties”, when again questioned on the possibility of further American involvement the Secretary of Defence said,
“We are prepared for all options but remain clear that American action will depend on how the Iraqi government goes forward, but I will reiterate that we remain prepared indefinitely”. His words were a sign that the administration was at best remaining vague about the next steps of the operation. The President made a short statement indicating he was pleased with the way the operation was unfolding, describing the attack as “
the only way to go after Saddam” equating the strikes as more a punishment for the dictators’ actions than a specific doctrine.
Journalists were a little more combative, a Washington Post report detailed how the strikes in Bagdad on the first day were clearly aimed at more than military sites, and the administration was aiming at destabilizing the regime as a whole. The Iraqi government remained as hostile as ever, accusing the United States of an unprovoked attack, foreign journalists were taken to tour craters in Bagdad and told that the United States had deliberately targeted civilian areas. Iraq also accused the U.S. of targeting Hussein and his family personally in failed strikes, though Rumsfeld disputed any Iraqi claims as to the U.S.’s aims. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, when asked if the U.S. had any intention of taking further military action gave a curious response, first reiterating the many options that the United States had available to them when dealing with Iraq, but he also made it clear that the White House policy was “
Regime change, that has been and continues to be our policy” Asked how regime change would be brought about he said
“ Well, I say to the Iraqi people that we encourage them to take that action upon themselves,” Which could only be interpreted as the Presidents spokesman encouraging a revolution in Iraq.
White House Press Secretary Fleischer
The tough talk was not unilateral in Washington, as some sought to walk back some of the brinksmanship at play. Secretary of State Powell seemingly absent from the decisions to activate Desert Badger, made a briefing to outline his department's goals in Iraq. He stated that he supported the President’s decision but was less clear about U.S policy towards regime change
“With respect to Iraq, that (regime change) has nothing to do with it, speaking with the President he has made it very clear this is everything to do with Iraq’s attacks on coalition aircraft, and we have to compel Iraq to end these attacks … there is no suggestion of regime change, quite the contrary”.
The search for the missing pilots was the unspoken factor in the military operation in Iraq, but it was no secret to the U.S. navy and air force who carried out a massive search hoping to catch radio communique, troop movements and any hints as to a current whereabouts living or dead. By now, U.S. thinking was that it was likely the pilots were in some kind of Iraqi custody either civilian, police or military. The movement near the probable crash site leaned toward that outcome given the less likely alternatives of the pair evading capture in such a hostile region. The rescue operation was dedicated to monitoring the Iraqi forces to spot any attempt to transport the pilots further north, this clashed with the goals of other military strikes as it forced U.S. forces to not attack Iraqi forces around the crash site. U.S. intelligence was quickly roped into the operation to aid in the search translating intelligence and dissecting photographs as well as using whatever sources there were inside Iraq to press them for any information they could get.
Day 3
As the third day of the operation began strikes, flights and surveillance continued across Iraq. And while the various secretaries and executive staff members praised the men and women in the field and touted a list of destroyed targets. There was a fight in the halls of power, various cabinet offices held grievances about being side-lined by an operation that they had as little warning about as the American public at large. The whole operation stank to high heaven of a DoD Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz stage-managed affair no doubt presented to the President as the only possible action available. That was the perspective Secretary Powell certainly held, who as the country's chief diplomat believed he should have been included in the decision to bomb major cities (Powell’s, exclusion from the decision was subsequently denied by members of the Bush administration, but was supported by confidential sources). Others were annoyed by the decision Rumsfeld’s expansion of Desert Badger had been conducted without input from either national security advisor Condoleezza Rice or CIA director George Tenet. Once the full extent of the operation was revealed to them suspicion fell upon Rumsfeld for the action taken, aware of his and his deputy's long-held desires to bring down the dictator.
Inside the White House, there was little time for solemn contemplation about the ongoing operation, as much as Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs, and the President put on their brave faces, infighting over what exactly the next steps were going to be, was consuming the executive branch. Few had been included in the decision to go for Desert Badger, perhaps it was excusable, after all, immediate action was required to prevent the capture of U.S. Airmen but someone should have at least told the Secretary of State and the CIA were only informed of the decision once it had been made, only then to ask for available targets to strike. But as soon as the bombs started dropping everyone clambered to be in the know, to influence the President’s decision making, or at least not to embarrass themselves by contradicting each other.
President Bush meeting his national security team
It was clear that the President was not exactly sure what to do next, he was certain he had made the right moves so far, he had been called upon to act and was damn certain of his decision. He flat out rejected any notion from the media that he had been at all manipulated by Rumsfeld, he was the President, and he made the decisions. But as certain as he was in ordering the strikes, his mind was focused mainly on the rescue operation and not wider Iraqi policy. Bush brought together his national security teams to discuss just that, to determine their objectives and how to achieve them. At the meeting Rumsfeld jumped right into it, listing the many victories of the U.S. forces and listed the former structures inside Iraq, Rumsfeld presented the Saddam regime as crumbling, its army in disarray and leadership on the run he pointed out that they hadn’t seen Saddam since the 1st day hinting that he was likely in hiding. Before he got to his conclusion the National Security Advisor Rice cut him off wanting updates on pilots, and the President agreed. Rumsfeld delivered disappointing news, no change.
“We all pray for their safe return,” the President said.
The President asked about next steps, it was an open question that prompted a few exchanged glances
“How do we deal with this guy?” a few months ago the President shifted U.S. policy to take an aggressive stance against Iraq, authorizing covert action to aid Iraqi opposition, and harsher enforcement of current policy and now Saddam has defied the U.S. once again
“He’s trying to test us, to see what we’re prepared to do, but I’m not backing down”. The President, not the most precise speaker when on the spot, made the room similarly uncertain when he asked. Rumsfeld nodded, screwed up his face to look as pensive as possible and directly said it.
“We should kill him”. It perked up everyone’s ears
“We ought to go to Bagdad and either capture or kill him, right now Americans are fighting to defend Americans and to liberate a people, Congress has approved it and the public supports it. We’ve drafted the plans; I say let’s go”. It was the kind of straight talk only the Secretary of Defence could muster, to propose a military operation with the kind of magnitude unseen since the Vietnam war with an almost sarcastic tone of voice.
“We use the strikes to destroy Iraq’s defences, hit the regime every which way, while we move the necessary ground forces into Kuwait and drive straight to Baghdad”. Powell looked in pain, the two secretaries' rivalry was legendary and to hear Rumsfeld handwave over the blood and sweat of such an operation as ‘driving straight to Bagdad’ cut Powell deep. Out of everyone he felt personally insulted by Rumsfeld’s actions convinced that he had deliberately cut Powell out of the operations decision to undermine him, but now he was prepared to counter Rumsfeld’s broad assumptions.
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld
“Don you are making a lot of broad assumptions” Powell who had intimately studied the numerous war plans picked them apart
“We are going to need more time, more equipment and more allies for something that big”, (estimates were at least half a year for the sufficient ground troops to be in place) the battle between Rumsfeld and Powell wasn’t just ideological but of military doctrine Powel favoured overwhelming force, to guarantee victory before any operation, Rumsfeld was the opposite, he saw risk aversion as a problem and had sought to rip it out of
his Pentagon, he fought to raise the risk level had cut costs and troop numbers (Rumsfeld’s war plan slashed the estimated troop numbers for an invasion of Iraq in half, estimating such an operation could begin in 2 to 3 months). Powell’s vision was supported by General Tommy Franks Head of Central Command, who pointed out that the enemy would try to adapt, and may not buckle as Rumsfeld predicted especially against a smaller invasion force. Powell had always referred to Saddam as a kidney stone, uncomfortable, even painful at times but will eventually pass, thus Powell stuck to the containment policy to sufficiently counter Iraq. He would not contradict the President on Desert Badger once the decision had been made, but he strongly pushed to tread lightly and avoid rash decisions, he raised that an invasion would inflame oil markets, heighten tensions in Israel, give strength to anti-U.S. regimes and groups potentially destabilizing U.S. allies
“If an American General is running an Arab country, a Macarthur in Baghdad, how long would that last? How do we define the terms of victory? If we take down Saddam until a new government is in place, you will be the government, a country of 25 million will be looking to you for however long it takes to stabilize the country” Powell referred to this as the pottery barn rule,
‘you break it you buy it'. Powell saved the strongest criticism for the unilateralism involved in Rumsfeld’s plan
“It would be nice to do things that way, except we can’t, Jordan, Turkey the Saudis and Kuwait need to be on board, we need the access, we need allies and a whole lot else”. Powell described a worst-case scenario where Saddam uses chemical or radiological weapons on U.S. forces, and all this would be taking place during next year’s presidential election. Powell’s cautionary tale hit home with the President, he had ordered military action to defend Americans immediately in danger, but his long term strategy would need to be different. Still, he wasn’t satisfied with giving in and allowing Saddam to walk away and continue persecuting his people and plotting against the United States
The Vice-President sat in a manner that translated his eternal displeasure, he knew that bringing other nations aboard would slow everything down, he presented Saddam not as some obstacle to U.S. hegemony or the moralistic reasons but as a direct threat to Americans, Cheney had taken it upon himself to ‘study’ Iraq and believed that agents of/funded by Iraq were plotting to attack the United States
“There is no doubt that Iraq has amassed weapons of mass destruction and is going to use them against us or our allies, Mr President inaction is a far greater risk”. The President nodded along with his deputy
Vice President Dick Cheney
“George what do you have on that?” the President was referring to CIA chief George Tenet, the CIA had stepped up its anti-Saddam activities and had been specifically tasked by the President to find evidence of Saddam’s WMD production as well as any weaknesses to the regime. Such work was slow going, there were few assets inside Iraq, fewer still who could provide reliable intel, and remaining sources were aware of the punishment should they be found conspiring with the United States both for themselves and their families. They would only provide the information with certain guarantees in place, what they had was data, raw unfiltered data, the locations of potential production or storage facilities (a list that the 5th fleet was making its way down as they spoke), rumoured liaisons between Iraq and the weapons black market or terrorist organisations, none of it confirmed, but Tenet knew that the Vice-President was keyed into all of it, his office somehow got it hands-on CIA reports, Cheney had been fixated on this for a while and was convinced that the United States was the target of an Iraqi led plot. Tenet downplayed it.
“Since our last assessment in 2000, we haven’t been able to draw any new conclusions yet but we are confident that Iraq continues to build and expand its infrastructure to produce WMD, we believe that Saddam still has plans for his atomic weapons programme”, it was a dramatic step down from the certainty of Cheney but open enough to leave room for considerable doubt. Cheney growled again.
CIA Director George Tenet
“There is always going to be uncertainty even if there is a one per cent chance we’ll need to respond”, the vice-president showed concern perhaps he took the pieces of data that portrayed Saddam on a wicked death march poised to strike everywhere at once all seriously or perhaps he just disliked pushback in such a setting. Bush absorbed the magnitude of the argument and came to his decision
“I want to know what it is gonna take to get inspectors back, he has to prove the world, and if he can’t – then there’s consequences, that’s our demand if not we keep bombing and we build our coalition, we get everyone on board and I want to see the plans on my desk”.
The White House finally had defined its aims for the ongoing operation in Iraq, both short and long term to end the disarmament crisis, either by forcing Saddam Hussein to readmit and abide by weapons inspections or face a potential invasion by the United States and its allies. All sides agreed that Saddam Hussein was a threat and the best way to keep him in check was the threat of invasion, Powell always insisted that war needed to be on the table and the worst option was to back down. It was a strong decision that left most satisfied, Condoleezza Rice and Andy Card (The WH chief of staff) applauded Powell for his role in putting diplomacy firmly on the table, while the hawks were confident that Saddam was far too deceitful for the diplomatic option to bear any fruit. The President first publicly announced his decision that night, to reporters saying that
“The best way to end this, is for Iraq to engage and cooperate fully with the U.N. resolutions, if not then we may have to take a more dangerous path”. The President spoke with Prime Minister Blair regarding the ongoing operation and the two spoke about the path forward, Blair supported the demand for U.N. compliance aware that Saddam’s refusal to do so might lead to war. For his part, Saddam played into the hawk's expectations again reiterating his vow to never ‘compromise or kneel’ in the face of the airstrikes, he hoped to ride out the strikes just as he had many times before.
(Left) President Bush announces his demand for a return to weapons inspections, (Right) President Bush and UK PM Blair
As the administration got its own affairs in order the American public and the wider world continued to reconcile their own. Despite strong support in the immediate afterglow, several days of mixed messages on the U.S.’s goals with the campaign allowed for some descent to build, from anti-interventionists where a few protests built up. When polled, though an overwhelming majority approved of the military action, two-thirds favoured a diplomatic solution. The 11 congressmen and women who slammed the House’s approval questioned the White House’s reasoning, Independent representative Bernie Sanders from Vermont as he had in 1991 and 1998 said he was
“Very concerned on the military action taken by the President, despite the fact that the constitution makes it very clear this body (congress) declares war”. Republican Ron Paul called the action
“Illegal and unconstitutional, and likely done to distract Americans from the economy, and might lead us into a war and get more servicemen killed”. But further up the ranks, Representative Pelosi said,
“While I am eternally grateful for the sacrifices of our men and women in the armed forces, I implore the administration to seek out every diplomatic option before putting more in harm's way”. Senate Leader Daschle (D) who enjoyed at best a frosty relationship with the White House after prefacing his comments with praise for the military said that
“I severely hope that the President has not made a rush to war here” his critic drew an attack from former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R) (who had himself been embroiled in a racism scandal after praising former senator Strom Thurmond at his 100th birthday) said that Daschle’s comments showed he had
“no interest in protecting Americans” sparking a war of words between Republicans and Democrats. The administration also saw some decent from the news media who doubted the claims of success touted by the Defence Department to dispute the narrative that only military targets were being struck, citing that such targets included breweries and commercial warehouses.
Globally, opposition and protests were much more widespread, in Syria, Jordan, Egypt Palestine and indeed the wider Arab World, protests broke out parred with occasionally violent incidents as well, for instance, Damascus where the U.S. embassy was evacuated for a time, as protesters threatened to storm the building an action that President Assad refused to condemn. President Mubarak of Egypt called for an end to the military action, but most Arab leaders remained quiet on the strikes prompting some protests not just against the U.S. but also their own governments in, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (where descent is heavily restricted) some street action was seen focused against the U.S, in Lebanon anger was projected on the silence of Arab leaders. In the UK significant protests erupted from the Muslim community including a march around parliament.
(left to right) the aftermath of protests in London, anti-US/UK protests in Lebanon, burned cars outside the US Embassy in Damascus
Far away from the beltways, the search for the two aviators continued with minimal results, no trace of attempted communique should the pilots be on the run and no large military manoeuvres that might hint towards moving the captured servicemen from the area they were downed in. The greatest deficiency in the U.S. military was the language barrier, it is easier to train someone to fly an F-14 than to speak Arabic, so trawling through Iraqi cables and radio took time, but then they finally found something pertaining to the pilots, intercepts in the Iraqi military. It revealed the high level of confusion in Iraqi military command after strikes began, as commanders struggled to give out orders as communications were dropped, bases were struck and forces scrambled to adapt. It also provided information regarding the missing soldiers, according to the intercept they were brought to the city of Al-Kut but there was no information on the current condition of the men. The first hint in three days was of some comfort but Kut was still a city of a quarter-million. Nonetheless, the U.S. marines remained prepared at a moment’s notice to raid the city for the men.
Also standing on the sidelines was the Iraqi opposition. The fractured opposition witnessed the bombing campaign with anticipation and expressed much desire to play a role in the conflict with Iraq. They had been provided renewed funding and organization under the direction of the CIA, the leadership had played a considerable role in lobbying legislators and department officials to support the complete toppling of Iraq. They cheered on the select quotes of Ari Fleischer that the United States was prepared to support Iraqi opposition but for now, they wanted to keep up the momentum of the campaign, convince the administration not to let up as it did in the past allowing Saddam to keep control “
Give Iraqis the means to take action” said Sharif al-Hussein a member of the Iraqi National Congress (and a claimant to the defunct Iraqi throne). Opposition groups had played a considerable role in lobbying senior Defence department heads and were keenly aware of options available to the President to truly threaten the regime IFR (Iraqi Freedom Activities) including the providing of arms to Iraqi opposition by deploying American trained Iraqi expatriates and the U.S. expelling Iraqi forces entirely from the southern no-fly zone. However, the CIA had crippling doubts as to the ability of the Iraqi opposition, it numbered less than 500 and was generally undisciplined, but the Pentagon ignored these complaints and went ahead with the programme. More than anything the Iraqi opposition needed an endgame, finally with the President's declaration it seemed one may be on the horizon. With the President's demand for a return to inspections made and Saddam’s knee jerk refusal, it looked as if Iraq was on a path for a showdown.
(Left) Meeting of the Iraqi opposition in London, (Right) CNN headlines ongoing events the 'showdown in Iraq'