He could have handed his fleet over to the US for internment. He decided not to and ignored the ultimatum. Frankly I would have done the same thing as Churchill. it was too big a risk and he was given a face saving alternative.
Worst 10 officers of each WWII power.
- Thread starter Spencersj345.346
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He could have handed his fleet over to the US for internment. He decided not to and ignored the ultimatum. Frankly I would have done the same thing as Churchill. it was too big a risk and he was given a face saving alternative.
I never said that running was dishonourable, I don’t think that it was. It was sensible. Just like the French surrender. Mers-el Kebir was dishonourable though. I’m certain about that. Although, we can agree to disagree.
You can rationalize it if you want. I completely disagree and so did many of the sailors that took part in the attack.
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GB produced better planes than the US in 1940- the Spitfire was better than the P-39 or P-40. Beaverbrook was in charge of production and development. He took credit for improving production. He should be blamed for the failures in development.
McPherson
Banned
The French had a fleet anchorage THEY controlled. They had options. Darlan had options that did not include offenses to his "honor".
1940 was not 1943. The US really cranked up the spending and I can't see how GB could compete.
It is not "rationalizing", a country in an existential war does what it has to do to win. Trusting his bare word was not an option. He was given choices and took none of them.
He also bungled the completion dates of the Richelieu class by not making the workers both in the shipyards and in the related industries immune from being called into the Army. If he hadn't screwed up in all likelihood both Richelieu and Jean Bart would have been done by the time of the Battle of France...which results in an interesting timeline if the ships head to Scapa Flow and not Dakar
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It absolutely is rationalizing. I’m not talking about whether it was necessary or not (although the French did scuttle their Fleet when the Germans tried to take it). I’m talking about the morality of attacking the sailors of a country that had been your ally up until that point. A country that held the Germans off while you’re soldiers retreated to safety. I consider it morally wrong. Just like the attack on Pearl Harbor (arguably moreso seeing as France was Britain’s closest ally and the United States was at best a neutral that was clearly in opposition to Japan).
A big difference is that Japan wasn't in an existential war with China , if it lost Japan would have survived. GB might not have survived the war with Germany, or it certainly appeared so at the time.
Hitler never threatened to destroy Great Britain. In fact, Great Britain was one of his ideal allies if you read Mein Kampf (don’t... it’s a long and boring book full of nonsense). In both cases, these countries would have merely faced a reduction in their power. Arguably, the Japanese would have had it worse in this regard. Hitler supported the British Empire and admired it. The Soviet Union would have certainly faced destruction. Arguably, so would France. He never had any intention of destroying Great Britain though.
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One factor that appears to be missing from most analyses of Montgomery in 1944. 21 Army Group was basically "it". There were essentially no more men in the numbers that people assume there was to be squandered on the battlefield. Montgomery was well aware of this and knew he had to husband his resources carefully. Britain could not afford massive losses of men such as occurred in WWI again. Yes, that made Montgomery cautious in what attacks he mounted and how he mounted them. Market-Garden was a gamble but its losses were not insurmountable when it failed.
His Army Group also suffered morale problems that are not fully understood by most people. When he brought back from the Mediterranean theatre units that had performed well there - 7th Armoured, 51st Highlanders, etc. they were given a short period of leave before taking part in Normandy and NW Europe. This had the reverse effect. It made them "canny" - unwilling to risk themselves in the way they had in the Mediterranean. This was remarked upon at the time and afterwards. They were reluctant to go into battle - with in their view, good cause. Let those that had not been tried take the risks! Montgomery was well aware of that and worked around it.
What most people also ignore is that Montgomery was under constant pressure to "perform" to make his army group win the war, quickly, from London and Washington. He resisted that pressure successfully.
So we have an Army Group that was full of "canny" soldiers. He had to work with that. He had an Army Group that couldn't be replaced. He was under pressure to "perform", to win. He did IMO quite a remarkable job.
Post war, he was not as good as CIGS. Something that Slim remarked upon, after succeeding him. Montgomery saw his role as CIGS as being "difficult" for the Army - Of asking questions and expecting answers. He didn't see himself as a uniting influence. Which was of course wrong of him. Slim was the reverse.
Slim is one who doesn't belong on this list by a long shot IMO. He performed well once he gained command of the Burma Army. He took the fight to the Japanese and usually won. As he relates a conversation he overhead in his HQ late at night between two staff officers, "He'll fight them here and here and here, see what I say!" Said one officer. "Why?" Asked the second. "'Cause they fought him there and defeated him! That's why he'll fight them there again! To show he can face and beat them!" Said the first officer.
His Army Group also suffered morale problems that are not fully understood by most people. When he brought back from the Mediterranean theatre units that had performed well there - 7th Armoured, 51st Highlanders, etc. they were given a short period of leave before taking part in Normandy and NW Europe. This had the reverse effect. It made them "canny" - unwilling to risk themselves in the way they had in the Mediterranean. This was remarked upon at the time and afterwards. They were reluctant to go into battle - with in their view, good cause. Let those that had not been tried take the risks! Montgomery was well aware of that and worked around it.
What most people also ignore is that Montgomery was under constant pressure to "perform" to make his army group win the war, quickly, from London and Washington. He resisted that pressure successfully.
So we have an Army Group that was full of "canny" soldiers. He had to work with that. He had an Army Group that couldn't be replaced. He was under pressure to "perform", to win. He did IMO quite a remarkable job.
Post war, he was not as good as CIGS. Something that Slim remarked upon, after succeeding him. Montgomery saw his role as CIGS as being "difficult" for the Army - Of asking questions and expecting answers. He didn't see himself as a uniting influence. Which was of course wrong of him. Slim was the reverse.
Slim is one who doesn't belong on this list by a long shot IMO. He performed well once he gained command of the Burma Army. He took the fight to the Japanese and usually won. As he relates a conversation he overhead in his HQ late at night between two staff officers, "He'll fight them here and here and here, see what I say!" Said one officer. "Why?" Asked the second. "'Cause they fought him there and defeated him! That's why he'll fight them there again! To show he can face and beat them!" Said the first officer.
McPherson
Banned
I don't think the situation can be ignored. The land war emergency was overriding. Now the way the shipbuilding program pre-war was mismanaged?
9 February 1934 | 1 June 1936 | |
1 June 1936 | 22 June 1937 | |
22 June 1937 | 18 January 1938 | |
18 January 1938 | 13 March 1938 | |
13 March 1938 | 16 June 1940 |
(from Wiki)
Might want to look at those guys.
Some of THEM would make my French list.
McP.
Fair enough I suppose, still I wonder what the effects of the French starting the first 2 Richeleus a year earlier than otl due to them reacting faster to the first 2 Littorios and said completed ships(and ideally every ship in the French Navy that could sail) staying in the war would be.
McPherson
Banned
It would make Denmark Strait... "interesting".
I suggest this book,
Butler, J. R. M. (1971) [1957]. Grand Strategy: September 1939 – June 1941. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. II (2nd ed.). HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630095-9. (pp 217-218.)
, to those who are upset about Mers el Kebir. the French ADM Marcel-Bruno Gensoul was actually given "option orders" to steam to the United States and turn over his ships to the Americans for internment. Admiral Darlan gave him those orders. (See citation above.)
The "irony" is that we now know ADM Darlan gave Gensoul that option he could use independently in case a Mers el Kebir ever came up. The hello of it, was that the British gave Gensoul the same option (Somerville) and the confusion in the tragedy was that when Gensoul radioed Darlan for final instructions; he, Gensoul, omitted to mention that option in his communique. So, when Darlan failed to issue clear instructions in time, Gensoul, still could have sailed forth to the French Martinique anchorage or to Norfolk.
Gensoul chose poorly.
Thanks for reconmending the book to me I will have to see if my county public library system/state university library system carries it.
Also how on Earth wasn't Gensoul court marshalled and shot for both disregarding his orders and deliberately misinforming his superiors? One can wonder how 1942 would have shaped out if the Dunkerques and the ships of the MN that weren't in France or British territory(including Richelieu and a fair few cruisers and destroyers) when Operation Catapult kicked off were in Norfolk,Boston,Philadelphia, and New York(and presumably given decent levels of maintenance after they arrived with Richelieu being finished as a gesture of goodwill(and good strategic sense)) when the US entered WWII
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McPherson
Banned
1. No-one knows Gensoul's thoughts on the subject. He refused to comment about Mers el Kebir.
2. Somerville, it can be argued, made a mistake by sending CAPT Cedric Holland as his actual messenger. There is nothing I have seen that suggests that Somerville understood the French at all, or recognized the significant "disrespect" that sending a subordinate to communicate a "demarche" to a senior French flag officer would have.
3. If this reads like I dump on anybody (especially Somerville) it is not. Situations like Mers el Kebir are "difficult" and it is almost impossible to get "protocols" correct.
4. Nevertheless, a combination of vacillation and BAD advice, when handling negotiations like this one inevitably leads to tragedy.
5. Lessons learned are:
a. Show respect.
b. Be firm.
c. Make clear (secretly) the preferred option is the one that allows some "grace" to the other side and allows them the "illusion" of choosing a course of action that gives them "independence" of action.
Words matter.
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marathag
Banned
He should have been sacking people alot sooner than OTL, like at 7th Armoured- a unit that may have done better as replacements.
11th Armoured also took a beating outside of Caen, but did much better than the 7th with later combat across France
I'm still blaming Noguès for not turning the Armée d'Afrique to the Free French in the wake of the armistice.
Case in point. You're criticising him because you think his victories weren't big enough, while at the same time trying to diminish his accomplishments by saying anyone could have won his battles - that they were "foregone conclusions".
I dont argue that Monty was one of the great general of history, nor that opportunities weren't missed under his command, I only argue that he was a consistantly successful general that has recieved a lot of unfair criticism more because of his personality than his record.
Do note that the British ultimatum also demanded that the ships would be demilitarized if they would move to Martinique.
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