He as in Pound or Churchill? I think sending force Z was really decided by the cabinet.
Why clueless? Pre Fall of FIC it works fine and post its to late to do anything about it due to more pressing priorities....?
By the time 1941 rolls around, it should have been evident to the British imperial general staff:
a. Churchill should be kept away from operational matters.
b. The Royal Navy had a 1940 staff study that showed that if the Japanese got as far as Hong Kong and the Hainan Island that for the British to cover and defend Singapore they had to project power clear into the South China Sea and win there. Now since both of those two professional nincompoops, Pound and Phillips, KNEW the results of that study since it was a devastating critique of their imbecile Singapore Bastion Defense Plan, I would kind of think they would and should be blamed when the brown goo hit the rotating screw when they tried to implement a plan they knew was doomed to fail. How do WE know this?
c. They (As in Churchill, the Foreign Office and the IGS) tried to con the Americans to move PACFLT to Singapore... The USN told them to go to hello in no uncertain terms because American admirals were just as smart as the British staff officers who panned the Singapore Bastion Defense, though the Americans did not know the exact details of the con the British tried to run on them
d. They, Pound and Phillips, (Might as well make it the entire Royal Navy) did not tell Churchill about b.
Boyd, Andrew; "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters; Lynchpin of Victory" Seaforth Publishing (London 2017) pp 55-100, planning and rebuttals, 175-210 (The American con-job.) 225-310 (The actual disaster described.)
Honestly Pound should have found a solution to keep force Z in reserve....which given the age of Repulse(who unlike her sister hadn't been rebuilt)shouldn't have been that hard just make her have serious condenser issues for a week or two
Agreed. No flattop, keep Force Z back as a counterforce to deter IJN power projection into the Indian Ocean. By 1935, the competent admirals in the RN considered Singapore and Malaya an outpost write off to be retaken in a counterstroke once the IJN/IJA overextended.
The problem with that is that removed the perceived deterrent effect and therefore the entire point of sending force Z.....
The point of keeping Force Z back is to put it out of IJN reach and to keep it as a fleet in being until the counterforce move is possible. This is what eventually happens only it is
the Americans who execute it after they screw up and put their own fleet within IJN tactical sortie radius reach at Pearl Harbor. This was the episode that taught Roosevelt to keep his hands off most of the operational execution of his political policies.
I think with hindsight you should send it to Singapore and then quickly on to a good will tour of DEI and Australia to show them you are defending them, by 8th they would be far away south heading to Perth and safety. That or send then to join US pacific fleet and hope they are out with the fast carriers come PH time?
Sink-ex Java Sea. Even bigger ABDA disaster.
Of course Repulse would need a serious upgrade to its AA suite which would take awhile given the need to swap out its single purpose 4" guns for dual purpose ones(and you might as well refit her while your at it), so she's probably ready by Midway when you factor in transit time with POW doing excellent work during Coral Sea and the carrier raids indeed its presence probably saves Lexington although it won't save the almost as valuable Neosho unless some big butterflies flap their wings. Alternatively the ships join Sommervile's Far Eastern Fleet
PoW is the South Dakota of the RN. Don't want her at all.
