ITTL, however, the main impetus for this policy no longer exists. Silesia has been regained and Prussia has been trimmed (albeit not destroyed), demonstrating Austria's dominance in Germany for all to see. With or without Bavaria, Austria is the top dog. While acquiring Bavaria might be nice - more land is always good, and it would make the borders prettier - it is no longer driven by an urgent need to make up for the loss of Silesia and regain German hegemony. Without that urgency the Austrians may not press the issue very hard, if they pursue it at all.

Hmm, I wonder if there will be a version of the United States of Belgium revolt ITTL, and how that'll go if there is.
 
This may be a controversial opinion, but I'm not so sure. My understanding is that Austria's policy - really Kauntiz's policy - of consolidating and growing Austria's lands within the Empire was a reaction to Prussian strength. Prussia had grown to be a serious threat to Austria, even a peer competitor. If Prussia could not be cut down to size by direct military means - as the SYW demonstrated - then the only other way for Austria to regain her dominance within the Empire was to expand at the expense of other princes, thus compensating for Silesia's loss and consolidating Austria's "German core." As a large, wealthy, German-speaking state adjacent to the main Austrian territories, Bavaria was the obvious target - and it helped that after 1777, Bavaria had a ruler who was interested in a trade.

ITTL, however, the main impetus for this policy no longer exists. Silesia has been regained and Prussia has been trimmed (albeit not destroyed), demonstrating Austria's dominance in Germany for all to see. With or without Bavaria, Austria is the top dog. While acquiring Bavaria might be nice - more land is always good, and it would make the borders prettier - it is no longer driven by an urgent need to make up for the loss of Silesia and regain German hegemony. Without that urgency the Austrians may not press the issue very hard, if they pursue it at all.
Additionally, the value calculation behind the swap proposal has been challenged. Trading the low countries for Bavaria, an adjacent German state which may side with Prussia in a future conflict, is not the same as trading the low countries for Bavaria, an adjacent German state which is pretty much under Austria's thumb. There's a lot less gain, and absolutely no threat elimination, in the later proposal.
 
On the flipside, you get the impression that Vienna was willing to part with the Austrian Netherlands at every opportunity for any situation that might gain them an advantage (see: Netherlands to France for Silesia, to Wittelsbach for Bavaria, etc). Being allied to France certainly reduces the desire to get rid of them - there’s not as much danger of them being indefensible - but it still may be desirable to swap them for something closer to home. I also have to imagine that the experience of the Austrian Succession was a little illustrative of how dangerous an enemy in Bavaria could be, even though the risk of Prussian-led princes war against Vienna has been functionally removed.
 
Additionally, the value calculation behind the swap proposal has been challenged. Trading the low countries for Bavaria, an adjacent German state which may side with Prussia in a future conflict, is not the same as trading the low countries for Bavaria, an adjacent German state which is pretty much under Austria's thumb. There's a lot less gain, and absolutely no threat elimination, in the later proposal.

Bavaria has been an enemy of Austria rather often, generally whenever France is hostile to Austria at the least. Bavaria is not only a potential hostile, but a staging ground to whatever other hostile wishes to meddle in the affairs of the HRE.
 
I know this is a Corsican timeline first and foremost, but it would be interesting if a different German state than Prussia may rise-up through the various wars and become the new rival of Austria. Or at this point is the middle of the 18 century too late for such a thing?
 
I think that it would be interesting to make Joseph II of Austria having a surviving son ITTL that continues the political reforms of his father.
 
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I know this is a Corsican timeline first and foremost, but it would be interesting if a different German state than Prussia may rise-up through the various wars and become the new rival of Austria. Or at this point is the middle of the 18 century too late for such a thing?
Prussia's gone to Poland, all that's left is Brandenburg. Without the OTL events, anything could happen, German unification will still be a movement that appears but could lead to two Germany's, North under ( silly extreme ) British influence/control ( via Hanover ) and the South under Austrian influence / control
 
That would lead to serious Anglo-Austrian conflict, which would be a ripe time for France getting all revanchist with Corsica while her most major rivals are focused on one another. Unless there's a breakdown in Franco-Spanish relations and a major resurgence of Spanish power.
 
But by the same token, if Augustus could acquire Ducal Prussia as a personal title, rather than merely an addition to the crown of Poland, might not claim on that basis to be hereditary King in Prussia, finally gaining the inalienable crown he failed to acquire in the WAS?
This did not occur to me. So it seems like the deal is even more advantageous and important to Augustus.
While would probably have to give out some Ducal Prussian land to PLC magnates in order to appease them*, he would still most likely retain more than a half of Ducal Prussia as a personal fief (thus giving him a rather rich an populous German-speaking holdings inside PLC and of course the ability to claim an hereditary crown).

* The most likely candidates to receive land in Ducal Prussia are the powerful nobles that have holdings on the territory reverting to Russia. The most important ones are Sapiehas that had an extensive estates in Polotsk and Vitebsk voivodeships and on Dnieper around Bykhov. In particular Alexander Michal Sapieha is the head of the Sapieha branch that holds most Sapieha holding en Eastern Belarus and thus the one most probably getting some significant land in Prussia.

although I'll have to think about where exactly the new Russian border will fall. (Not that it's super relevant to the main plot of the TL, but I suppose it would be helpful for a map...)
Yes, getting “provinces adjacent to Smolensk and Pskov regions" and "to connect Baltic and Black Sea trades" is extremely vague. For all we know it can mean the whole Ukraine and Belarus)

In analysis from my previous post I have interpreted these adjacent provinces literally, found the peculiar overlap with Russian Part of First Partition and tried to evaluate if such demands are reasonable or too outrageous.
You however showed that the value of Ducal Prussia for Augustus III is even greater than the one I have used in my analysis. He wants a hereditary crown badly and probably does not care much about poor provinces in the east of PLC (he doesn’t get much from them anyway). Thus my analysis could have potentially underestimated Russian potential gains (as Ducal Prussia is underevaluated).

IMHO Augustus will have a motivation to accept any Russian proposal that does not touch rich and populous provinces of Volhynia-Podolia (Braclav, Podolian and Volhiynian voivodeships, see this map for reference) and that does not result in a too large noble dissent (thus lands where there are extensive magnate holdings are definitely to stay in PLC). Most magnate holdings are in Volhynia-Podolia and central and western GDL (Brest-Litovsk, Nowogródek and Wilno voivodeships).
Here are maps of magnates’ holdings in early XVII century. I was not able to find more contemporary ones, but the general trend was the same.

Thus if Russia is persuasive enough Russia could additionally gain Minsk (probably without western tip on the right bank of Ptich river that is almost completely a Radziwill estate) and Kiev voivodeships. These voivodeships had respectively 300k and 400k population in 1790, so we can approximate Russian gains here as 550k totally in 1760 (considering that right bank of Ptich remains PLC’s). Russia would also like to annex small north-estern tip of Wilno voivodeships around Braslav on the left bank of Daugava (around 50k population) thus securing the whole Daugava.
These two provinces again are not rich, despite being large are severely underpopulated and (as especially is the case with Kiev voivodeship) are unruly and heavily lean to Russia (Kiev voivodeship IOTL had a great unti-Polish rebellion Koliyivshchyna in 1768; it is also heavily dominated both culturally and economically by Kiev that is in Russian hands since mid XVII century).

If Russia recieves this combined with the territories described in my previous post, it controls both banks of both Dnieper and Daugava from sources to their mouths (in case of Dniepr up to Russian controlled Zaporozhye to the immediate south of Kiev voivodeship).
PLC looses here but not overly much. Russia takes the least developed provinces of PLC that are devoutly orthodox (Mogilev in Minsk voivodeship is the center of only official orthodox diocese in PLC, there were numerous orthodox rebellions in these provinces) and also the territories where the Russia has an enormous amount of influence.
Essentially these territories remained fringe ones despite being a part of PLC for hundreds of years.

Territories further west are despite being Orthodox and East Slavic are much more integrated into the PLC and definitely are part of PLC-proper. Additionally while Russia would have a lot of supporters when trying to annex eastern voivodeships people of these core territories (Braclav, Podolian, Volhiynian, Brest-Litovsk, Nowogródek and Wilno voivodeships) are much, much less enthusiastic to become a part of Russia. Russia was trying to annex eastern voivodeships time after time for centuries and there is almost no doubt Russia would try this again. If Russia hoever receives eastern voivodeships and just them Russian influence in PLC may be reduced and the border between countries may actually stabilize for a rather long time (if PLC successfully implements the reforms and modernizes that is)

This scenario is in my opinion best-case scenario for Russia that is still plausible. In total Russia gets around 1.9 million people in eastern voivodeships and 250k in Courland.
The worth case scenario for Russia that is plausible is IMHO getting what I have described in my previous post.

In my opinion both cases are possible (as well as some compromises between them; for example Russia receives Braslavl area, from there the border follows Berezina River, then goes to Mozyr from the point where Berezina bends to the east and from there follows the Kiev voivodeship border). The bigger one would probably be the first Russian honest attempt at negotiations. Whether Augustus would accept it or force Russia to back down a bit can go either way.

Here I have butchered a PLC map (sorry for my lack of drawing skills) to illustrate the two main variants (green is the border in both variants, blue is the border in “best case scenario” for Russia, red – in “worse case”).
PLC_King_Theodore.jpg

Assuming East Prussia is ceded to Poland before Paul's accession, that does leave open the question of whether Paul will actually be able to gain the use of Königsberg (or a Prussian port) to launch his planned Danish campaign, or whether that will have to be conducted from Livonia. I'm not sure whether the latter would be merely an inconvenience or whether it would seriously impair the campaign, perhaps leading to a negotiated solution rather than actual war.
I don't see why Russia would be denied usage of PLC territory: since Peter the Great in all European wars Russian troops used PLC territory without much sentiment.
I do however doubt that Russia would organize a naval assault for which Konigsberg is most usefull.
After all Peter wants to take Sleswig-Holstein not Copenhagen.Given Peter's prussophilia it is likely that he will make an alliance with Brandenburg(and potentially reward Brandenburg with Swedish Pomerania) or at least a military access through Brandenburg. If Peter manages to do the same with Mecklenburg-Schwerin Russian troops would be able to reach Holsein by land.
 
That would lead to serious Anglo-Austrian conflict, which would be a ripe time for France getting all revanchist with Corsica while her most major rivals are focused on one another. Unless there's a breakdown in Franco-Spanish relations and a major resurgence of Spanish power.

France cannot be revanchist because it never owned Corsica, there's no reason why she'd want to annex a random Italian island
 
You however showed that the value of Ducal Prussia for Augustus III is even greater than the one I have used in my analysis. He wants a hereditary crown badly and probably does not care much about poor provinces in the east of PLC (he doesn’t get much from them anyway). Thus my analysis could have potentially underestimated Russian potential gains (as Ducal Prussia is underevaluated).

It's probably an exaggeration to say that Augustus "wants a hereditary crown badly." The reward he actually wanted for joining the French coalition in the WAS was a land corridor between Saxony and Poland, but he was unable to get this through negotiation with Prussia or Bavaria. Augustus then authorized Marshal Belle-Isle, the French envoy, to draw up terms on his behalf, probably hoping that Belle-Isle would succeed in getting the Polish corridor where Augustus had failed. But Belle-Isle knew he couldn't get Frederick to give up any part of Silesia, so he wrote the "Moravian plan" into the Nymphenburg terms as a consolation prize for Saxony - instead of a corridor to Poland, Augustus would get Moravia, the newly-created hereditary crown of Moravia, and a toll-free road through Bohemia to connect Saxony and Moravia.

Clearly the prospect of a hereditary crown was worth something to Augustus, otherwise Belle-Isle would not have offered it as an inducement to join the coalition. But it was not Augustus's first choice, and not a goal that he assiduously pursued during his reign (although to be fair, Augustus didn't really assiduously pursue anything during his reign; he was a hesitant, vacillating, and rather disinterested ruler). So while its potential royal crown may indeed make the value of East Prussia higher than you first thought, the crown itself was not something that Augustus was acutely desperate for.

Thank you very much for the maps, that will be very helpful to me!
 
Since it came up, I’ve begun to wonder whether a “Polish corridor” for the Wettins is a plausible outcome of TTL. I gave Saxony a few meager pieces in the Treaty of Prague - Cottbus and Halle - but it wouldn’t take much more land to give Saxony an overland link (around Crossen) between Poland and the electorate. I’ve never actually read anything to suggest that this was a Saxon priority in the SYW - discussions of Saxony’s winnings in the event of a coalition victory usually center around Cottbus and Magdeburg - but acquiring a Polish corridor was definitely a priority of Augustus and his ministers in the WAS just a decade earlier.

I don’t really know how much difference this would make to the future of Poland. A “Crossen corridor” gives the Wettins a contiguous state, but I’m not sure that non-contiguity was really one of Poland’s major problems at this point...
 
I think that removal of the Prussian threat, receiving a royal crown that is inherited and not subject to the whims of the Sejm, and a largely placated Russia is going to go a long way towards solving Poland's problems and giving them breathing space to reform into a more workable system.
 
wouldn't such a corridor have to go through Silesia?

Not necessarily. See this map, which shows the lands of the Bohemian crown before the WAS. A corridor from Krossen to Züllichau, in the space between Silesia proper and the Silesian exclave of Schwiebus, would be entirely on former Prussian land.
 
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Not necessarily. See this map, which shows the lands of the Bohemian crown before the WAS. A corridor from Krossen to Züllichau, in the space between Silesia proper and the Silesian exclave of Schwiebus, would be entirely on former Prussian land.
If they can get a strip of land between Saxony and Poland at the expense of Brandeburg better, but @Herucalmo was clearly talking about the Kingdom of Prussia not the Electorate of Brandeburg (as Saxon royal powerbase is clearly the newly acquired Prussia who share a border with Poland and not the electorate)
 
Here's a prospective map with a few revisions. Poland has given up Courland and some eastern territories (similar to First Partition lines), Saxony has gained Cottbus and the Crossen corridor (but not Halle), Prussia keeps Gelders.



Thoughts?
 
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