But by the same token, if Augustus could acquire Ducal Prussia as a personal title, rather than merely an addition to the crown of Poland, might not claim on that basis to be hereditary King in Prussia, finally gaining the inalienable crown he failed to acquire in the WAS?
This did not occur to me. So it seems like the deal is even more advantageous and important to Augustus.
While would probably have to give out some Ducal Prussian land to PLC magnates in order to appease them*, he would still most likely retain more than a half of Ducal Prussia as a personal fief (thus giving him a rather rich an populous German-speaking holdings inside PLC and of course the ability to claim an hereditary crown).
* The most likely candidates to receive land in Ducal Prussia are the powerful nobles that have holdings on the territory reverting to Russia. The most important ones are Sapiehas that had an extensive estates in Polotsk and Vitebsk voivodeships and on Dnieper around Bykhov. In particular Alexander Michal Sapieha is the head of the Sapieha branch that holds most Sapieha holding en Eastern Belarus and thus the one most probably getting some significant land in Prussia.
although I'll have to think about where exactly the new Russian border will fall. (Not that it's super relevant to the main plot of the TL, but I suppose it would be helpful for a map...)
Yes, getting “provinces adjacent to Smolensk and Pskov regions" and "to connect Baltic and Black Sea trades" is extremely vague. For all we know it can mean the whole Ukraine and Belarus)
In analysis from my previous post I have interpreted these adjacent provinces literally, found the peculiar overlap with Russian Part of First Partition and tried to evaluate if such demands are reasonable or too outrageous.
You however showed that the value of Ducal Prussia for Augustus III is even greater than the one I have used in my analysis. He wants a hereditary crown badly and probably does not care much about poor provinces in the east of PLC (he doesn’t get much from them anyway). Thus my analysis could have potentially underestimated Russian potential gains (as Ducal Prussia is underevaluated).
IMHO Augustus will have a motivation to accept any Russian proposal that does not touch rich and populous provinces of Volhynia-Podolia (Braclav, Podolian and Volhiynian voivodeships, see
this map for reference) and that does not result in a too large noble dissent (thus lands where there are extensive magnate holdings are definitely to stay in PLC). Most magnate holdings are in Volhynia-Podolia and central and western GDL (Brest-Litovsk, Nowogródek and Wilno voivodeships).
Here are
maps of magnates’ holdings in early XVII century. I was not able to find more contemporary ones, but the general trend was the same.
Thus if Russia is persuasive enough Russia could additionally gain Minsk (probably without western tip on the right bank of Ptich river that is almost completely a Radziwill estate) and Kiev voivodeships. These voivodeships had respectively 300k and 400k population in 1790, so we can approximate Russian gains here as 550k totally in 1760 (considering that right bank of Ptich remains PLC’s). Russia would also like to annex small north-estern tip of Wilno voivodeships around Braslav on the left bank of Daugava (around 50k population) thus securing the whole Daugava.
These two provinces again are not rich, despite being large are severely underpopulated and (as especially is the case with Kiev voivodeship) are unruly and heavily lean to Russia (Kiev voivodeship IOTL had a great unti-Polish rebellion Koliyivshchyna in 1768; it is also heavily dominated both culturally and economically by Kiev that is in Russian hands since mid XVII century).
If Russia recieves this combined with the territories described in my previous post, it controls both banks of both Dnieper and Daugava from sources to their mouths (in case of Dniepr up to Russian controlled Zaporozhye to the immediate south of Kiev voivodeship).
PLC looses here but not overly much. Russia takes the least developed provinces of PLC that are devoutly orthodox (Mogilev in Minsk voivodeship is the center of only official orthodox diocese in PLC, there were numerous orthodox rebellions in these provinces) and also the territories where the Russia has an enormous amount of influence.
Essentially these territories remained fringe ones despite being a part of PLC for hundreds of years.
Territories further west are despite being Orthodox and East Slavic are much more integrated into the PLC and definitely are part of PLC-proper. Additionally while Russia would have a lot of supporters when trying to annex eastern voivodeships people of these core territories (Braclav, Podolian, Volhiynian, Brest-Litovsk, Nowogródek and Wilno voivodeships) are much, much less enthusiastic to become a part of Russia. Russia was trying to annex eastern voivodeships time after time for centuries and there is almost no doubt Russia would try this again. If Russia hoever receives eastern voivodeships and just them Russian influence in PLC may be reduced and the border between countries may actually stabilize for a rather long time (if PLC successfully implements the reforms and modernizes that is)
This scenario is in my opinion best-case scenario for Russia that is still plausible. In total Russia gets around 1.9 million people in eastern voivodeships and 250k in Courland.
The worth case scenario for Russia that is plausible is IMHO getting what I have described in my previous post.
In my opinion both cases are possible (as well as some compromises between them; for example Russia receives Braslavl area, from there the border follows Berezina River, then goes to Mozyr from the point where Berezina bends to the east and from there follows the Kiev voivodeship border). The bigger one would probably be the first Russian honest attempt at negotiations. Whether Augustus would accept it or force Russia to back down a bit can go either way.
Here I have butchered a PLC map (sorry for my lack of drawing skills) to illustrate the two main variants (green is the border in both variants, blue is the border in “best case scenario” for Russia, red – in “worse case”).
Assuming East Prussia is ceded to Poland before Paul's accession, that does leave open the question of whether Paul will actually be able to gain the use of Königsberg (or a Prussian port) to launch his planned Danish campaign, or whether that will have to be conducted from Livonia. I'm not sure whether the latter would be merely an inconvenience or whether it would seriously impair the campaign, perhaps leading to a negotiated solution rather than actual war.
I don't see why Russia would be denied usage of PLC territory: since Peter the Great in all European wars Russian troops used PLC territory without much sentiment.
I do however doubt that Russia would organize a naval assault for which Konigsberg is most usefull.
After all Peter wants to take Sleswig-Holstein not Copenhagen.Given Peter's prussophilia it is likely that he will make an alliance with Brandenburg(and potentially reward Brandenburg with Swedish Pomerania) or at least a military access through Brandenburg. If Peter manages to do the same with Mecklenburg-Schwerin Russian troops would be able to reach Holsein by land.