What if Stalin decided to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Wehrmacht in 1941?

First, I would like to avoid talking about Rezun/Suvurov’s Ice breaker theory, there are plenty of threads about it, but instead on the attack itself. I don’t really want to talk about how realistic this operation is, yes, we all know that the red army is absolutely ill prepared for such an operation until 1942-1943, but hey this is the Vozhd order!

Let’s say that on February the 1st, Stalin is certain about Hitler’s intentions and that the Red Army is to launch a massive attack to disorganize the German’s not fully prepared force as soon as the weather allow it (afaik in early June). Let’s say that the main axis of attack are from the advanced salient of Lwow and Bialystok with a supporting attack on Eastern Prussia, while the red army maintains a defensive stance in Bessarabia.

So without a doubt, the red army would suffer a crushing defeat, but on what scale and how much worse (or better!) would the situation be compared to the actual Barbarossa of 1941?
 
Here are my 2 cents: the situation is somewhat comparable to the battle of Kharkov of 1942, with the red army unsuccessfully trying to launch a surprise pre-emptive attack (as there is no way that the german miss such a large attack) having a clear superiority in tank and artillery, but int his case probably not that much in term of men (the red army is likely to be smaller as the preparation of this operation are going to hamper the training of new recruits). Imo The Red Army is likely to progress at best of a few dozen kms before the front commanders lose control of their armies which will also happen to lose coordination with the neighbour units, the unit will also suffer from poor logistic. While the VVS would avoid the massive destruction of the first few days, being taken by surprise, it still is going to suffer from a crushing defeat after a few days, after that the Luftwaffe is likely to stop the progress of the red army advance and disrupt the communication. At this point the scale of the defeat is going to depend on how fast the Stavka&Stalin realize they have lost the battle and should retreat ASAP. Not having suffering from the massive encirclement of 1941 is likely to affect their judgement, in Kharkov one third of the units were lost mostly taken as pow, I am not sure about how much they would have lost but something like 50~60% of unit lost wouldn’t be surprising.

After that I am not really sure, the Wehrmacht is not going to counter-attack asap, having to recover from the previous battle. Assuming that the previous battle lasted for 2 weeks, a vast offensive starting from mid-July seems likely and would face little to no resistance.
 
It's a rather simplistic opinion, but I didn't realize until recently just how different the war aims and standards for victory are in this scenario. IOTL, with the Germans on the offensive, the Red Army got pushed back very far east, and they won the war. They could've been pushed much further east than they were, and lost Leningrad and Moscow, and still won the war. For a Soviet offensive, things would be entirely different. They would lose their ability to remain at war through failure after failure long enough to start getting success after success. I think the result would be a little like the Polish campaign in reverse -- at least, I don't think the Soviets would get west of the 1939 borders. They might take Königsberg -- but some atrocities in East Prussia, authorized or not, will just become part of Goebbels' 1941 Total War speech. By the time the Germans get the line Leningrad-Kiev-Odessa, the conclusion of the war falls into the hands of Hitler and Stalin. Hitler, in terms of what terms he's actually willing to settle for, and Stalin, in terms of what power he still has, if he has a heartbeat. Again, that's simplistic, and more political than military. But -- Barbarossa failed because the Heer never reached the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, and the Soviet offensive might have to reach Bonn-Bochum-Bavaria (the Rhine, the Ruhr, and something in the south of Germany that starts with B). Both operations are dangerously overambitious, and both favor the defender.
 
Given the logistical shambles the Red Army was in, any attempt at actually attacking is basically impossible.
 
Don’t forget that by changing the location and time of various Russian defeats you are also potentially changing the officers in charge and thus who may end up being purged by Stalin. Not being an expert on Russian Generals is it possible that these changes could result in one ore more of the better Generals (and other officers) being replaced and one or more of the less competent generals staying on or getting promoted?
Kind of like the many pre 1900 timelines about no RE Lee or US Grant?
 
This would make for a great TL. The obvious POD is Stalin is convinced that Hitler was going to attack for sure.

But part of the reason Stalin refused to be convinced is that he didn't have very good options, the USSR was just not ready for war. So the timeline would need to explore why, of the bad options available to him, Stalin chose the bad option of attacking.
 
This would make for a great TL. The obvious POD is Stalin is convinced that Hitler was going to attack for sure.

But part of the reason Stalin refused to be convinced is that he didn't have very good options, the USSR was just not ready for war. So the timeline would need to explore why, of the bad options available to him, Stalin chose the bad option of attacking.

Well, if he is sure that Hitler is going to attack, he has an option preached by the Soviet military doctrine of the 1930’s: defense based upon the fortified regions and counterattack when the enemy is exhausted. The main problem (besides general ineptitude, which was not fully appreciated) was that with a border moved, disarmament of the old fortifications started before the new ones had been built. Of course, the theory also did not anticipate the pincer offensives (being based upon WWI experiences) which would turn these fortifications into the massive traps.
 
My take on such a move has always been this

Firstly Stalin did not have the brass for it - but......had he suffered a 7.62 x 25mm Aneurysm and someone else takes over who does....

A force that is attacking retains a great deal of advantage in that it has the initiative, knows it is attacking where it is attacking and when (even when the enemy knows it is coming)

Only when the enemy 'catches up' does this advantage fade

In the case of the Red Army in June 1941 units were in effective peacetime deployment ie sub units might have 100 kms apart or more - logistics poor though it was was not 'even' with supplies, spares and ammo not having been issued to units and still in stores

The 2nd line and reserves was not even stood up OTL here it would be and logi limited though it might have been would have issued supplies, spares and ammo

Now I am certain that such an operation would lead to disaster - but that disaster would be further West than OTL - the Germans would initially suffer greater losses than they initially suffered OTL

Operations in the Balkans and Greece would likely not happen as everything would shift to the Front lines as German Intel started warning of the attack

It would all put Germany on the back foot for much of the Summer and possibly Autumn of 1941 and I think that it would act like a massive spoiling attack until the Russian attack runs out of steam and is defeated.

Barbarossa as we know it would be far more limited in that its impact would be not as great due to a much later effective start and the Red army 'despite any losses' being more ready for war.

All things considered had it gone ahead as a properly planned operation then the results while we would view them as terrible from TTLs historical POV would be better than the OTL results of Stalin sticking his fingers in his ears and yelling 'LALALALALALALALALAAA I see no Germans'
 
Well, if he is sure that Hitler is going to attack, he has an option preached by the Soviet military doctrine of the 1930’s: defense based upon the fortified regions and counterattack when the enemy is exhausted. The main problem (besides general ineptitude, which was not fully appreciated) was that with a border moved, disarmament of the old fortifications started before the new ones had been built. Of course, the theory also did not anticipate the pincer offensives (being based upon WWI experiences) which would turn these fortifications into the massive traps.

Exactly, the TL would need to address why Stalin didn't choose to defend.
 
My take on such a move has always been this

Firstly Stalin did not have the brass for it - but......had he suffered a 7.62 x 25mm Aneurysm and someone else takes over who does....

A force that is attacking retains a great deal of advantage in that it has the initiative, knows it is attacking where it is attacking and when (even when the enemy knows it is coming)

Only when the enemy 'catches up' does this advantage fade

In the case of the Red Army in June 1941 units were in effective peacetime deployment ie sub units might have 100 kms apart or more - logistics poor though it was was not 'even' with supplies, spares and ammo not having been issued to units and still in stores

The 2nd line and reserves was not even stood up OTL here it would be and logi limited though it might have been would have issued supplies, spares and ammo

Now I am certain that such an operation would lead to disaster - but that disaster would be further West than OTL - the Germans would initially suffer greater losses than they initially suffered OTL

Operations in the Balkans and Greece would likely not happen as everything would shift to the Front lines as German Intel started warning of the attack

It would all put Germany on the back foot for much of the Summer and possibly Autumn of 1941 and I think that it would act like a massive spoiling attack until the Russian attack runs out of steam and is defeated.

Barbarossa as we know it would be far more limited in that its impact would be not as great due to a much later effective start and the Red army 'despite any losses' being more ready for war.

All things considered had it gone ahead as a properly planned operation then the results while we would view them as terrible from TTLs historical POV would be better than the OTL results of Stalin sticking his fingers in his ears and yelling 'LALALALALALALALALAAA I see no Germans'

thats...highly optimistic. we know from the northern (baltic) commands who basically ignored their orders and went full on war-readyness well before the germans hit them that it did absolutly zero difference,the germans cut through them just as easily. yes,the disaster will be further west but its also going to vastly worse,the messy red army will get annihilated in great counter-attacks and pretty much be wiped out completly yet in poland instead of falling back east at least in part. This will really be one of the few moves the soviets can do which could actually make them lose the war.
 
It’s the spoiling attack to top all spoiling attacks. The Sorcerer Supreme (whomever it is) after having viewed all TL concludes that this was the best possible outcome. ITTL everyone “knows” the Soviet’s messed up. They should have defended in depth.
It has many many ramifications.
* Unlike most spoiling attacks it carried strategic rather than just tactical surprise. The Germans have been thrown back deep into Poland, almost to the Vistula, the sheer momentum of the Soviet attack and the flag open terrain almost demands it. The East Prussia attacks are stopped, but ones agains you are looking at the Germans being over a 150-200 miles behind where they were on June 22 1941 OTL.

* Which means Barbarossa is cancelled. By the time the Germans have pushed the Soviet’s back, you are looking at September or October at the earliest before they can think of large scale offensives. And lots of the troops which OTL fought in Barbarossa have here spent several weeks and months dealing with the attack and it’s aftermath. They need rest and refit.
Any attack which comes is not going to be the 3 Army Groups attacking over a 1000 mile long front of OTL. It’s going to be much smaller and limited and over a longer timetable. More like our OTL 42 or ever 43 offensives. Only one part, most likely in what was the OTL Army Group South sector.

* Which means as Pearl Harbour happens, there will be no Guderian at the Gates in Moscow, but rather on the Frontier.

And then butterflies take over.
 
thats...highly optimistic. we know from the northern (baltic) commands who basically ignored their orders and went full on war-readyness well before the germans hit them that it did absolutly zero difference,the germans cut through them just as easily. yes,the disaster will be further west but its also going to vastly worse,the messy red army will get annihilated in great counter-attacks and pretty much be wiped out completly yet in poland instead of falling back east at least in part. This will really be one of the few moves the soviets can do which could actually make them lose the war.

Then we will just have to agree to disagree ;)
 
The Germans would have found out about it beforehand and conducted a war of maneuver in Poland. The Soviet Army would be defeated and the Germans what advance into the Soviet Union and Stalin would find other countries less inclined to help him
 
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