First, I would like to avoid talking about Rezun/Suvurov’s Ice breaker theory, there are plenty of threads about it, but instead on the attack itself. I don’t really want to talk about how realistic this operation is, yes, we all know that the red army is absolutely ill prepared for such an operation until 1942-1943, but hey this is the Vozhd order!
Let’s say that on February the 1st, Stalin is certain about Hitler’s intentions and that the Red Army is to launch a massive attack to disorganize the German’s not fully prepared force as soon as the weather allow it (afaik in early June). Let’s say that the main axis of attack are from the advanced salient of Lwow and Bialystok with a supporting attack on Eastern Prussia, while the red army maintains a defensive stance in Bessarabia.
So without a doubt, the red army would suffer a crushing defeat, but on what scale and how much worse (or better!) would the situation be compared to the actual Barbarossa of 1941?
Let’s say that on February the 1st, Stalin is certain about Hitler’s intentions and that the Red Army is to launch a massive attack to disorganize the German’s not fully prepared force as soon as the weather allow it (afaik in early June). Let’s say that the main axis of attack are from the advanced salient of Lwow and Bialystok with a supporting attack on Eastern Prussia, while the red army maintains a defensive stance in Bessarabia.
So without a doubt, the red army would suffer a crushing defeat, but on what scale and how much worse (or better!) would the situation be compared to the actual Barbarossa of 1941?