What if Stalin decided to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Wehrmacht in 1941?

This very scenario was brought up in the article The Storm and the Whirlwind, from the Peter Tsouras book Third Reich Victorious.

Basically, the Luftwaffe picks up on Russian preparations, and that combined with the Russians cutting off shipments of goods and materials lets the Germans know what's coming.

The Russians make some initial progress, but the Germans then counterattack and perform a huge envelopment, encircling and destroying or capturing much of the Russian forces on the central front.

When the dust settles, since the Russians front-loaded the attack, there's nothing between the Wehrmacht and Moscow but a few undermanned and underequipped infantry corps. A month later, the Wehrmacht has taken Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, and the Russians sue for peace, which is truly draconian.

Written by somebody who hasn't read the list of Soviet (yes, Soviet, not "Russian") that couldn't be "front-loaded" because they had not been mobilized.

There is a workaround, of course: if the Soviets are planning this since 1939, then those forces will have been mobilized, and might be used in the initial attack. This is unlikely, because the Soviets really were pretty convinced they were relatively safe throughout 1940 (first because the Germans were occupied elsewhere, and then because moving to the East would be too lat ein the season). But it might happen.
I have my doubts, though, that all the new mobilized forces would be thrown in battle immediately: the hard limitation on how many troops the Soviets can "front-load" into the opening attack is exactly their poor logistics. Even if the Soviets do have ready by spring 1941 all the troops that they in OTL had plus those that they mobilized or raised later, a sizable part of this humungous army simply can't get on the first trains to the frontline. So the Germans may encircle and destroy the first wave, which will be more or less the same troops they did destroy historically. And we're back to the rest of the Krasnaya Armiya.
 
If someone is interested in doing a TL, I have the Army-level OOB and Soviet operational plans for the 1940-41 war plan.

I'd very much like to see what you have. Unless it derives from Suvrovs 'Icebreaker', I already have access to that.

I have been reading/translating Merekovs description of the transformation of the Red Army 1938 to June 1941. Would like to see how your material matches to Merkovs interpretation.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
There is world of difference between an Nazi Russian war where the Nazis (literally the most evil regime ever) invaded Sacred Mother Russia and plans to eliminate it from the face of earth and one in which a dictatorial Soviet Government invades Poland and lose in the process several million soldiers and then asks for monumental sacrifices for the war against fascism (which was their best friend until yesterday). In the first the invader will discover that there is only one way to destroy Russia and it involves killing every bloo## Russian. The second can end in internal revolution....
 
This has a number of effects on Britain. First Rommel will not be heading to North Africa to bail out the Italians, so they get pushed out of North Africa. Hitler won't be able to spare the men. He won't be able to intervene in Greece either for the same reason. There will be no Iraqi revolt and so no British invasion of Syria. Britain now has a lot of resources going spare and Churchill will be having many bright ideas about how to use them. The Australian Government will really want Malay re-inforced. The Russian's will soon be screaming for the entire war production in Britain to be shipped to them for free. Churchill will want to invade Italy and then cross the Alps into Austria and Germany.
 
But it probably won't change this much, because the Red Army is in no position to launch a full scale strategic offensive driving out Germans out of Poland.
Well yeah it would, a few days of offensive action before a pre-planned halt order is given is a much less riskier proposition than advancing west until the army breaks down.
 
Well yeah it would, a few days of offensive action before a pre-planned halt order is given is a much less riskier proposition than advancing west until the army breaks down.

Well I don’t think that Hitler would allow a massive withdrawal to launch a decisive counterblow given the stand or die approach he showed several times during the war, so the red Army won’t really advance to the west much. And like I stated in my first post I believe that in any case the red Army would pretty much stop by itself due to logistic issue and Luftwaffe attacks.

his has a number of effects on Britain. First Rommel will not be heading to North Africa to bail out the Italians, so they get pushed out of North Africa. Hitler won't be able to spare the men. He won't be able to intervene in Greece either for the same reason. There will be no Iraqi revolt and so no British invasion of Syria. Britain now has a lot of resources going spare and Churchill will be having many bright ideas about how to use them. The Australian Government will really want Malay re-inforced. The Russian's will soon be screaming for the entire war production in Britain to be shipped to them for free. Churchill will want to invade Italy and then cross the Alps into Austria and Germany.

Hmm Greece invasion is decided by november-december 1940 and the invasion happened in April when the weather is still suitable for any major operation in the east.
 
Hmm Greece invasion is decided by november-december 1940 and the invasion happened in April when the weather is still suitable for any major operation in the east.
But this was true when the Soviets didn't attack in February, here they did and so the German Army is a bit busy trying to get them out of Poland and East Prussia. Anything decided before the Soviet attack is irrelevant.
 
I'd very much like to see what you have. Unless it derives from Suvrovs 'Icebreaker', I already have access to that.

I have been reading/translating Merekovs description of the transformation of the Red Army 1938 to June 1941. Would like to see how your material matches to Merkovs interpretation.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...to-invade-germany.470112/page-3#post-19125620
Manninen also names the planned target areas and advance routes of the armies shown on the map, I can photograph and translate that part as well if need be.
 
This has a number of effects on Britain. First Rommel will not be heading to North Africa to bail out the Italians, so they get pushed out of North Africa. Hitler won't be able to spare the men. He won't be able to intervene in Greece either for the same reason. There will be no Iraqi revolt and so no British invasion of Syria. Britain now has a lot of resources going spare and Churchill will be having many bright ideas about how to use them. The Australian Government will really want Malay re-inforced. The Russian's will soon be screaming for the entire war production in Britain to be shipped to them for free. Churchill will want to invade Italy and then cross the Alps into Austria and Germany.

I don't think Britain can do much
 
Can't do much in mainland Europe except help Greece. Northern Norway is an option as well and will draw out Bismark. It would secure the convoy route to Murmansk.
 
There is world of difference between an Nazi Russian war where the Nazis (literally the most evil regime ever) invaded Sacred Mother Russia and plans to eliminate it from the face of earth and one in which a dictatorial Soviet Government invades Poland and lose in the process several million soldiers and then asks for monumental sacrifices for the war against fascism (which was their best friend until yesterday). In the first the invader will discover that there is only one way to destroy Russia and it involves killing every bloo## Russian. The second can end in internal revolution....

First thing, let's be very clear: the invader in OTL didn't "discover" as he went that he had to kill every Russian. The invader invaded with an already formed intention to "thin down" the Slavic populations by the tens of millions, as part of his plan for gaining Lebensraum. The survivors would be serfs.

Secondly, the NKVD is still there. No internal revolution, no matter what. In OTL, Soviet citizens volunteered to join the Germans after they were out of reach of the NKVD.

Finally, as to flip-flopping about who's the best friend - that's what was done regularly in OTL. "We've always been at war with Eastasia".
 
This has a number of effects on Britain. First Rommel will not be heading to North Africa to bail out the Italians, so they get pushed out of North Africa. Hitler won't be able to spare the men.

Actually Rommel already is in Africa by spring 1941, with a Light/Panzer division. The point would rather be that the DAK doesn't get reinforced.

He won't be able to intervene in Greece either for the same reason.

That depends. The Soviets aren't launching an offensive in April. But the Germans will come to understand the Soviets are about to attack, and in time to stop Marita-Merkur. The reasonable thing to do would be indeed to stop it. Then again, the decision-maker is Hitler.

There will be no Iraqi revolt and so no British invasion of Syria. Britain now has a lot of resources going spare and Churchill will be having many bright ideas about how to use them. The Australian Government will really want Malay re-inforced. The Russian's will soon be screaming for the entire war production in Britain to be shipped to them for free. Churchill will want to invade Italy and then cross the Alps into Austria and Germany.

Desires, desires...
 
The Germans don't have a good trackrecord in finding out the russian plans beforehand.

Walter Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs that by the time of attack on the SU Germany did not have any effective spy network on the Soviet territory and it was not even known if the strategic industrial plants connected to the main railroads by one or two lines. Of course, it is possible that he was just trying to discredit Abwehr but an absence of the strategic data seems more or less obvious: Soviet mobilization capacities were quite different from anticipated and the same goes for the Soviet industry and ability of its mobilization. Well, it seems that the same can be said about their miscalculation of the US.

Not that things were substantially better on operational level: at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and during Bagration the reserves accumulated behind the front line and directions of attack/counterattack were not discovered in advance.

Of course, on the initial stage of war this absence of knowledge was not critical due to the overwhelming advantage in the fighting skills so I’m rather septical about successful outcome of the Soviet preemptive strike in 1941. Not to mention that even in the summer of 1941 they were in the midst of a major upgrade of their armor with all resulting problems in training, supplies (most of the units were grossly under-equipped with the armor piercing shells; the same goes for the numbers of available field repair shops and the tractors in the existing ones), and organization.
 
They were doing reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory they would see the buildup of men and material. not to mention the chance of someone not wanting to get tortured and executed by the NKVD fleeing to the German side.

They could see something near the front line but hardly the reserves placed in the second echelon. Somehow German aviation was not helpful in discovering huge reserves placed close to the front line at Moscow and Stalingrad so I would not overestimate its reconnaissance capacities or the Soviet abilities in the areas of camouflage, creation of the fake targets and AA defense.

A person fleeing to the German side would be someone of a low rank with a very limited information beyond his immediate unit.

Edit: On the Eastern front Germans had predominantly tactical level reconnaissance aircraft, mostly Fw 189, and very few high altitude planes.
 
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This very scenario was brought up in the article The Storm and the Whirlwind, from the Peter Tsouras book Third Reich Victorious.

Basically, the Luftwaffe picks up on Russian preparations, and that combined with the Russians cutting off shipments of goods and materials lets the Germans know what's coming.

The Russians make some initial progress, but the Germans then counterattack and perform a huge envelopment, encircling and destroying or capturing much of the Russian forces on the central front.

When the dust settles, since the Russians front-loaded the attack, there's nothing between the Wehrmacht and Moscow but a few undermanned and underequipped infantry corps. A month later, the Wehrmacht has taken Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, and the Russians sue for peace, which is truly draconian.

Well, an idea of a single huge encirclement of whatever passes for the “central front” (something like 300 miles) does not look quite realistic and leaves an obvious question about the flanks. Then, the part about “front-loaded” is quite questionable because it ignores notion of the strategic reserves. Unlike OTL, the Red Army has time for mobilization and proper arrangement of the echelons so there should be enough reserves to counter the German counterattack. It still would be beaten due to the German tactical and operational superiority but situation is not going to be much worse than in OTL.

This being said, for all practical purposes in OTL 1941 the Red Army lost most of the existing troops and most of the 1st echelon of the raised reserve troops which more or less amounts to the “wank Germany” part of the scenario you are quoting. It also lost a big chunk of the existing armament industry, which may or may not happen in that scenario. The troops raised during the rest of 1941 had been often undertrained, undermanned and underequipped. The Germans could not advance faster then they did or make noticeably more encirclements than they did. And they could not make equipment working on a pure enthusiasm. So the 2nd part of scenario lookes too much like a wishful thinking (why would anybody wish Nazis a victory is beyond me :)) than a serious analysis.
 
And like I stated in my first post I believe that in any case the red Army would pretty much stop by itself due to logistic issue and Luftwaffe attacks.
There's a difference in stopping "early" because that's what the plan calls for and only stopping because the army has broken down.

In the former scenario there's a contiguous line of contact, relatively stable supply lines, and unit cohesion is maintained. The force is able to engage in defensive actions, limited follow up attacks, or engage in a fighting retreat.

In the later, units have likely ended up encircled, logistics have broken down entirely, and unit cohesion has evaporated. The force is paralyzed and only able to sit on its hands while the enemy prepares to dismember it.

The two scenarios aren't alike in the slightest beyond the fact that both involve not advancing far and ultimately stopping.
 
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