April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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formion

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The destroyers Hatsushimo and Mikazuki, and the second line destroyer Kuretake were taking the remaining four transports to Rangoon where the balance of the 65th Infantry Brigade and its supplies would be unloaded and transported overland to the front lines in the Arakan.

Is it plausible to assume that these ships will be unloading in Rangoon's docks when the heavy bomber attack starts?

With most of the attack squadrons on their way, planning continued for follow on operations. The Vultee Vengeance equipped No. 82 Squadron was held back to provide air support for the troops at dug in around Akyab along with Indian Lysanders. The Vengeance crews were not happy they were not getting a crack at the convoy but as the least experienced attack squadron in No. 221 Group, it was decided to hold them back.

He’s not done yet.

I am trying to see what other assets the Allies have to throw against the retreating Japanese. This squadron is the only one I could find.
 
When the Japanese admiral unloads the survivors and refuels and resupplies his ships (to the extent he can at a forward base) he could go back to Ramree to try and force a naval engagement at night when he perceives an advantage, perhaps covering some evacuation of the remiajing Japanese forces although I expect they are going to die in place.
 
When the Japanese admiral unloads the survivors and refuels and resupplies his ships (to the extent he can at a forward base) he could go back to Ramree to try and force a naval engagement at night when he perceives an advantage, perhaps covering some evacuation of the remiajing Japanese forces although I expect they are going to die in place.

There are no Japanese forces on or immediately near Ramree island, none that the IJN need worry about. With the convoy ships either sunk or forced to turn back, the Japanese are going to have to take an overland route.

Too bad the British or US don't appear to have subs out, that light cruiser would make a tempting target right now.

With the Japanese invasion stopped, this means the British will reinforce their position on Ramree first, meaning that the part of the 65th brigade that is coming overland will have to fight into the teeth of heavy defenses by the time they get there. Combined with convoy losses, the Japanese 65th Brigade may cease to exist as an effective fighting force in the near future.
 

formion

Banned
0600 Hours, 11 December 1942, Bassien River Delta, Burma – The light cruiser Kinu, the second line destroyer Sanae, and the seaplane tender Sanyo Marue were anchored near shore in the mouth of the Bassein River to set up a seaplane base to support the convoy headed for Ramree Island

I m interested to see what will happen with his flotilla.
 
No, the Japanese have stopped having such ridiculously good luck. Attrition is their biggest enemy and that is no different to OTL. Zheng He also bases a lot of his story on real events so it is hard to say that they are having bad luck. Things have swung against them earlier than OTL, that's all.
 
The Japanese are having such bad luck for this entire thread.

There is some luck involved but most of it has to do with the Allies being more aggressive and taking advantage of opportunities where they exist and attacking points of vulnerabilities. Most of the forces involved with the Allies were in theater OTL at some point. The primary exception are some of the American ships that were in the North Pacific OTL but are underemployed ITTL due to the North Pacific being a non-theater. However, a lot of Japanese forces sent to the Indian Ocean ITTL were also in the North Pacific OTL.
 

MatthewB

Banned
That's why the Hudson pilot making the late afternoon reconnaissance run over the retreating ships simply waggled his wings instead of making a strafing run of his own. He figured there had been enough for one day.
Plus he didn’t want to risk a Twinkie kill shot.
 
1800 Hours, 11 December 1942, Chittagong, India – All of the aircraft from the day’s attacks were back on the ground although they were scattered across airfields from Calcutta down to Akyab with a number of planes diverting to airfields around Akyab and Cox’s Bazaar due to damage or low fuel states. Based on reports from the aircrews themselves and the reconnaissance planes, the mission was an unqualified success. All four transports and two destroyers sunk with the rest of the escorting warships suffering some degree of damage. However, the mission was not without cost. A total of 148 bombers and fighters of all types participated in that attack on the convoy and that did not include the numerous reconnaissance aircraft that played a crucial role in the day’s action. Of the 148 attacking aircraft, 34 were either shot down over the convoy, ditched near Ramree Island or Akyab on the way home, or were written off as hangar queens after landing, a loss rate of almost 25 percent. Fortunately, aircrew losses were lighter with the crews that ditched near Akyab and Ramree Island had already been picked up and the at first light USS St. Louis’ four Seagulls would be ranging well south of Ramree Island on search and rescue missions.

The fighter pilots claimed 40 enemy aircraft shot down over the convoy and while the kills as usual inflated, 22 Japanese fighters and two Pete reconnaissance planes were either shot down or succumbed to damage on the flight back to Mingaladon. While the tired aircrews rested, ground crews serviced their planes with some readied for return flights to their home bases the next morning and others prepared for ground support mission to assist the hard pressed troops dug in around Akyab.
 
Experienced aircrew are harder to replace than aircraft, the Japanese lost both, I would imagine between 30 and 50 percent of the downed aircrew will be rescued for the Allies.
 
1930 Hours, 11 December 1942, Rangoon, Burma – The four Allied bomber squadrons approached Rangoon separately. It was not a good night for a bombing mission. While the weather was generally clear, the moon had just begun its waxing phase so there was not a great deal of light to navigate by but with the ships unloading men and supplies for the 65th Infantry Brigade tied up to Rangoon’s docks, an attempt had to be made.

No. 215 Squadron the most experienced of the four squadrons made it to the target just fine and dropped 96 500-pound bombs along Rangoon’s waterfront. The freighter Asahi Maru was hit and damaged by two bombs, a supply barge was sunk, and a two landed among supplies stacked up on the dock but by and large the bombing was not particularly accurate with most of the bombs falling into the water although a near miss flipped over a tugboat. No. 99 Squadron missed the target entirely, and hit the riverfront several miles to the northeast doing no significant damage. None of the Wellingtons were shot down by the sporadic anti-aircraft fire although one plane from each squadron failed to return for unknown reasons.

The two America squadrons arrived over the course of the next 45 minutes. By now the defenders were fully alerted and the 9th Bombardment Squadron lost two planes and their bombs were scattered throughout the city a few hundred yards short of the docks. The 11th Bombardment Squadron did better, losing one plane to flak and coming close to matching No. 215 Squadron’s accuracy. Another 500-pound hit the Asahi Maru and the damaged freighter began to settle on its keel with half of its supplies still on board. The other three transports tied up to the docks escaped direct hits although splinters from near misses caused casualties among the dock workers. All four squadrons departed the area without further incident although a damaged B-24 from the 9th ditched off Akyab and its entire crew was rescued by a fishing boat.
 
0100 Hours, 12 December 1942, Akyab, Burma – The ships of the Allied task force were anchored of the small port of Akyab getting fuel from lighters and stores from supply barges. Captain O’Donnell was anxious to get his ships back to sea. The reinforcement convoy from Trincomalee was due in less than 24 hours and the destroyer transport USS Waters and the commando carrier HMS Albatross were due to sortie from Chittagong in a few hours.

The light cruisers USS St. Louis and HMS Caradoc were getting put back on forward air defense picket duty to provide raid warning against air attacks for the inbound convoys. O’Donnell planned to take his remaining cruisers and destroyers and maneuver southeast of Ramree Island to interdict any additional Japanese attempts to land troops.
 
0100 Hours, 12 December 1942, Bassein River Delta, Burma – Captain O’Donnell would have been amused to know that his Japanese counterpart was working on his next course of action as well. The light cruiser Kiso and the destroyers Wakaba, Nagatzuki, Matsukaze, and Harukaze were anchored at the forward support base in the mouth of the Bassein River along with the light cruiser Kinu, the second line destroyer Sanae, and the seaplane tender Sanyo Maru. Wounded men were getting transferred to the seaplane tender and makeshift shore facilities while the crews of the warships attempted to make some repairs and took on supplies from barges and river steamers. Sanyo Maru was also transferring fuel to the destroyers.

Despite or maybe because of the disastrous defeat of the operation to land troops on Ramree Island Rear Admiral Shima was not about to give up. Of the more than 1100 men (out of 3000) the escorts rescued from the sunken transports, just under 700 were fit to fight. His supply officers and surviving officers from the 65th Infantry Brigade were already working to see what supplies existed onboard Shima’s ships, the supply barges at the base, and with some of the local garrison troops in the area so they could outfit convoy’s survivors. Once they had a good tally of how many men they could outfit, the plan was to load the soldiers onto the destroyers and make a 25-knot sprint from their current sanctuary to Ramree Island. Shima estimated the transit would take approximately eight hours and if they departed in the late afternoon, they could reach Ramree Island by midnight, offload the men and be on their way before dawn. With the vast majority of the operation conducted at night, Shima reasoned that ships would be safe from the prying eyes of Allied reconnaissance aircraft.
 
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