0600 Hours, 11 December 1942, Bassien River Delta, Burma – The light cruiser Kinu, the second line destroyer Sanae, and the seaplane tender Sanyo Marue were anchored near shore in the mouth of the Bassein River to set up a seaplane base to support the convoy headed for Ramree Island. While the seaplanes were readied for flight, the Japanese troop convoy was rounding the southern tip of Burma and entering the Bay of Bengal. The convoy was just over 200 miles due south of Ramree Island, approximately 18 hours from its destination. Rear Admiral Shima onboard the light cruiser Kiso noted with satisfaction the low-lying clouds. The weather was not supposed to clear for another four to five hours and Shima hoped it would stay cloudy longer. He had was promised fighter cover by both the IJN and the JAAF but he knew that the best way to stay protected from Allied bombers was for the weather to keep them on the ground. Shima told Kiso’s captain to keep the convoy headed due north at 10 knots. He did not see any advantages in attempting a deceptive course, that would simply increase the amount of time the troops of the 65th Infantry Brigade were crammed on to ships instead of safely on land.
April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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0700 Hours, 11 December 1942, Chittagong, India – At Allied airfields squadrons were going through their final checks in anticipation of heavy action that day. For the aircrews there was nothing to do but sit and wait. They did not have targets yet and the aircraft were armed with general purpose bombs because nobody knew if they would be attacking land targets or ships. First the weather had to clear, then the reconnaissance aircraft had to find targets. It was possible they would find nothing but with the convoy from Trincomalee due to arrive at Ramree Island in another 36 hours, they had to be prepared to stop any moves by the enemy.
Japanese radio traffic had been high for the past week and had increased over the past 48 hours. Additionally, the Japanese 55th Infantry Division opposing the East African and Indian troops dug in around Akyab had launched an attack during the night. The Allied lines were holding but the fighting was intense in several areas and calls for air support were increasing.
With no rain falling and the clouds starting to break up, at 0800 hours, two USAAF F-4 Lightnings took off out of Cox’s Bazaar with orders to reconnoiter Rangoon. From airfields near Chittagong, four Hudsons from No. 353 Squadron and two B-25s from 3 PRU took to cover the seaborne approaches south of Akyab while another two Hudsons were ordered to patrol for submarines near Ramree Island. Launching out of Akyab were eight Indian Battles from No. 7 Squadron. The Battles were flying in pairs fully armed on US Navy style search and strike missions. Four were covering the roads between Rangoon and the Arakan and the other four were covering the approaches out to sea.
Japanese radio traffic had been high for the past week and had increased over the past 48 hours. Additionally, the Japanese 55th Infantry Division opposing the East African and Indian troops dug in around Akyab had launched an attack during the night. The Allied lines were holding but the fighting was intense in several areas and calls for air support were increasing.
With no rain falling and the clouds starting to break up, at 0800 hours, two USAAF F-4 Lightnings took off out of Cox’s Bazaar with orders to reconnoiter Rangoon. From airfields near Chittagong, four Hudsons from No. 353 Squadron and two B-25s from 3 PRU took to cover the seaborne approaches south of Akyab while another two Hudsons were ordered to patrol for submarines near Ramree Island. Launching out of Akyab were eight Indian Battles from No. 7 Squadron. The Battles were flying in pairs fully armed on US Navy style search and strike missions. Four were covering the roads between Rangoon and the Arakan and the other four were covering the approaches out to sea.
0930 Hours, 11 December 1942, Rangoon, Burma – The two USAAF F-4 Lightings approached Rangoon from separate vectors at high speed with one plane concentrating on the airfields north of the city with the other taking a look at the docks and traffic in the river and off the coast.
The Ki-43 Oscars of the 11th Sentai on standing patrol over the area could not hope to catch the much faster American planes and the pilots were able to pass over their assigned objectives unmolested with cameras rolling. For the most part the clouds in the area had dissipated giving the reconnaissance a good look at their targets and the pilot flying over the city docks even reported the presence of “six large ships pier side.”
A half hour later the first sighting at sea was made when an Indian B-25 from 3 PRU struck pay dirt when it made contact with the Japanese convoy 150 miles south of Ramree Island. While the IAF and RAF reconnaissance pilots were getting better at maritime reconnaissance, a bright young staff officer with No. 221 Group had the presence of mind to suggest that experienced observers from HMS Indomitable’s No. 821 Squadron should fly with the Hudsons, Blenheims, and B-25s patrolling out to sea. This guaranteed a complete and accurate sighting report was sent back to No. 224 Group’s Headquarters at Chittagong and the forward operations center at Akyab. The sighting report was broadcast three times while the B-25’s pilot put his stripped-down bomber into a dive to escape from the shotai of Ki-43s from the 64th Sentai on combat air patrol over the convoy.
Onboard the light cruiser Kiso, Rear Admiral Shima looked up at the clearing skies and the rapidly departing reconnaissance bomber and ordered a message to sent to Rangoon requesting additional fighter cover. With eight hours of daylight left the race was now on and with the convoy discovered, there was no sense in maintaining radio silence.
The Ki-43 Oscars of the 11th Sentai on standing patrol over the area could not hope to catch the much faster American planes and the pilots were able to pass over their assigned objectives unmolested with cameras rolling. For the most part the clouds in the area had dissipated giving the reconnaissance a good look at their targets and the pilot flying over the city docks even reported the presence of “six large ships pier side.”
A half hour later the first sighting at sea was made when an Indian B-25 from 3 PRU struck pay dirt when it made contact with the Japanese convoy 150 miles south of Ramree Island. While the IAF and RAF reconnaissance pilots were getting better at maritime reconnaissance, a bright young staff officer with No. 221 Group had the presence of mind to suggest that experienced observers from HMS Indomitable’s No. 821 Squadron should fly with the Hudsons, Blenheims, and B-25s patrolling out to sea. This guaranteed a complete and accurate sighting report was sent back to No. 224 Group’s Headquarters at Chittagong and the forward operations center at Akyab. The sighting report was broadcast three times while the B-25’s pilot put his stripped-down bomber into a dive to escape from the shotai of Ki-43s from the 64th Sentai on combat air patrol over the convoy.
Onboard the light cruiser Kiso, Rear Admiral Shima looked up at the clearing skies and the rapidly departing reconnaissance bomber and ordered a message to sent to Rangoon requesting additional fighter cover. With eight hours of daylight left the race was now on and with the convoy discovered, there was no sense in maintaining radio silence.
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Congratulations, you win the bonus round, I was waiting to see if somebody would pick up on that.
Hold on folks, the next few updates are going to be wild...
1015 Hours, 11 December 1942, Mingaladon Airfield, Burma – Shima’s message to Rangoon was acted on immediately and 12 Zeroes of the Kanoya NAG that were on strip alert were already taxiing into takeoff positions. Oscars of the 64th Sentai had the initial tasking for providing air cover to the convoy but their time on station was limited because they were not plumbed for drop tanks. The Zeroes had enough endurance that the Kanoya NAG would be able to keep 12 fighters over the convoy at all times for the rest of the day and there would usually be six Oscars overhead as well. By 1030 all 12 fighters were in the air and well on their way and winging their way west.
1015 Hours, 11 December 1942, Chittagong Airfield, India – The initial report from the American Lightning gave the impression the entire Japanese convoy was docked in Rangoon setting in motion contingency plans for a daylight raid against Rangoon. However, the sighting report from the Indian B-25 brought the whole process to a screeching halt. Details of the sighting report were quickly sent to the airfields in Bengal and the Arakan along with orders to execute existing plans to interdict an amphibious invasion of Ramree Island. While there was considerable debate among the staff officers from the various units camping out in No. 224 Group’s Headquarters who were in charge of coordinating the operation over whether the actual target was Akyab or Ramree Island, they had to assume the worse case scenario.
While planning and preparations kicked into high gear, two Indian Blenheim Is from 3 PRU took off out of Chittagong with orders to head for the sighting.
While planning and preparations kicked into high gear, two Indian Blenheim Is from 3 PRU took off out of Chittagong with orders to head for the sighting.
1030 Hours, 11 December 1942, 70 Miles Southwest of Akyab, Bay of Bengal – While Allied air squadrons swung into action a task force of warships was maneuvering in the Bay of Bengal southwest of Akyab. The cruisers USS St. Louis, HMS Caradoc, HMS Frobisher, and HMS Hawkins and the destroyers HMS Laforey and HMS Lightning had assembled the day before to provide support to the convoy inbound from Trincomalee. They were joined that morning by the cruiser HMS Capetown and the destroyer HMS Javelin that had sortied from Chittagong 12 hours earlier due to growing concerns of a Japanese operation along the Arakan coast.
Captain George O’Donnell on HMS Capetown was in overall command as senior officer afloat. His main problem was that his ships had been operating independently on patrol duties in the area and he did not have the time to work them up as a proper task force. O’Donnell opted for simplicity putting Frobisher, Hawkins, Laforey, and Lightning in the lead since those ships did have experience operating together with St. Louis, Caradoc, and Capetown in formation behind the lead group with Javelin bringing up the rear.
Captain O’Donnell knew that Allied commanders hoped to stop the enemy convoy with airpower but he had to have his ships in position to take action if necessary. That meant O’Donnell had to order his task force to head southeast toward Ramree Island despite concerns about Japanese submarines in the area. Fortunately, a Hudson from No. 353 Squadron was detailed to cover his ships and St. Louis had her full complement of four SOC-3 Seagulls embarked. At 1100 hours Captain O’Donnell ordered his ships to steer southeast at 15 knots, less HMS Frobisher. She had been dealing with engine problems all night and had to head to Chittagong for repairs.
Captain George O’Donnell on HMS Capetown was in overall command as senior officer afloat. His main problem was that his ships had been operating independently on patrol duties in the area and he did not have the time to work them up as a proper task force. O’Donnell opted for simplicity putting Frobisher, Hawkins, Laforey, and Lightning in the lead since those ships did have experience operating together with St. Louis, Caradoc, and Capetown in formation behind the lead group with Javelin bringing up the rear.
Captain O’Donnell knew that Allied commanders hoped to stop the enemy convoy with airpower but he had to have his ships in position to take action if necessary. That meant O’Donnell had to order his task force to head southeast toward Ramree Island despite concerns about Japanese submarines in the area. Fortunately, a Hudson from No. 353 Squadron was detailed to cover his ships and St. Louis had her full complement of four SOC-3 Seagulls embarked. At 1100 hours Captain O’Donnell ordered his ships to steer southeast at 15 knots, less HMS Frobisher. She had been dealing with engine problems all night and had to head to Chittagong for repairs.
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Well St. Louis has been attached to the Eastern Fleet for quite some time so it makes sense that it was low on the queue
Remember the last SOC-3 was manufactured in 1938. The only way the St. Louis would have a full complement of aircraft would be a resupply from the states, those imo would have been OS2Us.
Errolwi
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