April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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Sorry, guess I read it wrong. Thanks for the correction.
Still a large amount of recon at Port Blair needs to be taken out.
Not as many as you think. If there is between 70 and 80 percent availability of planes, pretty normal I think, that leaves around 12 to 15 for sorties. Out of that you would maybe have say 4 to 5 out on actual missions with 4 to 5 more left to go out later on mission, then the rest would be available to substitute for a plane which would not be able to go out. Say maybe you had 4 to 8 away from the base on missions the rest would be at anchor or getting ready to go.
Remember these planes are not like modern patrol craft all they have is the good ole mark one eyeball to use in its searches so they have to cover more area actually to search than a modern aircraft. You also would have flights going out following the same tracks only hours later to cover the same area that was searched. I would not be surprised if they actually were not able to fly all the searches they wanted to do with just 18 planes considering all they needed to cover with them.
Good points and in this ATL they have already lost two - one shot down over Colombo and another shot up so bad that it limped back but was no longer flyable.
Spoiler - they're about to lose a few more....
I guess I was thinking that with 16, they might have 6-8 out at a time. Downtime for maintenance for a few, and staggered patrols. In any event there is a base that the Allies want to hit. Both to eliminate enemy recon ability, as well as draw attention away from the task forces. Make the Japanese spend fuel and bombs against land targets and not allow them to be used against the ships.
Still waiting...
Chill out dude. Not every writer will crank out updates every day. Enjoy the time and effort they put into their creations.
First Blood
Brereton's quote is OTL from his OTL 2 April raid on Port Blair and he did get a DFC for that mission.
2 April 1942, Port Blair Andaman Islands - The morning sun was rising at 0600 and the seaplane base at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands was a hive of activity. Ground crews prepared six of the big H6K Mavis flying boats for the day's patrol missions and aircrews made their final preparations before heading to their aircraft moored in line in the harbor. The Japanese had been in possession of Port Blair for less than two weeks and already it was turning into one of Japan's more important outposts in the Indian Ocean. As the ground crews went about their business the quiet morning was interrupted by the drone of aircraft engines. Without much in the way of warning, four B-17E Flying Fortresses and one LB-30 Liberator of the US 10th Air Force appeared overhead and began their bomb runs at 3000 feet. The bombers had taken off from Asansol in India near Calcutta almost five hours earlier and made the difficult night flight to Port Blair with one B-17 aborting due to engine trouble. As the bombers approached the harbor they split up to make their bomb runs against their targets. Flying in the co-pilot seat of the lead bomber was the 10th Air Force's commander, Major General Lewis Brereton. His plane and a second B-17 targeted ships in the harbor lining up to drop their 500 pound bombs on what they believed were the most important targets. They managed to sink a harbor barge and score a damaging near miss on a minesweeper, reporting after the raid direct hits on a large merchant ship and a heavy cruiser. Two other B-17s dropped incendiary bombs on the flying boats lined up in the harbor and the belly turret gunners strafed the H6Ks with their .50 caliber machine guns. Finally, the lone LB-30 dropped a combination of incendiary and high explosive bombs on the docks and wharves, causing some small fires to start which were reported as large explosions by the bomber's crew. Brereton honored D'Albiac's request to pay special attention to the seaplanes and ordered all five bombers to make a second run over the target so the gunners could strafe the seaplanes moored in the harbor. Fifteen minutes after the raid started, the bombers departed, with inaccurate anti-aircraft fire chasing the them as they headed for home. All five planes received some damage but nothing that could not be repaired.
The raid could have been worse. Damage to the docks was limited and the attacks against the ships in the harbor did not achieve much other than sinking a barge. Had all five bombers concentrated on the seaplanes the results could have been disastrous. As it was, the damage was bad enough. One bomb scored a lucky hit on a Mavis and easily sank the big flying boat while the concussion from a nearby bomb detonating in the water caused another one to flip over and sink. However, most of the damage done was from the strafing by the belly turret gunners. Three H6Ks were destroyed outright by the strafing gunners while five others received enough damage that they would need a day or so of repairs before they were ready to fly. Of the remaining six that were undamaged two were already down for maintenance, leaving four H6Ks ready to fly. Once the ground crews managed to sort things out and figure out which planes were still flyable, they resumed preparations for the days flights. With fewer assets to call on, the unit commander decided to concentrate his flights that day on the Bay of Bengal to help facilitate the mission of Ozawa's Malay Force. The pilots of the Mavis tasked to reconnoiter were given strict orders to avoid enemy fighters, the unit could not afford to lose anymore assets that day. At 0800, the four H6Ks began their take off runs in Port Blair's harbor.
All five of the American bombers returned to Asansol by 1200 with Brereton's plane the last to touch down. As came out of the bomber he greeted the crews of the other four planes exclaiming, "Boys, bombing Japs makes me feel damned fine." Brereton was the highest ranking US officer to fly a combat mission up to that point in the war and he received a Distinguished Flying Cross for his efforts. While the crews over-exaggerated the amount of damage they had done, they had hit the Japanese reconnaissance unit at Port Blair with a pretty heavy punch. Once the crews finished their congratulations for a job well done, Brereton immediately set his men to work on preparing aircraft for another visit to Port Blair the next day.
2 April 1942, Port Blair Andaman Islands - The morning sun was rising at 0600 and the seaplane base at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands was a hive of activity. Ground crews prepared six of the big H6K Mavis flying boats for the day's patrol missions and aircrews made their final preparations before heading to their aircraft moored in line in the harbor. The Japanese had been in possession of Port Blair for less than two weeks and already it was turning into one of Japan's more important outposts in the Indian Ocean. As the ground crews went about their business the quiet morning was interrupted by the drone of aircraft engines. Without much in the way of warning, four B-17E Flying Fortresses and one LB-30 Liberator of the US 10th Air Force appeared overhead and began their bomb runs at 3000 feet. The bombers had taken off from Asansol in India near Calcutta almost five hours earlier and made the difficult night flight to Port Blair with one B-17 aborting due to engine trouble. As the bombers approached the harbor they split up to make their bomb runs against their targets. Flying in the co-pilot seat of the lead bomber was the 10th Air Force's commander, Major General Lewis Brereton. His plane and a second B-17 targeted ships in the harbor lining up to drop their 500 pound bombs on what they believed were the most important targets. They managed to sink a harbor barge and score a damaging near miss on a minesweeper, reporting after the raid direct hits on a large merchant ship and a heavy cruiser. Two other B-17s dropped incendiary bombs on the flying boats lined up in the harbor and the belly turret gunners strafed the H6Ks with their .50 caliber machine guns. Finally, the lone LB-30 dropped a combination of incendiary and high explosive bombs on the docks and wharves, causing some small fires to start which were reported as large explosions by the bomber's crew. Brereton honored D'Albiac's request to pay special attention to the seaplanes and ordered all five bombers to make a second run over the target so the gunners could strafe the seaplanes moored in the harbor. Fifteen minutes after the raid started, the bombers departed, with inaccurate anti-aircraft fire chasing the them as they headed for home. All five planes received some damage but nothing that could not be repaired.
The raid could have been worse. Damage to the docks was limited and the attacks against the ships in the harbor did not achieve much other than sinking a barge. Had all five bombers concentrated on the seaplanes the results could have been disastrous. As it was, the damage was bad enough. One bomb scored a lucky hit on a Mavis and easily sank the big flying boat while the concussion from a nearby bomb detonating in the water caused another one to flip over and sink. However, most of the damage done was from the strafing by the belly turret gunners. Three H6Ks were destroyed outright by the strafing gunners while five others received enough damage that they would need a day or so of repairs before they were ready to fly. Of the remaining six that were undamaged two were already down for maintenance, leaving four H6Ks ready to fly. Once the ground crews managed to sort things out and figure out which planes were still flyable, they resumed preparations for the days flights. With fewer assets to call on, the unit commander decided to concentrate his flights that day on the Bay of Bengal to help facilitate the mission of Ozawa's Malay Force. The pilots of the Mavis tasked to reconnoiter were given strict orders to avoid enemy fighters, the unit could not afford to lose anymore assets that day. At 0800, the four H6Ks began their take off runs in Port Blair's harbor.
All five of the American bombers returned to Asansol by 1200 with Brereton's plane the last to touch down. As came out of the bomber he greeted the crews of the other four planes exclaiming, "Boys, bombing Japs makes me feel damned fine." Brereton was the highest ranking US officer to fly a combat mission up to that point in the war and he received a Distinguished Flying Cross for his efforts. While the crews over-exaggerated the amount of damage they had done, they had hit the Japanese reconnaissance unit at Port Blair with a pretty heavy punch. Once the crews finished their congratulations for a job well done, Brereton immediately set his men to work on preparing aircraft for another visit to Port Blair the next day.
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First Sightings
The message from I-3 is straight from the OTL:
As the four H6Ks took off from Port Blair's harbor, the fleets continued to move toward their respective operating areas. After assembling his fleet outside of Colombo on 1 April, Somerville has spent the rest of the day exercising his ships in order to provide them with some level of preparation for the upcoming operation. Now, after breaking off at 1800 on the previous day, the Deception Force was 40 miles away from its maneuver area 200 miles southwest of Colombo while the three main task groups of the Eastern Fleet were headed toward the Bay of Bengal after turning northeast approximately 100 miles south of Dondra Head. Earlier in the morning the Eastern Fleet's submarines arrived in their designated patrol boxes with the four Dutch submarines taking up positions on an east-west patrol line extending 200 miles out from Koggala on the southern tip of Ceylon to act as tripwire in case Nagumo's carriers made a run into the Bay of Bengal after their expected raid on Colombo. HMS Truant and Trusty were operating in patrol areas 150 miles south of Dondra Head. This was where the analysts at FECB expected Nagumo's carriers to operate when they hit Ceylon. Aggressive RAF air operations continued as well. With the RAF and FAA squadrons in place, the PBYs at Trincomalee and Koggala were supplemented by a motley collection of old biplanes - Seals at Trincomalee along with Swordfish and Vildebeests at Visakhapatnam. Standing fighter patrols were now a constant presence at Colombo and both airfields kept all fighters dispersed with their crews in high states of alert.
Onboard the Japanese ships it was largely business as usual. Nagumo's carriers were approaching the Sunda Strait and were expected to make transit early the next morning while Ozawa's carriers and cruisers were heading to Port Blair to pick-up their destroyer escorts and they were expected to transit the 10 Degree Channel on 3 April as well. The Japanese commander at Port Blair sent a request to Mingaladon Airfield outside Rangoon for a standing fighter patrol of Zeroes from the 22nd Air Flotilla for the next morning. He was concerned the Allies might try and pull a similar raid against his base and he wanted a surprise waiting for them if they did. His request was granted and he was promised that a shotai of three fighters would be flying a combat air patrol over Port Blair at dawn the next day.
Over the course of the day, reconnaissance reports came in from Japanese aircraft and submarines. Of the four H6Ks flying patrols over the Bay of Bengal, three reported large concentrations of merchant ships, particularly near the coast, as expected. Ozawa's Malay Force could expect to reap a rich harvest. One Mavis even dropped two 250 kg bombs on a lone merchant ship but both bombs missed. The fourth H6K managed to cover its assignment to Trincomalee and reported no enemy fighter activity but several merchant ships and auxiliaries were noted in port. As the big flying boat turned for home after completing its mission over the British anchorage, it encountered a Fairey Seal biplane from No. 273 Squadron returning from its patrol mission. The Seal's pilot failed to see the H6K in the sun until it was too late and the nose gunner in the Japanese patrol bomber peppered the old biplane with bullets, sending it spinning into the sea. The crew of the Mavis felt they had achieved some measure of revenge for the raid on their base that morning. Fortunately for Somerville, his luck held in that his ships were still well to the south of the flight path of the H6K that reconnoitered Trincomalee so his forces remained as yet unsighted. In addition to the reports from the H6Ks, at 1800 the Japanese submarine I-3 operating south of Ceylon reported that heavy enemy naval activity and air patrols made it impossible to get closer to Colombo.
During the next several hours as the reconnaissance reports reached the ships in the Kido Butai and the Malay Force, the officers analyzing the reports as well as those from the previous day suffered from what intelligence analysts call confirmation bias. Every piece of information they had up to this point confirmed previous estimates that the enemy's forces were concentrated south of Ceylon and that no significant forces were operating in the Bay of Bengal. They also hoped that I-7's floatplane would provide additional information on enemy fleet dispositions when it made its planned flight over Colombo the next day. In other submarine action on 2 April, I-6 operating 300 miles southwest of Bombay attacked and sank the British steamer Clan Ross sailing from Liverpool to Cochin with a cargo of explosives. After providing the survivors with water and biscuits and a bearing to Bombay, several crew members of the submarine lined the deck to wish them "Bon Voyage."
As the four H6Ks took off from Port Blair's harbor, the fleets continued to move toward their respective operating areas. After assembling his fleet outside of Colombo on 1 April, Somerville has spent the rest of the day exercising his ships in order to provide them with some level of preparation for the upcoming operation. Now, after breaking off at 1800 on the previous day, the Deception Force was 40 miles away from its maneuver area 200 miles southwest of Colombo while the three main task groups of the Eastern Fleet were headed toward the Bay of Bengal after turning northeast approximately 100 miles south of Dondra Head. Earlier in the morning the Eastern Fleet's submarines arrived in their designated patrol boxes with the four Dutch submarines taking up positions on an east-west patrol line extending 200 miles out from Koggala on the southern tip of Ceylon to act as tripwire in case Nagumo's carriers made a run into the Bay of Bengal after their expected raid on Colombo. HMS Truant and Trusty were operating in patrol areas 150 miles south of Dondra Head. This was where the analysts at FECB expected Nagumo's carriers to operate when they hit Ceylon. Aggressive RAF air operations continued as well. With the RAF and FAA squadrons in place, the PBYs at Trincomalee and Koggala were supplemented by a motley collection of old biplanes - Seals at Trincomalee along with Swordfish and Vildebeests at Visakhapatnam. Standing fighter patrols were now a constant presence at Colombo and both airfields kept all fighters dispersed with their crews in high states of alert.
Onboard the Japanese ships it was largely business as usual. Nagumo's carriers were approaching the Sunda Strait and were expected to make transit early the next morning while Ozawa's carriers and cruisers were heading to Port Blair to pick-up their destroyer escorts and they were expected to transit the 10 Degree Channel on 3 April as well. The Japanese commander at Port Blair sent a request to Mingaladon Airfield outside Rangoon for a standing fighter patrol of Zeroes from the 22nd Air Flotilla for the next morning. He was concerned the Allies might try and pull a similar raid against his base and he wanted a surprise waiting for them if they did. His request was granted and he was promised that a shotai of three fighters would be flying a combat air patrol over Port Blair at dawn the next day.
Over the course of the day, reconnaissance reports came in from Japanese aircraft and submarines. Of the four H6Ks flying patrols over the Bay of Bengal, three reported large concentrations of merchant ships, particularly near the coast, as expected. Ozawa's Malay Force could expect to reap a rich harvest. One Mavis even dropped two 250 kg bombs on a lone merchant ship but both bombs missed. The fourth H6K managed to cover its assignment to Trincomalee and reported no enemy fighter activity but several merchant ships and auxiliaries were noted in port. As the big flying boat turned for home after completing its mission over the British anchorage, it encountered a Fairey Seal biplane from No. 273 Squadron returning from its patrol mission. The Seal's pilot failed to see the H6K in the sun until it was too late and the nose gunner in the Japanese patrol bomber peppered the old biplane with bullets, sending it spinning into the sea. The crew of the Mavis felt they had achieved some measure of revenge for the raid on their base that morning. Fortunately for Somerville, his luck held in that his ships were still well to the south of the flight path of the H6K that reconnoitered Trincomalee so his forces remained as yet unsighted. In addition to the reports from the H6Ks, at 1800 the Japanese submarine I-3 operating south of Ceylon reported that heavy enemy naval activity and air patrols made it impossible to get closer to Colombo.
During the next several hours as the reconnaissance reports reached the ships in the Kido Butai and the Malay Force, the officers analyzing the reports as well as those from the previous day suffered from what intelligence analysts call confirmation bias. Every piece of information they had up to this point confirmed previous estimates that the enemy's forces were concentrated south of Ceylon and that no significant forces were operating in the Bay of Bengal. They also hoped that I-7's floatplane would provide additional information on enemy fleet dispositions when it made its planned flight over Colombo the next day. In other submarine action on 2 April, I-6 operating 300 miles southwest of Bombay attacked and sank the British steamer Clan Ross sailing from Liverpool to Cochin with a cargo of explosives. After providing the survivors with water and biscuits and a bearing to Bombay, several crew members of the submarine lined the deck to wish them "Bon Voyage."
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3 April
Note - OTL the 3 April raid by 10th Air Force was against the docks in Rangoon. Major Lewellyn as killed OTL on an attempted raid against Rangoon by two B-17s on 2 April (his plane crashed). For this ATL all bombers went against Port Blair on 2 April instead of a split raid and then the 3 April raid was also against Port Blair.
3 April 1942, Port Blair Andaman Islands - At 0600 on the morning of 3 April, the US 10th Air Force paid its second visit to the Japanese base at Port Blair, this time with six B-17E Flying Fortresses under the command of Brereton's aide Major Norman Lewellyn. However, this time the Japanese had a surprise in store for them. First, the unit commander at Port Blair made sure the five H6Ks flying that day were airborne by 0500 while the other six planes were dispersed in the harbor. Second, a shotai of Zeroes from the 22nd Air Flotilla were on patrol at 10,000 feet waiting to ambush any incoming raids. The big American bombers followed a similar plan as the day before with two concentrating on ships in the harbor, two attacking the seaplane base, and two bombing the docks and wharves. The Zeroes jumped the lead pair as they made their attack run against two large merchant ships and in the ensuing fight the B-17 piloted by Major Lewellyn was shot down while the other was heavily damaged. One Zero was shot down in exchange. Because the remaining H6Ks were dispersed in the harbor, the bombing against them was ineffective and strafing only managed to destroy one seaplane while the bombers attacking the docks managed to set several buildings on fire but no significant damage was done. With two fighters still harassing them, the bombers did not line up for an additional strafing run of the harbor and instead turned for home with the Zeroes chasing them out to sea. Brereton was deeply saddened by the loss of Major Lewellyn who had served with him for two years.
The morning of 3 April found Somerville's task forces in the Bay of Bengal approximately halfway between Trincomalee and Madras. With Boyd's carriers furthest out to sea of the three task forces, the ships turned northeast to head to their maneuver area 250 miles south of Visakhapatnam. At the same time, Force D was in its operations sending out radio signals mimicking a carrier group conducting flight operations. For those onboard the British ships and at British land bases, it was now a matter of waiting for the enemy to show up.
Nagumo's carriers were 800 miles south of Port Blair at 0900 and heading northwest toward Colombo on 3 April while Ozawa's ships transited the 10 Degree Channel and entered the Bay of Bengal. Onboard the Japanese ships, men played the same waiting game as their British counterparts. The day's reconnaissance reports were disappointing. Patrolling H6Ks reported nothing but merchant traffic at Visakhapatnam, Madras, Koggala, and Trincomalee although the crew of the Mavis flying over Madras had an exciting morning as they were chased away by two Blenheim bombers from No. 11 Squadron. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the H6K sent to investigate Colombo met the same fate as his counterparts from two days ago, this time at the hands of two Fulmars from No. 273 Squadron who were expertly vectored onto the radar contact by the inexperienced but fast learning crew manning Colombo's small radar station. There was a sense of unease onboard Nagumo's flagship about the lack of up to date intelligence on Colombo since the last successful mission over the port was 48 hours earlier. Nagumo and his staff waited for the expected report from I-7's floatplane, not knowing that I-7 had been sunk.
3 April 1942, Port Blair Andaman Islands - At 0600 on the morning of 3 April, the US 10th Air Force paid its second visit to the Japanese base at Port Blair, this time with six B-17E Flying Fortresses under the command of Brereton's aide Major Norman Lewellyn. However, this time the Japanese had a surprise in store for them. First, the unit commander at Port Blair made sure the five H6Ks flying that day were airborne by 0500 while the other six planes were dispersed in the harbor. Second, a shotai of Zeroes from the 22nd Air Flotilla were on patrol at 10,000 feet waiting to ambush any incoming raids. The big American bombers followed a similar plan as the day before with two concentrating on ships in the harbor, two attacking the seaplane base, and two bombing the docks and wharves. The Zeroes jumped the lead pair as they made their attack run against two large merchant ships and in the ensuing fight the B-17 piloted by Major Lewellyn was shot down while the other was heavily damaged. One Zero was shot down in exchange. Because the remaining H6Ks were dispersed in the harbor, the bombing against them was ineffective and strafing only managed to destroy one seaplane while the bombers attacking the docks managed to set several buildings on fire but no significant damage was done. With two fighters still harassing them, the bombers did not line up for an additional strafing run of the harbor and instead turned for home with the Zeroes chasing them out to sea. Brereton was deeply saddened by the loss of Major Lewellyn who had served with him for two years.
The morning of 3 April found Somerville's task forces in the Bay of Bengal approximately halfway between Trincomalee and Madras. With Boyd's carriers furthest out to sea of the three task forces, the ships turned northeast to head to their maneuver area 250 miles south of Visakhapatnam. At the same time, Force D was in its operations sending out radio signals mimicking a carrier group conducting flight operations. For those onboard the British ships and at British land bases, it was now a matter of waiting for the enemy to show up.
Nagumo's carriers were 800 miles south of Port Blair at 0900 and heading northwest toward Colombo on 3 April while Ozawa's ships transited the 10 Degree Channel and entered the Bay of Bengal. Onboard the Japanese ships, men played the same waiting game as their British counterparts. The day's reconnaissance reports were disappointing. Patrolling H6Ks reported nothing but merchant traffic at Visakhapatnam, Madras, Koggala, and Trincomalee although the crew of the Mavis flying over Madras had an exciting morning as they were chased away by two Blenheim bombers from No. 11 Squadron. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the H6K sent to investigate Colombo met the same fate as his counterparts from two days ago, this time at the hands of two Fulmars from No. 273 Squadron who were expertly vectored onto the radar contact by the inexperienced but fast learning crew manning Colombo's small radar station. There was a sense of unease onboard Nagumo's flagship about the lack of up to date intelligence on Colombo since the last successful mission over the port was 48 hours earlier. Nagumo and his staff waited for the expected report from I-7's floatplane, not knowing that I-7 had been sunk.
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Just caught up on the updates. It is a shame that Breteton's bombers were not able to get more of the Mavises, but they did destroy and damage quite a few. The second raid unfortunately got there too late and ran into fighters. It is too bad that the B-17Gs were not issued. Not only with rear guns, but that forward turret might have helped with the strafing.
Hopefully the deception force will continue to mislead Nagumo and Ozawa and that the Commonwealth planes can keep up their CAP over Columbo. Not sure if the Allied subs will be able to get in some sightings and shots to whittle down the Japanese Task Forces. They also need to have a sub surface by Port Blair and use its cannon to shell the docked planes and supply dumps.
Hopefully the deception force will continue to mislead Nagumo and Ozawa and that the Commonwealth planes can keep up their CAP over Columbo. Not sure if the Allied subs will be able to get in some sightings and shots to whittle down the Japanese Task Forces. They also need to have a sub surface by Port Blair and use its cannon to shell the docked planes and supply dumps.
Calm Before the Storm
Note - Birchall's PBY was shot down by Zeroes on 4 April but he did get off at least a partial sighting report. I-2's report regarding Trincomalee is per OTL.
4 April 1942, The Indian Ocean - 4 April 1942 was the calm before the storm as the curtain prepared to go up on what would turn out to be several days worth of confused air and sea actions spanning almost 1600 miles from Addu Atoll in Maldives in the south to Calcutta, India in the north. Onboard the ships of the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy men made the final preparations for battle as most assumed they would be in combat in the next day or two. At the land bases, most air units stood down all but essential operations for the day in order to make sure the aircraft and crews were ready. At Port Blair, commanders were relieved to not be on the receiving end of another air raid as operations and Allied attacks over the past three days had reduced the reconnaissance unit's strength by 50% from 18 to nine aircraft. They opted to not fly the H6Ks on 4 April because the unit would be heavily tasked for the next several days. The story was similar at the British air bases. Minimal fighter patrols were maintained over Colombo and a few PBYs still flew from Koggala and Trincomalee but that was it.
Ozawa's Malay Force was now in the Bay of Bengal and headed northwest toward Visakhapatnam. British patrol planes had not yet sighted his ships and for the time being his cruiser's floatplanes were being employed for local ASW patrols while a shotai of A5M Claude fighters maintained a combat air patrol overhead. Nagumo's carriers continued to push through the seas southeast of Ceylon as the hangar deck crews prepared the five carriers' powerful air groups for the next day's impending action. At 1200 the Akagi received a report from the submarine I-2 off Trincomalee stating that it could not get closer than 10 miles from the port due to aggressive enemy sea and air patrols. It seemed the enemy knew something was up as it was getting rather difficult for Japanese submarines and aircraft to get close enough to Colombo and Trincomalee.
The routine of the Kido Butai was broken up at 1600 when a patrolling RCAF PBY from Koggala appeared overhead. The plane's pilot, Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall who had attacked and sunk submarine I-7 three days earlier managed to get off a sighting report of, "many large ships 360 miles southeast of Colombo" before six Zeroes from the Hiryu shot the interloper down. Three of the PBY's crew members were killed but Birchall and the other six were taken prisoner. Birchall later proved to be a successful leader in his POW camp and after the war he rose to the rank of Air Commodore in the RCAF. Nagumo as well as his primary staff officers Commander Genda Minoru and Rear Admiral Kusaka Ryūnosuke assumed the PBY had made sighting report before it was shot down. They were also informed by the Akagi's intelligence section that radio traffic indicating a carrier group conducting flight operations had been intercepted. While the location could not be pinpointed, the general area was assessed to be somewhere south of Ceylon and northwest of the Kido Butai's current position. Kusaka argued that the plan for the morning of 5 April should be altered and that the Kido Butai needed to find and deal with the enemy carrier force before attacking a Colombo, after all, Colombo was a fixed target and it was not going anywhere. Genda disagreed stating that an attack against Colombo could be launched at first light while a reserve strike force armed with anti-ship weapons was held back until the search planes found the British ships. Genda saw no reason to have all of their planes sitting in the hangars waiting until the enemy forces were detected. He was also concerned about enemy land based aircraft operating from Colombo. Nagumo agreed with Genda and told him to see to a search plan employing the floatplanes from the cruisers Tone and Chikuma that provide adequate coverage out to 300 miles.
The ships of the Eastern Fleet operated in their maneuver areas with Somerville's three main task forces gathered 250 miles south of Visakhapatnam while the Deception Force patrolled 200 miles southwest of Colombo.On the HMS Warspite, Somerville received a message from Layton detailing Birchall's sighting report of Japanese ships southeast of Ceylon. The message also said that Birchall's message cutoff abruptly and that his aircraft had not been heard from since. So far the Japanese seemed to be adhering to the script, hopefully that would last.
4 April 1942, The Indian Ocean - 4 April 1942 was the calm before the storm as the curtain prepared to go up on what would turn out to be several days worth of confused air and sea actions spanning almost 1600 miles from Addu Atoll in Maldives in the south to Calcutta, India in the north. Onboard the ships of the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy men made the final preparations for battle as most assumed they would be in combat in the next day or two. At the land bases, most air units stood down all but essential operations for the day in order to make sure the aircraft and crews were ready. At Port Blair, commanders were relieved to not be on the receiving end of another air raid as operations and Allied attacks over the past three days had reduced the reconnaissance unit's strength by 50% from 18 to nine aircraft. They opted to not fly the H6Ks on 4 April because the unit would be heavily tasked for the next several days. The story was similar at the British air bases. Minimal fighter patrols were maintained over Colombo and a few PBYs still flew from Koggala and Trincomalee but that was it.
Ozawa's Malay Force was now in the Bay of Bengal and headed northwest toward Visakhapatnam. British patrol planes had not yet sighted his ships and for the time being his cruiser's floatplanes were being employed for local ASW patrols while a shotai of A5M Claude fighters maintained a combat air patrol overhead. Nagumo's carriers continued to push through the seas southeast of Ceylon as the hangar deck crews prepared the five carriers' powerful air groups for the next day's impending action. At 1200 the Akagi received a report from the submarine I-2 off Trincomalee stating that it could not get closer than 10 miles from the port due to aggressive enemy sea and air patrols. It seemed the enemy knew something was up as it was getting rather difficult for Japanese submarines and aircraft to get close enough to Colombo and Trincomalee.
The routine of the Kido Butai was broken up at 1600 when a patrolling RCAF PBY from Koggala appeared overhead. The plane's pilot, Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall who had attacked and sunk submarine I-7 three days earlier managed to get off a sighting report of, "many large ships 360 miles southeast of Colombo" before six Zeroes from the Hiryu shot the interloper down. Three of the PBY's crew members were killed but Birchall and the other six were taken prisoner. Birchall later proved to be a successful leader in his POW camp and after the war he rose to the rank of Air Commodore in the RCAF. Nagumo as well as his primary staff officers Commander Genda Minoru and Rear Admiral Kusaka Ryūnosuke assumed the PBY had made sighting report before it was shot down. They were also informed by the Akagi's intelligence section that radio traffic indicating a carrier group conducting flight operations had been intercepted. While the location could not be pinpointed, the general area was assessed to be somewhere south of Ceylon and northwest of the Kido Butai's current position. Kusaka argued that the plan for the morning of 5 April should be altered and that the Kido Butai needed to find and deal with the enemy carrier force before attacking a Colombo, after all, Colombo was a fixed target and it was not going anywhere. Genda disagreed stating that an attack against Colombo could be launched at first light while a reserve strike force armed with anti-ship weapons was held back until the search planes found the British ships. Genda saw no reason to have all of their planes sitting in the hangars waiting until the enemy forces were detected. He was also concerned about enemy land based aircraft operating from Colombo. Nagumo agreed with Genda and told him to see to a search plan employing the floatplanes from the cruisers Tone and Chikuma that provide adequate coverage out to 300 miles.
The ships of the Eastern Fleet operated in their maneuver areas with Somerville's three main task forces gathered 250 miles south of Visakhapatnam while the Deception Force patrolled 200 miles southwest of Colombo.On the HMS Warspite, Somerville received a message from Layton detailing Birchall's sighting report of Japanese ships southeast of Ceylon. The message also said that Birchall's message cutoff abruptly and that his aircraft had not been heard from since. So far the Japanese seemed to be adhering to the script, hopefully that would last.
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