Is a Late CP Victory Possible?

[ArtosStark]

This is why the Moltke offensive is so important, it could (and likely should) have put Germany in a good position to win the long war even putting aside the exaggerated aim of the offensive.

The 1914 offensive failed to achieve its objectives for the same reason that the Spring Offensive 4 years later and Barbarossa 26 years later would; logistic reality. German logistics arrangements were insufficient for the thrust that they undertook, particularly the western thrust. The advance quickly outran its ability to be supplied, and the initial assumptions of the armies ability to live off the land were overly optimistic. This led to underfed horses being sick from being fed green corn, reducing the ability of the wagon trains still further and limiting the cavalry as a useful arm. It led to hungry infantrymen with limited ammunition leading attacks without artillery support because the horse drawn artillery could not keep up.

Germany used every trick in the logistical playbook to try and make their unprecedented thrust work, and most of the delicately balanced logistic support for it collapsed almost immediately. They really couldn’t go much further than they did IOTL.

What’s more, aiming to improve German position for a long war goes against the very reason that the Schlieffen/Moltke plan existed in the first place. Von Moltke the Elder, Von Schlieffen, and Von Moltke the Younger all agreed on one thing: Germany could not win a long, two front war. Von Moltke the Elder’s strategy to deal with this was a defensive counterattack plan to encircle and destroy attacking Entente armies on German territory and then concluding a favourable peace settlement (and even he had no answer to the question of what happens if the Social Darwinist philosophy of the day means the enemy won’t make terms). Schlieffen and Moltke, instead looked for ways that the traditional German strategy of battle of annihilation could avoid a two front war by fighting one at a time. If a long war is anticipated the thrust through Belgium and Holland (or just Belgium) would not be contemplated in the first place.

 

[Riain]

Italy at the time has already rebuild his army as the failed austrian offensive at second battle of Piave showed and no the italian government will not surrender as their choice is between the tender mercy of Wien if they stop fighting and revolution if they don't bring home some result; so it's very probable that the British will redeploy in Italy or launch in any case an offensive that the Austrian don't have the capacity to resist anymore and frankly by the end of their offensive the Germans will be in need to R & R to be fight capable again so for now the Austrian are on their own.

Yes Dover is on the range of the gun and the gun are on the range of the gun of the royal navy plus look more like a terror weapon than something of real military utility and sorry but i doubt that the UK will collapse immediately from the German blockade and the Germans are already on the rope in term of food and is difficult to look to the war aims of Germany as they (like the Austrian) changed a lot and were not really codified

I'm no expert on Italy, without the US on the way can Britain redeploy more troops to Italy? How long after Caporetto did it take for the Italians to rebuild?

Long range guns into Dover aren't a terror weapon as much as harassment and interdiction, once the Germans show they can lob shells into Dover Harbour the Dover Patrol will have to vacate in case one of these shells hits something important.

Throughout the war RN gunfire proved effective only when it was closely observed, early in the war at close range it was terrifying. However once the Germans sowed some minefields and emplaced some shore guns the RN couldn't get in close so their gunfire became a nuisance more than a threat. It took time and effort for the RN to build the spotting towers and other procedures to conduct effective long range shore bombardment against the fortified coastline.

 

[Riain]

The 1914 offensive failed to achieve its objectives for the same reason that the Spring Offensive 4 years later and Barbarossa 26 years later would; logistic reality. German logistics arrangements were insufficient for the thrust that they undertook, particularly the western thrust. The advance quickly outran its ability to be supplied, and the initial assumptions of the armies ability to live off the land were overly optimistic. This led to underfed horses being sick from being fed green corn, reducing the ability of the wagon trains still further and limiting the cavalry as a useful arm. It led to hungry infantrymen with limited ammunition leading attacks without artillery support because the horse drawn artillery could not keep up.

Germany used every trick in the logistical playbook to try and make their unprecedented thrust work, and most of the delicately balanced logistic support for it collapsed almost immediately. They really couldn’t go much further than they did IOTL.

What’s more, aiming to improve German position for a long war goes against the very reason that the Schlieffen/Moltke plan existed in the first place. Von Moltke the Elder, Von Schlieffen, and Von Moltke the Younger all agreed on one thing: Germany could not win a long, two front war. Von Moltke the Elder’s strategy to deal with this was a defensive counterattack plan to encircle and destroy attacking Entente armies on German territory and then concluding a favourable peace settlement (and even he had no answer to the question of what happens if the Social Darwinist philosophy of the day means the enemy won’t make terms). Schlieffen and Moltke, instead looked for ways that the traditional German strategy of battle of annihilation could avoid a two front war by fighting one at a time. If a long war is anticipated the thrust through Belgium and Holland (or just Belgium) would not be contemplated in the first place.

Yes the Moltke plan was logistically unsound, but you know that there were missed opportunities; perhaps encircle the 5th French Army, to keep 4 divisions on the right rather than send them to the east, to transfer 2 whole armies from the left to the right wing and win the so called 'Race to the Sea' as a byproduct of trying to carry out the Moltke plan more fully. Despite all of this the Germans did get very close to Paris, and any of these changes might have swung the balance.

As for the long war, all of those generals underestimated Germany's ability to wage a long war, as did almost every combatant about their own country. I'm not suggesting they plan for a long war in the campaign, rather that if it was conducted better it would give Germany a better outcome to fight the long war with.

 

[Riain]

1. The effective range of the gun you mentioned is 22 kilometers; the English Channel is 33 kilometers wide at its shortest point near Dover.
It can fire out to 47 kilometers, but there's a reason that maximum range =/= effective range: loss of accuracy. So no, there is nothing with which the Germans can suppress defenses on the opposite side of the Channel.

2. German war aims never included annexing English ports. If you think otherwise, show citations; if you do not, explain what you meant about risking "Germany annexing ports."

3. Existential threats = the submarines starving Britain of supplies. Unless the High Seas Fleet were to double in size and grew another pair of testicles, invasion was never a realistic consideration no matter how hard the British propaganda press wanked over the idea, and certainly not after Jutland.

I don't know where you got the idea that I thought Germany would invade Britain let alone annex British territory, I most certainly have never given that impression.

The threat to Britain is that Germany takes all of Belgium and a chunk of northern France, realistically to the Somme estuary but in some extreme circumstances all the way to the Siene, and then for want of a better offer annexes this territory or gains permanent basing rights in the Peace Treaty with France. With France defeated there is no military action that could stop the former, and if the wild circumstances permit it the latter, so Britain will have to negotiate with Germany to get them to vacate these positions.

What leverage does Britain have in such a scenario?

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

I don't know where you got the idea that I thought Germany would invade Britain let alone annex British territory, I most certainly have never given that impression.

No idea where I got that impression.

Is Britain going to remain in the fight and risk Germany annexing ports or getting prolonged access outside the North Sea all in order to keep some shitty colonies in Africa?

If you're talking about Belgian ports, they're already in German hands with or without a peace treaty!
If the Germans capture them, they can use them regardless of whether they're legally German or not.

And they controlled nearly all of Belgium, barring a tiny zone in the very west, since November 1914!

The threat to Britain is that Germany takes all of Belgium and a chunk of northern France, realistically to the Somme estuary but in some extreme circumstances all the way to the Siene, and then for want of a better offer annexes this territory or gains permanent basing rights in the Peace Treaty with France. With France defeated there is no military action that could stop the former, and if the wild circumstances permit it the latter, so Britain will have to negotiate with Germany to get them to vacate these positions.

Military action didn't stop effective German control over the Belgian ports since the start of the war, and they had been based in Ostend since early 1915.
Belgian ports being under German control isn't a new problem; France being defeated and leaving the war is.

Which brings us back to the question of how. It's fairly obvious that the war won't last long after France folds, but you have to get there first.

What leverage does Britain have in such a scenario

What leverage does Germany have over Britain? It has lots of leverage over France through all the occupied land, but none over Britain.
The High Seas Fleet is still quiet after Jutland and the submarine fleet hasn't become any more menacing, so the British can viably end the war on status quo ante bellum.

 

[Riain]

No idea where I got that impression.

If you're talking about Belgian ports, they're already in German hands with or without a peace treaty!
If the Germans capture them, they can use them regardless of whether they're legally German or not.

And they controlled nearly all of Belgium, barring a tiny zone in the very west, since November 1914!

Military action didn't stop effective German control over the Belgian ports since the start of the war, and they had been based in Ostend since early 1915.
Belgian ports being under German control isn't a new problem; France being defeated and leaving the war is.

Which brings us back to the question of how. It's fairly obvious that the war won't last long after France folds, but you have to get there first.

What leverage does Germany have over Britain? It has lots of leverage over France through all the occupied land, but none over Britain.
The High Seas Fleet is still quiet after Jutland and the submarine fleet hasn't become any more menacing, so the British can viably end the war on status quo ante bellum.

I asked you what leverage Britain has, not what leverage Germany has.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

I asked you what leverage Britain has, not what leverage Germany has.

When you're talking about Britain losing colonies in the peace deal, Germany has to have leverage over Britain for that to be possible.
Losing France is leverage over France for colonies, and a general leverage over the last remaining Entente power to seek peace, but not leverage over that power to lose colonies.

 

[Riain]

When you're talking about Britain losing colonies in the peace deal, Germany has to have leverage for that to be possible.

Yes, if Germany occupies the French Channel coast after a successful late war offensive that is a long term, existential threat to Britain. Britain will trade away colonies in order to get Germany to leave the channel coast. The German population wasn't really interested in territorial gains in the west and the political/industrial class was most interested in securing open access to global trade so will likely vacate French territory for the return of it's colonies, the transfer of some Allies colonies and a guarantee of open trade access.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Yes, if Germany occupies the French Channel coast after a successful late war offensive that is a long term, existential threat to Britain.

Germany becoming continental hegemon and neutering all its continental rivals' industries is an existential threat to Britain regardless of whether it owns the Channel, because that means Britain will have no potential allies against Germany afterward and will basically make it Germany's bitch by default.

Germany owning Belgium specifically is not fun, since it is closer to the British coast, but it is peanuts compared to the larger problem of Germany owning all of Europe.

Britain will trade away colonies in order to get Germany to leave the channel coast.

If the Germans have managed to break French morale to the point that they'll ignore British cajolings to stay in the fight, then they are in a dominant enough position on the continent for that to be impossible. The Germans will say "No, we're dealing with the French and not you guys, so sod off and wait your turn."

Also, if taking Belgium really is such a big problem for the British due to its position, then the Germans would know that and categorically refuse any British offer to trade colonies that, to them, are second-order objectives and indefensible compared to Belgium.

The German population wasn't really interested in territorial gains in the west and the political/industrial class was most interested in securing open access to global trade so will likely vacate French territory for the return of it's colonies, the transfer of some Allies colonies and a guarantee of open trade access.

The German population wasn't interested in shit, but the government sure was.

The government's plans were to get Mitteleuropa, to satisfy a variety of interests: the industrialists wanted a closed market to export their goods to, the imperialists wanted the glory of conquest, the far-right wanted to "return to the East" and reenact their fantasy of the Teutonic Knights, and the noble officer class wanted new lands to rule as spoils after the war. This was Mitteleuropa: an open canvas for anyone and everyone to draw their desired future on, at the expense of the local population.

Compared to this, Mittelafrika was always of secondary importance.

 

[ArtosStark]

Long range guns into Dover aren't a terror weapon as much as harassment and interdiction, once the Germans show they can lob shells into Dover Harbour the Dover Patrol will have to vacate in case one of these shells hits something important.

Throughout the war RN gunfire proved effective only when it was closely observed, early in the war at close range it was terrifying. However once the Germans sowed some minefields and emplaced some shore guns the RN couldn't get in close so their gunfire became a nuisance more than a threat. It took time and effort for the RN to build the spotting towers and other procedures to conduct effective long range shore bombardment against the fortified coastline.

All gunfire has the same limitation. German coastal batteries, needing to fire to the outside of their possible range and further than their usual effective range, are less likely to drop shells into Dover harbour than the RN was to drop them into Zeebrugge or Ostend Harbour from offshore. And that is if they were able to achieve effective spotting over the British coast when they were often prevented from doing so over the Dover patrol Monitors by British fighters. And then quickly and accurately communicate that spotting over 30 miles away to the batteries.

And even if such shells are dropped into Dover harbour the RN seems about as likely to abandon the port as the KM was to abandon Ostend and Zeebrugge due to the actions of the Monitors.

Speaking of which, for someone who I know has read Admiral Bacons book, it seems odd to categorize the effectiveness of British coastal bombardment as going from terrifying to ineffectual with the addition of “some minefields” and “some shore batteries”. Particularly when the greatest results came later in the war. The Tirpitz battery came in to action in late 1915 with 4 x 11” guns at Ostend, the Knocke battery with 12” guns at Zeebrugge was proved in May 1916 and the Jacobenesen battery with 2 x 15” guns was set up in May 1917. Yet the greatest firing done by the Dover Monitors was in Spring and summer 1917, after the defences were in place.

but you know that there were missed opportunities; perhaps encircle the 5th French Army,

This was not a missed opportunity for the German army, it requires the French to remain in place in spite of the strong attacks against them. This requires the French to do something disadvantages to them so that the Germans can complete the encirclement that their own plan intended to happen by speed and surprise. Once the situation was clear to the French they fell back faster than the Germans could advance due to the intact infrastructure in their own territory. Meanwhile the Germans were slowed by the destruction of infrastructure in the newly conquered areas and restricted by trying to supply First and Third Armies through the same rail line.

In other words, the Germans would have to move forward faster in strength than their logistics could support, or the French would have to accommodatingly remain in place so that the Germans can encircle them.

to keep 4 divisions on the right rather than send them to the east

to transfer 2 whole armies from the left to the right wing and win the so called 'Race to the Sea' as a byproduct of trying to carry out the Moltke plan more fully

Having more troops to support on the logistically weakest section of front hardly seems like a way to improve the situation.

 

[Riain]

All gunfire has the same limitation. German coastal batteries, needing to fire to the outside of their possible range and further than their usual effective range, are less likely to drop shells into Dover harbour than the RN was to drop them into Zeebrugge or Ostend Harbour from offshore. And that is if they were able to achieve effective spotting over the British coast when they were often prevented from doing so over the Dover patrol Monitors by British fighters. And then quickly and accurately communicate that spotting over 30 miles away to the batteries.

And even if such shells are dropped into Dover harbour the RN seems about as likely to abandon the port as the KM was to abandon Ostend and Zeebrugge due to the actions of the Monitors.

Speaking of which, for someone who I know has read Admiral Bacons book, it seems odd to categorize the effectiveness of British coastal bombardment as going from terrifying to ineffectual with the addition of “some minefields” and “some shore batteries”. Particularly when the greatest results came later in the war. The Tirpitz battery came in to action in late 1915 with 4 x 11” guns at Ostend, the Knocke battery with 12” guns at Zeebrugge was proved in May 1916 and the Jacobenesen battery with 2 x 15” guns was set up in May 1917. Yet the greatest firing done by the Dover Monitors was in Spring and summer 1917, after the defences were in place.

Land based guns are more stable and more accurate than those on ships, in any case the 15" Langer Max had a range of 22km on ships and 47km on land but from Cap Griz Nez to Dover is about 36km so well within the maximum range.

I've also read Admiral Bacon's book, the long range shore bombardment became effective with the development of floating spotting towers that were towed into position well forward of the monitors to call their fall of shot. Prior to that the proliferation of the small and medium guns meant ships could only safely approach the coast to 16km in the day and 8km at night.

This was not a missed opportunity for the German army, it requires the French to remain in place in spite of the strong attacks against them. This requires the French to do something disadvantages to them so that the Germans can complete the encirclement that their own plan intended to happen by speed and surprise. Once the situation was clear to the French they fell back faster than the Germans could advance due to the intact infrastructure in their own territory. Meanwhile the Germans were slowed by the destruction of infrastructure in the newly conquered areas and restricted by trying to supply First and Third Armies through the same rail line.

In other words, the Germans would have to move forward faster in strength than their logistics could support, or the French would have to accommodatingly remain in place so that the Germans can encircle them.

It was a physically slim possibility, to tactically out-march on the offensive a retreating Army is the biggest of big asks. However due to the lack of a proper Army Group command level it wasn't even identified let alone attempted. If it was attempted all manner of outcomes might have happened, it might have been largely or even partially successful, or it might have caused Lanzerac to withdraw even further or with less organisation.

As for logistics, they weren't so bad on 20-24 August and in any case we're only talking a tactical advance of 5-10km; a morning's march that won't snap the logistics.

Having more troops to support on the logistically weakest section of front hardly seems like a way to improve the situation.

According to Van Creveld the biggest issue with logistics was pushing railheads forward, and once this was done supplies at the previous railhead were basically abandoned for the moment. Perhaps this is why when the actual transfer of troops for 5th, 6th and 7th Armies began in mid September they didn't run into any great supply problems. My suggestion is that these transfers begin two weeks earlier, where they can keep themselves supplies from the bypassed railhead dumps.

I think 'logistics' is often use as an excuse for inaction, backed by sayings such as 'professionals study logistics'. Despite inadequate logistics the Germans got within sight of Paris in 1914, Moscow in 1941 and Alexandria in 1942, the logistical problem is staying there not reaching there in the first place and if tactical/operational goals are reached logistics will often sort itself out.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Land based guns are more stable and more accurate than those on ships, in any case the 15" Langer Max had a range of 22km on ships and 47km on land but from Cap Griz Nez to Dover is about 36km so well within the maximum range.

No, that's 22km on rails. 47km is possible from an artillery emplacement, and if your target is the size of a city (ref: Batterie Pommern bombarding Dunkirk). However, the fact that it is stationary and not on rails makes it vulnerable to return fire.

It was a physically slim possibility, to tactically out-march on the offensive a retreating Army is the biggest of big asks. However due to the lack of a proper Army Group command level it wasn't even identified let alone attempted. If it was attempted all manner of outcomes might have happened, it might have been largely or even partially successful, or it might have caused Lanzerac to withdraw even further or with less organisation.

So you take an event that is already unlikely to happen, and then push it into a direction that is also unlikely because it "might" have been partially successful, or "might" have caused the French to fail. Sounds like a Hail Mary, and one which wouldn't have actually been attempted even if the opportunity for it was identified.

I think 'logistics' is often use as an excuse for inaction, backed by sayings such as 'professionals study logistics'. Despite inadequate logistics the Germans got within sight of Paris in 1914, Moscow in 1941 and Alexandria in 1942, the logistical problem is staying there not reaching there in the first place and if tactical/operational goals are reached logistics will often sort itself out.

Bad logistics is the #1 reason why Barbarossa and the Desert campaign ultimately failed, and getting within sight of victory is in no way comparable to actually getting to victory. The logistical problems might be fixed afterward if you win quickly enough, but you actually have to win before your logistical issues catch up with you, and all these examples are of the Germans failing to do so in time.

 

[ArtosStark]

Land based guns are more stable and more accurate than those on ships, in any case the 15" Langer Max had a range of 22km on ships and 47km on land but from Cap Griz Nez to Dover is about 36km so well within the maximum range.

It still requires spotting correction. The mathematical rule is that a stationary gun in perfect conditions will hit the point of aim directly once out of every 67 shots. Wind conditions at altitude, powder variations, buildup of unburnt powder in the bore, all contribute to inaccuracy at range, only partially offset by larger rounds and more powder, and increasing the farther the target is.

Langer Max had an effective range of 22 km on rails. The farthest it was ever known to fire was 44 km from a fixed emplacement when it bombarded Dunkerque in June 1917.

Dunkirk is actually a good example of what happens in a town under bombardment, as is Dover itself in WW2 when the Germans had much more, longer range artillery available than in WW1 on the Channel coast, and in WW2 it was directed by radar. In both cases the bombardment was by both air and gun (Dunkerque was only ranged in by German super heavy Artillery in 1917). In both cases the cities population dwindled as large numbers of people were evacuated and in both cases hundreds of civilians were killed and hundreds of buildings were damaged. But in both cases, the ports remained in operation and remained major parts of Allied logistic and naval networks. If the Germans were able to bombard Dover in 1914 ( which is unlikely, they would probably have to wait until later in the war when heavier guns were available) there seems little reason to believe that the pattern would not hold true here as well.

It was a physically slim possibility, to tactically out-march on the offensive a retreating Army is the biggest of big asks. However due to the lack of a proper Army Group command level it wasn't even identified let alone attempted. If it was attempted all manner of outcomes might have happened, it might have been largely or even partially successful, or it might have caused Lanzerac to withdraw even further or with less organisation.

Absent French cooperation it is highly unlikely to succeed at all. It would require considerably more force available to overcome the French counterattack.Besides having to be lucky enough to have that force available at the right time and place this is force that 3rd army would be required to support all the way there, eating further into their limited supplies. Meaning that, regardless of the outcome of the battle, the Germans would hit the end of their logistical tether sooner than OTL, not later.

As for logistics, they weren't so bad on 20-24 August and in any case we're only talking a tactical advance of 5-10km; a morning's march that won't snap the logistics.

Theatre level logistics had been bad since Liege. Army and Corps level logistics (limited and overstretched Motor transport companies supplementing the largely horse wagon transport from railhead to front and back) set the speed of advance and determined where the armies were during the battle of Charleroi. Just to get where they were the Germans were already using logistics strategies that increase speed but wear away your logistical network. Horses need fodder. And there is a point beyond which an army cannot be supported because their entire load would have to be fodder. Normally, about 50 km is the farthest from the rail head that an army can be supported (while being hard on your horses) while 20-30 km is much more common. The Germans were able to go further by attempting to sustain their fodder pool from the conquered area. But the time of year was wrong (August not being harvest season yet) and the year was poor. And they underestimated the requirements. So Horses were underfed on green corn that made them sick. This led to dead horses and a dwindling supply capacity.

At Charleroi, 3rd Army crossed the Meuse on the 23rd when they arrived there. The French forces guarding it had just pulled back to attack 2nd Armies flank. When they realized that 3rd Army might cut off French Retreat they returned and stopped 3rd Army’s push.

To avoid this the Germans would have had to have lunged even faster across load limited roads, taking them even further from their rail head (remembering that 5-10 km forward means 10-20 km further for your logistics section). They would then have to be well enough supplied to dig in sufficiently to resist the French counterattack. And they would have had to do this on the same day they reached the Meuse. Considering they were unsustainably burning through their logistics train just to get there it seems a tall order to push them further yet.

think 'logistics' is often use as an excuse for inaction, backed by sayings such as 'professionals study logistics'.

Well, you would have fit in well on the German staff.

Despite inadequate logistics the Germans got within sight of Paris in 1914, Moscow in 1941 and Alexandria in 1942, the logistical problem is staying there not reaching there in the first place and if tactical/operational goals are reached logistics will often sort itself out.

Absolutely none of those instances were victories and every one of them was the harbinger of disaster. It is irrelevant if you get close to the line by killing your mount, if you can then not finish. And that is what the Germans were doing. In all of those examples. Failing to finish.

 

[Riain]

It still requires spotting correction. The mathematical rule is that a stationary gun in perfect conditions will hit the point of aim directly once out of every 67 shots. Wind conditions at altitude, powder variations, buildup of unburnt powder in the bore, all contribute to inaccuracy at range, only partially offset by larger rounds and more powder, and increasing the farther the target is.

If you were in command of the Dover Patrol in 1918 and a 15" gun started firing into the harbour would you keep your forces in place on the basis that it won't hit anything? Or would you move your assets out of this crowded harbour knowing that it's just a matter of time before one of these shells hit your warships that were moored together in 3s and 4s?

https://doverhistorian.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/th-6-camber-wwi-motor-launches-admiralty-buildings-in-background.jpg

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

If you were in command of the Dover Patrol in 1918 and a 15" gun started firing into the harbour would you keep your forces in place on the basis that it won't hit anything? Or would you move your assets out of this crowded harbour knowing that it's just a matter of time before one of these shells hit your warships that were moored together in 3s and 4s?

Given that the Dover Patrol is armed with 15" guns (ref: monitors), maybe the first recourse would be to shoot at the enemy.

Afterward, if you haven't done so already, placing an order for artillery to be built in/around Dover to provide counter-battery fire by the time the Germans repair their own battery.

 

[Riain]

Theatre level logistics had been bad since Liege. Army and Corps level logistics (limited and overstretched Motor transport companies supplementing the largely horse wagon transport from railhead to front and back) set the speed of advance and determined where the armies were during the battle of Charleroi. Just to get where they were the Germans were already using logistics strategies that increase speed but wear away your logistical network. Horses need fodder. And there is a point beyond which an army cannot be supported because their entire load would have to be fodder. Normally, about 50 km is the farthest from the rail head that an army can be supported (while being hard on your horses) while 20-30 km is much more common. The Germans were able to go further by attempting to sustain their fodder pool from the conquered area. But the time of year was wrong (August not being harvest season yet) and the year was poor. And they underestimated the requirements. So Horses were underfed on green corn that made them sick. This led to dead horses and a dwindling supply capacity.

At Charleroi, 3rd Army crossed the Meuse on the 23rd when they arrived there. The French forces guarding it had just pulled back to attack 2nd Armies flank. When they realized that 3rd Army might cut off French Retreat they returned and stopped 3rd Army’s push.

To avoid this the Germans would have had to have lunged even faster across load limited roads, taking them even further from their rail head (remembering that 5-10 km forward means 10-20 km further for your logistics section). They would then have to be well enough supplied to dig in sufficiently to resist the French counterattack. And they would have had to do this on the same day they reached the Meuse. Considering they were unsustainably burning through their logistics train just to get there it seems a tall order to push them further yet.

Well, you would have fit in well on the German staff.

Absolutely none of those instances were victories and every one of them was the harbinger of disaster. It is irrelevant if you get close to the line by killing your mount, if you can then not finish. And that is what the Germans were doing. In all of those examples. Failing to finish.

I don't have sources to argue any points, which in any case sound right enough in detail. However I will point out that the Germans did cross the Marne and after the reverse there were able to consolidate on the Aisne, besiege Antwerp and transfer troops from the left to attempt outflanking in the Race to the Sea. It doesn't make sense to say the Germans couldn't attempt an encirclement of the 5th French Army 20-24 August because of logistics, it's far more likely it would have failed because of marching speeds. If the opportunity was recognised and an attempt was made it is exactly what was intended in the Moltke plan and even in failure would have taken the initiative from the French and likely made their withdrawal less successful. If the encirclement was even a partial success the halt taken would have been used by the logistic train to catch up a bit.

As for the German Staff comment, I know you're being sarcastic, but I'll take that as a compliment. 😁

To bring it back to the OP of late victory, I'll reiterate my first post. The war will be a long one in virtually any scenario, and the later the PoD the harder it is to get a CP victory. A PoD in 1914 such as winning the Race to the Sea or encircling a French Army or two and advancing further are far more likely to lead to an eventual CP victory than one in 1917.

 

[Riain]

Given that the Dover Patrol is armed with 15" guns (ref: monitors), maybe the first recourse would be to shoot at the enemy.

Afterward, if you haven't done so already, placing an order for artillery to be built in/around Dover to provide counter-battery fire by the time the Germans repair their own battery.

How did Monitors go at suppressing the German big batteries in Flanders between 1915 and 1917?

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

How did Monitors go at suppressing the German big batteries in Flanders between 1915 and 1917?

Up until mid 1916, they didn't have big enough guns to defeat the German batteries. All attempts were ineffective due to low range and low caliber.
In mid 1916, they obtained two such ships (Erebus, Terror), but their only prominent role that year was as part of a diversion at Dunkirk.
In 1917, they used them mainly for targeting the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostende, with limited success.
In 1918, the Wolfe and Clive got the Furious's 18" guns, but did not get any action with them until September because the German spring offensive had forced the Royal Navy to pause activities. From September onward, they bombarded the forts between Zeebrugge and Ostende and were quite successful, though their lateness made it meaningless for the war.

Conclusion: in 1916, they got the means to effectively bombard German forts, and they started seriously using them for that purpose in 1918, after they'd gotten even bigger guns. Should the Germans get that far forward in late 1918 / early 1919, they will not be able to attack Dover with impunity.

The fact that you chop off the date range before 1918, when the British finally start targeting German forts with effective guns, seems strange. Almost as if you wanted to corral the discussion away from the year which your point was weak on.

(Also, I'm pretty sure that if the Germans move forward to Cape Gris-Nez and start building batteries, the British will have started their own prior to that, and taken measures to prevent the German ones from being completed - say, by targeting the sites with the land artillery, or bombing them.)

 

[Wendell]

No discontinuation of unrestricted submarine warfare might help.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

As always, summer has come and I’m in the need of a creative project. And what better way to drastically rewrite the 20th century than to return to the classic CP victory scenario. I’ve been looking through old threads discussing 1917/1918 CP victories trying to get a handle on the plausibility of it without any more drastic divergences. So far, I’ve seen some pretty strong disagreements in threads going back over a decade, but it doesn’t look like there’s any consensus on it from people who know what they’re talking about.

If we handwave American intervention in the war, then in early 1918 we are looking a scenario where the Central Powers are trying to use all of their available forces to strike another knockout blow on the Western Front. But, of course, Germany is a ticking time bomb because of the social ferment from blockade, hardship, and industrial slaughter. They need to do something fast, and don’t have the luxury of waiting around. Those vaunted harvests from Ukraine aren’t coming any time soon. Opinion on whether Operation Michael can achieve a French collapse without American intervention seems roughly divided, with those saying it cannot seemingly just a little more plausible. The French are battered, but they aren’t as deteriorated socially as the Germans are and it sounds like it’s gonna take more energy to knock them out than Germany has in the tank. Could a blow against Italy trigger a chain reaction? It seems like they were really on the ropes after Austro-Hungarian successes, but also would an Italian withdrawal do much to add time to the German clock?

I’d like to see what people think and reopen the can of worms. Without an American intervention, is a 1918 victory in the cards? Would an attempt at a negotiated settlement even work at this point? Or is the game pretty much up for the Central Powers by this point?

Is a late PoD strictly necessary for what you're planning? Would a 1916 PoD that puts the CP in a much better position to grind out a victory by 1918 be insufficient?