What were German plans for poland if they won WW1

Riain

Banned
am presuming any German victory is going to have to be very much a compromise victory, otherwise Britain won't make peace


This is always the sticking point of CP victory scenarios. My view is that the war takes a somewhat different course than OTL, both Russia and France can be defeated thoroughly and that makes Britain's position as a combatant untenable.
 
They intended to annex a portion of its north and west and then puppetize what remained of it, I recall reading that Poles from the annexed areas would be expelled, and the area would be colonized by ethnic Germans, much like what would be later attempted in WW2.
An absolutely moronic idea if they wanted a newly independent Poland to be a loyal member of their sphere of influence. Granted, Poland's only alternative would be Russia, which I doubt many Poles would've wanted to do.
 

Riain

Banned
An absolutely moronic idea if they wanted a newly independent Poland to be a loyal member of their sphere of influence. Granted, Poland's only alternative would be Russia, which I doubt many Poles would've wanted to do.

Who were 'they' and when did they say what they said?

A lot if people said a lot of crazy shit, but very few people actually mattered.
 
it was called Regentschaftskönigreich Polen in german language
after War it should become Kingdom with Erzherzog Karl Stephan von Österreich or older son Erzherzog Karl Albrecht von Habsburg-Altenburg, as King.
both lived Poland and spoke polish

more info here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Poland_(1917–1918)
Karl Stephan or Karl Albrecht would've both been good candidates, but that likely would've only happened if Galicia were united with "Congress Poland" (or at least whatever was left of it)... and that wasn't exactly certain.
IMO the person with the most legitimate claim to the Polish throne was Frederick Augustus III of Saxony - he could've ruled it in a personal union, outside of the German Empire....
 
if they wanted a newly independent Poland to be a loyal member of their sphere of influence. Granted, Poland's only alternative would be Russia, which I doubt many Poles would've wanted to do.
The Poles would never be loyal with Germany holding Polish land. The kingdom of Poland will only survive with German bayonets.
 
The Poles would never be loyal with Germany holding Polish land. The kingdom of Poland will only survive with German bayonets.
Depends on what the conditions are. If the Polish economy goes terribly then instability is probable, but if life goes on more or less normally, your average person won't really care all that much that their monarch is German. Think back to Franz Josef, for example, whose reputation among the Poles in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was quite positive. When it comes down to it, the deciding factor will be the circumstances of this Kingdom of Poland's creation and how it proceeds through its formative years, not the ethnicity of its monarch.
 
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Okay so I'm going to dredge up an old post of mine because I think it is relevant

So essentially, general discussion on this board over German war aims in 1918 seemed inadequate to me. There seems to be a tendency to present various plans (Septemberprogramm, whatever the hell Ludendorff decided he wanted from Russia on a particular day, etc.) without really discussing the institutional battles going on behind the scenes. I did some reading and it seems like the main battle lines in 1918 was a struggle between the a military + imperial faction and the civilian/Reichstag faction over how best to negotiate and conduct themselves in a peace.

Unsurprisingly, the top brass of the Heer wanted a pretty damned punitive peace. Russia was to be dismembered, police actions to seize more territories or an outright invasion would be launched to overthrow the Bolshevik government and drive 'Great Russia' further and further east. Operation Faustschlag was planned by Ludendorff for the fall of 1918 to seize Petrograd and march on to Murmansk. The Kaiser essentially agreed, although he was particularly concerned with securing dynastic titles for his children. The navy broadly pursued expansionist aims, but were more geared towards securing ports and colonial expansion in order to bolster the world presence of Germany in the post-war world. Such plans as Mittelafrika and the seizing of the Faroe islands belongs to these gentlemen. The Deutsche Vaterlandspartei of v. Tirpitz and Kapp was also a full-fledged supporter of maximalist and punitive war aims against the defeated powers.

On the other side of the proverbial barricades were the civilian authorities. The Foreign Office's v. Kühlmann staunchly opposed any adventurism against the Bolsheviks. He saw only a waste of resources, a newfound Soviet unity, and a potential Valmy in the propositions. He sought to work with the Bolsheviks and "let them stew in their own fat" while Germany prosecuted the war in the west and tried to win the peace. Much of the parliamentary forces seem to have aligned similarly:

"The protocols of the February 1918 meetings of their caucus leaders are liberally sprinkled with declarations against annexations and indemnities: Deputies Hermann Pachnicke, Georg Gothein, Otto Fischbeck, and Friedrich Naumann of the People's Progressive Party (FVP) repeatedly came out against a land grab in Poland, Courland, and Livonia. Matthia Erzberger and Karl Trimborn of the Center Party as well as Philipp Scheidemann of the Social Democrats (SPD) resolutely supported their stance. And both Gothein (FVP) and Eduard David (SPD) on occasion warned about the dangerous degree of political interference by the army's ruling duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Indeed, these leaders must have felt greatly relieved five days after the Homburg Crown Council when Kuhlmann informed government officials that "any kind of wars of conquest ... are absolutely alien to German policies" in the east."

The alignment of forces was thus:

"The deliberations at Bad Homburg on February 13, 1918 produced a renewed Drang nach Osten not unlike the days of the Teutonic Knights. In one corner had stood the emperor, unabashedly pursuing dynastic ambitions in Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states with the zeal of a medieval potentate; decidedly anti-Bolshevik and desirous of dismembering "Great Russia." In another had stood the German navy, studiously disinterested in t east because the war at sea was to be won in the waters surrounding the British Isles before one turned to the Baltic, Barents, and Black seas. In yet another corner at Bad Homburg had stood Ludendorff and the "demi-gods" of the General Staff - vociferously assisted by industry, the Pan German League, and the Fatherland Party who, victorious on the eastern battlefields, were without a realistic concept of Ostpolitik, save their desire to lay their hands on as much real estate as possible. No less than one million German soldiers stood occupation in the east in March 1918, at a time when the great offensive in France foundered before Amiens for lack of infantry. And finally, Kuhlmann had stood virtually alone, the one person with at least a tenuous grasp of die grosse Politik. The foreign secretary was convinced that Russia needed to be included in any future concert of Europe, that the Brest-Litovsk peace was but a stop-gap measure (Provisorium) requiring revision at a future European peace conference, and that no Russian government could accept the permanent reduction of the state to pre-Petrine borders without access to either the Baltic or the Black seas. Moreover, he correctly discerned that German domination "Great Russia" and the "borderland states" would never be accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. Yet his concept stood little chance of success. Kuhlmann became strangely silent after Bad Homburg: at two future crown councils at Spa (May 1 he uttered hardly a word; to a third (July 2) he was not even invited. A belated appeal in March 1918 to Chancellor v. Hertling to uphold the primacy of the political branch fell upon deaf ears."

Of course, we know that the development of the military dictatorship in 1918 effectively shoved out any civilian intervention into army policy and conduct. The "Prätorianerregiment" (praetorian regime) of Ludendorff and Hindenburg had effectively centered power of policy on themselves.

I've heard many argue that the "Silent Dictatorship" would have fallen soon after the military situation was alleviated. If we suppose that the German army was able to surmount the odds in late 1918 somehow and force the Entente to the table (no United States for instance), then what faction in Germany prevails at the negotiation table. Given the social discontent, strikes, and potential for revolution inherent in late 1918, could the SPD and Reichstag parties have ridden the tiger to reassert control? Would the coalition of business, general staff, and right parties be left to draw up an overwhelmingly punitive peace? I imagine the sheer weight of emergency conditions in Germany would preclude any of the fantastical designs of creating a grand colonial empire spanning the east or the center of Africa. It would say it would even preclude even a serious eastern intervention against the Bolsheviks. The power elite of German society may have desired one thing, but could they even achieve it if the civilian government completely refuses to cooperate or even outright sabotages them? What do you all think about this?

Quotes are from:
Herwig, Holger H. “Tunes of Glory at the Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918.” German Studies Review, vol. 6, no. 3, 1983, pp. 475–94. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1429756. Accessed 23 Aug. 2022.

As I mention in this post, I think there is too much of the whole "they wanted this" or "they wanted that" without actually indicating who they were in the first place, and how they changed their ideas over the course of the war. As has been mentioned in the thread, the borderstrip idea was one specific proposal emanating from one specific camp that generally favored very bellicose demands upon the defeated nations. This camp largely enjoyed institutional power in 1918 (are we assuming that this when the CP win?), but it does not seem likely they'll enjoy it long. Especially not having sole jurisdiction over German demands at the peace conference. As shown by one of my quoted sections in the post, it seems like the vast majority of parties in the Reichstag were against any major annexations in Poland at all. Does it not seem more likely then that the borderstrip proposal would not actually be implemented?
 
Think back to Franz Josef, for example, whose reputation among the Poles in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was quite positive.
That because Poland didn’t exist at that point and Austria-Hungary treated them the best out of the three powers occupying Poland.

Depends on what the conditions are. If the Polish economy goes terribly then instability is probable, but if life goes on more or less normally, your average person won't really care all that much that their monarch is German.
It not only the fact that monarch is German. It’s the fact that a new Kingdom of Poland will enflame Polish nationalism .
 
That because Poland didn’t exist at that point and Austria-Hungary treated them the best out of the three powers occupying Poland.
Poland did exist in the form of Congress Poland. A glorified puppet state, sure, but it did exist. Franz Josef was still well-liked amongst his Polish subjects.
That because Poland didn’t exist at that point and Austria-Hungary treated them the best out of the three powers occupying Poland.


It not only the fact that monarch is German. It’s the fact that a new Kingdom of Poland will enflame Polish nationalism .
As Congress Poland demonstrates, a Polish puppet-state isn't inherently going to inflame Polish nationalism.
 

Riain

Banned
Okay so I'm going to dredge up an old post of mine because I think it is relevant



As I mention in this post, I think there is too much of the whole "they wanted this" or "they wanted that" without actually indicating who they were in the first place, and how they changed their ideas over the course of the war. As has been mentioned in the thread, the borderstrip idea was one specific proposal emanating from one specific camp that generally favored very bellicose demands upon the defeated nations. This camp largely enjoyed institutional power in 1918 (are we assuming that this when the CP win?), but it does not seem likely they'll enjoy it long. Especially not having sole jurisdiction over German demands at the peace conference. As shown by one of my quoted sections in the post, it seems like the vast majority of parties in the Reichstag were against any major annexations in Poland at all. Does it not seem more likely then that the borderstrip proposal would not actually be implemented?

This is true, and further is linked to the course of the war, how the CP won and the situation on the ground when Russia capitulates.
 
Poland did exist in the form of Congress Poland. A glorified puppet state, sure, but it did exist.
Which wasn't normally independence and had various revolts with autonomy being removed decades ago.

As Congress Poland demonstrates, a Polish puppet-state isn't inherently going to inflame Polish nationalism.
The kingdom of Poland was viewed as the first step of a United Poland by various collaborators from Russian controlled Poland.
 
This is always the sticking point of CP victory scenarios. My view is that the war takes a somewhat different course than OTL, both Russia and France can be defeated thoroughly and that makes Britain's position as a combatant untenable.
So were looking at a 1914 west front German victory, maybe the Germans take the mouth of the Somme, to Amiens, to Rheims, to Verdun, taking the industrial area, but leaving a short line, perhaps being able to send a whole army east after the middle of October.

The situation in the West, plus extra forces in the east win enough victories to keep Italy neutral, meaning in 1915, the Austrians and Germans keep extra pressure on Russia, and completely block the escape of the Serbians.

The Italian blockade hole eases supply issue for Germany in winter 1915/1916 and beyond. Peace negotiations start taking place early 1916 as the Allies have a less clear path to victory, France is hobbled with the additional lost territory, Russia has lost more too, Serbia has been neutralized.

I am thinking, smart Germany wouldn't annoy all 3 opponents, Czarist Russia is still the best ex opponent to be friends with, break the encirclement, let them deal with a hostile Polish population and let them off easy. Pick on France if anybody (Briery basin, colonies, Vosges passes). Germany wouldn't be thinking like that unless somebody is channeling Bismarck though.

Poland seems very unsatisfying, nothing there resource wise that Germany really needs.
 

Riain

Banned
I think a big difference between Russia and Germany is that Prussians disdained Poles and didn't want to rule over them and assimilate them like the Russians tried. For Ludy this meant expulsion from the 30,000km strip he wanted to annex and for Hoffmann it meant minimal annexation to minimise the number of Poles in 'Germany'.

I suspect this lack of interest will suit the Poles, it will give them wriggle room they lacked under the Russians to develop as a nation.
 
It seems like they had plans to create a puppet state out of poland. But how likley would it be that the Germans would try to restore the post partition Prussian borders. To show a greater expansion of the metropol to better sell the war to their people
Germany would not annex any territory from Congress Poland, they would be content with installing a puppet government, and influencing the Polish economy to serve/aid German interests. If Austria-Hungary collapses then Southern Poland would would want to join Poland. Which would be accepted by Germany since not doing so would destroy any Polish-German relationship, a relationship that would be strained due to Polish irredentism on German lands, and a desire in Poland for more sovereignty. German overreach could very well spark a new geopolitical competition that the Teutons would lose.
 
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