At which point does "unconditional surrender" becomes unavoidable for Germany?
- Thread starter SuperCalifraga
- Start date
Derek Pullem
Donor
There is a difference between when unconditional surrender became a realistic war aim and when it was a political statement.
I'd argue that from Churchill's "we will fight them on the beaches" speech on 4 June 1940 that unconditional surrender was the political war aim. Militarily it became credible after Stalingrad / Tunisia / Guadalcanal.
I'd argue that from Churchill's "we will fight them on the beaches" speech on 4 June 1940 that unconditional surrender was the political war aim. Militarily it became credible after Stalingrad / Tunisia / Guadalcanal.
Something like that. There is a note somewhere from 1940. The British were approached in Sweden by coup plotters as their views if there was a different German Government,
The answer ( and its a briefing to brief the Swedish interlocuters) is to the effect that HMG view was they were not at war with this particular government but with the Reich system which seems to think it can invade its neighbours every 20 years.
While the Western Allies ( and to some extent the Soviets) were very nice about it unconditional surrender is about the total destruction of german civil society and its rebuilding in a manner of the victors choosing.
I voted after the battle of Moscow, but it's a bit of a cheat and use of hindsight!
If Germany can beat the USSR quickly than maybe there's a peace negation that will work/be better than continuing for everyone. But as soon as their initial plan to do that fails (and they have no plan B so can only continue with plan A) it's massively unlikely for events to unfold differently from OTL. Problem is Plan A involved beating the Soviet army in the field, only the Soviet mobilisation only increases from then on until reaching and staying at around 6-6.5m despite ongoing heavy losses. The Germans never beat their own June 1941 figure (3.7m), and in general slowly dwindle in numbers. Its also not just a numbers game. Initially the Germans outfought the Soviets in many different ways, but that German advantage becomes less and less great as the war goes on not only due to the Soviets learning lessons and getting generally better than they were, but because the German systemic weaknesses biting harder and harder.
Of course it's not just the USSR that matters here, but the Germans are pinned in the east. This allows the wallies much more freedom of action. Ultimately even if the wallies were going to entertain a negotiated peace (and why would they?), Stalin's not once he starts winning.
Also it kind of depends on what the conditions are, Pull back to Pre1941 borders is one thing, Pull back to Pre1936 borders and accept the TOV in all ways plus lots of troops to ensure it this time, is something else. Of course there is the separate issue of not what the allies would accept but what the Nazis would offer or accept!
If Germany can beat the USSR quickly than maybe there's a peace negation that will work/be better than continuing for everyone. But as soon as their initial plan to do that fails (and they have no plan B so can only continue with plan A) it's massively unlikely for events to unfold differently from OTL. Problem is Plan A involved beating the Soviet army in the field, only the Soviet mobilisation only increases from then on until reaching and staying at around 6-6.5m despite ongoing heavy losses. The Germans never beat their own June 1941 figure (3.7m), and in general slowly dwindle in numbers. Its also not just a numbers game. Initially the Germans outfought the Soviets in many different ways, but that German advantage becomes less and less great as the war goes on not only due to the Soviets learning lessons and getting generally better than they were, but because the German systemic weaknesses biting harder and harder.
Of course it's not just the USSR that matters here, but the Germans are pinned in the east. This allows the wallies much more freedom of action. Ultimately even if the wallies were going to entertain a negotiated peace (and why would they?), Stalin's not once he starts winning.
Also it kind of depends on what the conditions are, Pull back to Pre1941 borders is one thing, Pull back to Pre1936 borders and accept the TOV in all ways plus lots of troops to ensure it this time, is something else. Of course there is the separate issue of not what the allies would accept but what the Nazis would offer or accept!
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In Sep 1944
a few highlights:
At the start of the month the soviets are at the Bulgarian border,
by the 6th the Tartu Offensive is complete,
by the 12th Romania is signing an armistice in Moscow,
on the 13th they're taking Warsaw suburbs,
the 16th Sofia is occupied,
Sep 19th Finnish/soviet Armistice,
Sep 23rd Soviets cross into Hungary,
Sep 27th, Soviet troops in Albania,
and on the 30th the Lublin-Brest offensive is complete and goals achieved
At which point during that are they going to say "Oh OK no harm, no foul back to June 1941 borders we go" bearing in mind that would mean a soviet retreat for most of the month!
Even if your suggestion is the offer would have to be better than June 1941 borders, really what's better for the Soviets than to keep on going and to dictate terms from the Reichstag, especially as the Walies are now also advancing from the West.
Wouldn't that be rather difficult as it was Britain and France that declared war on Germany?
Germany "only" wanted to regain the territories it had lost after WWI and then go about its genocidal war on Russia.
Several posters have mentioned the allies not wanting a round 3 after 20 years.
IMO, WW2 was less about the 'dagger in the back' myth than the shameful way Germany was treated after asking for terms in 1918. A fact that was increasingly recognised in the 1930s and led to a certain amount of initial support for Hitler's demands.
So the best way not to have round 3 is perhaps not enforcing another unconditional surrender/breaking up the country that will only piss the Germans off and create the demand for another rematch.
You have to see where Stalin is coming from in mid-1944. He has suffered enormous losses so far. Russia is scraping the bottom of the barrel manpower wise and Russian tactics are very costly to themselves.
He has experienced the resilience of his own people against horrible odds and expects nothing less from the Nazis. So even with great success, there are clearly still some nasty battles to be fought.
Then there are the constant rumours of German superweapons which have already produced the V1, V2 and jet fighters. Who's to say they won't suddenly produce some war-winning new weapon?
With hindsight, naturally Stalin (and the WAllies) should have fought it out till the end but with imperfect information, sometimes taking a guaranteed comprise is better than a risky superior solution.
Stalin doesn't trust the Wallies and strongly believes (correctly IMO) that they let Russia do all the heavy lifting and incur the heavy casualties so they can pick up the spoils. The preferred British way of fighting wars as Stalin knows.
So repelling the Nazis and having them turn all their strength against the Wallies and weaken them would benefit Stalin. He gets a breather, can rebuild his armies and when the time is right again, go for round 2 against the Germans.
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That would make some sense in a Notzi world. Where Germany led by a different government had actually kept its word after the Munich Agreement. And hadn't attacked Poland.
Bear in mind that by 1/1/1939 Germany has regained nearly all its lost territories and its breaches of Versailles have been accepted.
But since, in Western eyes, it now clearly can't be trusted to abide by Treaties or from annexation of lands outside the Second Reich (Czechia) . . . Then unconditional surrender is the sole acceptable solution to the WAllies.
That's a bit rich coming from a nation that has attacked most countries in the world at some point in time and controls most of the world through violent conquest and occupation. Even British diplomats would have difficulty communicating this with a straight face...
From Fawlty Towers (albeit being a miscommunication):
(a german) "No, we didn't"
John Cleese "Yes, you did, you invaded Poland"
I understand what you're saying and I agree but these things are always from a point of view.
The British would say the Germans started the war when they invaded Poland and their own declaration of war was the result.
The Germans will say the British started the war when they split up Germany in 1919 and allowed parts to become Polish.
The Polish will probably say the Germans started it during their first partition of Poland in the 18th century or perhaps they'll blame the Teutonic Knights.
The fact is you can only look at who declared war on whom (or attacked whom).
Germany declared war on Poland.
France and Britain declared war on Germany.
1). Only by mid 44 they are winning, and are in a position to transmute all those loses into a massively advantageous position if they get to Berlin quickly (i.e the huge Eastern and Central European land grab that occurs OTL)
2). The Soviets were not really scraping the bottom of the barrel manpower wise, they manged to increase their mobilised numbers from beginning 1944 (6.4m approx.) to the end of 1944 (6.8m approx) all while sustaining approx. 1.5-1.8m casualties. However during the same period the Axis numbers they faced not only started at roughly half the soviet numbers but by the end they had dropped by approx 30% of the Axis starting figure. I.e. Obviously the Soviets can't maintain these figures forever, but it's Germany and Co who are having a much bigger and immediate issue in this respect. The Russians don't have to last forever, they just have to outlast the Germans.
3). An elaborate plan based on getting the wallies to fight harder and then suddenly leap back in rejuvenated to seize everything, rather than just continue winning and maintain momentum, is fraught with failure points.
4). threats of war winning weapons works the other way around it's makes it more important to win quickly, and not give the Germans chance to get them from workshop to battlefield (also 5 minutes looking at the V1, V2 and Jet fighters even at the time they were deployed shows they're not super weapons). "Who's to say" is a bit of a "what if" to suspend victory especially one you spent 3 years working towards
5), the resilience of the German people, yes Stalin knows Germany will resist, but again in 1944 he's in a much better position then the Germans were in 1941, and he has the wallies advancing from the west, as well as Wallie air forces bombing Germany night and day.
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The biggest problem with this conclusion is that the 1945 method seems to have worked. 76 years and counting. In the 79 years preceding 1945 German governments (including the primary originating originating state of Prussia) managed FOUR wars of aggression (1866 - Seven Weeks War, 1870 - Franco Prussian War, 1914 WW I, 1939 WW II) that featured increasing death tolls and commission of war crimes. For that matter the gap since the Wall Fell is the second longest stretch German governments have managed to avoid a war of aggression in 150+ years.
Truth be told, I rather prefer the second option (although it is horrible that the people of the DDR had to experience life under a repressive Communist dictatorship as a result) since the next go-round would almost certainly have involved heavy use of special weapons..
Indeed it's point of view*. The question was "At which point does "unconditional surrender" becomes unavoidable for Germany?" Most important for the answer to that question, is the allied point of view. They will want a return to 1937 borders (at minimum) and they will want assurance that they're not getting into the same shit 10-20 years later, which effectively means an occupied Germany.
This means that after the US is in the war, unconditional surrender effectively can't be avoided. Because the terms they will ask for any peace, will come down pretty damn close to unconditional surrender from the Germany's point of view. So that ain't happening, because it's unaaceptable for the Germans.
Germany's point of view may have been they didn't cause the war, that they will want to keep some of their gains, that they don't want to be occupied. OK. No peace then, until they agree.
*But frankly, it's very unrealistic to claim that Germany didn't start WW2. They were definitely imperialistic from 1933 on and weren't going to stop with Poland.
Stalingrad. Germany suffered a devastating defeat there and their vulnerability was exposed, and by that point they were at war with the United States as well. Germany could get a conditional peace agreement during the Battle of Britain if Dunkirk goes much worse for the allies, but once Stalingrad ends its over.
After Pearl Harbour.
I think the issue for me is that if Germany is facing permanently losing East Prussia, Silesia and so on, no German government (even in a Hitler dies early scenario) would have been willing to surrender before Berlin falls.
I think the issue for me is that if Germany is facing permanently losing East Prussia, Silesia and so on, no German government (even in a Hitler dies early scenario) would have been willing to surrender before Berlin falls.
Yep this is an important point. We are focusing on what the allies would want and when they would want it, but frankly Germany proved itself plenty willing to go down in flames ignoring reality, and that wasn't just due to Hitler.
Ironically the stabbed in the back myth might come back to bite German high command et al, because well if you've peddled it for decades then how can you surrender unless there is literally foreign armies in Berlin!
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Stalingrad became the pivot point on the Eastern Front for a number of reasons, both material and ego related.
Material/strategic first - The Volga was one of, perhaps the most, vital waterway in the Soviet Union. Huge amounts of goods, including oil and grain traveled up and down the waterway. While not quite the level of the Mississippi trade wise, it was perhaps more important in a relatively transportation poor Soviet Union, where the road and rail network was quite weak by European (and fairly pitiful by U.S. standards, especially the road system) into the war years. Stalingrad (actually known as Volgagrad both before Stalin's rise to power and after the fall of the USSR) is ideally placed to interdict traffic on the river, especially from the oil rich Caspian Sea region. The side that holds it holds the, at the time, main source of oil for the Soviet Union (and the Red Army). Germany's greatest weakness, resource wise, was oil*, any modern industrialized country required it in vast quantities, it is literally the life blood of industry and transportation, the entire reason for the German 1942 Southern Offensive was to gain control of Baku and the Caspian Sea oil resources found nearby. Without Stalingrad movement of that vital resource back into the Reich would be vastly more difficult and even if the Caspian is not reached possession of the city (more properly the riverfront on which it is located, would be a huge step in denying the Caspian Sea oil to the Soviets).
The second strategic issue is that the battle for the city became a black hole for combat formations. Both Heer and Red Armylosses during the battle exceed the TOTAL combat losses (KIA/WIA/MIA) for the United States in all of WW II (86,000 German captured at Stalingrad died in Soviet PoW camps, total USMC deaths/died of wounds in WW II were slightly above 20,000). Neither side could make up the losses suffered there, making victory in the battle absolutely critical, since the loser would be hard pressed to have another go (this was especially true for the Germans, who were already experiencing manpower shortages to the point that they had been forced to use 100,000 lightly armed Romanians, well over 120,000 Italian, and 120,000 Hungarian troops, all with insufficient heavy equipment to cover sections of their defensive front). Failing at Stalingrad meant loss of control of the Volga, all that implied, until the end of the War.
The second factor (and in some ways, the more critical one) is the egos of the two War Lords involved. Hitler became utterly obsessed with taking "Stalin's City" for symbolic reasons and Stalin, for the same symbolism became remarkably focused on holding it. The became an increasingly critical element in the battle, by October both dictator's were laser focused on the actions, requiring daily detailed briefings on any movement of forward positions advancing or retreating (this is also the period, where any commander with an ounce of brains would have looked at the German position and withdrawn to a better defensive position to have a fresh try at the City in 1943, before throwing away a few hundred thousand additional troops). Hitler's ego and hatreds prevented him from seeing this, and he gutted the Heer as a result.
Had the Soviets lost the city the impact on morale would have been enormous; it would also very possibly have led to one of Stalin's infamous fits of anger with God knows how many purged senior officers (including the very officers who led the Red Army to Berlin 29 months later) or, alternatively Stalin committing suicide by shooting himself in the back 36 times with three different calibers of ammunition and then cutting his throat, twice. Either way the impact on the Soviet war effort is incalculable and quite possibly sufficient to turn the tide in the East.
*There were a number of others, mainly ores needed as alloying elements in high strength steel, and rubber, but even the ore situation could be, to a degree, managed by imports through third parties like Turkey, Spain and Sweden, and synthetic rubber eased, but did not erase the need for natural substance)