Remember the Texas! The United States in World War II (an alternate history)
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
It wasn't "the Far Left" that was opposed to US support for the Allies against Nazi Germany and changed its tune on 23 June. It was the Communist Party of the USA, and only the CPUSA. The Communists were following the "Party line" decreed by Moscow. Other leftists (notably the "Third Camp" Trotskyites) ignored Moscow's orders. The Socialist Party of Norman Thomas was dominated by strict pacifists and opposed intervention right up to Pearl Harbor.
IMO, it would not be that easy. There would be bitter criticism of Roosevelt for sending US warships into a war zone and exposing them to this risk. Some isolationists would cite Hitler's claim of self-defense by the U-boat, and ask whether Texas and its escorts "fired the first shot". Others might point out that US ships had been warned repeatedly against venturing into the eastern Atlantic.
Note that OTL, the torpedoing of USS Kearny and sinking of USS Reuben James did not trigger a declaration of war.
There were also some Democrat isolationists, such as Sen. Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, a fanatical opponent of Lend-Lease. If 100 Republican Representatives vote against war, Wheeler would too (IMO).
Again IMO, the votes would be much closer. In any case, while Roosevelt may get a declaration of war, it will be much more controversial than OTL, and (IMO) highly controversial.
The timing will be questioned. Some conspiracy-minded types may suggest that the Texas incident was engineered because BARBAROSSA was imminent, and the USSR would need US support.
The problem was the warship technology of 1900 - 1945> did not allow a fleet to do more than raid at that distance. The USN war-gamed the problem almost every year, on the map & with fleet exercises. Trying to send the fleet to PI without a couple intermediate bases invariably resulted in disaster. Japan had ports on Formosa & in its Pacific islands. Truk was a major fleet base. The Japanese & USN both assumed that if the US fleet tried to attack directly across the Pacific a defeat like the Russian fleet suffered would be reproduced. But the 1920s the USN had written War Plan ORANGE into a 'long war' 18 to 24 months of naval construction would be necessary to build the auxiliaries needed to supply the fleet and build the intermediate bases. The actual campaign would required a year of more of seizing the appropriate atolls. The plan contemplated a amphibious force of a couple Marine Brigades & between 50,000 & 100,00 US Army transported across the Pacific. The US Army was cash short during the 1920s & 30s. Most of its regiments & divisions were cadre & depended on National Guardsreserve officers and new recruits to reach combat strength. For WP ORANGE the Army estimated it would require six months to have 50,000 men ready for overseas service & a year to prepare a 100,000 man force.
If you count the US mobilization as starting with the panic funding of mid 1940 then it actually took the USN three years to get geared up for the Central Pacific offensive outlined in WP Orange. of course the S Pacific campaign in 1942 drew off resources, as did the Europe First policy. The two largest hold ups was the destruction of the carrier fleets in 1942 & more important the number of specialized auxiliary ships needed to support the battle fleet. Construction of those was a lower priority than ships for the Atlantic/European war. Once the Essex class carriers & the first wave of auxiliaries were ready mid 1943 plans could be executed.
I've had a similar line of thought for many years, but placed the flash point at the US occupation of Iceland. Transports of US Navy & Marines being torpedoed as they approach Iceland. This was outside the exclusion zone of July 1941. Considered a war Zone by both the Germans and British.
Either way it gets the US closer to war with Germany.
The US I suspect will still not defend as they probably will assume that Japan will go after them first and overwhelm them. The USN in WW2 made the right choices I think with its overall strategy
The field is wide open. Fredenhall, Patton, & Stilwell were all well regarded corps commanders in 1941. Stilwell had actually been selected to command the US component of Operation GYMNAST, before being sent off to China.
Marshals four mobilization Barons of 1940-41 were Drum, Lear, Dewitt, & Kruger. All were great planners & organizers. Drum proved politically inept & terminated his advancement in 1942. Lear was developing health problems by 1942. Dewitt also was showing age problems, & made some politically bad decisions. Kruger is the only one of the four who proved himself in combat, & did very well suffering MacArthur and fighting the Japanese. Kruger commanded more amphib ops than any other US General.
There would still be the unknown but brilliant younger men, like Eisenhower. Politically skilled, capable planners & executors, consistently rated in the top 5% of their peers for several decades of service. Ike was propelled ahead of the pack by the combined opinions of Marshal & Churchill, but were the war to start months earlier circumstances would favor others. The trick is not picking a top performer like Fredendall, who cant cope with the realities of coalition warfare.
1. Mac was not all that well known in 1941. & many remembered him as the guy who gunned down the first Bonus Army. (Roosevelt distributed sandwiches when the second group of veterans came to Washington.)
2. Mac became a favored leader because he was able to isolate himself and control the press narrative from his HQ in the south Pacific. When he went to the US & was interviewed by the Republican party leaders as a presidential nominee the interviewers left the room 'disappointed' . Up close and candid he was obviously a liability. Guys like Devers or Eisenhower had diplomatic skills. Mac by comparison was walking suicide politically speaking.
3. Mac was far over the mandatory retirement age. Roosevelt used that to enable Marshals purge of the old crocks from the Army 1939-1942. Ditto for the Navy. Didn't matter how popular a Lt General or three star Admiral was. Few continued past the retirement age mark.
I thought Kimmel was on the way out anyway - he was to be replaced by Nimitz in January '42, so maybe it wouldn't have made to much difference.
My work here is done!
Less flippantly, it is actually a real possibility. MacArthur had, despite the Bonus Army, a killer rep with the American public, probably because he ignored one of unwritten rules of the Army, "don't make it about you". MacArthur LOVED publicity, had members of his staff more or less dedicated 100% to the care and feeding of his media persona.
IOTL he was stuck on the far side of the Pacific with the entire Imperial Navy preventing his return. In TTL
MAcArthur was the best known officer in the U.S. Army. He was also the darling of, among other media giants, William Randolph Hearst.
'Best known' included hated by a fair number of Great War veterans, and viewed skeptically by career Army officers and the politicians who knew him as CoS. Stimson drank the Kool Aid, but others spit on the ground when his name came up. Like I said he was ok when the narrative was controlled by a friendly press. But, don't let him address a room of other leaders. The possibility of a Presidential nomination tanked about five minutes after he started running his mouth to the party honchos.
Kimmel had been in command for less than a year when Pearl Harbor happened. He was relieved and replaced by Nimitz 10 days later. Before he was assigned command of Pacific fleet Nimitz was a Rear Admiral (upper half). He was jumped over a stack of other officers (including, thank God, Bill Halsey) to take the command.
He was selected for the critical position as chief of Army Ground Forces, one of the three critical organization for the second wave of mobilization after the war started. He was a risk taker & proved over and over his ability to plan and organize. His political skills, and judgement on certain points may be a question. The guy did get himself wounded in 1943 & killed in 1944 taking completely unnecessary risks.
Would Halsey have even wanted command? He never struck me as one to relish a shore command like CINCPAC.
Probably not. However, the military doesn't really care too much about what you want. In peacetime there is a LOT of preference placed on seniority, at least as much as on demonstrated competence. Once the shit hits the fan seniority falls way below competence, which is how Ike went from freshly promoted Bird Colonel in March of 1941 to Five Star General of the Army in December of 1944.
marathag
Banned
Gen Marshall forced thru that the first M3 Stuart tanks produced would goto the Philippines
nbcman
Donor
Mac and his toadies would have to give up on their Philippine Commonwealth (PC) payday if they return to the States before 1942. The money would keep adding up as long as the PC kept up with defense spending through 1942 (0.46% went to Dougie). Considering that there would be more PC defense spending with the earlier US entry, Mac and his toadies would get an even bigger payday staying put 'for the good of the US and the Philippine Commonwealth'.