The Sudeten War: History of the World after an Alternate 1938

Chapter I: Rise of the Nazis and the Sudeten Crisis, 1933-1938.
After reading the Wikipedia article on Turtledove's alternate history series concerning WW II erupting over the Sudetenland Crisis, I decided to do my own take on how such a world might develop. This is the first installment of that TL:



The Sudeten War

Chapter I: Rise of the Nazis and the Sudeten Crisis, 1933-1938.

In 1933, the Nazi Party rose to power in Germany as millions of voters had made them the largest party in the Reichstag. At long last President Hindenburg had been left no other choice but to appoint party leader Adolf Hitler Chancellor in January. After the Reichstag fire that was deemed an act of arson by a Dutch communist, the Reichstag Fire Decree imposed in February rescinded most civil liberties. The subsequent Enabling Act passed in March empowered Hitler to pass laws without the Reichstag’s consent. Opponents intending to vote against these laws were intimidated or outright arrested.

The basis was laid for a dictatorship as Hitler could now simply ban all other parties. The entire country was rapidly Nazified: state parliaments and the Reichsrat (federal upper house) were abolished and their powers transferred to the central government. Civil organizations all received Nazi leaders and merged with the party or were dissolved, and for the media it was much the same with Propaganda Minister Goebbels controlling newspapers, radio, cinema, theatres, music and so on. All symbols of the Weimar Republic were removed and replaced by the swastika and other Nazi symbols. Jews were fired from their jobs as teachers, professors, judges, magistrates and government officials. A deficit spending based economic policy was initiated to rapidly combat unemployment, earning public support.

Their economic policy also included rapid militarization against the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. This military build-up, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and Germany’s questionable involvement in the Spanish Civil War were not protested against by Britain and France, diplomatically or otherwise. On the contrary, nobody so much as batted an eyelid when Hitler reintroduced conscription in 1935 and announced plans to expand the Wehrmacht to 550.000 men in 36 divisions. It was much the same when he remilitarized the Rhineland against the provisions of the punitive Treaty of Versailles. The diktat that Hitler hated so much.

Hitler was encouraged by the passive attitude of Paris and London. In February 1938, Hitler emphasised to Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg the need for Germany to secure its frontiers. Schuschnigg scheduled a plebiscite regarding Austrian independence for March 13th, but Hitler sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg on March 11th demanding that he hand over all power to the Austrian Nazi Party or face an invasion. German troops entered Austria the next day, to be greeted with enthusiasm by the populace. Again no-one spoke out against this blatant violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Believing the British and French wouldn’t act and would try to keep the peace, Hitler felt confident enough to plan his next expansionist move targeting Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia was a multi-ethnic republic – made up of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia – that had emerged from the decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Over three million of its inhabitants, roughly 23% of the total population, were ethnic Germans who hadn’t been consulted on whether they wanted to be Czechoslovak citizens. Most of them lived in the Sudetenland region on the borders. Though the constitution guaranteed equal rights for all citizens and some progress was made to integrate Germans and other minorities, they continued to be underrepresented in the government and the army. The Great Depression hit the highly industrialized and export oriented Sudeten Germans hardest of all, with 60% of all unemployed in Czechoslovakia being German. The Sudeten German Party led by Konrad Henlein, an instrument of the Nazis, demanded autonomy, to which the government replied it was willing to grant more minority rights but was reluctant to grant more autonomy. In May 1938, the Sudeten German Party won 88% of all ethnic German votes.

For much of the summer Hitler was busy planning a limited war against Czechoslovakia no later than October 1st that year (he was determined to act before Czechoslovak defences were completed and before British rearmament would be complete circa 1941-’42) whilst accelerating naval expansion, hoping to have a credible deterrent against the British. Tensions were rising and a war seemed like a distinct possibility. The French were as keen as the British to avoid war and, unwilling to face the Germans alone, took their lead from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Conservative Government. Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet was told by Polish ambassador Lukasiewicz that Poland wouldn’t act if France intervened to defend Czechoslovakia and would never permit Soviet forces to pass through its territory for that purpose either. Some later Polish proposals to the contrary, i.e. offering Polish support, were not responded to by London and Paris.

The crisis escalated over the summer with the German press accusing the Czechoslovak government of atrocities against the Sudeten Germans. It got to the point that on September 12th at the Nuremberg Rally, Hitler made outrageous accusations that Czechoslovak President Beneš wanted to gradually exterminate the Germans and that he was suppressing the Slovak, Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities of his country too. In the meantime, the British had already pressured Edvard Beneš to request a mediator. This mediator was Lord Runciman, who arrived in Prague on August 3rd with instructions to convince Beneš to agree to something acceptable to the Sudeten Germans. Two weeks prior on July 20th, Bonnet had informed the Czechoslovak ambassador that France would publicly declare its support to help the negotiations, but that his country wasn’t willing to go to war over the matter. Hitler hoped the Czechoslovaks would remain adamant, giving Britain and France the rationalization to abandon them to their devices.

In the meantime developments were taking place in Moscow that would give the Sudetenland Crisis an entirely new direction. The Soviet Union’s People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov was the namesake of the 1929 Litvinov Protocol. This protocol provided for immediate implementation of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact by its signatories, thereby renouncing war as a part of national foreign policy (specifically between the Soviet Union and several neighbouring countries). Litvinov wanted peace and was the leading voice for the official Soviet policy of collective security with the Western powers against Nazi Germany. Ironically, his pursuit of peace led to war.
 
Indeed so. I don't know how it'll play out though. On one hand, would Czech fortifications, unfinished as they are, be enough to stem the tide against Germany...and then there's Hungary, who would be more than willing to side with Germany given that it would give them the capability to take lands at Czechoslovakia's expense, if not agree with Germany to outright partition Czechoslovakia between them.
 
germans not getting the prague gold even if they win would be a huge boost to the allies
That and the military-industrial complex, plus whatever losses the Germans take. Even if the Entente and Poland don't do squat about this (though they would probably have declared war or at least observed the campaign and learnt lessons from it), this war will be a massive loss to the Germans.

Czechoslovakia here is also no slouch compared to 1939 Poland, relative to Germany.
 
That and the military-industrial complex, plus whatever losses the Germans take. Even if the Entente and Poland don't do squat about this (though they would probably have declared war or at least observed the campaign and learnt lessons from it), this war will be a massive loss to the Germans.

Czechoslovakia here is also no slouch compared to 1939 Poland, relative to Germany.
What were the Czech's military capabilities vs. say, Poland?
 
What were the Czech's military capabilities vs. say, Poland?
If mobilisation was completed by the time the Germans planned to invade (before 1st October at the latest), then they would have about double the manpower the Poles had when war started in 1939, with a greater proportion of automatic weapons. They have about double the amount of gun tanks, 350, with 100 apparently requisitionned from export orders and the majority likely being gun tanks too. Those were also slightly better than Polish tanks in terms of protection but IIRC they only had 1-man turrets while the 7TPs had two-man ones.
The Czech have about half the AT guns the Poles had, but they had more in fortifications. The AA defense was likely weaker although for their credit the Czech have double the amount of fighters and those were much more capable.

Overall, the Czech have parity with the Germans in theater in terms of manpower, and intervention of allies would likely make sure this parity remains. Thanks to their fortifications and somewhat more defensible ground, the Czech could fight on more even terms than Poland, especially since Germany is weaker and less experienced than in 1939. The Germans estimated that if morale collapsed in Czechslovakia the war would only last one-two weeks, but if morale remains high then they could hold for 4 weeks to three months.

In fact, the air war might not have been as unbalanced as one might expect. The Germans only had some 600-800 Bf 109s in 1938, with 50% being unavailable as of July due to reliability issues. These were nowhere near the Es in terms of performance, and they had a really weak armament. The 300-400 Avia B-534 the Czechs have climb faster and are more maneuverable, are flown by good pilots and are not slower enough to be really overmatched. The Germans would likely have to keep fighters in reserve to counter France or Poland too. Besides, the weather was already getting worse in September-October. If France actually commits its bomber force to annoy the Germans, the Czech might actually stalemate the air war. If the Czech hold till November, they actually have a good chance to stay in the war until next Spring.
 
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If mobilisation was completed by the time the Germans planned to invade (before 1st October at the latest), then they would have about double the manpower the Poles had when war started in 1939, with a greater proportion of automatic weapons. They have about double the amount of gun tanks, 350, with 100 apparently requisitionned from export orders and the majority likely being gun tanks too. Those were also slightly better than Polish tanks in terms of protection but IIRC they only had 1-man turrets while the 7TPs had two-man ones.
The Czech have about half the AT guns the Poles had, but they had more in fortifications. The AA defense was likely weaker although for their credit the Czech have double the amount of fighters and those were much more capable.

Overall, the Czech have parity with the Germans in theater in terms of manpower, and intervention of allies would likely make sure this parity remains. Thanks to their fortifications and somewhat more defensible ground, the Czech could fight on more even terms than Poland, especially since Germany is weaker and less experienced than in 1939. The Germans estimated that if morale collapsed in Czechslovakia the war would only last one-two weeks, but if morale remains high then they could hold for 4 weeks to three months.

In fact, the air war might not have been as unbalanced as one might expect. The Germans only had some 600-800 Bf 109s in 1938, with 50% being unavailable as of July due to reliability issues. These were nowhere near the Es in terms of performance, and they had a really weak armament. The 300-400 Avia B-534 the Czechs have climb faster and are more maneuverable, are flown by good pilots and are not slower enough to be really overmatched. The Germans would likely have to keep fighters in reserve to counter France or Poland too. Besides, the weather was already getting worse in September-October. If France actually commits its bomber force to annoy the Germans, the Czech might actually stalemate the air war. If the Czech hold till November, they actually have a good chance to stay in the war until next Spring.
But, and as you say in other words, it depends on if France commits to an actual shooting war earlier than they did IOTL, which may not be guaranteed.
 
But, and as you say in other words, it depends on if France commits to an actual shooting war earlier than they did IOTL, which may not be guaranteed.
Yep, especially considering that unlike with Poland, France didn't have a military clause in its agreements with Czechoslovakia. That said the French mobilised in 1938. Even this threat would still keep German forces unavailable for the invasion of CZ.
 
Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet was told by Polish ambassador Lukasiewicz that Poland wouldn’t act if France intervened to defend Czechoslovakia and would never permit Soviet forces to pass through its territory for that purpose either. Some later Polish proposals to the contrary, i.e. offering Polish support, were not responded to by London and Paris.
IOTL, Jozef Beck actually did say, at least privately, in Poland, that Poland would have to fight Germany if France did to maintain the 1921 treaty with France. But I could believe that he would moderate that sentiment for the French themselves so as to not antagonize Germany directly.
 
In fact, the air war might not have been as unbalanced as one might expect. The Germans only had some 600-800 Bf 109s in 1938, with 50% being unavailable as of July due to reliability issues. These were nowhere near the Es in terms of performance, and they had a really weak armament. The 300-400 Avia B-534 the Czechs have climb faster and are more maneuverable, are flown by good pilots and are not slower enough to be really overmatched. The Germans would likely have to keep fighters in reserve to counter France or Poland too. Besides, the weather was already getting worse in September-October. If France actually commits its bomber force to annoy the Germans, the Czech might actually stalemate the air war. If the Czech hold till November, they actually have a good chance to stay in the war until next Spring.

Really, that situation in the air as you describe it looks very bad for the Luftwaffe, and for the Germans as a whole. Roughly half of their mainline fighter out because of reliability issues, and a need to keep some of the half they can use out of the fight in case the French, British, and Polish get fresh? Not good.

That means that, while the Luftwaffe technically has more fighters, they will be outnumbered in the air on day one unless they can destroy a large chunk of the enemy's air force in a surprise attack that catches them on the ground. Possible, but since Prague knows war is imminent, less likely. If the Czechoslovaks are smart now they will be spreading out large portions of their air force, especially the fighters, to secondary locations along with pilots, ground crew, security and fuel and ammunition stocks.

In addition, it is possible seeing the Czechoslovaks making such spirited resistance might animate the French into taking earlier and more aggressive action against Germany.

Perhaps the Saar Offensive is launched in '38 instead of '39, and has some real teeth.
 
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Really, that situation in the air as you describe it looks very bad for the Luftwaffe, and for the Germans as a whole. Roughly half of their mainline fighter out because of reliability issues, and a need to keep some of the half they can use out of the fight in case the French, British, and Polish get fresh? Not good.

That means that, while the Luftwaffe technically has more fighters, they will be outnumbered in the air on day one unless they can destroy a large chunk of the enemy's air force in a surprise attack that catches them on the ground. Possible, but since Prague knows war is imminent, less likely. If the Czechoslovaks are smart now they will be spreading out large portions of their air force, especially the fighters, to secondary locations along with pilots, ground crew, security and fuel and ammunition stocks.

In addition, it is possible seeing the Czechoslovaks making such spirited resistance might animate the French into taking earlier and more aggressive against against Germany.

Perhaps the Saar Offensive is launched in '38 instead of '39, and has some real teeth.
The weaker state of the Siegfried line and the potentially longer Czech resistance relative to the Poles might indeed allow the French to actually press on with that offensive, in spite of mobilization issues and a much weaker Army. This might allow them to realize the actual extent of the Siegfried line so they might actually keep more of the Saar.

That said, considering the limitations of the French Army in 1938 and the shorter time until winter sets in, I'm afraid that such an offensive would have remained rather limited. But if it allows the French to put more pressure and learn more out of it, I'd say it's worthwhile.
The French bomber force is one factor we have to consider too. While most of the aircrafts were obsolete and had reliability issues and spare parts were lacking, they were less obsolete than a year later. Moreover, the German air defense would have been much weaker, and indeed battles with the Czech Air Force could have revealed the vulnerability of the Luftwaffe. OTL, the French were able to send obsolete bombers by day without facing opposition in 1939. Here, there is really a possibility that France launches regular bombing attacks on the Ruhr, although they would still have done limited damage.

This goes for recon missions too, the Potez 630s that were entering service would have been among the fastest aircrafts at the time, very difficult to intercept. Performing more recon missions could be highly useful to French intelligence.
 
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In the meantime developments were taking place in Moscow that would give the Sudetenland Crisis an entirely new direction. The Soviet Union’s People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov was the namesake of the 1929 Litvinov Protocol. This protocol provided for immediate implementation of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact by its signatories, thereby renouncing war as a part of national foreign policy (specifically between the Soviet Union and several neighbouring countries). Litvinov wanted peace and was the leading voice for the official Soviet policy of collective security with the Western powers against Nazi Germany. Ironically, his pursuit of peace led to war.
Si vis pacem, para bellum
 
If mobilisation was completed by the time the Germans planned to invade (before 1st October at the latest), then they would have about double the manpower the Poles had when war started in 1939, with a greater proportion of automatic weapons. They have about double the amount of gun tanks, 350, with 100 apparently requisitionned from export orders and the majority likely being gun tanks too. Those were also slightly better than Polish tanks in terms of protection but IIRC they only had 1-man turrets while the 7TPs had two-man ones.
The Czech have about half the AT guns the Poles had, but they had more in fortifications. The AA defense was likely weaker although for their credit the Czech have double the amount of fighters and those were much more capable.

Overall, the Czech have parity with the Germans in theater in terms of manpower, and intervention of allies would likely make sure this parity remains. Thanks to their fortifications and somewhat more defensible ground, the Czech could fight on more even terms than Poland, especially since Germany is weaker and less experienced than in 1939. The Germans estimated that if morale collapsed in Czechslovakia the war would only last one-two weeks, but if morale remains high then they could hold for 4 weeks to three months.

In fact, the air war might not have been as unbalanced as one might expect. The Germans only had some 600-800 Bf 109s in 1938, with 50% being unavailable as of July due to reliability issues. These were nowhere near the Es in terms of performance, and they had a really weak armament. The 300-400 Avia B-534 the Czechs have climb faster and are more maneuverable, are flown by good pilots and are not slower enough to be really overmatched. The Germans would likely have to keep fighters in reserve to counter France or Poland too. Besides, the weather was already getting worse in September-October. If France actually commits its bomber force to annoy the Germans, the Czech might actually stalemate the air war. If the Czech hold till November, they actually have a good chance to stay in the war until next Spring.
The AA defense was probably the weakest part of our army back then. While there were several batteries with around a dozen guns each, these were often quite old (the 90 mm version), there were the somewhat modern 83,5 mm, which would honestly be better used against tanks though (they were quite similiar to german 88 mm). In some cases the AA was quite usable (mostly in Prague), but there were not many reserve pieces. There were all in all 350 actual tanks (mostly LT 34 and LT35) and some 70 tankettes (comparable to German Panzer I). All the tanks were equiped with cannon, and outside of Panzer III, none of the German tanks could pierce their frontal armour (meanwhile, Panzer I and II could be pierced with machine guns from the sides and by just about any CZS cannon)

Honestly, Germany might not actually be capable of achieving parity. Considering that at least some of their 48 divisions will have to be moved against France. Meanwhile, the CZS has 1 250 000 men in 42 divisions and border "regiments", who can relly on mountainous terrain, several rivers and fortifications. And Germany doesn't have the Czechoslovak arsenal which it had against Poland of course. As for moral collapsing, yeah thats not happening. Considering the strong pro-war demonstrations around CZS in september and the high quality of training and officer caders, Czechoslovak army should be quite capable to fight untill the bitter end, if necessary.

By the late.october the weather will be becoming extremely unsuited for large scale aerial warfare and by the beginning of November, it would be outright highly risky (it seems there were rather rainy days at the end of October and it only got worse by beginning of November, with only a few clear days). And from what I remember, there were not large amounts of ammunition reserves for Luftwaffe, with some claiming that they had at most a month (though I read about this some time ago, so it might not be true, or only partially true). Honestly, the problem for the Germans will be fuel. If the French can cut off German oil supply, combined with the fact that Romania will likely side with its allies and might quite well embargoe Germany, it would be interesting to see just how long the Germans can keep themself supplied.


As for this beginning, I quite like it. Factually correct and well written. Will be interesting to see which direction this conflict will go.
 
The biggest problem the Czecoslovaks have is loyalty. The Sudeten Germans and Slovaks were called 'compromised' in 1938 by many allied intelligence
 
The biggest problem the Czecoslovaks have is loyalty. The Sudeten Germans and Slovaks were called 'compromised' in 1938 by many allied intelligence
Honestly, most minorities will be fine with some concessions. 2/3 of the Germans and basically all Slovaks joined their regiments as ordered.

If the government offers autonomy to minority regions and equal position, perhaps federalization, to Slovakia (which it might easily be forced to do by WAllies) it should be enough to secure the minorities and Slovaks, and at least a part of the Sudeten germans.
 
Honestly, most minorities will be fine with some concessions. 2/3 of the Germans and basically all Slovaks joined their regiments as ordered.

If the government offers autonomy to minority regions and equal position, perhaps federalization, to Slovakia (which it might easily be forced to do by WAllies) it should be enough to secure the minorities and Slovaks, and at least a part of the Sudeten germans.
such offers and proposals were shot down if i am not mistaken. Germans were also sorely under-represented in the education system of Czechoslovakia from what i understand. While it may be *easy* to mend fractures, I am not sure it would be politically viable, as it would hand, in particular to the Slovak People's Party and SdP a lot of power, both of whom won their regional elections in 1935 if i am not mistaken.
 
such offers and proposals were shot down if i am not mistaken. Germans were also sorely under-represented in the education system of Czechoslovakia from what i understand. While it may be *easy* to mend fractures, I am not sure it would be politically viable, as it would hand, in particular to the Slovak People's Party and SdP a lot of power, both of whom won their regional elections in 1935 if i am not mistaken.
By late 1938, the Prague goverment was quite willing to give in to many of the regional demands, just so they could preserve the borders. The problem was, that Henlein and SdP were not really planning to negotiate at this point, as they were already commited to joining Hitler and Germany.

If the West demands that Prague implements an autonomous and federal system, in exchange for guaranteeing the borders, Benes will unhappily accept, to preserve the borders (or perhaps he will no longer be in power to do anything about it) The SdP is not going to accept this, but many of their voters, who sometimes supported them mostly because of the lack of progress with their rights and positions could leave them. They would still retain large support, but not the absolute one they had by Munich.

As for the Slovaks, they were never fully separatist. Even in 1939, Hitler had to threaten Tiso with Hungarien annexation to get him to declare independence. If offered federation, they will jump in, if only to preserve their lands from Hungary, whom they disliked much more then Czechia.
 
By late 1938, the Prague goverment was quite willing to give in to many of the regional demands, just so they could preserve the borders. The problem was, that Henlein and SdP were not really planning to negotiate at this point, as they were already commited to joining Hitler and Germany.

If the West demands that Prague implements an autonomous and federal system, in exchange for guaranteeing the borders, Benes will unhappily accept, to preserve the borders (or perhaps he will no longer be in power to do anything about it) The SdP is not going to accept this, but many of their voters, who sometimes supported them mostly because of the lack of progress with their rights and positions could leave them. They would still retain large support, but not the absolute one they had by Munich.

As for the Slovaks, they were never fully separatist. Even in 1939, Hitler had to threaten Tiso with Hungarien annexation to get him to declare independence. If offered federation, they will jump in, if only to preserve their lands from Hungary, whom they disliked much more then Czechia.
hm, didn't know that last fact. Thanks.
 
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