Sane German response to the Sarajovo murder in July 1914

[BooNZ]

Doing a search you see a ton of threads about Germany going east. There is a lot of debate on if Britain comes in anyway (Belgium or no Belgium). Its in Britain's interests to be in anyway.

Exactly what did Britain gain from the war? Without Britain the war likely ends in 1915 with far fewer men and less treasure wasted by all - and before unreasonable war goals have got out of hand.

If Britain stays neutral and France respects Belgian neutrality, Germany wins in the end, but its a grind, the Russians will do better defending their country, vs launching years of forlorn attacks on Germany and Austria.

Russia started the war in 1914 with an offensive doctrine and is unlikely to do better against 3-4 German Armies compared to the thrashing it got from a single German Army. In 1915 Russia sat on the defensive and then got routed, losing 1.5 million men in the ensuing retreat, before the A-H forces were distracted by the Italians. In 1916 the A-H forces continued to be distracted by the Italians, while the Germans were spending quality time with the Franch and the British in the west. The Russians then won a hard fought victory against A-H while no one was looking and then proceeded to collapse. It is difficult to imagine how the Russians are expected to perform better against far more Germans with far fewer men.

 

[Vabasion]

Exactly what did Britain gain from the war? Without Britain the war likely ends in 1915 with far fewer men and less treasure wasted by all - and before unreasonable war goals have got out of hand.

Russia started the war in 1914 with an offensive doctrine and is unlikely to do better against 3-4 German Armies compared to the thrashing it got from a single German Army. In 1915 Russia sat on the defensive and then got routed, losing 1.5 million men in the ensuing retreat, before the A-H forces were distracted by the Italians. In 1916 the A-H forces continued to be distracted by the Italians, while the Germans were spending quality time with the Franch and the British in the west. The Russians then won a hard fought victory against A-H while no one was looking and then proceeded to collapse. It is difficult to imagine how the Russians are expected to perform better against far more Germans with far fewer men.

It broke Germany its main rival. People at the time really wouldn’t understand the modern mentality of coexistence and working together like EU does nowadays. Germany is growing too close to our power therefore they need to be cut down before they overtake us. If they don’t act Germany becomes the continental hegemon. And distance from him to WW1 is about the same as from WW1 to us today. It was still fresh.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

In OTL there were no UK general elections between 1910 and 1918 due to the war, only 2 re-shufflings of the cabinet with the formation of "grand coalition" governments... had the UK remained neutral in 1914 (and stayed that way for a while, another matter entirely) and there been an election in 1916 or before (which by law should have happened were it not for the circumstances), I wonder what would've happened....

The Conservatives were (IIRC) the largest party in the Commons, just shading it from the Liberals following by-election losses for the Government. However the Liberals had two supporting blocks in the IRP (hence why Home Rule was heavily on the agenda from 1910 onwards) and the Labour Party.

If the Liberal Government falls on a vote of no-confidence - not necessarily a given - then the King would almost certainly call for Bonar Law to form a minority government, and he may press for a general election. I doubt he could mobilize enough support from the Liberals - and the IRP (certainly) and Labour (probably) won't back the Tories. They probably would support the Liberals in any vote as they would not fancy an election bringing Bonar Law and a Unionist government.

More likely is a National Government formed under Asquith (as in 1915). Even if he is persona-non-grata I doubt the Tories' bogeymen Lloyd George & Churchill would be acceptable - in fact the Tories made Churchill's exclusion from the cabinet a condition for the coalition. I would expect Asquith to survive as PM this time. As others have suggested, other potential Liberal leaders would include McKenna. It couldn't be Bonar Law as PM, who failed to seize the crown in 1916 as he knew the numbers did not stack up.

Essentially the British political system is moved forward a year, so we probably lose Asquith (or replacement Liberal PM) in late 1915 or early 1916 after the failures at Gallipoli & Loos to be replaced by Lloyd George, who would not be in as strong a position as late 1916 given the role as Minister of Munitions has run for 12 less months, and had less time to seduce his Conservative fellow ministers. Possible at that time someone might suggest Balfour as a former PM and someone who could be flexible on issues & so acceptable to the Liberal Imperialists.

 

[History Learner]

WI Germany had decided to stand to defend against France (in otl the French attack failed desperately- But Germany attacked Belgium. Had more of Germany's forces attacked Russia they would have done badly in 1914.

My feeling is that Russia would accept some humiliation for Serbia.

Over by Christmas. A lot fewere dead than OTL and none of the from Britain.

Could that have happened?

See this post:

I just came across a previous discussion of this in an older thread, where @AJE pulled up a paper by Terence Holmes at a conference six years ago, "Not the Schlieffen Plan 1914":

If Moltke had followed Schlieffen’s real intentions for the counter-offensive conduct of a two-front war, the first great battle of 1914 would have been fought in Lorraine in the third week of hostilities, on terms much more favourable to Germany than they were at the battle of the Marne. We can reconstruct this alternative scenario because we know exactly what the French chief of staff Joseph Joffre intended to do if the Germans did not invade Belgium.

French war planning was constrained by two political imperatives. In the first place, France was committed by agreement with her Russian ally to launch an ‘all-out and immediate’ attack against Germany as soon as possible after the outbreak of war. Moreover, the French government had resolved not to encroach on Belgian territory unless the Germans did so first. Joffre was therefore obliged to incorporate in his war plans a variant which allowed for a full-scale offensive avoiding Belgian territory altogether, and that would have come into effect in 1914 if the Germans had stayed on the defensive and not entered Belgium. For this eventuality Joffre decided that three of his five armies, comprising some 60 percent of his first-line troops, should invade Lorraine on 14 August, aiming initially to reach the line of the river Saar between Sarrebourg and Saarbrücken (Doughty 2010, 146-8, 155-8, 168). Ominously, that position was flanked at both ends by the German fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg.

Schlieffen had long before outlined how the Germans should exploit a massive French incursion through ‘the relatively narrow space between Metz and Strasbourg’. The aim must not be to push the enemy back to his fortified border. Rather, he had to be engaged on three sides, ‘from Metz, from the Saar and from Strasbourg’, and brought to a standstill there, which would give the Germans an excellent chance of decisive victory by means of envelopment attacks out of Metz and Strasbourg. The ultimate aim of this ‘attack on the enemy’s flank and rear’ would be to surround the French invasion forces and ‘not just defeat them, but lay them low and as far as possible annihilate them’ (Boetticher 1933, 260).

Joffre himself was acutely aware of the perils attending a French offensive in Lorraine. He said that the object would be to rupture the German front, but he conceded
that:

"in the course of this operation our forces would be liable to be taken in flank by attacks coming in all probability from both Metz and the region of Molsheim-Strasbourg. By penetrating like a wedge into the midst of the enemy’s lines we would be more or less inviting envelopment (Joffre 1932, 74-5)."

But a German defensive posture in 1914 would have compelled Joffre to embark on that hazardous course of action — that was precisely what he was committed to if the Germans refrained from attacking through Belgium and waited instead for the opportunity to counter-attack. In that event, the war would have started with a great battle of encirclement as soon as the French First, Second and Fourth Armies had completed their short advance into the danger zone between Metz and Strasbourg. Speaking in 1904 of the strategic importance of these fortresses, Schlieffen once again emphasized their role in counter-offensive operations: ‘I do not mean a Metz and Strasbourg that are to be besieged and defended, but rather a Metz and Strasbourg in which armies are assembled and through which they march in order to attack the enemy by surprise’ (Zuber 2004, 160).

Tl;dr 60% of the French Army is destroyed in the Fall of 1914, allowing German to decisively win the war no later than 1915 but more likely achieving the goal of having the war end by Christmas.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Kaiser Bill seems a bit dense sometimes... doubt he was that good at "reading between the lines"

You're the one "reading between the lines"; Wilhelm took the Serbian response at face value. And AFAIK, nobody told him he was reading it wrong.

As far as Russia, I don't think Germany and A-H really had to push that hard. To my knowledge, the only prominent Russian that spoke out against mobilization was Witte....

After Austria issued its overweening ultimatum. Which is my point.

 

[Aghasverov]

You're the one "reading between the lines"; Wilhelm took the Serbian response at face value. And AFAIK, nobody told him he was reading it wrong.
After Austria issued its overweening ultimatum. Which is my point.

Conceded... that was my personal take on it, based in the translation of the Serbian response that I read. Wilhelm did take it at face value, thought that war had been averted at that point, and was surprised to learn that A-H declared war anyway shortly thereafter... there were certain members of his government/staff though who were not surprised at all, as that was the intended/hoped for result.

 

[Athelstane]

See this post:


Tl;dr 60% of the French Army is destroyed in the Fall of 1914, allowing German to decisively win the war no later than 1915 but more likely achieving the goal of having the war end by Christmas.

I think 1915 is the safer bet. Viviani's government would be ferociously reluctant to admit it had lost, especially in a scenario where virtually all of its territory remained unoccupied. That said, a calamity like the one under consideration in Lorraine would result in Viviani being out of power a lot sooner than October 1915.

 

[Comte de Geneve]

Back to the OP, the ONLY Sane response by Imperial Germany was NOT to give A-H the 'blank cheque'. But who in that regime was going to be the sane adult. The 'blank cheque' totally enabled the out-of-control war party in Vienna, ecstatic now that the only brake on the drive to war, FF, was not only removed but elevated to a causus belli. After that point it would have taken some highly capable diplomacy and some harsh doses of reality to prevent the August Apocalypse. And there was no one among the European leaders who qualified. The heart of the tragedy.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Well, consistent with British policy only if you go back to around 1907-08, and after that ONLY consistent with the views of a handful of Ministers in Asquith's cabinet (and with certain personages in their Conservative opposition, and with a couple of very widely-read newspapers)... unfortunately it was some of the most powerful Ministers (Grey, Churchil) who held to this view...

Really? Only 1907-08? How does that explain the Crimean War? The Napoleonic Wars? The Seven Years War? The War of the Austrian Succession? The War of the Spanish Succession? The list goes on and on. British policy was always to support the weaker power or coalition in continental Europe against the power or coalition the seemed likely to dominate the continent.

As Sir Humphrey so ably puts it:
Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it's worked so well?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

It was a "strong note"... that was the intention, I have no doubt. Austria-Hungary wanted to force a reckoning with the Serbs. I won't agree that it was completely unwarranted.
Just a couple days before the Kaiser was reading his diplomatic correspondences re: the ultimatum, Poincare had been wining and dining with Tsar Nicky... far from urging a course of moderation, he fully encouraged Russia to support the Serbian position and all but assured Nicky that if a war were to erupt in the East, there would be a concomitant war in the West... IMO there were "blank cheques" issued on both sides before the Ultimatum was even issued...

No one is disputing any of that

The question is what would happen if the Germans did not issue their blank cheque

 

[marathag]

That would be lose-lose result no matter who won.
Its either Germany and A+H dominates the continent, or France and Russia.
Neither is a good result for the UK

 

[Athelstane]

Really? Only 1907-08? How does that explain the Crimean War? The Napoleonic Wars? The Seven Years War? The War of the Austrian Succession? The War of the Spanish Succession? The list goes on and on. British policy was always to support the weaker power or coalition in continental Europe against the power or coalition the seemed likely to dominate the continent.

It could be what he means is that while the basic strategic instinct remained the same, the direction in which it was employed shifted under Edward VII. I think it's significantly harder to see Britain joining France in a war against Germany before 1907 (and even more so, before 1905, when Balfour is still in charge).

You mentioned the Crimean War. That's actually important to consider, because it left a very bad taste for major European wars (or indeed, any major wars, something the Confederate government nevr properly appreciated) in the mouths of British votaries. By the time of Edward VII, that bad taste had faded a lot in British memories, and unfortunately Wilhelm II seemed determined to do everything possible to bury it.

 

[Aghasverov]

Really? Only 1907-08? How does that explain the Crimean War? The Napoleonic Wars? The Seven Years War? The War of the Austrian Succession? The War of the Spanish Succession? The list goes on and on. British policy was always to support the weaker power or coalition in continental Europe against the power or coalition the seemed likely to dominate the continent.

As Sir Humphrey so ably puts it:
Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it's worked so well?

Hmmm... good point. I was thinking only in terms of the sudden UK aversion to things German that seemed to take place in the decade before 1914. But, now that you mention it, it does seem to be part of a larger pattern.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Hmmm... good point. I was thinking only in terms of the sudden UK aversion to things German that seemed to take place in the decade before 1914. But, now that you mention it, it does seem to be part of a larger pattern.

It was essentially one of the twin central pillars of British foreign policy - no one power shall dominate the continent. The other being Britannia shall rule the waves.

Many British decisions make sense (more sense?) when viewed through this prism. Why the 'sudden' aversion to all things German? Berlin was seriously beginning to look like the prime power on the continent and was beginning to look like it was aiming to challenge for control of the seas as well. Time to ditch the French antipathy and mend fences with the Russians...

 

[Deleted member 94680]

You mentioned the Crimean War. That's actually important to consider, because it left a very bad taste for major European wars (or indeed, any major wars, something the Confederate government never properly appreciated) in the mouths of British votaries. By the time of Edward VII, that bad taste had faded a lot in British memories, and unfortunately Wilhelm II seemed determined to do everything possible to bury it.

A fair point. But the same could be said for France. Or Russia. Or the Ottoman Empire even. All foreign involvements leave an after effect on the nations involved, for good or ill. But come a major European war, even while memories of Crimea were 'fresh', I strongly suspect the national interest would be dusted off and applied to the situation.

 

[Mikey]

It was essentially one of the twin central pillars of British foreign policy - no one power shall dominate the continent. The other being Britannia shall rule the waves.

Many British decisions make sense (more sense?) when viewed through this prism. Why the 'sudden' aversion to all things German? Berlin was seriously beginning to look like the prime power on the continent and was beginning to look like it was aiming to challenge for control of the seas as well. Time to ditch the French antipathy and mend fences with the Russians...

I think the problem here is that a big part of balance-of-power strategic considerations is to *avoid* having to fight in an enormous continental war, rather than looking for opportunities to kick one off. Given the relative positions of France, Germany, and Russia in 1914, I think the British strategy was probably best pointed at avoiding war, rather than supporting the anti-German alliance. Buying time for Russia particularly would make sense. And to this end, Grey did work pretty hard to try to avoid things all going off.

Germany is best served in the July Crisis by trying to reign Austria-Hungary in, rather than egging them on, and there's some reason to think that the German ambassador in Vienna was more than a little sympathetic to his hosts, even at the expense of his duties to Berlin. This is, after all, an actual opportunity for the Central Powers to expand their influence in the Balkans, since sympathies were so strongly *against* Serbia in the immediate aftermath of the assassination. If Austria-Hungary took what it could reasonably get without war, or actually managed to maneuver so that it wouldn't be perceived as the aggressor even after the assassination, I think things are pretty likely to resolve themselves in their favor.

 

[Aghasverov]

I think the problem here is that a big part of balance-of-power strategic considerations is to *avoid* having to fight in an enormous continental war, rather than looking for opportunities to kick one off. Given the relative positions of France, Germany, and Russia in 1914, I think the British strategy was probably best pointed at avoiding war, rather than supporting the anti-German alliance. Buying time for Russia particularly would make sense. And to this end, Grey did work pretty hard to try to avoid things all going off.

Germany is best served in the July Crisis by trying to reign Austria-Hungary in, rather than egging them on, and there's some reason to think that the German ambassador in Vienna was more than a little sympathetic to his hosts, even at the expense of his duties to Berlin. This is, after all, an actual opportunity for the Central Powers to expand their influence in the Balkans, since sympathies were so strongly *against* Serbia in the immediate aftermath of the assassination. If Austria-Hungary took what it could reasonably get without war, or actually managed to maneuver so that it wouldn't be perceived as the aggressor even after the assassination, I think things are pretty likely to resolve themselves in their favor.

Buying time for Russia to do what, get the "steamroller" to the borders of Galicia and East Prussia?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

I think the problem here is that a big part of balance-of-power strategic considerations is to *avoid* having to fight in an enormous continental war, rather than looking for opportunities to kick one off. Given the relative positions of France, Germany, and Russia in 1914, I think the British strategy was probably best pointed at avoiding war, rather than supporting the anti-German alliance. Buying time for Russia particularly would make sense. And to this end, Grey did work pretty hard to try to avoid things all going off.

Oh, undoubtedly. I also do not believe that I have suggested anywhere that Britain was looking to start a War, rather realigning her support in case one came along. There's no reason (IMHO) to completely disregard Asquith's "Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators." as an indicator of British opinions of the July Crisis. Obviously, that all changed with Belgium and the very real danger Germany suddenly posed, but when it appeared to be a localised Austrian-Serbian confrontation, the Prime Minister of Britain was unconcerned, not rattling sabres.

Germany is best served in the July Crisis by trying to reign Austria-Hungary in, rather than egging them on, and there's some reason to think that the German ambassador in Vienna was more than a little sympathetic to his hosts, even at the expense of his duties to Berlin. This is, after all, an actual opportunity for the Central Powers to expand their influence in the Balkans, since sympathies were so strongly *against* Serbia in the immediate aftermath of the assassination. If Austria-Hungary took what it could reasonably get without war, or actually managed to manoeuvre so that it wouldn't be perceived as the aggressor even after the assassination, I think things are pretty likely to resolve themselves in their favour.

Personally, I believe German support for a quick, authoritative "demonstration" against Belgrade would be Berlin's best course of action. Push the Austrians to strike whilst the iron is hot, knock Serbia down a peg or two in the eyes of the Slavs and the rest of Europe, satisfy their honour and 'gracefully withdraw' with some form of concession from Serbia. An undertaking whilst Europe was still feeling sorry for Vienna would give Austria a lot of leeway in what they did and provided it didn't expand past what could reasonably be described as a Police Action, foreign support for Serbia would be that much less likely. German honour could be assuaged by acting as the 'protector' of Austria as she deals with Serbia, the might of the Heer held in check in case things escalated.

 

[Mikey]

Buying time for Russia to do what, get the "steamroller" to the borders of Galicia and East Prussia?

Ha! I meant in terms of years, not months.

Personally, I believe German support for a quick, authoritative "demonstration" against Belgrade would be Berlin's best course of action. Push the Austrians to strike whilst the iron is hot, knock Serbia down a peg or two in the eyes of the Slavs and the rest of Europe, satisfy their honour and 'gracefully withdraw' with some form of concession from Serbia. An undertaking whilst Europe was still feeling sorry for Vienna would give Austria a lot of leeway in what they did and provided it didn't expand past what could reasonably be described as a Police Action, foreign support for Serbia would be that much less likely. German honour could be assuaged by acting as the 'protector' of Austria as she deals with Serbia, the might of the Heer held in check in case things escalated.

Yeah, I mean, that would have been far clearer: respond immediately rather than dither around for a month while everyone escalates. But ultimately, that's on AH, not Germany.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Yeah, I mean, that would have been far clearer: respond immediately rather than dither around for a month while everyone escalates. But ultimately, that's on AH, not Germany.

Ultimately, yes. But a strongly worded German dispatch to Vienna urging only prompt action as opposed to the fullness of the "Blank Cheque", perhaps combined with the "halt in Belgrade" of the 26th July, would force Austria to act well before the idiotic 25th July self-imposed delay.