Sane German response to the Sarajovo murder in July 1914

[raharris1973]

It broke Germany its main rival. People at the time really wouldn’t understand the modern mentality of coexistence and working together like EU does nowadays. Germany is growing too close to our power therefore they need to be cut down before they overtake us. If they don’t act Germany becomes the continental hegemon.

But the thing with the British is that almost as soon as the ink was dry on the treaty, the British seemed to work against the logic of cutting Germany down, and fretted about France getting too powerful and aggressive. The British spent almost twenty of the interwar years systematically undermining the containment structure France was trying to maintain against Germany, leading to France getting conquered by Germany when the next war *did* happen.

I mean a country can feel all clever about it's diplomatic flexibility and justify doing a diplomatic about-face or reversal every generation, saying sagely, 'we have no permanent allies, only permanent interests,' but when the result is that there is a a major war every generation and you lose your empire at the end you can also that interpret as the country not knowing what the heck it needs or what it is doing in foreign affairs.

And distance from him to WW1 is about the same as from WW1 to us today. It was still fresh.

I think you meant to compare WWI to something else - Napoleonic era? Holy shit, that's true now. The German storming of Liege in '14 is now more distant from us than Waterloo was from 1914.

Essentially the British political system is moved forward a year, so we probably lose Asquith (or replacement Liberal PM) in late 1915 or early 1916 after the failures at Gallipoli & Loos to be replaced by Lloyd George, who would not be in as strong a position as late 1916 given the role as Minister of Munitions has run for 12 less months, and had less time to seduce his Conservative fellow ministers. Possible at that time someone might suggest Balfour as a former PM and someone who could be flexible on issues & so acceptable to the Liberal Imperialists.

This was a great description of how British politics might work out but you skipped the crucial part about how, why and when and which British government did the declaration of war. You referenced failures at Gallipolli bringing down Asquith early, so that presumes Britain gets in the war somehow.

That would be lose-lose result no matter who won.
Its either Germany and A+H dominates the continent, or France and Russia.
Neither is a good result for the UK

....and while some explanations, especially in retrospect, talk about the fear of German domination of the continent. (probably many contemporary explanations did too) Many contemporary explanations took the opposite tack and treated it as Britain expecting France and Russia to win, and thus needing to join them to get and stay on their good side. Or, the even more phantasmagorical fear that the Germans might beat the Russians and French, and the Russians and French, disappointed at lack of British support, might take revenge....on Britain (with what financial, naval, and military resources, I do not know, and never adequately explained. Yet this BS was peddled).

If Austria-Hungary took what it could reasonably get without war, or actually managed to maneuver so that it wouldn't be perceived as the aggressor even after the assassination, I think things are pretty likely to resolve themselves in their favor.

I wonder what was the most Austria-Hungary could "get" from the crisis if it turns into a high pressure situation but not an actual war?

Turnover of some suspects? How high up and how connected people would be turned over?

An indemnity? A compensatory peace of territory?

An up front alliance with other Balkan states like Bulgaria or the Ottomans or Albania?

Personally, I believe German support for a quick, authoritative "demonstration" against Belgrade would be Berlin's best course of action. Push the Austrians to strike whilst the iron is hot, knock Serbia down a peg or two in the eyes of the Slavs and the rest of Europe, satisfy their honour and 'gracefully withdraw' with some form of concession from Serbia. An undertaking whilst Europe was still feeling sorry for Vienna would give Austria a lot of leeway in what they did and provided it didn't expand past what could reasonably be described as a Police Action, foreign support for Serbia would be that much less likely. German honour could be assuaged by acting as the 'protector' of Austria as she deals with Serbia, the might of the Heer held in check in case things escalated.

This is probably a bit harder to accomplish in practice without great power collision than it sounds. And it doesn't sound that easy. I mean, it's a hopeful hypothesis. Maybe things work out, but most probable effect might be that Austria gets to be at war with Serbia for a week or two, or until it takes Belgrade, or until it seeks to dictate terms, and then Russia mobilizes to show that it is getting terms bargained down to something reasonable for its protege.

 

[Vabasion]

But the thing with the British is that almost as soon as the ink was dry on the treaty, the British seemed to work against the logic of cutting Germany down, and fretted about France getting too powerful and aggressive. The British spent almost twenty of the interwar years systematically undermining the containment structure France was trying to maintain against Germany, leading to France getting conquered by Germany when the next war *did* happen.

I mean a country can feel all clever about it's diplomatic flexibility and justify doing a diplomatic about-face or reversal every generation, saying sagely, 'we have no permanent allies, only permanent interests,' but when the result is that there is a a major war every generation and you lose your empire at the end you can also that interpret as the country not knowing what the heck it needs or what it is doing in foreign affairs.



I think you meant to compare WWI to something else - Napoleonic era? Holy shit, that's true now. The German storming of Liege in '14 is now more distant from us than Waterloo was from 1914.



This was a great description of how British politics might work out but you skipped the crucial part about how, why and when and which British government did the declaration of war. You referenced failures at Gallipolli bringing down Asquith early, so that presumes Britain gets in the war somehow.



....and while some explanations, especially in retrospect, talk about the fear of German domination of the continent. (probably many contemporary explanations did too) Many contemporary explanations took the opposite tack and treated it as Britain expecting France and Russia to win, and thus needing to join them to get and stay on their good side. Or, the even more phantasmagorical fear that the Germans might beat the Russians and French, and the Russians and French, disappointed at lack of British support, might take revenge....on Britain (with what financial, naval, and military resources, I do not know, and never adequately explained. Yet this BS was peddled).



I wonder what was the most Austria-Hungary could "get" from the crisis if it turns into a high pressure situation but not an actual war?

Turnover of some suspects? How high up and how connected people would be turned over?

An indemnity? A compensatory peace of territory?

An up front alliance with other Balkan states like Bulgaria or the Ottomans or Albania?



This is probably a bit harder to accomplish in practice without great power collision than it sounds. And it doesn't sound that easy. I mean, it's a hopeful hypothesis. Maybe things work out, but most probable effect might be that Austria gets to be at war with Serbia for a week or two, or until it takes Belgrade, or until it seeks to dictate terms, and then Russia mobilizes to show that it is getting terms bargained down to something reasonable for its protege.

Exactly my point. Their rival was cut down and now France was the hegemon so they need to work on weakening it. The entire British policy for several centuries by that point is making sure Europe has no single power able to dominate it.

The world war may have been a terrible experience for all involved but it wasn’t as bad for Britain as it was for others. And it resulted in crushing of Germany, colonial expansion and dominance, while also wrecking Russia, severely wrecking France and destroying Germany as a great power for decades at least.

If the French haven’t fallen or if the British weren’t led by Churchill they may have gotten off easy once again. Fall of France forced them to shoulder the brunt of the fighting between them and American involvement. And Churchill was a man who wasn’t going to emulate the coalition wars of the Napoleonic era with peace for breathing room. He pawned off the empire to win

 

[BooNZ]

I've seen similar arguments before, suggesting that if the UK failed to declare war, then a couple of prominent Cabinet members would resign (including possibly Asquith himself), which would lead to the Liberal government falling, which would lead to a Conservative government being formed, which would then declare war at the earliest possible moment. I'm just not quite so sure that it would shake out like that, but maybe someone on here who is more familiar with UK Parliamentary procedure in 1914 could elucidate it further for me?

The key priorities of Asquith were the Liberal Party and the Liberal Government. The fractured nature of both, meant the PM avoided strongly favouring one faction over another, in case it prompted a string of resignations. Because of this, his own preferences are not especially obvious. Aside from his loyalties to the Liberal Party, I believe his loyalty to Grey was due to their existing relationship and a mutual preference for peace - hence his demonstration of solidarity when Grey threatened to resign over his private undertakings to France.

The only members of the British Cabinet actively supporting a war with Germany were Grey and Churchill. This was after Asquith had already declared his expectation Germany would breach Belgian neutrality. Grey had refused to clarify his position in the event Germany did not invade Belgium. Churchill was in secret discussions with the Conservatives on the basis the Liberal Government would choose choose against war after a (presumably minor) violation of Belgium neutrality. Bonar Law as leader of the Conservatives had told Grey (or Asquith) there was no consensus among the Conservatives without the Germans in Belgium.

I doubt if either Grey or Churchill would voluntarily resign in the scenario provided and even if they did, the Liberal Government would survive. It is even more unlikely for Asquith to resign and collapse the Liberal Government, severely damage the wider Liberal Party, to bring Britain into a war to be managed by the Conservative Party. In contrast, Asquith could definitely expect around 8 resignations from doves and non-interventionists in Liberal Cabinet and the collapse of the Liberal Government if Britain entered the war without a decent CB.

It may force new elections, I don't know that the outcome would be a foreordained conservative led government.

The Conservatives were however, pretty much unconditionally pro-Entente, and anti-German, along with several of the press barons. So if they stick with that, and get into power, Britain is going to war, just later, unless they are breaking campaign promises. I was tempted to say that bringing Britain into the war a few weeks late would mean bringing Britain in just in time to lose. However, on reflection, that really wouldn't be the case in an east first scenario, because any defeats of the French would be defeats of French offensives, not the conquest of France by German invasion, which was the threat in OTL 1914.

That might have traditionally been the case (not so sure about Russia), but the efforts of Grey and the British Foreign Office had the German Diplomacy optimistic about the prospect of a conservative Government. The impression I had was the Conservatives were not so much more anti-german, as more pro-military/war in general, but I might have misremembered. As outlined above, in private discussions Bonar Law stated the Conservative Party did not have the numbers for war without the Germans in Belgium, although a communication from the Conservatives was tabled during the Liberal Cabinet deliberations, which implied something different.

It broke Germany its main rival. People at the time really wouldn’t understand the modern mentality of coexistence and working together like EU does nowadays. Germany is growing too close to our power therefore they need to be cut down before they overtake us. If they don’t act Germany becomes the continental hegemon. And distance from him to WW1 is about the same as from WW1 to us today. It was still fresh.

As outlined above, the vast majority of the British decision makers did not want war. Those that did had used their influence to carry Britain to the brink, but ultimately those individuals lacked the authority to bring the war to Britain.

As Sir Humphrey so ably puts it:
Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it's worked so well?

I love the show, but am saddened when Sir Humphrey is always dragged out and cited on this topic. It suggests some greater force propelling British foreign policy, where ordinarily it is guided by the self interest or opinions of individuals.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

This was a great description of how British politics might work out but you skipped the crucial part about how, why and when and which British government did the declaration of war. You referenced failures at Gallipolli bringing down Asquith early, so that presumes Britain gets in the war somehow.

Would have thought that was self-evident. Any coalition involving the Conservatives is going to be more "pro-war" than the existing Liberal cabinet which did enter the conflict.

 

[BooNZ]

Kaiser Wilhelm himself said that Serbia's response removed all cause for war. He had to be reminded that the object of the Austrian demands, as endorsed by Germany, was to force war. It is not clear whether the German leadership intended to bring on a larger war against Russia and France. However, it is clear that some of them wanted such a war, and none were opposed. Nobody was thinking about how to avoid war.

Kaiser Bill seems a bit dense sometimes... doubt he was that good at "reading between the lines"

You're the one "reading between the lines"; Wilhelm took the Serbian response at face value. And AFAIK, nobody told him he was reading it wrong.

While Wilhelm deemed the Serbian response satisfactory, he also stated Belgrade should be temporary occupied to ensure the Serbs complied with their undertakings, since otherwise the Serbs could not be trusted. Wilhelm swiftly grasped the true nature of the Serbian response(s), identifying the fish hooks in an otherwise dead fish. Wilhelm was a bit of a dick, but he was not stupid in a conventional way.

 

[Jellico]

I love the show, but am saddened when Sir Humphrey is always dragged out and cited on this topic. It suggests some greater force propelling British foreign policy, where ordinarily it is guided by the self interest or opinions of individuals.

OTOH the consistency by those self interested individuals does point to the almost geographic logic of the position. It is almost as if, after establishing hegemony on the British Isles the government was continually faced with a question of how to achieve maximum influence on the continent at minimum cost.
I would actually be interested to know who first came up with the Sir Humphrey quote. I am not sure I have seen anything sum it up before then. It is so articulate it almost has to be something Lynn and Jay heard floating around the public service.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

but am saddened when Sir Humphrey is always dragged out and cited on this topic. It suggests some greater force propelling British foreign policy, where ordinarily it is guided by the self interest or opinions of individuals.

Or, these individuals with their self interests and opinions, have been formed by educational and service circles to see things the “right way” and propagate this continued course of British action.

 

[BooNZ]

Or, these individuals with their self interests and opinions, have been formed by educational and service circles to see things the “right way” and propagate this continued course of British action.

Erie Crowe hated Germans, Grey loved the French, Arthur Nicolson loved the Russians, King George hated Wilhelm and Churchil loved a fight. Shafting the Germans was about the only compatible course of action, which confused those decision makers outside the British Foreign Office or not ordinarily involved in matters relating thereto.

 

[Aghasverov]

Erie Crowe hated Germans, Grey loved the French, Arthur Nicolson loved the Russians, King George hated Wilhelm and Churchil loved a fight. Shafting the Germans was about the only compatible course of action, which confused those decision makers outside the British Foreign Office or not ordinarily involved in matters relating thereto.

Odd that Eyre Crowe was so anti-German, considering he was born in Germany, grew up and was educated in Germany, and would "lapse" into a thick German accent when riled. Almost like a mirror image of Wilhelm, who in his formative years was surrounded by English and Anglophiles. Some "time on the couch" may have done them both some good... or if not at least the psychoanalyst's reports would have made an interesting read.

 

[TDM]

WI Germany had decided to stand to defend against France (in otl the French attack failed desperately- But Germany attacked Belgium. Had more of Germany's forces attacked Russia they would have done badly in 1914.

My feeling is that Russia would accept some humiliation for Serbia.

Over by Christmas. A lot fewere dead than OTL and none of the from Britain.

Could that have happened?

I think the problem, is that's not the German plan at the time (although see the point about the real schlieffen plan)

The risk for Germany is it ends up fighting on two fronts at the same time. Of course they do anyway but I'm pretty sure if everyone knew how it would end up they wouldn't have gone for it in the first place.

The problem with fighting Russia from a German perspective is not that they can't be beaten (Germany was kind of banking on that being better trained and equipped would mean a win). But that because of it's size and numbers Russia is a tarpit, you might well beat it but it will take time. But they know from fairly recent experience that a quick war with France is not only possible but also winnable.

But that is Germany's whole problem in a nutshell it can't just pick a war it can win, it's needs to pick a war it can win quickly

The Russian full mobilization (and refusal of Tsar Nicky to de-mobilize) made that quite impossible...

Right but Nicky wasn't doing that in a vacuum was he.

Need to check up on the Demands Serbia had in the first two Balkan Wars

'This is the Territory we have taken by force of arms. Deal with it.'
The other Sovereign nations had to suck that up

right but there had been the whole force of arms bit right?

And as stated in my post,
Serbia had no Defense Treaties with Russia, or anybody else, for that matter, not even secret ones. They didn't even have a official Guarantee of Independence, like Belgium had

But everyone knew Russia had their back, it's why AH went to Germany for their blank check first. I mean you are right in abstract but it doesn't make any difference to how people acted and reacted

While Wilhelm deemed the Serbian response satisfactory, he also stated Belgrade should be temporary occupied to ensure the Serbs complied with their undertakings, since otherwise the Serbs could not be trusted. Wilhelm swiftly grasped the true nature of the Serbian response(s), identifying the fish hooks in an otherwise dead fish. Wilhelm was a bit of a dick, but he was not stupid in a conventional way.

Yep, what he (and the AH especially) didn't want was some big international conference were the matter was discussed by a lot of people with vested interests that differed from Germany's and AH's. He had wanted the AH's to move quickly and hand the world a fait a-compli before it was too late to stop and not worth fighting over. AH was for various reasons unable to do that.

 

[marathag]

Butt everyone knew Russia had their back

Did they?
Maybe they should have made some treaties stating that, secret or otherwise on why they were backing a nation arms deep in atrocities from the two previous Balkan wars, and now, regicide.

No one thought the Russians would fully mobilize to protect Serbia, when full mobilization meant all the interlocking alliances come into play.
Tzar Nicky knew the French had his back, from diplomatic agreements and treaties locking them together.
Nicky liked the dream of his troops in Berlin and Vienna, soon followed by them in Constantinople , the Russian Chicken flag flying over them all.

 

[Aghasverov]

While Wilhelm deemed the Serbian response satisfactory, he also stated Belgrade should be temporary occupied to ensure the Serbs complied with their undertakings, since otherwise the Serbs could not be trusted. Wilhelm swiftly grasped the true nature of the Serbian response(s), identifying the fish hooks in an otherwise dead fish. Wilhelm was a bit of a dick, but he was not stupid in a conventional way.

Yeah, "dense" was a poor choice of words on my part, didn't mean to imply that he was stupid. I think he was a quite intelligent man who occasionally did, and (more often) said some stupid things. He seems to have been quite good at playing people whom he perceived to be his intellectual inferiors (Nicky, rightly), but not too good at recognizing when he was getting played himself - an all-too-common trait with leaders who are supremely overconfident of their own intellectual abilities I'd say.
I had forgotten about Willy's suggestion to occupy Belgrade... at least shows that he read the Serbian response with some more perspective than he's usually credited with. Of course an attempted occupation of Belgrade, or a demand to do so, would've meant war, so the end result would've (more than likely) been the same.
(by the way, loved the "fish hooks in a dead fish" bit... spot on, Sir! ) .

 

[Keb]

Ever read the actual Serbian responses to Austria's 10 demands? Of course, I can't read them in the original language so there may be some "nuance" that I'm missing, but to me they seem to positively drip of a certain disingenuousness... sort of a "yes we are agreeing to eight of these 10 demands, but you are so infernally stupid if you think we'll ultimately comply..."
Also IIRC the ones they did not comply with pretty much obviated any likelihood of an impartial investigation being conducted, particularly if that investigation were to point toward certain elements within the Serbian government... which as we now know, it would have...

A bit late, but to add to this, the following is drawn from Christopher Clarke's book, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 which goes into some detail on Serbia's response.

There followed the ten demands of the ultimatum proper. The first three points focused on the suppression of irredentist organs and of the anti-Austrian propaganda they generated. Points 4, 6 and 8 addressed the need to take action against persons implicated in the Sarajevo outrage, including compromised military personnel and frontier officials and ‘accessories to the plot of 28 June who are on Serbian territory’. Point 7 was more specific: it demanded the arrest ‘without delay’ of Major Voja Tankosić and Milan Ciganović. Tankosić was, unbeknown to the Austrians, a Black Hand operative close to Apis; it was he who had recruited the three youths who formed the core of the assassination team. Ciganović was known to the Austrians only as ‘a Serbian state employee implicated by the findings of the preliminary investigation at Sarajevo’, but he was also, according to the later testimony of Ljuba Jovanović, a member of the Black Hand who doubled as an agent working secretly for Pašić. Point 9 requested that Belgrade furnish Vienna with explanations regarding the ‘unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who notwithstanding their official position have not hesitated since the outrage of 28 June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility towards the Austro-Hungarian monarchy’. This point referred among other things to the interviews given by Spalajković in St Petersburg; it also reminds us of how deeply Austrian attitudes were affected by Serbian responses to the outrage. Point 10 simply requested official notification ‘without delay’ of the measures undertaken to meet the preceding points.

The most controversial points were 5 and 6. Point 5 demanded that the Belgrade government ‘accept the collaboration in Serbia of organs of the Imperial and Royal Government [of AustriaHungary] in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy’ and point 6 stated that ‘organs delegated’ by Austria-Hungary would ‘take part in the investigations’ relating to accessories in the crime. As usual in Vienna, this text was composed by many hands, but it was Berchtold who had insisted on incorporating a reference to Austrian involvement. The reason is obvious enough: Vienna did not trust the Serbian authorities to press home the investigation without some form of Austrian supervision and verification. And it must be said that nothing the Serbian government did between 28 June and the presentation of the ultimatum gave them any reason to think otherwise.
...
Vienna’s ultimatum was, to be sure, drawn up on the assumption that the Serbs would probably not accept it. This was not a last-ditch attempt to save the peace between the two neighbours, but an uncompromising statement of the Austrian position. On the other hand, it was not, unlike Rambouillet, a demand for the complete prostration of the Serbian state; its terms were tightly focused on the threat posed by Serbian irredentism to Austrian security, and even points 5 and 6 reflected concerns about the reliability of Serbian compliance that the drafters had reason to believe were valid.
...
In their replies to the individual points, the drafters offered a subtle cocktail of acceptances, conditional acceptances, evasions and rejections. They agreed officially to condemn all propaganda aimed at the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the annexation of its territories (though they used a modal form of the verb that avoided the implication that there had ever actually been any such propaganda). On the question of the suppression of irredentist organizations, the reply stated that the Serbian government possessed ‘no proof that the Narodna Odbrana or other similar societies’ had as yet committed ‘any criminal act’ – nevertheless, they agreed to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and any other society ‘that may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary’. Point 3 stated that the government would happily remove from Serbian public education any anti-Austrian propaganda, ‘whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda’. Point 4 agreed to the removal from the military of suspect persons, but again, only once the AustroHungarian authorities had communicated to them ‘the names and acts of these officers andfunctionaries’. On the question of the creation of mixed Austro-Serbian commissions of enquiry (point 5) the reply stated that the Serbian government ‘did not clearly grasp the meaning or scope of the demand’, but that they undertook to accept such collaboration, inasmuch as it could be shown to agree with ‘the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations’. Point 6 (on the participation of Austrian officials in the prosecution of implicated persons) was rejected outright on the grounds that this would be contrary to the Serbian constitution – this was the issue touching on Serbia’s sovereignty, on which Sazonov had urged Belgrade to stand firm. As for point 7, calling for the arrest of Tankosić and Ciganović, the Serbian government stated that it had already arrested Tankosić ‘on the very evening of the delivery of the note’; it had ‘not yet been possible to arrest Ciganović’. Again, the Austrian government were asked to provide the ‘presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the proofs of guilt, if there are any [. . .] for the purposes of the later enquiry’. This was a somewhat devious response: as soon as the name of Ciganović had cropped up in connection with the Sarajevo enquiry, the prefecture of police in Belgrade had hustled him out of the capital on a special commission, all the while officially denying that any person by the name of Milan Ciganović existed in the city. The reply accepted without condition points 8 and 10 regarding the prosecution of frontier officials found guilty of illegal activity and the duty to report to the AustroHungarian government on the measures undertaken. But point 9, under which the Austrians had demanded an explanation of hostile public comments by Serbian officials during the days following the assassinations, elicited a more equivocal response: the Serbian government would ‘gladly give’ such explanations, once the Austrian government had ‘communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by said officials’.

It is hard to dissent from Musulin’s breathless admiration for this finely wrought text. The claim often made in general narratives that this reply represented an almost complete capitulation to the Austrian demands is profoundly misleading. This was a document fashioned for Serbia’s friends, not for its enemy. It offered the Austrians amazingly little. Above all, it placed the onus on Vienna to drive ahead the process of opening up the investigation into the Serbian background of the conspiracy, without, on the other hand, conceding the kind of collaboration that would have enabled an effective pursuit of the relevant leads.

On 16 July, in conversation with the retired German diplomat Count Lützow, the Russian ambassador in Vienna learned that the Austrians were drawing up a note worded ‘in very harsh terms’ and containing, as the ambassador put it, ‘demands unacceptable to any independent state’. Lützow’s source, astonishingly enough, was a long and candid conversation in Vienna with Berchtold and Forgách.
...
These breaches of Austrian secrecy had two important effects. The first was simply that by around 20 July, the Russians and their great power partners were pretty fully apprised of what the Austrians had in store. The Serbian authorities too, were informed, as we know from a report of 17 July by Crackanthorpe, the British minister in Belgrade.

Now, it's important to note that Austria designed the ultimatum to be unacceptable, but the Serbian 'acceptance' such as it was provided a major propaganda coup that made them look like the innocent party in the exchange.

EDIT: Typo correction.

 

[TDM]

Did they?

yes, it's why AH looks for German assurance, it why Germany is talking to Russia


it's why in July we have:

French President Raymond Poincaré and Prime Minister René Viviani departed for Saint Petersburg on 15 July, arrived on 20 July and departed on 23 July.
The French and the Russians agreed their alliance extended to supporting Serbia against Austria, confirming the already established policy behind the Balkan inception scenario. As Christopher Clark notes "Poincare had come to preach the gospel of firmness and his words had fallen on ready ears.

and that's because earlier:

Franco-Russian Alliance changes to Balkan inception scenario, 1911–1913[edit]
The original Franco-Russian alliance was formed to protect both France and Russia from a German attack. In the event of such an attack, both states would mobilize in tandem, placing Germany under the threat of a two-front war. However, there were limits placed on the alliance so that it was essentially defensive in character.
Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s, the French and the Russians made clear the limits of the alliance did not extend to provocations caused by each other's adventurous foreign policy. For example, Russia warned France that the alliance would not operate if the French provoked the Germans in North Africa. Equally, the French insisted that the Russians should not use the alliance to provoke Austria-Hungary or Germany in the Balkans and that France did not recognise in the Balkans a vital strategic interest for France or Russia.
That changed in the last 18 to 24 months before the outbreak of the war. At the end of 1911, particularly during the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913, the French view changed to accept the importance of the Balkans to Russia. Moreover, France clearly stated that if, as a result of a conflict in the Balkans, war broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, France would stand by Russia. Thus, the alliance changed in character and Serbia now became a security salient for Russia and France. A war of Balkan inception, regardless of who started such a war, would cause the alliance would respond by viewing the conflict as a casus foederis, a trigger for the alliance. Christopher Clark described that change as "a very important development in the pre-war system which made the events of 1914 possible."[41]

so look if you want to say but Russia's actions came out of the blue, that's cool. but no one in 1914 would agree with you!

Maybe they should have made some treaties stating that, secret or otherwise on why they were backing a nation arms deep in atrocities from the two previous Balkan wars, and now, regicide.

And so we get to Serbia was evil and so deserved invasion and one shouldn't back evil people and if you do you are on the stand for what happens next and absolve others.

1). Serbia =/= the black hand (and yes 'factions within Serbia', but frankly so many factions everywhere that Serbia is definitely not alone here). Not forgetting that the Serbian Government rather than twirling it moustaches and swirling it's cape accepted all but one of AH's demands in response to the assassination.

2). AH wasn't exactly whiter than white in the Balkans either so wouldn't get a pass even by your metric. (and let's not even get into AH actions in Serbia and the wider area during WW1)

3). sometimes those you are diplomatically invested in for your own reasons aren't nice, that has never stood in the way of foreign policy for anyone Russia is hardly unusual in this regard.

No one thought the Russians would fully mobilize to protect Serbia, when full mobilization meant all the interlocking alliances come into play.
Tzar Nicky knew the French had his back, from diplomatic agreements and treaties locking them together.
Nicky liked the dream of his troops in Berlin and Vienna, soon followed by them in Constantinople , the Russian Chicken flag flying over them all.

You get that the last two sentences pretty much negates the first one right? (although I'm not sure about Nicky have a goal of invading and conquering Germany and AH, even if he like the idea of beating them in the field). You get the the alliance system was the MAD of it's day, it was designed to prevent anyone trying anything small lest it turns into something much bigger.

 

[TDM]

A bit late, but to add to this, the following is drawn from Christopher Clarke's book, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 which goes into some detail on Serbia's response.



Now, it's important to note that Austria didn't really design the ultimatum to be unacceptable, but the Serbian 'acceptance' such as it was provided a major propaganda coup that made them look like the innocent party in the exchange.

Yep exactly which is why as mentioned earlier the kaiser is writing "bugger that removes the justification for going to war" (paraphrased).


The problem was he had wanted AH to go straight in when people were still shocked from the assassination and get it done before international positions could be drawn. But AH itself was split on the issue. The list of demands/ultimatum itself being a compromise point to certain factions within AH. As you point out the demands were designed to be rejected, but they did give Serbia the opportunity to basically appeal to the intentional community by looking reasonable by accepting all but 1 (or 2 depending on how you count). And given the international treaty system and international community were pretty much the same that mattered a lot. On top of this there are a few interests keen on war anyway.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Now, it's important to note that Austria didn't really design the ultimatum to be unacceptable, .

Are you sure about that?
On 14 July, the Austrians assured the Germans that the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is practically excluded" (Fromkin)
On 18 July, to reassure Stolberg, Count Hoyos promised him that the demands in the draft text of the ultimatum "were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them". (Kautsky)
On 18 July, Hans Schoen, a Bavarian diplomat in Berlin, told the Bavarian Prime Minister Count Georg von Hertling that Austria was only making a pretence "of being peacefully inclined". Commenting on the draft text of the ultimatum shown to him by German diplomats, Schoen noted that Serbia would not be able to accept the demands, so the result would be war. (Fromkin)
On 23 July, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, presented the ultimatum to the Serbian government. At the same time, and having a strong expectation of Serbian rejection, the Austrian Army opened its war book, and began preparations for hostilities. (Fromkin)

All gleaned from wiki, but I have the Fromkin book and they’re all accurate.

 

[Catspoke]

Russia started the war in 1914 with an offensive doctrine and is unlikely to do better against 3-4 German Armies compared to the thrashing it got from a single German Army. In 1915 Russia sat on the defensive and then got routed, losing 1.5 million men in the ensuing retreat, before the A-H forces were distracted by the Italians. In 1916 the A-H forces continued to be distracted by the Italians, while the Germans were spending quality time with the Franch and the British in the west. The Russians then won a hard fought victory against A-H while no one was looking and then proceeded to collapse. It is difficult to imagine how the Russians are expected to perform better against far more Germans with far fewer men.

Maybe. This TL butterflies off OTL pretty quickly in the east, even if an offensive mind set rules, the Russians could suffer a OTL Tannenburg style encirclement, or a earlier minor repulse, and start backing away from the frontier.

In this time line, I am assuming the Germans probably deployed west and start shipping one army at at time east, so a few corps at a time arrive in the east, starting mid August. Maybe the August 20th battle of Gumbinnen works for the Germans with an extra corps or two and the Russians get cautious then.

Regardless the Germans get better results if as part of all this they avoid DOWing everybody, no need to DOW Russia right away, unless they DOW Austria, because the Germans can't really advance over the Russian frontier until late August, and no need to DOW the French, let them do it. The British can't come in if no one is at war, gives time to transfer armies to the east, crash buy stuff, bring home merchants, or even secure a favorable diplomatic solution.

Long term Moscow and Leningrad are far away for the Germans, with a sparse and incompatible rail net, if the Russians can avoid getting crushed in a frontier battle, it seems the Russians would have a better chance of getting better force ratios deeper inside Russia, is it really worth all that?, a favorable diplomatic solution for Germany within a couple of months seems like how this ends up.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Erie Crowe hated Germans, Grey loved the French, Arthur Nicolson loved the Russians, King George hated Wilhelm and Churchil loved a fight. Shafting the Germans was about the only compatible course of action, which confused those decision makers outside the British Foreign Office or not ordinarily involved in matters relating thereto.

And yet here they are following a path that fairly accurately follows the traditional British foreign policy goals. Strange how when together (and reaching decisions by consensus, obviously) all of these individual concerns balance themselves out to benefit the nation.

 

[TDM]

Sorry to add, the problem is you can't look at one action in isolation but rather how it sits in with everything else that's going on.

If AH had gone straight in and got it's pound of flesh from Serbia (a chunk of land and Serbian vassal status), there's likely not that much that could have been done and frankly there may well have been enough international sympathy to make the position of those who might want to do something harder. But move on few week and the context changes, Serbia is the one being all doe-eyed and "yes we realise this is all very serous and a tragedy has occurred and we accept the judgement of the infinitely wise international community lets all have a big meeting to work out what went wrong and how we can avoid it happening again".

Same people have the same backs, same treaties are still in place, none of that has changed. But the content of countries taking action has changed.

Plus on top of all that no matter the thinking behind it, and the reality of international treaties Germany invading Belgium to fight France neither of which has assassinated any AH Arch duke, looks and plays really badly.

 

[TDM]

Are you sure about that?
On 14 July, the Austrians assured the Germans that the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is practically excluded" (Fromkin)
On 18 July, to reassure Stolberg, Count Hoyos promised him that the demands in the draft text of the ultimatum "were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them". (Kautsky)
On 18 July, Hans Schoen, a Bavarian diplomat in Berlin, told the Bavarian Prime Minister Count Georg von Hertling that Austria was only making a pretence "of being peacefully inclined". Commenting on the draft text of the ultimatum shown to him by German diplomats, Schoen noted that Serbia would not be able to accept the demands, so the result would be war. (Fromkin)
On 23 July, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, presented the ultimatum to the Serbian government. At the same time, and having a strong expectation of Serbian rejection, the Austrian Army opened its war book, and began preparations for hostilities. (Fromkin)

All gleaned from wiki, but I have the Fromkin book and they’re all accurate.

I maybe wrong but I get the impression from the rest of the post that's a typo