Regarding Norway, I already said my opinion...
Frankly, I dont know much about resources sent to Finland. I only remember about the 30 MS 406. From a strictly military perspective, sending resources to Finland was a mistake. However, from a political perspective, it was a sound policy, due to the nature of threat Finland faced: the Red Menace. If the Entente didn't send not even material help to those who fight the Soviets, what message would have been to both conservative voters and most importantly Romania? Romania needed to be assured she would receive help if Stalin attacked and the Anglo-French depended on a friendly Romania that would sell its oil to them and not to the Germans.
I see that the French help to Finland during the Winter War is estimated to have been worth 600 million 1940 marks (or 192 million 2020 euros), roughly 10% of all materiel bought or received from abroad during the war.
This help included, among other things
2855 LMGs (7.5 mm and 8 mm) and ammunition
50 mortars (81 mm, Brandt) and ammunition
60 AT guns (25 mm and 40 mm) and shells
24 field guns (75 mm, m/97 and 105 mm, m/13) and shells
24 howitzers (155 mm, St. Chamond) and shells
184 cannons (80 mm/90 mm/120 mm/155 mm, De Bange) and shells
30 Morane Saulnier MS 406 fighters
100 tons TNT
25 field radios
102 field telephones
It has been pointed out that the weapons the French sent to Finland were mostly old-fashioned and obsolete, and thus keeping them in France instead would not have been a major help to the French war effort in 1940.
In political and diplomatic terms, though, one could argue the French side of the planned Allied intervention into Finland quite possibly was
the crucial thing that helped Finland in the end survive the war as an independent nation. The discussion and official views about the intervention had in Paris in February and early March 1940 made Stalin believe that the intervention was truly happening, and soon at that, and as his connections with his spies in London were temporarily severed at the time, he did not receive word of the British views that were more sceptical and lukewarm. Based on the French information, he then accepted going for a negotiated peace in March, before the Allies get "boots on the ground", instead of pushing for a total victory.