No War in Europe: Does Japan still launch the Pacific Campaign?

[Johnrankins]

Given his circumstances, and his objectives, that is kind of unrealistic, don't you think? To take the American example, George Washington in 1776, when you dig into the details, old George was kind of ruthless and most undemocratic during the American revolution. I would suggest that Uncle Ho, in his time and place, given his peculiar education and his expected enemies, would have been a most ruthless and single minded character. And given the circumstances of post WWII decolonization in east Asia having to be a violent process because the colonial powers were still trying to reassert their imperialist aspirations militarily, one can expect that successful national liberation movement leaders will not be liberal democrats? As an aside, the same set of historical operators explains Mao. Ruthlessness and a certain authoritarian mindset kind of is a given.

Given his circumstances can we blame Hitler for anything he did? Raised by a domineering mother and abusive father he became a starving artist in Vienna. After serving in WW1 he saw his country go through hyperinflation, had parts of his country torn apart by foreigners, have to pay heavy reparations inflicted on her, and had to battle members of both the right and left to come up on top. However despite all that he manages to unite all of Germany including Rhineland, Austria, and Sudetenland, kicked out many foreigners and rebuilt the economy.

But viva la revoltution and all that. If you are going to make excuses be consistent. Mass murdering psychotic dictators are mass-murdering psychotic dicators no matter what the excuse.

 

[McPherson]

What's your logical action as Japanese government from say 1936 on? How do you do better?

Freeze out the Europeans and come to a deal with Russia (success) and the United States (failure). That means a modus vivendi with the Americans that allows them a free hand in South China and Japan in North China with the demarcation line roughly at the Yellow River, or the pre Marco Polo bridge incident defacto. Tokyo becomes locked into the China War cycle and does not see the FDR administration signals around 1937 and or misinterprets them. So...

That is not a popular view about American or Japanese imperialism, but facts on the ground, ya' know? Incidentally, past 1940? Yōsuke Matsuoka? Ribbentrop, who was not exactly all there in the rationality department, either, is reputed to have said; "der Mann ist wahnsinnig, ist er nicht?" (That man is crazy, is he not?) during the Tripartite Pact negotiations.

He thought Matsuoka was certifiably insane. He was probably correct, but among the regime in Tokyo, Matsuoka was considered "normal".

 

[McPherson]

Hainan was certainly very gettable by Japan, and by 1939 they had it. But my caution on Thailand is that you absolutely need the Fall of France to make a Thai-Japanese alliance happen.

Phibun admittedly spent most of the 30's making Thailand's regime proficiently fascistic, but this did not manifest itself in foreign policy until the collapse of France made possible the Franco-Thai War (Oct. 1940). And this in turn gave Japan an opportunity to intervene on Thailand's side. But even then, the Thais only knuckled under at the outbreak of war.

And without a Japanese presence in Indochina (esp. southern Indochina - Cambodia and Laos especially) it is really hard to see how Japan has the leverage to get its way into Thailand.

And in this respect, the American presence in the PI astride Japanese supply lines south kind of becomes superfluous.

Phibun can be brought on board with a slice of Malaysia. If it comes down to it, Indochina is doable in the swath that involves the Nutcracker Option. France is in no better position than any other European power. (Her destroyers are 1700 km radius of action, her air line is similar to the British and her logistics are just as hopeless; so defeat is inevitable.). The only enemy airpower in the way in East Asia worth a damn, is American and the only reason they are in the way is because of the Philippine Archipelago. The Pacific war comes down to airpower. Pure and simple, if the Japanese have and maintain air superiority they cannot be beaten, period. Geography dictates how it is applied.
The RTL evidence is what happened to the Japanese when they lost air superiority in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. British example: Burma retaken was only possible when the allied air forces achieved air superiority in late 1943; so the allied armies could maneuver under that air cover and SUPPLY via air in that hellish terrain and the Japanese could not.

And of course key to any of this was the destruction of the Kido Butai, the primary strategic naval air weapon the Japanese built so well and used so foolishly. I remind you that the British were absolutely helpless against it and the Americans and Australians likewise until it was finally destroyed. I flatly write this, because that weapon system was what made the Sickle possible in the first place.

So could the South China Sea be traversed to the landing spots on the Kra peninsula without Indochina? Yup. But it requires the Philippine Islands be neutralized. That airpower has to go, whether Indochina is in hand or not, because the oil, tin, and rubber is south of MacArthur's bombers. You have seen this before?

QED.

 

[Athelstane]

Phibun can be brought on board with a slice of Malaysia.

Yeah, but only if he's sure Britain can be prevented from taking it back!

That's why Indochina was an easy prize to offer to Phibun: The Wehrmacht had taken up permanent residence in Paris.

So in a hypothetical timeline where there's no war in Europe, Japan is stymied in her expansion to the South. Thailand won't play ball until it is sure the major European powers in SE Asia are neutralized. And if Germany has not overrun Western Europe, or is even at war, those powers are free to dedicate their military resources in resistance to any Japanese aggression, and they'll do so in concert. France alone can't whip Japan, but it certainly can if it is in alliance with Britain and the Netherlands; and even by itself, it can absorb a great deal of Japanese military resources. Heck, you don't even need America in the ring.

And of course key to any of this was the destruction of the Kido Butai, the primary strategic naval air weapon the Japanese built so well and used so foolishly. I remind you that the British were absolutely helpless against it and the Americans and Australians likewise until it was finally destroyed. I flatly write this, because that weapon system was what made the Sickle possible in the first place.

Actually, this raises another butterfly: If there is no war in Europe, and there is no Fall of France, you're not only going to see a considerably slower British buildup of its air power, you're ALSO going to see *no* Two Ocean Navy Act passed by Congress. American air and naval power was already on the upslope before 1940, to be sure, but at nothing like the pace post summer 1940. Likewise, the same will be true for MacArthur's efforts to build up the Philippines' defenses.

So if Japan has its opportunity door closed to the Southern Resource Area by lack of war in the ETO, it also is not going to be facing the same avalanche of American military hardware getting deployed to the Pacific which it had to face post-1940 in OTL.

I'm not sure what Japan does with its wonderful Kido Butai in this scenario, beyond various ops against the KMT off the China coast. But I suppose it could be leverage for extracting minor concessions from the Western powers.

 

[McPherson]

Yeah, but only if he's sure Britain can be prevented from taking it back!
That's why Indochina was an easy prize to offer to Phibun: The Wehrmacht had taken up permanent residence in Paris.

As it turns out, there was no way the British could take it back. Their command structure and dispositions (the Singapore bastion defense) was ill-conceived and not practical. Whether the Wehrmacht was in Paris or not is not relevant. What is relevant, was could the RN fight the IJN with any hope of success in the South China Sea? The answer is a flat no. They were simply incapable of facing Kido Butai in a straight up air-sea battle. Wrong equipment, wrong training, wrong logistics, wrong admirals. What would work in Europe was guaranteed disaster in the Western Pacific.

So in a hypothetical timeline where there's no war in Europe, Japan is stymied in her expansion to the South. Thailand won't play ball until it is sure the major European powers in SE Asia are neutralized. And if Germany has not overrun Western Europe, or is even at war, those powers are free to dedicate their military resources in resistance to any Japanese aggression, and they'll do so in concert. France alone can't whip Japan, but it certainly can if it is in alliance with Britain and the Netherlands; and even by itself, it can absorb a great deal of Japanese military resources. Heck, you don't even need America in the ring.

Airpower again. The Allies (US included.) had 2x to 3x the IJN/IJA numbers and assets in region so we can subtract the US and add France and still come up snake eyes. The Japanese had aircraft and op-experience and TACAIR superiority of an order of magnitude greater than anything the Allies could bring to bear in region. They are on the interior of the air power arc, (Think wheel and spokes) can mass at will (superior range in their aircraft) whereas the allies are scattered out of mutual support on the rim of that arc, cannot reach the IJN/IJA base structure at all (out of range) and in the colonies do not have the sustainment in theater that Japan does or they, the Allies, would have back in their native countries.

The only enemy air force in region with strategic bomber reach is the USAAC and that force does not have the FIGHTER REACH to make the bombers effective. More on that in a moment.

Actually, this raises another butterfly: If there is no war in Europe, and there is no Fall of France, you're not only going to see a considerably slower British buildup of its air power, you're ALSO going to see *no* Two Ocean Navy Act passed by Congress. American air and naval power was already on the upslope before 1940, to be sure, but at nothing like the pace post summer 1940. Likewise, the same will be true for MacArthur's efforts to build up the Philippines' defenses.

The 2 ocean navy bill was passed before the war in Europe started.

So if Japan has its opportunity door closed to the Southern Resource Area by lack of war in the ETO, it also is not going to be facing the same avalanche of American military hardware it had to face post-1940 in OTL.

The US tech in the pipeline begins in 1935. So yes the hardware is there. The question is when does it ramp up? That is a fair question. Given the Panay Incident and a few other Nasty things going on, the answer is war by March 1942. THAT was the USN planning estimate for the first punch. The Japanese beat the Americans to the punch by three months.

I'm not sure what Japan does with its wonderful Kido Butai in this scenario, beyond various ops against the KMT off the China coast. But I suppose it could be leverage for extracting minor concessions from the Western powers.

Central Mahanic style battle with the RN in the South China Sea prior to the Singapore operation. Outcome? US and Japan are at war after the RN's defeat. Pacific War more or less as it played out.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Technological joker in the deck.

Given enough Marauders and Lightnings? Japan is not going anywhere. That is why the Japanese had to move when they did. If they wait for the dim-witted Americans to figure out the RIKKO, the Japanese are kaput. Nobody else has the tech in 1941 or the geography to make it work. This of course presumes that some ASB whispers into the ear of the air staff in Washington; "Hey; dummies, better get the Lightning and the Marauder up and running and base them (^^^) at Rabaul, Guam, and Luzon."

The Zero and the Betty made the Sickle possible. System of systems.

 

[Athelstane]

As it turns out, there was no way the British could take it back. Their command structure and dispositions (the Singapore bastion defense) was ill-conceived and not practical. Whether the Wehrmacht was in Paris or not is not relevant. What is relevant, was could the RN fight the IJN with any hope of success in the South China Sea? The answer is a flat no. They were simply incapable of facing Kido Butai in a straight up air-sea battle. Wrong equipment, wrong training, wrong logistics, wrong admirals. What would work in Europe was guaranteed disaster in the Western Pacific.

No, wrong, I'm really puzzled by what you're saying here.

Yamashita only took Singapore by the skin of his teeth.

Now, in a scenario where Britain is not even at war in Europe, they're not going to be able to devote additional resources to Malaya and Singapore? Really?

Look, Britain doesn't need to be able to whip the Kido Butai in the South China Sea! They just need to keep Japan from conquering all of Malaya and Singapore. To hold on until they can redeploy more forces and build up capabilities.

That's it.

Japan loses if it can't conquer Singapore.

Because so long as Britain can keep a foothold there, the Thais are not going to feel safe aligning with Japan. And, more to the point, it won't be able to secure the oil facilities in the DEI, which will all be in range of British air attack from RAF air bases in Singapore and southern Malaya. Even if they've magically conquered the Philippines at the same time.

The 2 ocean navy bill was passed before the war in Europe started.

I am not talking about the 1938 Act, but the 1940 Act (the Vinson-Walsh Act). THAT was the one that authorized the avalanche.

The 1938 buildout does create problems for Japan, and takes away all the advantage they'd built up in battleship construction; but it was the 1940 Act which was the recipe for total American naval dominance in the Pacific.

Given the Panay Incident and a few other Nasty things going on, the answer is war by March 1942. THAT was the USN planning estimate for the first punch. The Japanese beat the Americans to the punch by three months.

No, I don't see that at all. What triggers the war? FDR isn't going to launch war on Japan on his own hook. There simply wasn't the support in Congress for that.

 

[McPherson]

No, wrong, I'm really puzzled by what you're saying here.

Yamashita only took Singapore by the skin of his teeth.

The incompetence of the British defense is the matter to which I allude. If you need the specifics; that is a good start for it.

Now, in a scenario where Britain is not even at war in Europe, they're not going to be able to devote additional resources to Malaya and Singapore? Really?

Look, the RN was never going to be able to devote the forces required because of Italy in the Mediterranean Sea and what they felt they needed in home waters. In their
plans in 1938, the RN estimated a deployment equivalent to 2 SAGs and 1 CTF to defend Singapore as a deterrent. In numbers that is about 8 old BBs and 3-4 CVs. 6-8 CAs and 5-8 Cls plus about 40 or so DDs and auxiliaries.

They intended to bluff.

Japanese air and sea assault assets in the Sickle amounted to 1 SAG and 2 to 3 CTF raids. (Why the Kido Butai was important. Defeat the Americans at Hawaii, defeat the Australians at Darwin in the North Territories, defeat the British (Crushingly so, for Somerville on paper was Nagumo's match in all assets except in flattops.) in the Indian Ocean. He lost badly because British naval doctrine with regards to a major fleet action was not supported by adequate shore based air reconnaissance or by a good shore control master plot. If the RN was caught up in the gross negligence, ineptitude and inefficiency which plagued the Allied command structures in East Asia in 1941 and 1942, it just comes down to the utter incompetence of Tom Phillips when he was the head honcho for the RN's equivalent of the USN's Warplans (OP-20-G). I am cutting neither Pound, his superior, or him any slack. They were the authors of the Singapore Bastion Defense and they set up Somerville for his own subsequent defeat.

Note, I am not cutting the USN any slack either, but that outfit's faults lay at Bu-Ord, Bu_Air, and Bu-ships. The actual fighting at the strategic and op-art level was outstanding. Tactics? Uhm… Let's say that it takes a year of war for the USN to figure it out. But the RN? Bolos across the board at the Op-art and strategic levels and Java Sea, Sri-Lanka and Andaman Islands kind of make me happy it was the USN and the Australians that fought the CTF engagements and later surface actions of CARTWHEEL. The RN was completely outclassed.

BTW as to force on force naval in the Sickle? Mainly Japanese RIKKOs and air power chasing off Allied surface squadrons. Force Z actions would negate the Bluff Fleet. That could fly out of Hainan Island and kibosh the RN in the South China Sea.

Everything else was convoy escort and land-based air covered. (About 300 aircraft, split between fighters and bombers. Yes that small a force!)

Look, Britain doesn't need to be able to whip the Kido Butai in the South China Sea! They just need to keep Japan from conquering all of Malaya and Singapore. To hold on until they can redeploy more forces and build up capabilities.

How? How can they cram more into the Singapore Bastion Defense Scheme? They already poured more into it, than they ever could long-term sustain or ever expected to deploy.

That's it.

Japan loses if it can't conquer Singapore.

Because so long as Britain can keep a foothold there, the Thais are not going to feel safe aligning with Japan. And, more to the point, it won't be able to secure the oil facilities in the DEI, which will all be in range of British air attack from RAF air bases in Singapore and southern Malaya. Even if they've magically conquered the Philippines at the same time.

How is Britain going to stop them? Oh, here is the Royal Navy? We also have 150,000 + troops in Malaysia and you only have 52,000? It does not work that way. Where's your air cover? Where's your defense in depth? To hold Singapore it means the British have to extend out to deny the SLOCs all the way to Hainan Island. Guess who is the only one who has that kind of reach or the geographical position to do that? Better be nice to President Quezon and not irritate General MacArthur. The Marquess of Linlithgow (Bengal famine of 1943) sure does not fit that bill, the asshole.

Guess what I 'think' the ultimate fail point of the whole ramshackle British position is? C.W.H.Pulford. The RAF was the critical fail for the British in Malaya and frankly in Burma, too.

I am not talking about the 1938 Act, but the 1940 Act (the Vinson-Walsh Act). THAT was the one that authorized the avalanche.

The 1938 act was the kibosh to the naval treaties. After that, the brakes were off.

The 1938 buildout does create problems for Japan, and takes away all the advantage they'd built up in battleship construction; but it was the 1940 Act which was the recipe for total American naval dominance in the Pacific.

I argue that the 1940 act was unbalanced in that it did not provide enough ASW or fleet trains assets. Sometimes you need to think about the tail on the alligator. No tail and that alligator cannot move.

No, I don't see that at all. What triggers the war? FDR isn't going to launch war on Japan on his own hook. There simply wasn't the support in Congress for that.

Here. You'll have to go through the archives. Trace the mobilization history up to Pearl Harbor. Without consulting Congress, FDR acted to take and control sovereign territories of foreign states before formal states of war occurred. Specifically Greenland and Iceland were placed under defacto US control. I would not have put it past FDR to make "friendly arrangements" with the DEI and possibly Australia to fortify and reinforce them under a similar arrangement. The Japanese beat him to the punch in the DEI before the negotiations were complete.

Some think, the Curtin government came to such an "understanding" with the Americans anyway. Shrug. I think the Australians are one hello of a fine bunch of people who sort of swung that barn door; themserlves. They finally acted in their interests which after 1942 were not British interests. I count Coral Sea as the moment when that happened and when the UK ceased to matter in the Pacific War. Kind of harsh, but think about it? Sri Lanka is a defeat after the Singapore disaster. Coral Sea, right next to Australia is a victory. London lied to Canberra about Sri Lanka, and after so many other lies... what is Curtin now to do?

It was what it was.

 

[trurle]

The reality is under the constraints presented to them the Japanese government took a completely logical route.

They had no viable alternatives. Unless they could sell leaving Chinese supply lines up to the army which would do nothing but lengthen the Chinese incident and keel Japan quagmired

Absolutely incorrect. Japanese decision pathway before Pacific war was self-consistent (because ruling group did not change) but a lot of opportunities were simply excluded from decision process. For example, no systematic geological survey was taken, neither in Japan proper nor in Manchuria. Also, rubber can be grown on Hainan and Guangdong - again not systematically tried.

 

[McPherson]

Absolutely incorrect. Japanese decision pathway before Pacific war was self-consistent (because ruling group did not change) but a lot of opportunities were simply excluded from decision process. For example, no systematic geological survey was taken, neither in Japan proper nor in Manchuria. Also, rubber can be grown on Hainan and Guangdong - again not systematically tried.

(^^^) This is correct. I will add that the Japanese had a small but very good chemical industry and they are supremely gifted and perniciously persistent engineers. Given their strategic choices and the historic economic models of how far they would finance an option to create any strategic opportunity, they could have developed synthetic rubber and synthetic oil industries, from their small coal reserves in Japan proper and in Manchuria. They could have made do with the actual raw ferrous ore to finished steel alloys option in Korea and southern Manchuria working around the three biggest bottlenecks the Americans and British embargoed; scrap steel, rubber and oil. This might have sufficed for the China war as their army operations there were for that mostly infantry based army that was used to the incredible hardships of long marches and little motorized transport against a roughly equivalent non-motorized enemy. But the Japanese ruling clique wanted to be "cheap" about it and not make the additional economic investments. Self constrained options, such as synthetics and full mine to alloy iron processing would have been very expensive and denied them their ambitions outside NW China

The Tokyo junta 東京独裁 (Tokyo dictatorship or zuk-sai) and the 財閥 (Zaibatsu or industrial cliques.) wanted to have their navy and they wanted to seize colonies. They were imperialists. They could agree on that much amongst themselves in a group consensus.

 

[McPherson]

Given his circumstances can we blame Hitler for anything he did? Raised by a domineering mother and abusive father he became a starving artist in Vienna. After serving in WW1 he saw his country go through hyperinflation, had parts of his country torn apart by foreigners, have to pay heavy reparations inflicted on her, and had to battle members of both the right and left to come up on top. However despite all that he manages to unite all of Germany including Rhineland, Austria, and Sudetenland, kicked out many foreigners and rebuilt the economy.

But viva la revoltution and all that. If you are going to make excuses be consistent. Mass murdering psychotic dictators are mass-murdering psychotic dicators no matter what the excuse.

That is a Godwin, but to address it?

Look, Ho Chi Minh was an "evil" man. But unlike Stalin, maybe Mao, and other examples of human evil (Pol Pot, Idi Amin and Robert McNamara), he had his goal/vision and he was efficient about it.

Example? He knew his nation would be bombed when it challenged the United States and that his nation would suffer horribly. His air generals started planning for that aspect of the war in 1958 when they sent carefully screened candidates to the soviet union to learn everything the Russians knew about air defense against a dominant enemy air force. Their success was in the returning trained cadres understanding that against the Americans, the Russian model would not work. A total war bombing campaign would reduce North Vietnam to ruins inside 6 weeks. THAT is what the students told Ho and his air generals. They had to try something else. So they added a propaganda element to HOBBLE American airpower by portraying an absolute air campaign as a war crime before the world community. It worked.

This was much the same as the rest of the Vietnamese war strategy. Attack the American mind via wearing down the will of the enemy. That is not so much Mao Zedong, who stole it from Sun Tzu, as it is Clausewitz. Find the enemy's strategic center and impose your will upon it. Television became a weapon of war. That is PURE unadulterated political/military genius.

 

[RMcD94]

Absolutely incorrect. Japanese decision pathway before Pacific war was self-consistent (because ruling group did not change) but a lot of opportunities were simply excluded from decision process. For example, no systematic geological survey was taken, neither in Japan proper nor in Manchuria. Also, rubber can be grown on Hainan and Guangdong - again not systematically tried.

Wow I had no idea that they didn't check Manchuria for oil? Why wouldn't they do that? That's idiocy

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The American notion that Tojo was a one-man dictator like Hitler is deeply ahistorical and postwar...

It doesn't seem to be a wartime thing. The Three Stooges had a run-in with Hitler, Mussolini, and some generic Japanese general.

 

[TastySpam]

That is a Godwin, but to address it?

Look, Ho Chi Minh was an "evil" man. But unlike Stalin, maybe Mao, and other examples of human evil (Pol Pot, Idi Amin and Robert McNamara), he had his goal/vision and he was efficient about it.

Mao pretty much achieved most of his goals. He won the Chinese Civil War (much like Ho Chi Minh won the Vietnamese Civil War). He held power until more or less his death. And the PRC has notably outlived the USSR and assuming nothing blows up this year, it'll even last longer! (1921-1991 vs 1949-2019).

In contrast...the Khmer Rouge is...no longer around.

 

[McPherson]

Mao pretty much achieved most of his goals. He won the Chinese Civil War (much like Ho Chi Minh won the Vietnamese Civil War). He held power until more or less his death. And the PRC has notably outlived the USSR and assuming nothing blows up this year, it'll even last longer! (1921-1991 vs 1949-2019).

In contrast...the Khmer Rouge is...no longer around.

Kind of my original point. (^^^) So thank you for stating it much better than I did.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Regarding the original proposition.

Japan attacked the US and Britain when...

• France was out of the war.
• Britain had suffered a bad defeat, and was heavily engaged in Europe.
• The USSR was apparently on the brink of collapse

The US was intact to fight them, but still the odds against them were about as good as it could get.

If the Hitler War is over by late 1941... It would hard for even the most virulent Japanese to believe they can take on practically the whole world single-handed.

And even a mad dog imperialist could learn from reality. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji was as rabid as anyone in the Japanese military. (His list of war crimes includes cannibalism.) Despite his relatively low rank, he was very influential in the high command, even attending war council meetings. (He was apparently charismatic; also brilliant - he planned the Malaya offensive.)

Tsuji had been in Manchuria during the 1939 Nomonhan conflict with the USSR. And thereafter, when anyone suggested attacking the USSR, he was quick to pour cold water on it. He'd seen what the Soviet Army was like, and understood just how bad Japan would be defeated.

Of course his opinion alone would not control. But if he and others like him, however reluctantly, acknowledged the reality of the balance of forces, would there still be a consensus for launching the wider war?

One would have to survey the top men in the Japanese inner circle and decide how they would act. If the consensus decided against the wider war, does Japan try to fight the China war without oil imports? Do they start losing?

Could there be a consensus in Japan that (however distasteful it is) the China war must be given up? If so, how does the high command deal with the mad dogs who would insist on fighting on? There could be a ferocious internal power struggle.

It's been noted here that Japanese national opinion was vehemently against letting go of Manchuria. The "get-out-of-the-war" leadership would probably try to end the war by withdrawing to Manchuria.

China would not accept that, but what could they alone do? It would take two years at least for Chiang to consolidate control of the rest of China. Since that would require eliminating or absorbing the Communist forces, it might take much longer.

 

[TastySpam]

Could there be a consensus in Japan that (however distasteful it is) the China war must be given up? If so, how does the high command deal with the mad dogs who would insist on fighting on? There could be a ferocious internal power struggle.

It's been noted here that Japanese national opinion was vehemently against letting go of Manchuria. The "get-out-of-the-war" leadership would probably try to end the war by withdrawing to Manchuria.

China would not accept that, but what could they alone do? It would take two years at least for Chiang to consolidate control of the rest of China. Since that would require eliminating or absorbing the Communist forces, it might take much longer.

Eh, there was already kind of an IJA consensus that the war in China was more or less unwinnable. It was the KMT that said a Japanese withdrawal to Manchuria was not enough. It's hard to advocate withdrawing to Manchuria when the enemy says they'll continue attacking you even after you move your lines back many many miles.

I suppose the IJA could withdraw to Manchuria and hope Chiang fights the Communists instead, but Chiang had repeatedly pledged that he wouldn't do that - that he would continue the war until all of China was liberated.

That exact possibility was IIRC actually sent from the Japanese to the Chinese circa 1939 - and the Chinese unequivocally rejected it. Which makes sense, accepting such a peace offer would have destroyed Chiang's credibility both in and outside of China.

 

[TastySpam]

Compared to Jiang Jieshi or 蔣中正 or Chiang Kai Shek (the Peanut) as the Americans (Stilwell) knew him; Mao was very competent and "somewhat" honest.

Chiang was a very good general. His Northern Expedition pretty much crushed almost every other force in China despite massive inferiority in both numbers and political legitimacy. It was as audacious as Oda Nobunaga's victory against the Imagawa. If anything, the problem was that Stillwell was not very competent

As mentioned earlier, the KMT defeat was less Chiang's military incompetence and just poor KMT governance after 1945. And Mao's brilliance was honestly less in military affairs, but politics and philosophy. In that sense, he's actually a lot like Lenin. At the end of the day, Maoism is a profoundly successful idealogy in terms of attracting believers. Maoism pretty quickly spread like wildfire across the world, from African rebels to American social activists and even modern anti-austerity activists. And Mao pretty consistently outfoxed his political foes his entire life.

 

[trurle]

Wow I had no idea that they didn't check Manchuria for oil? Why wouldn't they do that? That's idiocy

Japanese even did not check Sakhalin for oil.
Regarding terms for mental state of interwar Japanese decision makers, the correct term would be "groupthink", not the idiocy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink

 

[McPherson]

Chiang was a very good general. His Northern Expedition pretty much crushed almost every other force in China despite massive inferiority in both numbers and political legitimacy. It was as audacious as Oda Nobunaga's victory against the Imagawa. If anything, the problem was that Stillwell was not very competent

As mentioned earlier, the KMT defeat was less Chiang's military incompetence and just poor KMT governance after 1945. And Mao's brilliance was honestly less in military affairs, but politics and philosophy. In that sense, he's actually a lot like Lenin. At the end of the day, Maoism is a profoundly successful idealogy in terms of attracting believers. Maoism pretty quickly spread like wildfire across the world, from African rebels to American social activists and even modern anti-austerity activists. And Mao pretty consistently outfoxed his political foes his entire life.

You are kidding? A rather bungled expedition to suppress what amounted to regional bandits versus the American's successful Burma campaign with half trained Chinese troops? Chiang's political/military incompetence as a war leader and generalissimo was manifestly demonstrated during Ichi Go when the peasants of Henan province actually rose up in rebellion against the KMT army under this bungler, Jiang Dingwen, and virtually aided the Japanese war effort because Chiang's KMT political and military rule was outrageously corrupt and awful. Never mind their urge for vengeance for the 1938 Yellow River Flood; how does one explain the loss of political faith in the Henan province people who hated the KMT more than they hated the Japanese?

 

[KanonenKartoffel]

As it turns out, there was no way the British could take it back. Their command structure and dispositions (the Singapore bastion defense) was ill-conceived and not practical. Whether the Wehrmacht was in Paris or not is not relevant. What is relevant, was could the RN fight the IJN with any hope of success in the South China Sea? The answer is a flat no. They were simply incapable of facing Kido Butai in a straight up air-sea battle. Wrong equipment, wrong training, wrong logistics, wrong admirals. What would work in Europe was guaranteed disaster in the Western Pacific.

The incompetence of the British defense is the matter to which I allude. If you need the specifics; that is a good start for it.

Look, the RN was never going to be able to devote the forces required because of Italy in the Mediterranean Sea and what they felt they needed in home waters. [...]

They intended to bluff.

The problem is that you're arguing the wrong thing.

It doesn't matter if the British defense is utterly incompetent. It doesn't matter if they have insufficient forces present, and Japan controls the air, and all that.

What matters for "Can Japan persuade Thailand that it doesn't have to worry about British retaliation?" is whether Thailand thinks the British will be able to retaliate or if Japan can trounce them and kick them out. For that purpose, the historical performance of any arm of Japan's military against GB/France/etc. is irrelevant unless it happens before this point, because it's not information available to the people making these decisions. Unless we're bringing magic time portals into the mix, but then we're in the wrong subforum.

It doesn't matter how cozy the bed actually is, if it looks like a bed of nails, you're not going to sell it to anyone.