Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)
- Thread starter Not James Stockdale
- Start date
Deleted member 94680
Maybe that’s where the 4,000 figure comes from? The sums have been done and to make enough room for enough 88s to destroy the RN’s anti-convoy efforts need that many barges?
The more I think about this, the more I realize that Sea Lion survives because it's hard to map sea power like the Maginot line or the front lines of the wars or the steadily expanding and shrinking size of Nazi Germany. It's hard to teach naval power intuitively, and it's easy to dismiss things you don't understand. I made this point before I think, too. The evidence is staring us in the face: what is the first alt-history question most people are interested in, once they start to think about the field, if they don't have a military or logistical background? It's this one. And you talk people out of it through education, unless, like Glenn239, it becomes some sort of security blanket instead.
Really, we shouldn't be surprised that Britain has flashless charges for night engagements. We shouldn't be surprised that they have a big home fleet to defend the islands. We shouldn't be surprised that they have virtually limitless small patrol boats. We shouldn't be surprised at the hapless state of the defenses actually on the island.
The reason we shouldn't be surprised is because the navy is Britain's principal defensive line, not the stop lines, not the air force, not the beaches, not the Home Guard. Not even France, which is just the forward salient. The navy is and always has been the main line of defense. That's what it's there for. This is why the stop lines weren't invested in adequately and this is why they sent tanks off to Egypt even when an invasion of southern England seemed like a real possibility. This is why the Navy is there. The Navy is Britain's Maginot line.
And since 1940, first the Germans and then the Sealionistas have been hunting for a way to sneak around that line, except that they can't, because unlike with France's Maginot line, they can't go through Belgium, they can't hold their breath long enough, they can't swim fast enough, and Britain's Maginot line is bigger, more mobile, and more heavily armed than the people trying to attack it.
That's it, really. Everything else in every one of these interminable threads is just a debate about whether maybe there's a cheat code to break the game.
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So.
looking at the initial plans for Sea Lions first wave which somehow has deposited 90 Thousand troops (not that I believe that they had a realistic chance of transporting that many troops in one go) on the Beaches of Southern Kent and East Sussex and scattered some FJs in Kent.
Then what? Let's say that somehow deck mounted '88's scare off the most aggressive and professional navy in the world in 1940 (and as an ex RNR member - the most aggressive and professional navy in the world any time in the last 350 years for that matter
)
Assuming that the British don't immediately throw in the towel (which I believe is what the Germans would have been counting on - in the same way that the Japanese had been counting on the Chinese doing after Nanking - like the Japanese the Germans would have been disappointed) how many days do they have to 'hold' any beach head they have managed to claim?
I have noted that in the mass majority of actions in WW2 where the Germans beat the British they enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers, equipment, intelligence, logistics and airpower - this is often called 'German superiority'
I have also noticed that in the mass majority of actions in WW2 where the British beat the Germans they also enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers, equipment, intelligence, logistics and airpower - this is often called 'the British beat the Germans because they had more stuff'
The fact is that had mostly light infantry force of 90 thousand men lacking AFVs, Artillery, and supplies landed in Sussex and Kent - they would have been opposed by a force many times this size with AFVs, Artillery and supplies - granted Britain was short of AFVs and Artillery but they would have had many times more than this first wave would have.
There would of course would be an even greater disparity - if we bring into account the confusion and disruption to the invading force that an amphibious operation would bring particularly when the said force has no legacy and experience of such ops and lacks the necessary specialised kits to make it work and certainly has no chance of conducting effective cross beach logistics at the scale required.
And then even more so if we start to apply the inevitable casualties that such a force would suffer even with an implausible successful crossing to those RN forces attempting to interdict it.
How many would they lose in said crossing to all causes?
How many would be forced to turn back from this first wave?
How many would land on the wrong beach further diluting the available troops for a give plan?
How many would accidentally invade France?
The first wave would be defeated but only because 'the British beat the Germans because they had more stuff'
As Bart would say 'DUH!'
looking at the initial plans for Sea Lions first wave which somehow has deposited 90 Thousand troops (not that I believe that they had a realistic chance of transporting that many troops in one go) on the Beaches of Southern Kent and East Sussex and scattered some FJs in Kent.
Then what? Let's say that somehow deck mounted '88's scare off the most aggressive and professional navy in the world in 1940 (and as an ex RNR member - the most aggressive and professional navy in the world any time in the last 350 years for that matter
)Assuming that the British don't immediately throw in the towel (which I believe is what the Germans would have been counting on - in the same way that the Japanese had been counting on the Chinese doing after Nanking - like the Japanese the Germans would have been disappointed) how many days do they have to 'hold' any beach head they have managed to claim?
I have noted that in the mass majority of actions in WW2 where the Germans beat the British they enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers, equipment, intelligence, logistics and airpower - this is often called 'German superiority'
I have also noticed that in the mass majority of actions in WW2 where the British beat the Germans they also enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers, equipment, intelligence, logistics and airpower - this is often called 'the British beat the Germans because they had more stuff'
The fact is that had mostly light infantry force of 90 thousand men lacking AFVs, Artillery, and supplies landed in Sussex and Kent - they would have been opposed by a force many times this size with AFVs, Artillery and supplies - granted Britain was short of AFVs and Artillery but they would have had many times more than this first wave would have.
There would of course would be an even greater disparity - if we bring into account the confusion and disruption to the invading force that an amphibious operation would bring particularly when the said force has no legacy and experience of such ops and lacks the necessary specialised kits to make it work and certainly has no chance of conducting effective cross beach logistics at the scale required.
And then even more so if we start to apply the inevitable casualties that such a force would suffer even with an implausible successful crossing to those RN forces attempting to interdict it.
How many would they lose in said crossing to all causes?
How many would be forced to turn back from this first wave?
How many would land on the wrong beach further diluting the available troops for a give plan?
How many would accidentally invade France?
The first wave would be defeated but only because 'the British beat the Germans because they had more stuff'
As Bart would say 'DUH!'
What if they transit units through the still ""friendly"" USSR, then through Japanese occupied China to invade Hong Kong?
THE WEHRMACHT WILL STAND ON BRITISH SOIL* ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
*in a capacity other than POWs
THE WEHRMACHT WILL STAND ON BRITISH SOIL* ONE WAY OR ANOTHER!
*in a capacity other than POWs
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Exactly. If the Germans could have done it, they would have. But in 1940 they did not have the resources to do it, just like the US did not have the resources to invade the Japanese home islands in 1942.
Right, the RN had hundreds of armed trawlers and such that would enter the fray as the battle moved to the beach. But the battle has to get to the beach for that to happen, that is, the invasion has to brush through the 80 x RN warships that attacked previously.
The problem with crushing the invasion "at their leisure" is that if the first wave lands intact it gets harder to crush the invasion on the beach. The British army in 1940 didn't have that many good "attack" divisions, and unit for unit, the Germans were better. If the Germans got ashore, the British might deploy reserves to contain them (a la Anzio), but to throw them back might not be possible. The barges - the weakest part of the invasion - weren't required to run supplies and more men to an established position, they were needed for the first mass of 100,000 to land. The supply after that could be done by other transports, (warships, motor boats, trawlers, tugs, anything that could make 8kt or better). The exception to that idea would be the 2nd wave, which would require a large barge transportation force. If an "Anzio" situation were to evolve, it might come to a point where the British decide to make peace, or that the Germans reverse the direction and start evacuating, or that they just bear down and decide to ride it out into 1941 in a bridgehead. None of these scenarios are good for the British, so turning the invasion back before it lands would be best I think.
If 80 RN warships go after the invasion convoy in daylight, let's assume the LW response is an all-out counterattack with every plane available against the RN forces attacking, at the maximum achievable sortie rate, in order to defeat that attack. Until that was achieved, no "inland interdiction", no "bombing empty ports", no "attacking RAF airfields". Everything into the Channel, all out, as many sorties as possible, or against RN warships trying to reload ammunition in port. What happens?
It's not yet a total war. How many warships could the British afford to lose before they decided to make peace instead? The IJN off Guadalcanal found that the number of sinkings and damage was too much to sustain. But, they were over 2,000 miles from home and had the room to stop fighting for Guadalcanal. Can the RN stop fighting in the Channel?
I'm guessing that under air sea battle conditions in the most atypical air sea battle in modern history, an RN destroyer with let's say 1,000 rounds of main gun ammunition will fire about 250 or more at aircraft, 250 at the convoy escorts that are trying to shoot at them, will keep 200 in reserve that will not be used, (no captain fires off all his ammunition), and the other 300 at 6 targets in groups of about 50 rounds each, sinking, let's say 4 of them and damaging the other 2.
553,099 tons in 5 months is 110,000 tons per month. If the RN in the Channel in 1940 scored at the Tunisia rate - 110,000 tons per month - against a Sealion campaign, would you say that would be enough, nor not nearly enough, to stop the invasion?
Bone and Malta were about 6 hours steaming from the major Axis ports. How much closer did they need to be?
Ajax had radar fire control in that battle, hence the big difference in performance.
Yes, from the ammunition expenditure profile I sketched up response, I think to win the battle and repulse the invasion, I think it's pretty clear the RN would need to do exactly that, plus use air and RN aux. forces. That it did not have the ammunition aboard the RN 80 warships otherwise to repel Sealion in one go.
Two things. First, when the captain of Jarvis Bay turned and challenged the Scheer, do you think he was under the illusion he could "effectively engage" a pocket battleship? What do you think he was doing? Second, if an RN destroyer group encounters a dozen enemy motor boats sailing ahead of the convoy, do you think they might attack them, or just wave and sail on by?
Samar is just an example of an air sea battle where the overwhelming surface superiority didn't pan out due to the grinding effects of constant - even if largely ineffective - air attacks. You list a bunch of reasons why you think this example won't play in an air sea battle in 1940. But we don't really know, do we?
I was picturing it that if an RN destroyer went right in close against 40 ships that these might have more than one submarine deck gun. Am I wrong on that?[/QUOTE]
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At the risk of injecting reality, in the course of research for a book chapter (in a real academic book published by a real academic press) I looked at a large number of documents concerning planning for Gallipoli at the British National Archives and other archives in the UK. They clearly illustrates what happens when a force with basically no experience in conducting an opposed amphibious assault tries to shoehorn the planning process in to a very short period of time, at the same time extemporizing doctrine, tactics, and equipment to fit "making do". This is exactly what the Germans were doing in the (abortive) process for SEALION and the results would have been the same even before you throw in the reality that unlike Gallipoli where the British (and French) forces had almost no opposition in depositing the forces on the beach, the German force would have a good deal of opposition before the first soldier sets foot on British soil. (1)
(1) The problems the RN and MN had were from mines as they attempted to go further up the Straits, in the areas of the assault beaches the mines were not a major issue.
(1) The problems the RN and MN had were from mines as they attempted to go further up the Straits, in the areas of the assault beaches the mines were not a major issue.
It's hard to teach naval power full stop. Even otherwise intelligent individuals can have serious problems grasping the importance of combat that doesn't end with a measurable increase in the area of terra firma held by one side or the other.
Obnoxious foreigners (and a few Brits) have been trying to sneak around that line since some Italian bloke in 55BC. Most of them came a cropper. Hence this excellent summary.
Deleted member 94680
This post is pretty much unmitigated nonsense, as in it doesn’t make any sense.
That's true, although to Caesar's benefit, that line didn't use to travel at 25 knots and have 15-inch guns on top of it.
All of them. The Japanese were free to cut their losses at starvation island because it was starvation island. Great Britain has just a teeny-tiny bit more strategic and sentimental importance.
NO.
1. You need a port for that. Only ships with an amphibious capacity can deliver supplies to a beach. Thats why the Allies developed Landing Ships, DUKW transports, an underwater pipeline, and Mulberry Harbors and were still stuck for supplies until they were able to get a workable deepwater port going. The only thing the Germans have are barges, which are now stuck and burning on the beach because the RN has sunk the tow vessels or sinking them in transit. The RN doesn't just go away here. They stand off and pound away at the beached vessels and the troops on the beach. You've put them in a kill box. This is truly Dieppe writ large.
2. Motor boats, trawlers and tugs are not going to supply an army, even if they could. This is, what six divisions? Sixth army needed a minimum of 300 tons of supplies a day to survive. Lets say they need a minimum 50 tons of supplies. Thats 100 truckloads. Good luck. The Japanese tried supporting a few infantry divisions with destroyers, and they slowly starved to death. The KM doesn't have destroyers.
Had the Germans ever maintained troops in combat over a seaborne logistic chain before 1940 or is that yet another thing they're going to learn off the cuff in a few weeks and blag their way through when they have to do it for real?
It's amazing that the two foremost maritime powers on the planet put three years of planning and building specialist equipment into a cross Channel invasion to go on top of (literally) centuries of experience of amphibious operations (although obviously never on the same scale) but people think a nation that had been a maritime power for about three years over two decades previously before their navy bottled it and decided to sit in port for the duration after their first proper sea battle is going to do it all in six weeks.
It's amazing that the two foremost maritime powers on the planet put three years of planning and building specialist equipment into a cross Channel invasion to go on top of (literally) centuries of experience of amphibious operations (although obviously never on the same scale) but people think a nation that had been a maritime power for about three years over two decades previously before their navy bottled it and decided to sit in port for the duration after their first proper sea battle is going to do it all in six weeks.
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Here is Fuhrer Directive #16, see paragraph #2:
- Objectives A and E were clearly never achieved, not even close.
- As far as I know, Objectives B and C were never even really attempted.
- Not sure about Objective D but I doubt the Germans had that much heavy artillery.
Deleted member 94680
But paragraph 3 (a) clearly references “anti-aircraft artillery”, so 88s were definitely part of the plan.
For those who live in that area, at what point does the weather make this a no go. I realize weather in that area can be bad anytime of the year and it played a huge role in timing of D-Day and that was in June (thank you Group Captain Stagg). When do things reach a point where you can't reliably count on even 48 hours of good weather?