AHC: Central Powers USA

[Genrexx]

Just as a POD - how about the Dogger Bank Incident (1904 when Russia Baltic Fleet shot up some UK Fishing boats as it was sailing to Vladivostok) goes a little warmer. UK still doesn't actually go to war with Russia but gives substantially more aid (credit plus munitions) to Japan. And so Japan 'wins' the war quicker and more decisively (for instance, more artillery at Port Arthur could have ended the siege a lot quicker; better more/supply would have aided the Japanese army advance quicker and further into Manchuria. So Japan gets a peace treaty quicker, and more favorable and then starts pushing further into North China; and also subverting US rule of Philippines. So there's even more overt US/Japan tension leading US to declare war on Japan when Japan starts seizing German outposts in China and the Pacific in July 1914.

How that then degenerates into an idiotic US vs UK shooting war, I'm not exactly sure. But it was a bad month for diplomacy

 

[Genrexx]

And as for Canada, my favorite country to the North, well it would've taken a year or two. US would've needed time to mobilize an Army. But ITL the US Army went from 300,000 in 1917 to a planned 5,000,000 by 1919. (There were 2,000,000 in the AEF in France at Armistice, quite a logistical accomplishment). Whereas the population of Canada as a whole was only 8.000,000 in 1916. Globally the war would've been over by Christmas 1915, I think.

 

[RodentRevolution]

And as for Canada, my favorite country to the North, well it would've taken a year or two. US would've needed time to mobilize an Army. But ITL the US Army went from 300,000 in 1917 to a planned 5,000,000 by 1919. (There were 2,000,000 in the AEF in France at Armistice, quite a logistical accomplishment). Whereas the population of Canada as a whole was only 8.000,000 in 1916. Globally the war would've been over by Christmas 1915, I think.

While you cannot absolutely rule out a 1915 end to the war in the Western Hemisphere it should be pointed that the US was only able to arm its forces thanks to three rifle factories set up for the British and even with an additional field artillery plant set up for the French and another for the British the creation of a field artillery arm was slow (the fact that the AEF used Entente supplied artillery is a bit more complicated and part of an effort to simplify logistics). The Springfield armoury did try but even having run up production towards the target of equipping a 1 million man army it failed (mind you by 1917 the US did have sufficient rifles for the infantry and other rifle carrying component of that hypothetical 1 million strong army).

Certainly though it is worth reminding people that no one ever succeeded in conquering Canada without employing an army that would represent a significant portion of the local population cf French and Indian War.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

I do not think the word partisan nor guerrilla not irregular has crossed my keyboard in this thread until now. The idea of a finish to the war on terms favourable to the US seemed likely to me to occur in 1916.

The point I keep raising is there is nothing in it for the US in joining the CP except chunks of someone else's territory. Germany had been in many ways the country most noticeable in testing the Monroe Doctrine. Even as late as 1914 they were threatening to seize custom houses in Haiti. A little potted history of the German efforts in this regard is here. Though I have picked a source somewhat dismissive of the German efforts in this regard. There is also the point while the British and their Empire reliably bought American manufactures the Germans were busily competing in the same product lines.

I didn't intend to imply you did: that was a separate point in my head. Vaguries in the English language make it easy to see how you would have taken that partisan point to be applying to you as well, when it was raised earlier and separately. Now that I look it over again, I could have ordered that sentince in a way that would have avoided the problem.

 

[Lusitania]

An interesting side note. In both Canada and US many towns had German names and especially in US Midwest most German descent kids were educated in both German and English. German language newspapers flourished and the Midwest had a very German feel to it. ioTL it was Canada and US declaring war against Germany that wiped out that unique German feeling. Within a Generation German newspapers had disappeared and education was very much English only (public). So a German ally for US will have a positive impact to the German-Americans.

 

[Riain]

While you cannot absolutely rule out a 1915 end to the war in the Western Hemisphere it should be pointed that the US was only able to arm its forces thanks to three rifle factories set up for the British and even with an additional field artillery plant set up for the French and another for the British the creation of a field artillery arm was slow (the fact that the AEF used Entente supplied artillery is a bit more complicated and part of an effort to simplify logistics). The Springfield armoury did try but even having run up production towards the target of equipping a 1 million man army it failed (mind you by 1917 the US did have sufficient rifles for the infantry and other rifle carrying component of that hypothetical 1 million strong army).

Certainly though it is worth reminding people that no one ever succeeded in conquering Canada without employing an army that would represent a significant portion of the local population cf French and Indian War.

According to US SecWar in November 1914 the US possesed the small arms, small arms ammo and personal gear to equip 500,000 men. However he specifically says that they lack artillery, artillery ammo AND the means to make good on these shortages in the short term. In this scenario we're talking about the only saving grace would be Canada would be in a worse position, likely having to import artillery.

What was US artillery production like before otl April 1917?

 

[Riain]

And as for Canada, my favorite country to the North, well it would've taken a year or two. US would've needed time to mobilize an Army. But ITL the US Army went from 300,000 in 1917 to a planned 5,000,000 by 1919. (There were 2,000,000 in the AEF in France at Armistice, quite a logistical accomplishment). Whereas the population of Canada as a whole was only 8.000,000 in 1916. Globally the war would've been over by Christmas 1915, I think.

The US Army/NG situation of April 1917 is vastly different to that of August 1914. The US Army had taken many or most of the "walk before you can run" measures during that period due to the revolution in Mexico and the Preparedness Movement. For example in the July 1916 Defence Act the Regular Army was authorised to expand from 6 field artillery regiments to 9, including the first heavy regiment of 6" howitzers based in Hawaii. Similar applies to the infantry and cavalry arms.

In organizational terms the US RA conducted several concentrations on the Mexican border in 1914-16, which shook out US mobilization procedures, culminating in the mobilization of the entire NG in July 1916. This mobilisation, to support the RA Punitive Expedition, was a godsend for the US as it gave the entire 170,000 man NG 6 months of hard training in a tense political/operating environment as well as giving US commanders valuable experience commanding an army and divisions in the field.

It was this hard core of 250,000 hard trained men, lead by the first Americans to lead and train modern divisions in the field under threat of war, that the AEF was built on so quickly, not the green forces of 1914.

 

[Genrexx]

The US Army/NG situation of April 1917 is vastly different to that of August 1914. The US Army had taken many or most of the "walk before you can run" measures during that period due to the revolution in Mexico and the Preparedness Movement. For example in the July 1916 Defence Act the Regular Army was authorised to expand from 6 field artillery regiments to 9, including the first heavy regiment of 6" howitzers based in Hawaii. Similar applies to the infantry and cavalry arms.

In organizational terms the US RA conducted several concentrations on the Mexican border in 1914-16, which shook out US mobilization procedures, culminating in the mobilization of the entire NG in July 1916. This mobilisation, to support the RA Punitive Expedition, was a godsend for the US as it gave the entire 170,000 man NG 6 months of hard training in a tense political/operating environment as well as giving US commanders valuable experience commanding an army and divisions in the field.

It was this hard core of 250,000 hard trained men, lead by the first Americans to lead and train modern divisions in the field under threat of war, that the AEF was built on so quickly, not the green forces of 1914.

That sounds about right; still US would've raised a huge army, 1 million or more in 1914. Sooner or later US would've moved North - maybe summer of 1915. Maybe Christmas 1915 in Toronto, if Pershing gets lucky. Was Canada any more prepared than US in 1914? Maybe some UK officers with experience but Canada hadn't fought since 1812...

Would the war in Europe have lasted that long? Seems likely - depends on Battle for the Atlantic. France and UK would've been hurting without US supplies and capital. Where would they get them? UK would have been forced to allocate more to Navy than in the Great War. US too.

 

[Riain]

That sounds about right; still US would've raised a huge army, 1 million or more in 1914. Sooner or later US would've moved North - maybe summer of 1915. Maybe Christmas 1915 in Toronto, if Pershing gets lucky. Was Canada any more prepared than US in 1914? Maybe some UK officers with experience but Canada hadn't fought since 1812...

Would the war in Europe have lasted that long? Seems likely - depends on Battle for the Atlantic. France and UK would've been hurting without US supplies and capital. Where would they get them? UK would have been forced to allocate more to Navy than in the Great War. US too.

In April 1917 either Congress or the President (I suspect Congress ) authorised immediate raising of all the regiments of the 1916 Defense Act and their manning at full war strength. A bit later they authorised the conversion of the cavalry regiments into infantry regiments. I believe the same applied to the NG. This provided the initial legal basis and organisational structure of the Army to expand into.

Something very similar would apply in 1914, if the 1917 authorsed expansion is any guide the Regular Army would go from 90,000 to maybe 170,000. Certainly the 30 odd infantry regiments were at about 2/5 strength of about 850 men, so authorising these to war strength would provide billets for 36,000 infantrymen for starters. If the same rule of thumb applies to the 1914 NG, and I suspect that the situation there is worse, it would go from 158,000 to 300,000 or more billets upon "Federalisation" and authorisation for war strength.

Thats getting close to half the 500,000 sets of gear the US had on hand simply to bring the RA/NG to war strength.

Of course jamming a uniform on a man and giving him a rifle doesn't make him ready for modern war. I suspect that the RA might try to fill a lot of its 36,000 infantry billets from the NG to reduce the training overhead, particularly from less well equipped NG units.

 

[Lusitania]

In April 1917 either Congress or the President (I suspect Congress ) authorised immediate raising of all the regiments of the 1916 Defense Act and their manning at full war strength. A bit later they authorised the conversion of the cavalry regiments into infantry regiments. I believe the same applied to the NG. This provided the initial legal basis and organisational structure of the Army to expand into.

Something very similar would apply in 1914, if the 1917 authorsed expansion is any guide the Regular Army would go from 90,000 to maybe 170,000. Certainly the 30 odd infantry regiments were at about 2/5 strength of about 850 men, so authorising these to war strength would provide billets for 36,000 infantrymen for starters. If the same rule of thumb applies to the 1914 NG, and I suspect that the situation there is worse, it would go from 158,000 to 300,000 or more billets upon "Federalisation" and authorisation for war strength.

Thats getting close to half the 500,000 sets of gear the US had on hand simply to bring the RA/NG to war strength.

Of course jamming a uniform on a man and giving him a rifle doesn't make him ready for modern war. I suspect that the RA might try to fill a lot of its 36,000 infantry billets from the NG to reduce the training overhead, particularly from less well equipped NG units.

The issue is that for that to happen we would of needed a POD prior to 1914 and US be aligned to Germany. Which throws all military numbers on both sides out. Since both sides would of been building up troops. Finance and investments in the uS by British and French would of been greatly reduced and additional sources for material and manufacturing procured either Canada or elsewhere.

To keep it simple for everyone and everything prior to 1914 to be iOTL and all troop levels and such be same we need a POD after war breakouts in Europe that causes US to reluctantly join on Germany side. Say as someone mentioned Britain attempts to capture and control oil production in Venezuela. This might be due to an anti war US administration who stops all trade with Britain and France due to their blockade of US trade with Germany. So we have a summer 1914 POD.

You readers choose. A pre 1900 POD and different US and Canada info. Or a post war breaking out POD but not a US start mobilize out of blue at time war breaks out in Europe.

 

[Genrexx]

In April 1917 either Congress or the President (I suspect Congress ) authorised immediate raising of all the regiments of the 1916 Defense Act and their manning at full war strength. A bit later they authorised the conversion of the cavalry regiments into infantry regiments. I believe the same applied to the NG. This provided the initial legal basis and organisational structure of the Army to expand into.

Something very similar would apply in 1914, if the 1917 authorsed expansion is any guide the Regular Army would go from 90,000 to maybe 170,000. Certainly the 30 odd infantry regiments were at about 2/5 strength of about 850 men, so authorising these to war strength would provide billets for 36,000 infantrymen for starters. If the same rule of thumb applies to the 1914 NG, and I suspect that the situation there is worse, it would go from 158,000 to 300,000 or more billets upon "Federalisation" and authorisation for war strength.

Thats getting close to half the 500,000 sets of gear the US had on hand simply to bring the RA/NG to war strength.

Of course jamming a uniform on a man and giving him a rifle doesn't make him ready for modern war. I suspect that the RA might try to fill a lot of its 36,000 infantry billets from the NG to reduce the training overhead, particularly from less well equipped NG units.

absolutely would take some time. there are some great videos at national world war one museum discussing AEF. Pershing decided he needed to retrain every unit that got to France for a month or two.

 

[History Learner]

Once again and for reasons we have discussed above most of your 100,000 are in National Guard units that will not be ready for deployment until the winter due to training issues and thus unlikely to see operations until summer 1915. Also why the obsession with cutting the Trans-Canada? If you think you have the forces to push through to Ottawa and Montreal you are best concentrating on that as cutting the Trans-Canada is not a knock out blow. Worse doing so with insufficient force to defend itself exposes whatever troops you do send to defeat in detail as the Canadians do not need to match the US man for man on the defensive.

While I think in a long war scenario an incursion to sever the east-west link is likely it would most likely wait until the US had a sufficient force available that it could defend itself from counter attack and be able to split that force off without affecting the conduct of other operations.

The US may given the national character launch a premature offensive into Canada but by and large they are better standing on the defensive. Those Organised Militia/ National Guard units that are initially useless for an offensive are a different proposition on the defensive where they can force the Canucks to expend ammunition and recall the Canadians are no less dependent on one ton horse drawn wagons in this era than anyone else beyond their railheads. The limited manoeuvre force available to the US is adequate for conducting a mobile response to attack.

I've already stated, repeatedly, there is no way the U.S. will do a mass overrun of Canada in 1914 nor do I think they will do much beyond sit on the border. I have argued, however, that portions of the force could be used to cut the Trans-Canada. As for the value of the Trans-Canada, cutting it removes Western Canada from the support of the East and vice-versa. Not only does this prevent, say, support from India reaching Canada, it also means the Canadian industrial heartland has been now been cut off from its breadbasket.

 

[History Learner]

@Riain my apologies for taking so long on this, I got snowed in and lost power this weekend, had to literally dig my way out and then this week is my finals week so I've been prioritizing that. With that said, onto the oil issue.

First, U.S. production, at least by 1917-1918 was insufficient for both domestic consumption and exporting to the Allies, so they had to import most of Mexico's production; most of said production was owned by U.S. Companies anyway:

With the onset of World War I, oil becomes vital for modern warfare, fueling ships, land vehicles, and planes. German attacks disrupt U.S. oil exports to its adversaries Britain and France, causing oil shortages in those countries. When the United States enters the war allied against Germany in 1917, the Wilson administration steps up efforts to supply oil to Britain and France. U.S. production cannot meet both domestic and war demand, so the United States begins importing oil from Mexico to close the gap. During the U.S. war effort, Mexican imports average between 2.5 million barrels and 4 million barrels of oil per month, supplementing U.S. production of about 30 million barrels a month.

The best thing I found was this large PDF PhD dissertation, which is extensively detailed. On Page 73, they detail British domestic production, imports and consumption:

And then they provide the decisive bits about American contribution:

Mexico could also not make up for the loss even assuming they wanted to for the British:

Table 3-1 shows that Mexican output rose from about 3,750,000 tons in 1914 to over 9,000,000 in 1918. This growth, coupled with declining Russian production, made Mexico the world's second largest producer of oil by 1918, albeit a long way behind the USA. Less than 500,000 tons was supplied by Mexico to Britain in 1918 and none to France or Italy, but Mexico was significant to the Allies. The USA imported around 3,500,000 tons of oil in 1917, an increase of nearly 1,000,000 since 1914; most of this was unrefined crude.293 US imports from Mexico helped balance US supply and demand and enabled US refined products to be exported.294 Mexican crude was refined in the USA. The availability of Mexican oil released more US oil for export. All Mexican oil was produced by American or British owned firms.295 The correspondence of the British Embassy in Washington records concerns over civil unrest and potential German influence in Mexico; British support for the Monroe Doctrine and desire to maintain good relations with the USA meant that Britain took no action independent of the USA in Mexico.

Some other highlights:

Earlier in the month Sir Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, had pointed out that UK petrol stocks were declining because demand exceeded imports. Shortages of shipping meant that imports in 1917 were likely to be lower than in 1916. Civilian consumption of 10,000,000 gallons per month could be reduced to 8,000,000. Any further cuts would severely disrupt the life and commerce of the country. Military use at home had to be restricted; the War Office and the Admiralty were both taking measures to economise on the use of petrol.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet had consequently been restricted. In early June Tothill said in a memorandum that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be convoyed.' On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern part of the North Sea.' Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the immediate future.

Restrictions on oil imports affected food supplies in two ways. The first was that importing oil in double bottoms of cargo ships meant that ships not designed to carry oil could transport it. It did not increase the cargo capacity of the ship so there was a trade off between oil and other goods such as food. On 13 August Maclay told the First Lord of the Admiralty and Hankey that imports from the USA and Canada had fallen by about 1,250,000 tons per annum because of the need to carry oil in the double bottoms of liners and cargo ships. To replace losses 480,000 tons of tankers were being constructed annually, a fifth of the total merchant ship construction programme. The absence of the cargo ships that otherwise would have been built meant a fall of 1,750,000 tons of imports over twelve months. These figures were for naval oil only: another 250,000 of capacity must be allocated to double bottom imports to maintain commercial stocks and 240,000 tons of construction used to replace sunk commercial tankers.

The shortage of oil also impacted domestic food production because of attempts to increase output by replacing farm animals with motorised tractors. On 17 July Rowland Prothero, the President of the Board of Agriculture, wrote to Long regarding a letter sent by Cadman to the Board of Agriculture asking it to consider cutting its demands for petrol for tractors. Prothero wanted to help as much as possible but could not do so without reducing a ploughing programme that had been approved by the Cabinet. If insufficient petrol was available to carry out this out then he felt that it was up to the Cabinet rather than himself to reconsider the situation.254 Long explained that Cadman was acting on his authority; he was responsible to the Cabinet for all issues regarding oil.

In November Prothero warned the War Cabinet that insufficient fuel had allocated to the motor tractors ordered as part of a programme to increase agricultural output in England and Wales. He argued that food production should be given the same status as the armed forces and munitions output, giving it priority over other civilian and industrial uses. The Cabinet should make sure that more oil was imported and that enough of it was allocated to food production. Otherwise the part of the ploughing programme to be carried out by motor tractors would have to be abandoned. In that case the Cabinet must give the order or the Board of Agriculture would lose all credibility with farmers.256 Long explained that oil stocks still were dangerously low despite the importation of 100,000 tons per month in double bottoms. Doing so reduced the imports of food and other essentials so all new tankers would have to be used to replace the use of double bottoms. The Ministry of Shipping estimated that overall imports must be reduced by 8,000,000 tons per annum (666,000 tons per month), showing that the use of double bottoms must end as soon as a safety margin of oil stocks was secured. Demand for petroleum products from the Armed Forces was rising; almost all new warships burnt oil. The required level of naval stocks was rising each month. Prothero's requests placed demands on tanker tonnage that Long would do his 'utmost to meet, but which it is impossible to guarantee in the existing conditions of the Admiralty and War Office stocks.'257 Adoption of Prothero's proposal to treat agriculture the same as the armed forces would contradict the Cabinet's ruling, and would return to the situation that the current structure was intended to avoid. Shipping resources were already operating at maximum effort.

In December Maclay told the Petroleum Committee that Britain was 'faced with a very serious deficit in the tonnage now required to be allotted to Government services. The wheat position is particularly grave.'258 By the end of January, wheat stocks would be only 15-16 weeks demand, a very low level since half was held by the farmers. Wheat was available in the USA; the problem was finding ships to transport it. Maclay said there was a shortage of 40 ships, and it was 'of the utmost importance that every possible step be taken to reduce this deficit.'259 He suggested that half the deficit could be covered by abandoning the use of double bottoms for oil for a month. J. A. Salter, the Director of Shipping Requisition, attended the 12th meeting of the committee on 12 December 1917. He explained that the main problem was the failure of the French and Italian harvests, meaning that imports had to be diverted from Britain to those countries. The meeting concluded that a telegram should be sent to Sir Frederick Black in New York urging that the Americans release more tonnage for the North Atlantic route. Stopping use of double bottoms was discussed. Long insisted that naval fuel had to be prioritised.

The RN remained the most important user of oil. Reversion to coal as a fuel for warships was considered. Maclay's 13 August memorandum urged that building either coal fired ships or ones that could burn either oil or coal should be considered. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt, the DNC, had looked into this in June and concluded that it would be very difficult to convert existing oil burning ships to coal. Oil boilers were much bigger than coal ones. Oil bunkers were in the wrong parts of the ship to be used for coal. One of the advantages of oil was that, unlike coal, it could be stored in parts of the ship that were awkward to for sailors to access. Oil was often carried low down, so there would be stability issues if the position of the fuel storage was changed. Ships that had been designed from the outset as oil burners would have to be completely rebuilt. Those completed as entirely oil fired, but designed to burn both coal and oil, would be difficult to convert to use coal and would have their fuel storage significantly reduced. New ships would have to be either slower or larger if they reverted to coal and would have bigger crews and shorter ranges than oil burners. D'Eyncourt thought that it was feasible to build a coal burning 22 knot destroyer for anti-submarine work, but it would be too slow to work with the Grand Fleet. Converting enough ships to burn coal to make a significant difference to oil usage would take the country's entire warship construction capacity for a year. He suggested that a substantial saving could instead be made by ordering oil burning warships to use reduced power except when it was crucial to achieve maximum speed.

The RN did construct small coal fired warships, such as convoy sloops, gunboats and minesweepers, during the war; several monitors, slow ships intended for coastal bombardment, used coal. Some of the battleships and cruisers that were under construction in British shipyards for foreign navies, and were taken over by the RN, burnt a mixture of oil and coal. All destroyers, battle cruisers and battleships ordered for the RN during the war burnt exclusively oil, as did all cruisers with the exception of the five ships of the Hawkins class. They were designed to hunt down commerce raiders, probably operating in remote areas where oil might not be available. One of the class was lost accidentally and the others converted to oil in the 1920s.

The Scottish shale industry's output was almost at its maximum possible level by the middle of 1917. A new refining process, called Scheme G, was proposed; it would increase the output of fuel oil but would reduce that of some other products.268 In November Long's committee considered this issue. The shale companies were very cautious, and were reluctant to carry out Scheme G because they would risk losing their existing markets in lubricating and batching oils. The possible solutions were to give them a 10 year contract to supply the Admiralty, or to take their operations under Government control. The committee preferred the former.269 The proposed price was too high for the Admiralty. It suggested that the Munitions Ministry take control of the industry; it was reluctant to do so. Scheme G would add only 40,000 tons of fuel oil to the existing output of 55,000 tons per annum; the Admiralty took 35,000 tons. In April 1918 it was decided that this was too little to justify the cost and disruption of Scheme G, including the loss of domestic supplies of batching oil to the jute industry. The Scottish shale industry was important enough that in May Long ordered that no men should be removed from it if this would cut production. Efforts to use deposits in England came to nothing because English shale was less suitable than that in Scotland, and there was a shortage of manpower and machinery.

Tl;dr the U.S. provided nearly 80% of the fuel used by the Entente, no other supplier exists to replace them and even if they did, the British lack the shipping capacity to import from them without American aid. Removing American oil collapses the ability of the Royal Navy to operate as well as collapses domestic agricultural production; food crisis and the HSF cutting off imports all together thus follows. Domestic production to offset this would take too far long to be of use, and is largely limited to taking away from the coal ouput. They also cannot not ration more than they did IOTL without collapsing the civilian economy all together, nor can they revert back to coal to keep the Royal Navy going.

This pretty much proves my point about the Entente seeking peace by Christmas.

 

[History Learner]

One thing of note I found is this map of the Canadian Railway system in 1914. Of note is the fact that the rail connections from Halifax to the Canadian heartland, with one of the two lines quite literally sitting on the U.S. border while rail connections with the U.S. mean offensives to cut the Trans-Canadian line is certainly logistically easy for the United States in theory.

 

[RodentRevolution]

This pretty much proves my point about the Entente seeking peace by Christmas.

Except that it does not. The paper only talks about existing stockpiles in 1917 rather than 1914 and notes the falls then. The paper alludes to the British having in 1913:

This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'243

Page 81 of Gibson; British Strategy and Oil, 1914-1923

So the British have oil for the Navy till February if they import zero. Now this might be enough to bring them to the table except they are not going to be importing zero, not nearly enough mind you as the tankers now have to go and return from Persia in this scenario which was the Achilles heel of British strategy but there will be imports. In addition but there were other options such as shale oil which were declined OTL because the cost benefit was not there and the crisis was not that severe. Here such measures will be implemented. You also will not see an ever larger more motorised BEF assisting the French.

This would suggest then ITTL Verdun analogue would not be countered by a Somme style offensive thus probably degrading France's ability to resist while Britain is looking at literally scrapping the bottom of the barrel sometime in 1916 as the effects of an excess of idle cargo ships from the US trade are countered by losses and travel times versus consumption.

 

[History Learner]

Except that it does not. The paper only talks about existing stockpiles in 1917 rather than 1914 and notes the falls then.

No, it actually shows production for all of those years and even has another graph showing how U.S. exports were in 1914 and from then on; I didn't include it because everything else pretty much states all that needs to be stated.

The paper alludes to the British having in 1913:

This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'243

Page 81 of Gibson; British Strategy and Oil, 1914-1923

It does not, the full quote is talking about Pre-War planning on how much to have on hand:

The target level of naval oil stocks was disputed. After the war Churchill wrote that Fisher's Royal Commission had advocated a reserve of four years' war consumption, which was far more than could be afforded, and that Jellicoe, then Second Sea Lord, wanted substantial increases in stocks. The Royal Commission actually recommended four years' peace consumption. The Pakenham Committee used war consumption but proposed stocks of only one year. The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'243 He argued that Britain would have to control the seas in order to import food, so would also be able to import oil, and that cost did not matter in wartime.

It's also important to note that this is talking about 1913 peace time levels, when 1914 war time levels would be far different.

So the British have oil for the Navy till February if they import zero. Now this might be enough to bring them to the table except they are not going to be importing zero, not nearly enough mind you as the tankers now have to go and return from Persia in this scenario which was the Achilles heel of British strategy but there will be imports.

The British do not have the shipping capacity to rely on the Persians nor do the Persians have production capacity. Even if the British received every single drop of Persian fuel, that amounts to only 243,000 tons; nowhere near enough to make up for the loss of American imports.

In addition but there were other options such as shale oil which were declined OTL because the cost benefit was not there and the crisis was not that severe. Here such measures will be implemented.

As I already cited, the shale industry was already at the maximum. To re-post:

The Scottish shale industry's output was almost at its maximum possible level by the middle of 1917. A new refining process, called Scheme G, was proposed; it would increase the output of fuel oil but would reduce that of some other products.268 In November Long's committee considered this issue. The shale companies were very cautious, and were reluctant to carry out Scheme G because they would risk losing their existing markets in lubricating and batching oils. The possible solutions were to give them a 10 year contract to supply the Admiralty, or to take their operations under Government control. The committee preferred the former.269 The proposed price was too high for the Admiralty. It suggested that the Munitions Ministry take control of the industry; it was reluctant to do so. Scheme G would add only 40,000 tons of fuel oil to the existing output of 55,000 tons per annum; the Admiralty took 35,000 tons. In April 1918 it was decided that this was too little to justify the cost and disruption of Scheme G, including the loss of domestic supplies of batching oil to the jute industry. The Scottish shale industry was important enough that in May Long ordered that no men should be removed from it if this would cut production. Efforts to use deposits in England came to nothing because English shale was less suitable than that in Scotland, and there was a shortage of manpower and machinery.

Even if they did go for Scheme G, 40,000 tons does nothing for them.

You also will not see an ever larger more motorised BEF assisting the French.

Which means France is definitely knocked out by Christmas or, at the latest, the start of 1915 as the Germans can take Bethune without the BEF guarding it.

 

[Riain]

The issue is that for that to happen we would of needed a POD prior to 1914 and US be aligned to Germany. Which throws all military numbers on both sides out. Since both sides would of been building up troops. Finance and investments in the uS by British and French would of been greatly reduced and additional sources for material and manufacturing procured either Canada or elsewhere.

To keep it simple for everyone and everything prior to 1914 to be iOTL and all troop levels and such be same we need a POD after war breakouts in Europe that causes US to reluctantly join on Germany side. Say as someone mentioned Britain attempts to capture and control oil production in Venezuela. This might be due to an anti war US administration who stops all trade with Britain and France due to their blockade of US trade with Germany. So we have a summer 1914 POD.

You readers choose. A pre 1900 POD and different US and Canada info. Or a post war breaking out POD but not a US start mobilize out of blue at time war breaks out in Europe.

The US RA and NG had been gradually reforming since the Spanish-American War, the Militia Act of 1792 (the one the 2nd amendment 'right to bear arms' was written to enable) was replaced by the Dick Act of 1903 which was further amended in 1908. This established the terms of the organised Militia (the NG) and the Unorganised Militia (the rest of the male citizenry) could be 'Federalised' under and established that the NG had to be called out before the government could call for volunteers. In 1911 the US Army went to a permament divisional structure in peacetime, like Europe had years (Britain) or decades (the big Continental Armies) earlier, for the 3 CONUS Army Departments. In 1912 the NG was restructured in a similar way, so that ostensible divisions were organised (on paper) in peacetime for Federalisation in wartime. SecWar Garrison had different ideas to Stimpson which while quite reasonable from a military perspective were not acceptable politically thus Stimpsons organization was what the US had in 1914 and even 1916.

Congress authorisation of war strength doesn't require an early PoD, it would be their first order of business as soon as they declared war.

 

[RodentRevolution]

It's also important to note that this is talking about 1913 peace time levels, when 1914 war time levels would be far different.

Except that is solely your inference as the article does not address whether those figures were for peacetime usage or projections of wartime usage.

The British do not have the shipping capacity to rely on the Persians nor do the Persians have production capacity. Even if the British received every single drop of Persian fuel, that amounts to only 243,000 tons; nowhere near enough to make up for the loss of American imports.

Yes you are correct to take advantage of my using Persia as shorthand for the beyond Suez sources of British Empire oil such as India but I would argue strongly that the British while not having sufficient in the long run do have considerable shipping resources freed up in the medium term by the cessation of trade with the US. This adds a lot of double bottomed craft to the purebred tankers. Now in the long run the British will find consumption exceeds supply but in OTL consumption went up in the course of the war by 54% and then required USW on top to provoke a supply crisis. It was this increase in supply that absorbed the increase in tankers from British builders during the period 1914-1917 here that won't happen but the extra travel time will be a killer, albeit a slow killer.

As I already cited, the shale industry was already at the maximum.

I think you are ignoring the fact that small increases in supply add weeks to and even months to length of time Britain can endure. Further it is likely the British focus more personnel on industrial tasks and fewer on the BEF. There will be fewer new oil fired destroyers built for example, fewer planes and oil fired trucks (a mechanised aspect of war which again I predict will bite in 1916) and more careful husbanding of supplies to the civilian economy, which again will weaken it but I would argue is more likely to produce crisis in 1916 than before.

Which means France is definitely knocked out by Christmas or, at the latest, the start of 1915 as the Germans can take Bethune without the BEF guarding it.

Hum I am not sure how you go from not expanded enough to conduct an offensive to absent for defensive operations but no matter. The point is the BEF ought to be able to do much of what it could do in 1915 however the crunch point was when it launched the New Army divisions into the Somme Offensive to draw off pressure from Verdun. Now it may be there are sufficient New Army troops available ITTL to conduct a more limited version of the same offensive which would achieve the same affect as the later months were redundant and merely saw the British butt heads with concentrated German reinforcements, there may be insufficient force for an independent offensive but sufficient to commit directly to the French stand at ITTL's Verdun or equivalent, there may be insufficient for either in which case the crisis is upon the Entente in July of 1916 There is as always a range of decisions that could potentially be made affecting the exact outcomes.

However I think Christmas 1914 is very unlikely in the extreme up there with the US making enough blunders to be knocked out of the war and forced to supply the Entente with resources. 1915 is not entirely off the cards I would agree I just happen to think 1916 the more likely expiration point for Entente resistance.

 

[VoidStalker]

Which means France is definitely knocked out by Christmas or, at the latest, the start of 1915 as the Germans can take Bethune without the BEF guarding it.

What I see from that paper is that over times reserves would decrease but I do not see that happening quick enough to knock out France in 1914. It does mean that in 1915 things get rougher as the year progresses and that the Italians joining would add even more stress to oil demands.

We are going to see reduced industrial output in 1915 due to the lack of oil and other inputs from the US. So less war material, less fuel to run transportation, more coal demand in industry stretching that further. I think we see the British try a negotiated peace in 1915 if they can get to any relative position of strength. I wonder if the Popes attempts at attempting peace discussions has more success here?

Also interesting to note was the talk of 22 knot coal fired destroyers and how those were too slow for the Grand Fleet, the switch to more coal fired ships is going to have interesting effects and I have to wonder if any of the cruisers or larger ships will be switched to coal fire builds as time progresses.

 

[History Learner]

Except that is solely your inference as the article does not address whether those figures were for peacetime usage or projections of wartime usage.

It does though:

The target level of naval oil stocks was disputed. After the war Churchill wrote that Fisher's Royal Commission had advocated a reserve of four years' war consumption, which was far more than could be afforded, and that Jellicoe, then Second Sea Lord, wanted substantial increases in stocks. The Royal Commission actually recommended four years' peace consumption. The Pakenham Committee used war consumption but proposed stocks of only one year. The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'243 He argued that Britain would have to control the seas in order to import food, so would also be able to import oil, and that cost did not matter in wartime.

Yes you are correct to take advantage of my using Persia as shorthand for the beyond Suez sources of British Empire oil such as India but I would argue strongly that the British while not having sufficient in the long run do have considerable shipping resources freed up in the medium term by the cessation of trade with the US. This adds a lot of double bottomed craft to the purebred tankers. Now in the long run the British will find consumption exceeds supply but in OTL consumption went up in the course of the war by 54% and then required USW on top to provoke a supply crisis. It was this increase in supply that absorbed the increase in tankers from British builders during the period 1914-1917 here that won't happen but the extra travel time will be a killer, albeit a slow killer.

The United States, Mexico, and Russia were the only ones with production above 1.5 million tons in 1914; British imports alone were 1.6 million tons in 1912, to say nothing of the French. No other single source supplier exists, and combing India, the rest of the British Empire and Persia collectively is 1.9 million tons. British imports in 1914 were 2.586 million tons. Even if Britain took every single drop from its formal and informal Empire, she would still be short almost 700,000 tons of oil. Her Empire, meanwhile, will have collapsed economically and the French will have not a drop.

I think you are ignoring the fact that small increases in supply add weeks to and even months to length of time Britain can endure. Further it is likely the British focus more personnel on industrial tasks and fewer on the BEF. There will be fewer new oil fired destroyers built for example, fewer planes and oil fired trucks (a mechanised aspect of war which again I predict will bite in 1916) and more careful husbanding of supplies to the civilian economy, which again will weaken it but I would argue is more likely to produce crisis in 1916 than before.

As the report outlines, even if they adopted Scheme G it would not offer any immediate benefit as it would take time to construct the production lines for it. Even assuming the British have it day one, that's just 40,000 tons extra a year. To put that into perspective, her 1914 imports of 2.586 million tons equals out to ~49,000 tons a week which means that doing this would literally extend British resistance by about six days.

Hum I am not sure how you go from not expanded enough to conduct an offensive to absent for defensive operations but no matter. The point is the BEF ought to be able to do much of what it could do in 1915 however the crunch point was when it launched the New Army divisions into the Somme Offensive to draw off pressure from Verdun. Now it may be there are sufficient New Army troops available ITTL to conduct a more limited version of the same offensive which would achieve the same affect as the later months were redundant and merely saw the British butt heads with concentrated German reinforcements, there may be insufficient force for an independent offensive but sufficient to commit directly to the French stand at ITTL's Verdun or equivalent, there may be insufficient for either in which case the crisis is upon the Entente in July of 1916 There is as always a range of decisions that could potentially be made affecting the exact outcomes.

Because you've stated the BEF would not be mechanized and the 1915 increase, which added 650,000 soldiers to the BEF in the space of 10 months in 1915, doesn't happen. Given Falkenhayn damn near broke through at Second Ypres, and here we're assuming British logistics are worse and they're still a force of about 250,000 men, we can be reasonably sure of a much greater German success ATL.