AHC: Central Powers USA

[History Learner]

What I see from that paper is that over times reserves would decrease but I do not see that happening quick enough to knock out France in 1914. It does mean that in 1915 things get rougher as the year progresses and that the Italians joining would add even more stress to oil demands.

Context was saying the BEF doesn't expand over the course of 1915 nor add mechanized elements, such as increased truck transportation for logistics.

 

[RodentRevolution]

snip

This is an entire post of you repeating the same quotes and saying people have said things which they did not say

You also will not see an ever larger more motorised BEF assisting the French.

Nothing about 1915 which is actually before the wartime mobilisation was truly able to impact the BEF anyway what you see in 1915 is the Regular Army and Territorial Force components plus some Empire forces, it is not until 1916 that the New Army becomes available in the same way the supply of aircraft and lorries starts to become ever more significant to operations from 1916 as the British and by extension Entente extend a clear superiority in supply of such machines of war over the Germans and by extension the CP.

Going back to your post the six months supply is stated to be war consumption whereas you said

It's also important to note that this is talking about 1913 peace time levels, when 1914 war time levels would be far different.

So to be clear this was estimated war consumption.

The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption;

Per Gibson

Your bolding.

 

[History Learner]

This is an entire post of you repeating the same quotes and saying people have said things which they did not say

I don't think you can claim that when I directly quoted them. To recap:

Except that is solely your inference as the article does not address whether those figures were for peacetime usage or projections of wartime usage.

This is your claim, which was that the citation was neither saying the cited figures were for peacetime or wartime consumption. If you meant in the general, that is false as it repeatedly states figures were for peacetime or wartime consumption standards. If you mean the specific six months figure of Churchill, that too is wrong as it directly says this:

The target level of naval oil stocks was disputed. After the war Churchill wrote that Fisher's Royal Commission had advocated a reserve of four years' war consumption, which was far more than could be afforded, and that Jellicoe, then Second Sea Lord, wanted substantial increases in stocks. The Royal Commission actually recommended four years' peace consumption. The Pakenham Committee used war consumption but proposed stocks of only one year. The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'243 He argued that Britain would have to control the seas in order to import food, so would also be able to import oil, and that cost did not matter in wartime.

So I'm not sure what you're disputing here.

Nothing about 1915 which is actually before the wartime mobilisation was truly able to impact the BEF anyway what you see in 1915 is the Regular Army and Territorial Force components plus some Empire forces, it is not until 1916 that the New Army becomes available in the same way the supply of aircraft and lorries starts to become ever more significant to operations from 1916 as the British and by extension Entente extend a clear superiority in supply of such machines of war over the Germans and by extension the CP.

I just provided a source that shows the BEF was expanded by 650,000 men over the course of 1915. To recap what you said:

So the British have oil for the Navy till February if they import zero. Now this might be enough to bring them to the table except they are not going to be importing zero, not nearly enough mind you as the tankers now have to go and return from Persia in this scenario which was the Achilles heel of British strategy but there will be imports. In addition but there were other options such as shale oil which were declined OTL because the cost benefit was not there and the crisis was not that severe. Here such measures will be implemented. You also will not see an ever larger more motorised BEF assisting the French.

So, what exactly are you arguing because I'm not seeing a compelling rationale here?

Going back to your post the six months supply is stated to be war consumption whereas you said So to be clear this was estimated war consumption.

The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption;

Per Gibson

Your bolding.

The Royal Commission was talking peacetime consumption, but the point to be made here however is that what constitutes wartime consumption in 1913 was probably a lot different in 1914. Regardless of that, even assuming a six month supply, the war ends in the Spring of 1915 unquestionably. ​

 

[RodentRevolution]

I don't think you can claim that when I directly quoted them. To recap:

This is your claim, which was that the citation was neither saying the cited figures were for peacetime or wartime consumption. If you meant in the general, that is false as it repeatedly states figures were for peacetime or wartime consumption standards. If you mean the specific six months figure of Churchill, that too is wrong as it directly says this:

So I'm not sure what you're disputing here.

I just provided a source that shows the BEF was expanded by 650,000 men over the course of 1915. To recap what you said:

So, what exactly are you arguing because I'm not seeing a compelling rationale here?

The Royal Commission was talking peacetime consumption, but the point to be made here however is that what constitutes wartime consumption in 1913 was probably a lot different in 1914. Regardless of that, even assuming a six month supply, the war ends in the Spring of 1915 unquestionably. ​

The Royal Commission is talking about years of supply. The thing is once Churchill committed the Royal Navy to maintaining stocks equivalent to 6 months of wartime usage then those stocks are anticipated as to what ships are coming into commission, it is why Churchill as First Sea Lord does not say unto Parliament "The Navy will have x tons for the foreseeable" because the stock will constantly be added to as more oil firing and mixed fired warships come into commission. Churchill's figure is less than the recommendation of 4 years' worth of supply but it is still significantly greater than you seem to give it credit for.

As to the my comment on the expansion of the BEF yes you can say it was a little vague but you are hard pressed to insist it must be interpreted as you insist. The BEF refers traditionally to British Army troops in France and Belgium. These were a mix OTL of Regular Army, Territorial Force and New Army men. In this timeline it is likely that the New Army will not be as large. Nor will the BEF keep adding to its stock of motor transport throughout 1916, 1917, 1918 as per OTL. It might be able to substitute some steam lorries for petrol lorries but it would be hard at this juncture to say if and how far that would go.

But once again you have yet to produce solid evidence for a collapse by Christmas 1914. Now I can understand arguing for a scope from Jan 1915 to maybe half way through 1917 for the Entente being forced to terms but the nice cheap war option just is a real reach. Of course odd things do happen but I still contend that 1916 is the likely middle range of probabilities for the end of the War which will end in German victory bar a sudden change of course in trends.

The results will be that the US may or may not compensate itself with Canada or part therefore or indemnities for the war or a portion thereof while losing trade to German protectionism as the new Europänischen Zollverein take hold. There is a reason I would not call it an American victory nor would most American analysts of the time or economists to this day.

It is a WI that handily produces British and French defeat mind you which seems to be what the OP actually wanted.

 

[Genrexx]

The US RA and NG had been gradually reforming since the Spanish-American War, the Militia Act of 1792 (the one the 2nd amendment 'right to bear arms' was written to enable) was replaced by the Dick Act of 1903 which was further amended in 1908. This established the terms of the organised Militia (the NG) and the Unorganised Militia (the rest of the male citizenry) could be 'Federalised' under and established that the NG had to be called out before the government could call for volunteers. In 1911 the US Army went to a permament divisional structure in peacetime, like Europe had years (Britain) or decades (the big Continental Armies) earlier, for the 3 CONUS Army Departments. In 1912 the NG was restructured in a similar way, so that ostensible divisions were organised (on paper) in peacetime for Federalisation in wartime. SecWar Garrison had different ideas to Stimpson which while quite reasonable from a military perspective were not acceptable politically thus Stimpsons organization was what the US had in 1914 and even 1916.

Congress authorisation of war strength doesn't require an early PoD, it would be their first order of business as soon as they declared war.

response more to Riann - upthread my suggested POD was Dogger Bank (1904) leading to more UK support for Japan in Russo Japanese War leading to quicker Japanese victory leading to more aggressive Japanese intervention in China after revolution (1911) and even possibly subversion in Philippines leading to more open US Japan hostility leading to 1914 US declaring war over Japan intervention in China and invasions of German colonies in Marianas and Caroline islands.

 

[Lusitania]

response more to Riann - upthread my suggested POD was Dogger Bank (1904) leading to more UK support for Japan in Russo Japanese War leading to quicker Japanese victory leading to more aggressive Japanese intervention in China after revolution (1911) and even possibly subversion in Philippines leading to more open US Japan hostility leading to 1914 US declaring war over Japan intervention in China and invasions of German colonies in Marianas and Caroline islands.

But would japan actions result in an isolationist US to suddenly declare war on British empire? British support does not result in British actions against US. IOTL the British were always very careful to not upset the Americans too much.

 

[Riain]

One thing of note I found is this map of the Canadian Railway system in 1914. Of note is the fact that the rail connections from Halifax to the Canadian heartland, with one of the two lines quite literally sitting on the U.S. border while rail connections with the U.S. mean offensives to cut the Trans-Canadian line is certainly logistically easy for the United States in theory.

In 1914 no General Staff thought of cutting countries in half by occupying rail lines, they thought of defeating armies in the field. This is closely allied to General Staffs developing campaign plans rather than comprehensive war plans; which was the purview of whole of government bodies not foreseen in 1914. If the various army commanders of 1914 gave thought to railways is was in tactical and operational terms, moving troops quickly or denying movement to the enemy.

 

[Riain]

The longer this thread goes on the more I'm reminded that wars are won by armies and navies and logistics is a support function that gets too much attention. In the context of this thread it's hard to get past the fact that the US in 1914 was a military pygmy and this has to be remedied before logistics plays a factor.

 

[VoidStalker]

In 1914 no General Staff thought of cutting countries in half by occupying rail lines, they thought of defeating armies in the field. This is closely allied to General Staffs developing campaign plans rather than comprehensive war plans; which was the purview of whole of government bodies not foreseen in 1914. If the various army commanders of 1914 gave thought to railways is was in tactical and operational terms, moving troops quickly or denying movement to the enemy.

No Modern day Anaconda plan? I would figure using lessons of the Civil War splitting a country in half would occur to US generals.

 

[RodentRevolution]

No Modern day Anaconda plan? I would figure using lessons of the Civil War splitting a country in half would occur to US generals.

At the time no one really expected a war to go on for that long. The lessons of the day largely appeared to show that first side to mobilise would avalanche the others main field armies and then be in a position to dictate terms. The Franco-Prussian War was an example that seemed to bear this out. The French Republic had tried holding on after the Imperial armies had been defeated but were unable to materially shift their situation.

Which does not mean that the thought would not occur later to American generals once the war had clearly become a longer one. What they would not do though is just throw some small force that the Canadians could easily overwhelm into the fray at the opening of the war. That sort of thing had been part of war planning (more properly speculation) at the time of the Venezuela Crisis when the Americans had assumed the need to launch virtual suicide missions against lock gates prior to the Great Lakes (I forget exactly where at the time of writing) and the railway bridge at Riviere-du-Loup. However this was an era when the likely BEF was larger than the entire US regular Army and the British Empire would be giving the US their undivided attention.

Here we have a US force that once properly mustered and organised should have around a two to one numerical advantage over the defenders at the points of contact. At least at first a late spring or early summer 1915 offensive should seem to be sufficient to do the job. It is only when and if the Canadians manage to sufficiently fortify the approaches to Montreal and Quebec that such operations would be seen to confer material advantages and would need to be conducted in sufficient force that the Canadians could simply envelope and overwhelm the detachment.

So you would see likely it as part of a long war but not a short war.

 

[Genrexx]

But would japan actions result in an isolationist US to suddenly declare war on British empire? British support does not result in British actions against US. IOTL the British were always very careful to not upset the Americans too much.

you're searching for a POD. I'm just trying sketch one.

ITL there was some Japan-US tension already. TR's intervention in Russo-Japanese war was as much about reigning in ascendant Japan as about ending a war that was basically decided. And there was a certain amount of anti-Japanese racism brewing.

And US was not totally isolationist even if Wilson thought he was. Else why the support for the Spanish American War and and occupation of the Philippines and the great white fleet. Japan saw anti-Asianism as insuiting. Though certainly ITL US public opinion was neutralish v/v Europe in 1914.

So make the US get worked up over Japan.

So for POD - have the Japanese be more victorious (with UK help) in Russo-Japanese war, then more aggressive over next decade in the Pacific/China; then maybe an early unprovoked Japanese occupation of the Marianas and Caroline Islands - strategically located between Hawaii and Philippines - could have provoked a US-Japan row; and if US attacked first then Britain would have been obligated under Japan-Britain alliance.

Maybe it would help to have TR succeed in getting rid of Taft in 1912 and then winning the general election. He always seemed a little more trigger happy.

As you say UK diplomats were careful. But in the summer of 1914 things didn't work out the way they hoped.

 

[sarahz]

really why precisely?

Canadians are smarter?
But they could easily continue to fight. However ITTL the war in Europe should be over early in 1915 (at the latest).

Cant see why it would be, unless some one does something really daft..

 

[sarahz]

At the time no one really expected a war to go on for that long. The lessons of the day largely appeared to show that first side to mobilise would avalanche the others main field armies and then be in a position to dictate terms. The Franco-Prussian War was an example that seemed to bear this out. The French Republic had tried holding on after the Imperial armies had been defeated but were unable to materially shift their situation.

Which does not mean that the thought would not occur later to American generals once the war had clearly become a longer one. What they would not do though is just throw some small force that the Canadians could easily overwhelm into the fray at the opening of the war. That sort of thing had been part of war planning (more properly speculation) at the time of the Venezuela Crisis when the Americans had assumed the need to launch virtual suicide missions against lock gates prior to the Great Lakes (I forget exactly where at the time of writing) and the railway bridge at Riviere-du-Loup. However this was an era when the likely BEF was larger than the entire US regular Army and the British Empire would be giving the US their undivided attention.

Here we have a US force that once properly mustered and organised should have around a two to one numerical advantage over the defenders at the points of contact. At least at first a late spring or early summer 1915 offensive should seem to be sufficient to do the job. It is only when and if the Canadians manage to sufficiently fortify the approaches to Montreal and Quebec that such operations would be seen to confer material advantages and would need to be conducted in sufficient force that the Canadians could simply envelope and overwhelm the detachment.

So you would see likely it as part of a long war but not a short war.

hmm historically 2 to 1 has not been enough to ensure taking a properly fortified position with equivalently skilled and armed troops.

 

[Lusitania]

you're searching for a POD. I'm just trying sketch one.

ITL there was some Japan-US tension already. TR's intervention in Russo-Japanese war was as much about reigning in ascendant Japan as about ending a war that was basically decided. And there was a certain amount of anti-Japanese racism brewing.

And US was not totally isolationist even if Wilson thought he was. Else why the support for the Spanish American War and and occupation of the Philippines and the great white fleet. Japan saw anti-Asianism as insuiting. Though certainly ITL US public opinion was neutralish v/v Europe in 1914.

So make the US get worked up over Japan.

So for POD - have the Japanese be more victorious (with UK help) in Russo-Japanese war, then more aggressive over next decade in the Pacific/China; then maybe an early unprovoked Japanese occupation of the Marianas and Caroline Islands - strategically located between Hawaii and Philippines - could have provoked a US-Japan row; and if US attacked first then Britain would have been obligated under Japan-Britain alliance.

Maybe it would help to have TR succeed in getting rid of Taft in 1912 and then winning the general election. He always seemed a little more trigger happy.

As you say UK diplomats were careful. But in the summer of 1914 things didn't work out the way they hoped.

Yes I could see US Japan come to blowsbut why would Britain back japan against US when it did not favor Canada over the US?

 

[History Learner]

The Royal Commission is talking about years of supply. The thing is once Churchill committed the Royal Navy to maintaining stocks equivalent to 6 months of wartime usage then those stocks are anticipated as to what ships are coming into commission, it is why Churchill as First Sea Lord does not say unto Parliament "The Navy will have x tons for the foreseeable" because the stock will constantly be added to as more oil firing and mixed fired warships come into commission. Churchill's figure is less than the recommendation of 4 years' worth of supply but it is still significantly greater than you seem to give it credit for.

The Royal Commission is talking about peacetime years of consumption, not wartime. As for the six month figure, it specifically says storage and nowhere else can I find anything in the document that specifically says they had six months on hand in 1914. Regardless of that, I can accept the Royal Navy has six months on hand for the sake of the argument. This is something important that occurred to me; that six month figure is solely for the Navy, not the civilian merchant fleet or even the general economy. Bunker Fuel can't be re-purposed for either the BEF or civilian economy. In short, the civilian economy has collapsed by December of 1914 and the Navy will follow at the latest by February of 1915. This is the inescapable conclusion that can be had as no other resources exist to replace the Americans.

As to the my comment on the expansion of the BEF yes you can say it was a little vague but you are hard pressed to insist it must be interpreted as you insist. The BEF refers traditionally to British Army troops in France and Belgium. These were a mix OTL of Regular Army, Territorial Force and New Army men. In this timeline it is likely that the New Army will not be as large. Nor will the BEF keep adding to its stock of motor transport throughout 1916, 1917, 1918 as per OTL. It might be able to substitute some steam lorries for petrol lorries but it would be hard at this juncture to say if and how far that would go.

The comment must be taken as I insist because no other logical explanation exists. We've established the UK will run out of fuel by Christmas in general and the Navy by February at the latest. You've argued a possible solution for the UK is to not motorize nor expand the BEF to make up for this, but have argued this doesn't begin until 1916 with the New Army units despite the fact the BEF was expanded by 650,000 men over the course of 1915. Your argument thus stipulates this can somehow continue on as happened historically despite the fuel crisis with no appreciable effect on the wider British economy; essentially they can do exactly as they did IOTL with no fuel. This simply is not going to happen.

But once again you have yet to produce solid evidence for a collapse by Christmas 1914. Now I can understand arguing for a scope from Jan 1915 to maybe half way through 1917 for the Entente being forced to terms but the nice cheap war option just is a real reach. Of course odd things do happen but I still contend that 1916 is the likely middle range of probabilities for the end of the War which will end in German victory bar a sudden change of course in trends.

I already have produced solid evidence in the case of the fuel situation alone. Let's recap:

British domestic production in 1914 is 285,000 tons.
Production in India, the rest of the British Empire and Persia in 1914 is 1,989,000 tons.
Total combined production: 2,274,000 tons.

British Consumption 1914: 2,851,000 tons.
Total Deficit: -577,000 tons.

Thus, the 1914 crop production collapses, the UK civilian economy collapses, and probably much of the logistical underpinnings of the BEF collapse as well. The Royal Navy, if we accept the comment about six month's storage is an accurate reflection of what's on hand, lasts until February and from that point on is confined to port while the HSF and USN completely cut off imports into the isles and the flow of supplies to France. Anglo-French industrial production collapses, food production collapses, and their armies will begin collapsing likewise.

There is no other interpretation to be had.

Even assuming they could instantly complete Scheme G, that is only 40,000 tons a year added, nowhere near enough to make up for this loss. Rationing was already pushed to its lowest possible limit IOTL, nothing more can be done there. They can't revert to coal for the Royal Navy, as already shown. No other suppliers of fuel exist to make up for these losses, nor could they get to them if they wanted. The inescapable conclusion is that the Entente is forced to surrender no later than February of 1915, most likely by Christmas as by that time they will be having a hunger winter due to the failed harvest and collapse in their civilian economies.

 

[Genrexx]

Yes I could see US Japan come to blowsbut why would Britain back japan against US when it did not favor Canada over the US?

well, they had a treaty - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Japanese_Alliance

it was supposed to be defensive - meaning if one is attacked the other will join

so if US attacked Japan, then UK would be obligated

 

[RodentRevolution]

There is no other interpretation to be had.

You keep on insisting this and then get cross when even people partial to your viewpoint are unconvinced. The thing is in 1914 most of the Royal Navy is still coal powered, British agriculture is animal and coal powered and I know this has been explained to you before in another thread because it was still to large extent true until after World War 2. British power stations are coal powered. British railways are coal powered. The merchant fleet is coal powered (well some of it is wind powered but overwhelmingly coal).

I point out to you the majority of the 1915 expansion occurred from the Territorial Force an already existing organisation. There were other organisation involved but again pre-existing ones). Kitchener's New Army became an effective military force only in 1916. New recruits in 1914 will simply not become ready until 1916 hence you need to look at pre-existing personnel structures.

Now I would agree that Britain will have to make do with much less oil, just as Germany had to make do with much less oil but this does not translate into collapse with immediate effect because the vast majority of energy in the British economy is from coal. Coal provides town gas for lighting and heating, coal provides electrical power and coal provides motion, many factories actually had their own steam plant for their own steam driven machinery. I know steam lorries fired by coal were an important part of road transport until after the General Strike, I do not know if and to what extent such could be used to make good the relative lack of motor driven vehicles for the BEF but they may be an option some transport roles and possibly as artillery tractors (actually I think some steam tractors were used as such OTL).

The thing is some trades in Britain that contributed to the consumption of oil will cease to be a concern in the event of war with the USA because they exported to the USA. That is just one example of areas in which economies will be made.

Inevitably with the loss of income from exports, the reduction of imports impacting things like immediate food and material rationing and so on the British will find themselves on a path to defeat but that defeat will not be immediate. The odds are good that it will take years. People not just British people but people do show far more resolution in such situation than many commentators allow, every single new generation is described as soft and especially snowflakey but such claims have never been born out in history.

 

[Lusitania]

well, they had a treaty - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Japanese_Alliance

it was supposed to be defensive - meaning if one is attacked the other will join

so if US attacked Japan, then UK would be obligated

Ah yes but Portugal also has the oldest treaty with Britain over 500 years. During WWI it advised the Portuguese that they would need to enter the war on their own and not through the treaty.
Therefore they do same thing with the Japanese treaty if the Japanese were perceived as the agressors you can get every last pound that British would of said no we not backing you up. They would if stated that prior to shells being fired.

 

[Riain]

The Royal Commission is talking about peacetime years of consumption, not wartime. As for the six month figure, it specifically says storage and nowhere else can I find anything in the document that specifically says they had six months on hand in 1914. Regardless of that, I can accept the Royal Navy has six months on hand for the sake of the argument. This is something important that occurred to me; that six month figure is solely for the Navy, not the civilian merchant fleet or even the general economy. Bunker Fuel can't be re-purposed for either the BEF or civilian economy. In short, the civilian economy has collapsed by December of 1914 and the Navy will follow at the latest by February of 1915. This is the inescapable conclusion that can be had as no other resources exist to replace the Americans.



The comment must be taken as I insist because no other logical explanation exists. We've established the UK will run out of fuel by Christmas in general and the Navy by February at the latest. You've argued a possible solution for the UK is to not motorize nor expand the BEF to make up for this, but have argued this doesn't begin until 1916 with the New Army units despite the fact the BEF was expanded by 650,000 men over the course of 1915. Your argument thus stipulates this can somehow continue on as happened historically despite the fuel crisis with no appreciable effect on the wider British economy; essentially they can do exactly as they did IOTL with no fuel. This simply is not going to happen.



I already have produced solid evidence in the case of the fuel situation alone. Let's recap:

British domestic production in 1914 is 285,000 tons.
Production in India, the rest of the British Empire and Persia in 1914 is 1,989,000 tons.
Total combined production: 2,274,000 tons.

British Consumption 1914: 2,851,000 tons.
Total Deficit: -577,000 tons.

Thus, the 1914 crop production collapses, the UK civilian economy collapses, and probably much of the logistical underpinnings of the BEF collapse as well. The Royal Navy, if we accept the comment about six month's storage is an accurate reflection of what's on hand, lasts until February and from that point on is confined to port while the HSF and USN completely cut off imports into the isles and the flow of supplies to France. Anglo-French industrial production collapses, food production collapses, and their armies will begin collapsing likewise.

There is no other interpretation to be had.

Even assuming they could instantly complete Scheme G, that is only 40,000 tons a year added, nowhere near enough to make up for this loss. Rationing was already pushed to its lowest possible limit IOTL, nothing more can be done there. They can't revert to coal for the Royal Navy, as already shown. No other suppliers of fuel exist to make up for these losses, nor could they get to them if they wanted. The inescapable conclusion is that the Entente is forced to surrender no later than February of 1915, most likely by Christmas as by that time they will be having a hunger winter due to the failed harvest and collapse in their civilian economies.

IOTL France's economy shrank something like 23% and Germany's something like 27%, France suffered mutinies in 1917 but fought on until the bitter end while Germany defeated Russia and launched a massive offensive in the west a full year after the shocking 'Turnip Winter'. In contrast the British economy grew by something like 8%, despite the uboats and massive disruption in trade. The point being that with armies in the field the then modern economies have massive amounts of slack and are immensely resilient and capable of incredible feats of output and improvisation. Britain won't have to surrender until her economy shrinks by 25% or more, and years of improvisation to ameliorate the ever shrinking availability of oil, which includes at least the 5th Army not being formed in 1916 and perhaps not even the 4th Army and even then the BEF will have to be dealt a crushing blow on the battlefield to dash any hopes that the situation will radically and quickly improve with the next big BEF offensive.

 

[Riain]

hmm historically 2 to 1 has not been enough to ensure taking a properly fortified position with equivalently skilled and armed troops.

I've read that the actual impact of numbers in terms of battlefield impacts is the square of the numbers involved, so 2 vs 3 is actually 4 vs 9. I suspect that the NPAM is man for man equivalent to the NG, but the RA will be better trained than the NPAM although perhaps not much better equipped in terms of artillery.

in any case the US has 3 RA and 12 NG divisions available in late 1914 compared to Canada's 6 NPAM divisions. I think at least 4 NG divisions/division equivalents will be stationed on the Mexican border and perhaps other vulnerable places, leaving at most 8 NG divisions and the 3 RA divisions for service in Canada. NG divisions were not all alike, Pensylvania NG formed a division in 1889 in line with European trends and 22 years before the RA and NY NG followed suit with a division before the RA. Further (and after the events of TTL butterfly it) the NY NG were the first non RA unit to acquire heavy artillery in the form of 4.7" howitzers in 1916, which is indicative of how some states were quite lavish with their NG and responded differently to international events compared the the Federal Government. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1916/10/08/301912752.pdf

All in all I think the US will be able to cherry pick 4-6 NG divisions of the they have ~8 available to deploy to Canada to supplement the 3 RA divisions on the offensive and match the number of field forces Canada has while outnumbering them in numbers of units, generating that 'numbers squared' impact. I think the campaign would be much like the German invasion of Belgium/France, with the Americans driving the Canadians back until they reach their culmination point (the Canadian version of the Marne) where the US forces stop because of logistics, fatigue and resistance. Then winter sets in.