How bad would WAllied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

  • 2x what they suffered IOTL

    Votes: 31 16.9%
  • 3x what they suffered IOTL

    Votes: 42 23.0%
  • 4x what they suffered IOTL

    Votes: 25 13.7%
  • 5x or more what they suffered IOTL

    Votes: 85 46.4%

  • Total voters
    183
The barometeric detonators (there were three) of the bombs trigger when the falling bomber reaches the set altitude. Parsons designed the barometric detonators to be set after take off by the mission weapons specialist. Himself in the case of the Hiroshima Nagasaki bombs. When the bomb seperated from its shackles in the bomb bay timers (triple redundancy again) begain counting down as a back up to the barometric triggers. Parsons was not stupid & took a few precautions to ensure the devices detonated whatever happened. That included using common and proven components for the detonating system & repeated tests of everything. In case the timers & barometric triggers failed there was a final system of impact or shock triggers. Even if the precision implosion device were damaged & a fission event did not occur the 1000+kg of convention explosive would scatter the highly toxic plutonium scraps about the landscape.

Rhoades 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb' has details on the triggering mechanisms of the Little Boy and Fat Man bombs & how Parsons intended them to operate, but there are a a number of other reliable sources on this. You dont need a Top Secret clearance & career in the artillery to learn these things.

Isn't the bigger issue that the US would need to base the nuke in Brittan and if the bomber with a nuclear payload was shot down by fighters before leaving Brittan it could be the biggest case of friendly fire in history.
 
Shifting a bit the focus from nukes to standard equipment, whould have the type XXI made any difference?? an healthier German industry means that the planned mass production of type XXI with prebuilt sections could have taken place so what kind of damage could they have done to allied shipping? Also pointing out that the soviets gave up (civil war for the loss of Moskow and leningrad )in summer 1942, schifting all the subs from the artic to central atlantic could have made any difference for example a delay of torch for subs ?
 
I think the US only had 90 divisions. The Allies coalition would have to take over where the USSR left off. The Battle of Berlin for example had 2.5 million Soviet troops, over 6000 tanks and self propelled artillery. The German forces were numbered at over 1 million, over 10 thousand artillery and 1500 tanks. In less than a month of fighting, Soviet forces lost almost half of what the US and UK lost that entire year on the front with Germany.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The shipyards the Germans might take in the USSR are likely to have been trashed between attacks by the Germans and sabotage by the Russians. Even if Skippy the ASB makes them fully functional who is going to staff them? Sure you can use previous Russian shipyard workers as slave labor but there are so many ways to sabotage a ship being built that won't be detected until too late. Once you have the ship built, you then have to get them from Leningrad or nearby someplace out of the Baltic. In any case the Kriegsmarine in 1942/43 is going to be concentrating on light forces and submarines, neither of which these yards would be turning out satisfactorily - do you really want to be in a U-boat built by slave laborers with every incentive to make mistakes.

Agreed.

The Med will be an Allied lake, the only thing that the Axis can do is air attacks and as the Allies have more airbases in North Africa and various islands as well as carriers the effectiveness of Axis air will be limited. There were a few Luftwaffe units that became expert at maritime attack and trained for that, but without that training they won't be effective.

But the Luftwaffe units released by the end of conventional fighting on the Eastern Front and the greater availability of fuel and spaces for new pilots to train in, plus the obvious recognition that maritime attack will be of vital importance in the continuing struggle against the Western Allies, will mean that such training will now be given urgent priority. Anti-ship weapons will also be prioritized for further development.
 
Depends on when the
Isn't the bigger issue that the US would need to base the nuke in Brittan and if the bomber with a nuclear payload was shot down by fighters before leaving Brittan it could be the biggest case of friendly fire in history.

Depends on when the device is armed. Parsons started arming them after the aircraft went above the trigger altitude, approx 10,000 feet.
 
Sometime in 1941/42 the Reich defeats the USSR, Stalin dies and civil war ensues allowing Germany to occupy the country up to the Ural Mountains. They are still at war with Britain and the US. Assuming they have the political will to defeat Nazi Germany

They wont. The US can easily leave the conflict in Europe which in combination with mounting casualties and the desire to end the war with Japan ASAP would lead to war weariness and massive opposition should the war in Europe be continued. Without the US in the war Britain has to quit as well. Assuming that through some miracle the Western Allies stay in the war their casualties would be actually lower than OTL since all their attempts of invasion would be easily repelled by the Germans. So the ground fighting phase would take just a few days/weeks instead of months/years. Two or three fruitless invasion attempts would lead to a negotiated peace sometimes in 1944 or in 1945 after Roosevelts death.
 
I think the US only had 90 divisions. The Allies coalition would have to take over where the USSR left off. The Battle of Berlin for example had 2.5 million Soviet troops, over 6000 tanks and self propelled artillery. The German forces were numbered at over 1 million, over 10 thousand artillery and 1500 tanks. In less than a month of fighting, Soviet forces lost almost half of what the US and UK lost that entire year on the front with Germany.

The US manned 90 US Army divisions (one, the 2d Cav was dissolved in later 1943) and six USMC divisions for 96 ground combat divisions. There were twelve Separate Infantry Regiments existing in 1943 for special tasks. Those were dissolved in 1944-45 as they became redundant.

>>>HyperWar is a web site that has some reasonably accurate information of the mobilization of the US Army Ground Forces. Stauntons 'Order of Battle' for US Army Ground Forces in WWII has a good summary on paper, and with dates and reasons specific formations were stood up or dissolved. The US Army Green Book on the mobilization of the Ground Combat Forces is a excellent source, Tho it is not written for people with low comprehension. There are companion Volumes for the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces.

The US also directly armed and supplied in 1943-44: Eight French (later ten in 1945), two Italian, two Brazilian, & three Chinese (used by Stillwell in Burma). So, including the Marines The US directly armed and supplied 113 ground combat divisions. Depending on how its added up the arms & support equipment, ammunition, and miscl shipped to Allies amounted to 12 - 18 more ground divisions. So, by late 1944 the US was directly & indirectly supporting the equivalent of approx 125 US size ground combat divisions.

In 1941-42 the US Army prepared several plans for meeting multiple targets for ground combat strength. The worst case plan assumed the the Soviet government and Red Army would be driven from Europe & the residual Red forces, and Britain would collapse. A more realistic worst case plan assumed only the USSR would collapse. In that case it was estimated the US would still need to directly arm & support approx fifty US size ground combat divisions in the residual Red army elements in Siberia & Iran. This estimate ran up to 180-200 divisions armed/supplied by the US.

Were the Red Army to remain a viable force a target of 150 US manned divisions was identified. Then adding units manned by foreign personnel by armed & supplied by the US. In late 1943 the target was down sized to 120 US manned ground combat divisions. As 1943 progress the target for US manned GCD was reduced again with 90 US Army Div being the final goal settled on in mid 1943. The number of foreign manned GCD & corps/army support echelon remained a looser goal & in negotiation for the remainder of the war.

The two primary drivers in reduction of Ground Combat Force goals were first the growth of the US Air Forces, & second the growth of industrial and Army service support. The original estimates for the size of the Air Force and service support were based on Great War data that had been reworked in the 1920s & 1930s. Actual experience in mobilization and combat 1941-43 caused the size of the air and support forces to be revised upwards by several orders of magnitude. i.e.: The number of Army AF air Wings was roughly quadrupled over the 1939 mobilization estimates. As mobilization progressed 1941-43 that air forces would be more efficient at winning the war than Ground Forces hence the repeated reduction. The surplus over requirements produced were largely left in the civilian world, with a select portion going to the expanded air and service forces.
 
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They wont. The US can easily leave the conflict in Europe which in combination with mounting casualties and the desire to end the war with Japan ASAP would lead to war weariness and massive opposition should the war in Europe be continued. Without the US in the war Britain has to quit as well. Assuming that through some miracle the Western Allies stay in the war their casualties would be actually lower than OTL since all their attempts of invasion would be easily repelled by the Germans. So the ground fighting phase would take just a few days/weeks instead of months/years. Two or three fruitless invasion attempts would lead to a negotiated peace sometimes in 1944 or in 1945 after Roosevelts death.

Actually,in this scenario its likely that Britain falls to a renewed Sea Lion around the time Roosevelt dies. This double shock may well cause a attempted nazi coup on the east coast,which gives the wehrmacht a pretty solid foothold there to land on.
 
The US manned 90 US Army divisions (one, the 2d Cav was dissolved in later 1943) and six USMC divisions for 96 ground combat divisions. There were twelve Separate Infantry Regiments existing in 1943 for special tasks. Those were dissolved in 1944-45 as they became redundant.

>>>HyperWar is a web site that has some reasonably accurate information of the mobilization of the US Army Ground Forces. Stauntons 'Order of Battle' for US Army Ground Forces in WWII has a good summary on paper, and with dates and reasons specific formations were stood up or dissolved. The US Army Green Book on the mobilization of the Ground Combat Forces is a excellent source, Tho it is not written for people with low comprehension. There are companion Volumes for the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces.

The US also directly armed and supplied in 1943-44: Eight French (later ten in 1945), two Italian, two Brazilian, & three Chinese (used by Stillwell in Burma). So, including the Marines The US directly armed and supplied 113 ground combat divisions. Depending on how its added up the arms & support equipment, ammunition, and miscl shipped to Allies amounted to 12 - 18 more ground divisions. So, by late 1944 the US was directly & indirectly supporting the equivalent of approx 125 US size ground combat divisions.

In 1941-42 the US Army prepared several plans for meeting multiple targets for ground combat strength. The worst case plan assumed the the Soviet government and Red Army would be driven from Europe & the residual Red forces, and Britain would collapse. A more realistic worst case plan assumed only the USSR would collapse. In that case it was estimated the US would still need to directly arm & support approx fifty US size ground combat divisions in the residual Red army elements in Siberia & Iran. This estimate ran up to 180-200 divisions armed/supplied by the US.

Were the Red Army to remain a viable force a target of 150 US manned divisions was identified. This included units manned by foreign personnel by armed & supplied by the US. In late 1943 the target was down sized to 120 US manned ground combat divisions. As 1943 progress the target for US manned GCD was reduced again with 90 US Army Div being the final goal settled on in mid 1943. The number of foreign manned GCD & corps/army support echelon remained a looser goal & in negotiation for the remainder of the war.

The two primary drivers in reduction of Ground Combat Force goals were first the growth of the US Air Forces, & second the growth of industrial and Army service support. The original estimates for the size of the Air Force and service support were based on Great War data that had been reworked in the 1920s & 1930s. Actual experience in mobilization and combat 1941-43 caused the size of the air and support forces to be revised upwards by several orders of magnitude. i.e.: The number of Army AF air Wings was roughly quadrupled over the 1939 mobilization estimates. As mobilization progressed 1941-43 that air forces would be more efficient at winning the war than Ground Forces hence the repeated reduction. The surplus over requirements produced were largely left in the civilian world, with a select portion going to the expanded air and service forces.

Interesting. These are the Rainbow 5 plans I am guessing. Like you said it called for around 200 divisions (61 armored divisions) and nearly 10 million ground forces as well as 239 air groups. 5 million of these ground forces would be marked for the invasion of Europe. I also suspect the same 5 million number would have been marked for Downfall (the invasion of Japan itself) if the US did invade Japan. The expected casualties for Downfall apparently were estimated in the millions for the invasion force. Although, I would think they would want more divisions than just 200. A lot more under these circumstances. It appears the Germans somehow had 375 divisions by wars end.
 
Interesting. These are the Rainbow 5 plans I am guessing. Like you said it called for around 200 divisions (61 armored divisions) and nearly 10 million ground forces as well as 239 air groups. 5 million of these ground forces would be marked for the invasion of Europe. I also suspect the same 5 million number would have been marked for Downfall (the invasion of Japan itself) if the US did invade Japan. The expected casualties for Downfall apparently were estimated in the millions for the invasion force. Although, I would think they would want more divisions than just 200. A lot more under these circumstances. It appears the Germans somehow had 375 divisions by wars end.
US Army divisions were extraordinarily large (20-25,000 men) compared to their German or Soviet (6-9000 men) counterparts. That's the reason behind all those 1945 maps with 1 US division facing off against 4 Soviet ones, or 1 US army group facing 4 Soviet fronts despite manpower being equal on both sides.
 
Interesting. These are the Rainbow 5 plans. ...

The Rainbow or color plans did not touch much on the details of mobilization or hard numbers. They were a strategic guide, a set of priorities & schedule for who to defeat first, second, third. Mobilization planning & industrial planning used the 1941 Rainbow plans as a guide or starting point, & were not directly part of them. The Army and Navy War Plans Divisions had responsibilities for both the color plans, and a big chunk of the mobilization planning. Hence there was some overlap.

The pre 1942 mobilization planning was very difficult since Congress had never funded adequate Army & Navy planning staffs. Also US law & the political climate prevented any effective centralized industrial policy before Dec 1941 DoW. It was not until after the DoW that Marshal & King could complete realistic plans for full mobilization.
 
.... It appears the Germans somehow had 375 divisions by wars end.

A lot of those were specialty units that were labeled 'divisions' . ie: the fortress or static divisions. The US & Commonwealth used other labels for similar units. In their ground combat forces the term division had a narrower or more specific meaning.
 
They couldn't complete it IOTL because of various factors particularly the massive amount of resources going to the East. If the USSR was knocked out of the war and the whole of Eastern Europe occupied (plus the resources of the rest of Europe) there would be far more resources and slave labor available to make the Wall far stronger and actually finish it.

Other than their "fortress cities" projects the Germans didn't commit very much resources in that regard to the East. Most of their concrete fortifications were in the West and Italy.

The Atlantic Wall of 1944 ITTL where the USSR is defeated in 1941/42 will be far more developed than the Atlantic Wall of OTL where the Reich had to deal with the Eastern Front, North Africa, Italy, the U-Boat campaign and the Allied Bombing campaign all at once. Any attempt at an amphibious landing won't be the walk in the park that it was IOTL. The longer it takes the Allies to establish air superiority/supremacy before they attempt a landing (just like OTL) means the likelihood of the Wall being completed approaches certainty.

And where would the Germans build their wall? Normandy? That still leaves hundreds of miles of coast open to attack that the Nazis could never have hoped to protect. The whole concept of the Atlantikwall was a gigantic waste of resources that was only valid where there was a real chance to push the invader into the sea, i.e, nowhere. At no point during World War II was any large-scale, dedicated amphibious assault ever repelled by land forces. It would have been better if the Germans emphasized more of a defense in depth to slow the Allies long enough for a viable counterattack to be made, rather that staking everything on just a "crust" near the coast.

I believe if the Atlantic Wall had been finished in the event of a Reich victory (it would likely be completed around 1946/47), any Allied attempt to get a foothold would suffer losses comparable to the first days of Operation Olympic.

The Allies would have invaded Europe long before then, probably still in 1944.

How long do you think it would take for the WAllies to establish air superiority sufficient to attempt an invasion in France?

OTL or slightly later.
 
Actually,in this scenario its likely that Britain falls to a renewed Sea Lion around the time Roosevelt dies. This double shock may well cause a attempted nazi coup on the east coast,which gives the wehrmacht a pretty solid foothold there to land on.

Sea Lion isn't possible without sinking the entire Royal Navy.
 

Thothian

Banned
In a scenario where the USSR collapses in late 41/early 42, the Allies will pick around the edges of Nazi conquests. They would seek to peel off N Africa, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, the Aegean islands, etc., maybe even go after Norway.

And then of course when the a-bomb comes online, German cities ( and by that I mean cities within Germany's pre-war borders) will start getting nuked, 1 after the other.

Until the Allies have air superiority, the bombs would come in great swarms of bombers ( and their escorting fighters) with only 1 of the bombers having the bomb. Perhaps the Allies, frustrated and bloody-minded because of the war's length, will begin to use chemical weapons, and drop anthrax cakes all over Germany. Operation Vegetarian, anyone?

Eventually, Germany folds, either through economic collapse or a coup by the sane elements of the Wehrmacht who are tired of seeing European civilization being sent straight to hell. Afterwards, one could imagine Japanese observers ( perhaps under the auspices of the Red Cross) being allowed to tour the devastated areas. Upon receiving their report, Emperor Hirohito says " This ... this opening of the mouth of Hell on earth must not come to my beloved Japan. We must end the war."

To anyone who says the WAllies wouldn't have gone down some of the roads I outline here, I must disagree. The mentality in the US was such that nothing less than utter victory would be accepted, no matter how many corpses of the other side must be piled up.

Perhaps after V-J day, Truman says " Let every nation learn from these horrible times. Let all the powers that be on this Earth look upon Europe and know: The United States of America will pay any price in blood and treasure to eradicate the enemies of liberty from the world, now and until the Almighty calls our world to a close. Never, never, never again will the United States of America allow any power in this world to rise to a position to endanger us all."

cue Pax Americana
 
Until the Allies have air superiority, the bombs would come in great swarms of bombers ( and their escorting fighters) with only 1 of the bombers having the bomb.
Other users who are far more versed in WW2 aviation can elaborate or correct me but the idea of a single nuclear bomber embedded within a massive conventional bomber/fighter stream seems plausible until you look at the post drop maneuvers that the releasing aircraft had to do to avoid being destroyed by the nuclear bomb's blast wave.

The flight profile/post drop maneuvers would be impossible for a massive stream of bombers to pull off which is why nuclear attacks are single aircraft missions or at the most three aircraft. Good luck trying to get a single bomber over the toughest air defenses in Europe without it being shot down before it reaches the target city.

At 17 seconds past 9:15 am at 30,000 feet, Col. Tibbetts dropped the bomb while Chuck Sweeney in Great Artiste dropped his instrument packages. Tibbetts immediately put Enola Gay into a hard 60 degree bank to the right, and Sweeney made the same turn to the left. When they straightened out to level flight they had lost 1,700 feet of elevation.

43 seconds after being released, the uranium "Little Boy" bomb exploded at a height of 1,890 feet. Perhaps 40 seconds after the blast tail gunner Bob Caron saw the shimmering shock wave approach, and seconds later it hit the aircraft.

Col. Tibbetts later wrote that the shock wave " ... struck the plane with a violent force. Our B-29 trembled under the impact and I gripped the controls tightly to keep us in level flight." Although they were about nine miles away they were still hit with the power of a close blast of anti-aircraft flak. The next day, "... Bob Lewis told reporters that if felt as if some giant had struck the plane with a telephone pole."

Detailed link describing what the aircraft during the atomic bombings in Japan did to avoid being caught in the blast:
https://user.xmission.com/~tmathews/b29/155degree/155degreemath.html
 
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