The Myth of Intervention and the ACW

[Saphroneth]

You missed the 16th Lancers at Cahir, and the depot battalions should still count as home service/garrison units. However, the fundamental point is a good one: that during the Crimea Ireland was garrisoned relatively lightly, and predominantly with its own military units.

Thanks. So it looks like that assessment from upthread holds - the UK can be adequately garrisoned without removing any chance to project force.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Thanks. So it looks like that assessment from upthread holds - the UK can be adequately garrisoned without removing any chance to project force.

Well that should be obvious given the Crimean War deployments one would think. They stretched the available manpower of the Empire at the time (due to a smaller army) but the militia maintained it's presence at home, and was enough to provide for adequate home defence. Here they have the militia and the Volunteer movement with over 160,000 men to its rosters come 1862.

The only argument I can imagine for the British keeping a larger garrison in Ireland is fears of a pro-American Fenian rising while Britain is distracted, but considering the result of the 1867 rising historically, I could say we know it's not likely to prove effective but the British in 1862 don't know that.

 

[Saphroneth]

All with vertical armour, all with 68 pounder guns

Ironclad one: Rideaumax, complete.

With 5" of iron armour weight equivalent, and an 11-ton engine w/o machinery and 11 ton bunker - which Springsharp says is five knots, but I have my doubts - she's got a composite strength of 0.7 and four 68 pounder guns with seven feet freeboard, or a surprisingly large number of guns with five feet of freeboard (at least ten) because the reduction of two feet of armour height is so much of the ship's weight.
n.b. this ship has armour down to two feet below the waterline, which is basically the entire ship.

Ironclad two: Rideaumax, complete, central-battery only.

Same engine, same armour thickness, back to 7 feet of freeboard. By armouring only the central 80 feet of the ship it is possible to carry eight guns at composite strength of 1.00


Ironclad three: Rideaumax with no armour or guns

With an allowance of one inch extra draft per ten tons of armour/gun weight:

Unloaded draft 5 feet
Loaded draft 7 feet 2 inches (loaded displacement 669)
Loaded freeboard 8 feet
72 ton engine
23 tons bunker
Complete belt from 8 feet above waterline to 2 feet 2 inches below
12 guns


n.b. none of these allow for a bulkhead - you can't do that on SpringSharp, annoyingly. Nevertheless I think this shows that a Rideaumax armoured ironclad is possible according to SpringSharp.

Oddly the same program can't speak highly enough of their seaworthiness! I think it's the huge freeboard relative to their other dimensions.

 

[Cockroach]

n.b. none of these allow for a bulkhead - you can't do that on SpringSharp, annoyingly. Nevertheless I think this shows that a Rideaumax armoured ironclad is possible according to SpringSharp.

Oddly the same program can't speak highly enough of their seaworthiness! I think it's the huge freeboard relative to their other dimensions.

TBH, Springsharp is optimized for the 1890s to 1940s era, and even then it has problems with small (generally less than 1000 tons, and particularly, small and fast) ships. I'd be very cautious using it's output for older small vessels.

 

[Saphroneth]

TBH, Springsharp is optimized for the 1890s to 1940s era, and even then it has problems with small (generally less than 1000 tons, and particularly, small and fast) ships. I'd be very cautious using it's output for older small vessels.

Perhaps true - though I think it's still possible to show that the raw mass of armour can be carried. Specifically, the upper limit on tonnage for the Rideaumax ironclad is about 600 tonnes, and 5" of iron armour (weight equivalent roughly to backed 4-4.5") on a 130 foot long sheet (allowing for the ends) is about (5x1/38 x 130 x 0.3 x 7850) = 40 tons for every metre of armour belt height for one side of the ship.
If you have a two metre high belt, both sides, that's a total of about 160 tonnes of armour - which is pretty huge, don't get me wrong, but the Clown class was about 230 tonnes so you can clearly manage a functional ship plus armour in the Rideau size. If not by a really huge amount. (It still leaves you about 200 tonnes for extra ship strengthening and more guns, so I think you could manage a four- or six-gun ironclad.)

ED: 600 tonnes is from (110 feet x 30 feet x 5 feet x 1/27 tonne per cubic foot)

 

[Saphroneth]

If guns had to come from England by steamship at 6 knots cruising, the trip, in good weather, would take 20 days in transit, should the guns be immediately available in Liverpool, with 2 days to load and 2 days to unload.

What about if the gun's coming from England by steamship at twelve knots sustained speed? Or attached to a gunboat? Ships that hit storms crossed in twenty days during Trent- the Persia landed some of her cargo at Bic twelve days after being dispatched. Twenty days in good weather is distinctly ahistorical.
I'd also like some kind of citation for the two days loading and two days unloading - it sounds plausible, but I want to see your evidence.

The initial armament would be that in storage, which for both sides, would be muzzle-loading, smooth-bore cast iron guns and carronades.

Care to list them for the Americans?

The Canadians had at least (guns and carriages):


On field carriages
8x 12 pdrs (sent during Trent)
4x 9 pdr (ditto)
5x 24 pdr
2x 24 pdr howitzers on sleighs

On siege carriages
9x 68 pdr 95 cwt
95x 32 pdr 56 cwt
36x 24 pdr 50 cwt
2x 8" 65 cwt shell guns
3x 18 pdr
1x 12 pdr
4x 10" howitzer
2x 8" howitzer
1x 24 pdr howitzer

On ship carriages
80x 32 pdr 56 cwt
7x 8" 65 cwt shell guns

On trail carriages
15x 68 pdr carronades
39x 32 pdr carronades
10x 24 pdr carronades
11x 18 pdr carronades
5x 12 pdr carronades

On beds
1x 24 pdr gun
4x 10" mortars
11x 8" mortars
6x 5.5" mortars

Someone else put this together, citing
http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_02243/3?r=0&s=1

They could also be rifled, as could the surplus Army guns and "columbiads" in storage in the Atlantic Coast ports.

Care to list the guns in storage? I've had real trouble finding them - but the impression I got was that most of the guns not captured at e.g. Norfolk VA were actually in the forts around Washington by this point and that the remainder were insufficient to fully arm the coastal forts.

The Union can prioritize one, but only at some expense for the others. ("Washington DC forts", "Siege guns for army","Naval guns", "New gunboats on Lakes","Lake forts".)

There was no manufacturer of small arms or cannon in Canada or of black powder.

But the Canadians, unlike the US, can import them from overseas (in other words Britain, which had plenty to spare). We've already shown that with a blockade in place the Americans are thrown back on decidedly inadequate local sources of saltpetre, cannons and black powder, but they solve it without qualm in your view; conversely the Canadians, who recieved literally tens of thousands of small arms over the time of the Trent crisis and who have the number one industrial power in the world supplying them with all the products of their arsenal, are crippled by their own lack.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Well looking for US Navy guns I found a New York Times piece of December 10, 1863 though the table is a little unclear, I am reading it as stocks as of March 1861 and then added since then to 1863 though I note what appears to be a typo as 305 Dahlgren 9" plus 303 Dahlgren 9" equals 608 not 808*

CLASS OF GUN. On hand March, '61. Made since. On hand Nov. 1, '63.

Howitzer, 12-pounder light....... 57 26 83

Howitzer, 12-pounder heavy...... 50 208 258

Howitzer, 24-pounder............. 29 508 537

Howitzer, 12-pounder rifled...... _____ 325 325

32-pounders, 27 cwt................ 177 _____ 177

32-pounders, 32 cwt............... 376 _____ 376

32-pounders, 42 cwt............... 363 _____ 362

32-pounders, 40 cwt............... 57 _____ 57

32-pounders, 51 cwt............... 200 _____ 200

32-pounders, 57 cwt............... 700 _____ 700

8-inch, of 55 cwt................... 172 _____ 172

8-inch, of 63 cwt.................. 385 _____ 385

8-inch, of 106 cwt.................. 14 _____ 14

8-inch, of 90 cwt................... 4 _____ 4

10-inch. of 87 cwt................. 27 _____ 27

9-inch Dahlgren................. 305 303 808 (608?)*

10-inch Dahlgren.................. 19 10 29

11-inch Dahlgren.................. 32 291 323

13-inch mortars.................... _____ 200 200

20-pounder Parrott................ _____ 214 214

30-pounder Parrott................ _____ 237 237

100-pounder Parrott............... _____ 180 180

150-pounder Parrott............... _____ 60 60

15 inch smooth bores............. _____ 36 36

20-pounder rifled (Dahlgren)..... _____ 13 13

Total..........................2,966 2,811 5,777

It is of course somewhat compromised by running till 1863 which number would be impacted by Trent but it ought to shed a little light as to what the Navy started out with.

Edited to improve clarity of table headings.

 

[Saphroneth]

It is of course somewhat compromised by running till 1863 which number would be impacted by Trent but it ought to shed a little light as to what the Navy started out with.

Hm, very useful. I happen to have somewhere a count of large Army guns delivered as of late 1863, and a source that says the 100-lber Parrott was just being first cast in March 1863 and that only one 15" smoothbore existed as of Trent, with the 20" and 150-lber both being no-shows at this point - so I think for the rest of the guns (the ones already in service pre-ACW) we can pro-rata the production to give us a best-case scenario for the US. (Pro rata is best case as production naturally follows an ascending curve.)

The problem however is that the Army, not the Navy, handles coastal defence. But nevertheless this is a fairly good first look.

Interesting that the 8" and 32-lber guns weren't being produced any more - it places very definite constraints on the kind of medium fort guns that the Union could use, and means that they're really going to have to rely on their massive-calibre guns which were mostly being produced slowly.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

though the table is a little unclear, I am reading it as stocks as of March 1861 and then added since then to 1863

You need to add in the top row. The three headings are: 'On hand March '61,' 'Made since,' 'On hand Nov 1, 1863'.

though I note what appears to be a typo as 305 Dahlgren 9" plus 303 Dahlgren 9" equals 608 not 808*

It's janky OCR. I think your amendment is probably the correct one- you can see how a 6 might be misinterpreted by a computer as an 8. EDIT: We might be better working off the original report: turns out it's 503 built, for a total of 808.

DOUBLE EDIT: Man, this report is the gift that keeps giving.
Manufactured for the navy since March 1 1861:
Powder from foreign nitre: 2,676 tons
Powder from domestic nitre: 260 tons
Purchased from individuals: 44 tons

Interesting that the 8" and 32-lber guns weren't being produced any more

A lot of those will have been put on the converted merchant ships, as well.

What I find most interesting is the comment that they have only a few establishments capable of casting cannon:

Cyrus Alger's South Boston Iron Works
Fort Pitt Foundry, Pittsburgh, PA
West Point Foundry, Cold Spring, NY
Builders Iron Foundry, Providence RI
Hinkley, Williams and Co. of Boston
Portland Company, Portland ME
Seyfert, McManus and Co's Scott Foundry at Reading, PA.

The three top were in operation at the start of the war, and the latter four brought in during it. However, McClellan's letter suggests that as of 20 February 1862 the bottom four were not operational, that Alger was refusing orders from the Army, and that the maximum capacity of all three was 33 guns a week.

The other thing I find interesting is that naval raids could affect a pretty considerable proportion of those foundries...

 

[Saphroneth]

The other thing I find interesting is that naval raids could affect a pretty considerable proportion of those foundries...

Both the Boston ones are fairly easy targets. West Point I wouldn't want to rely on hitting unless NY is supine, and Pittsburgh and Reading are out of reach... but the Portland one is probably in British hands in a Trent scenario alright.

And the Providence RI one is just asking for it. The West Passage has no forts in it and can admit most small frigates, let alone gunboats!

 

[RodentRevolution]

The three top were in operation at the start of the war, and the latter four brought in during it. However, McClellan's letter suggests that as of 20 February 1862 the bottom four were not operational, that Alger was refusing orders from the Army, and that the maximum capacity of all three was 33 guns a week.

The other thing I find interesting is that naval raids could affect a pretty considerable proportion of those foundries...

Raiding the same list of letter and looking for reports by the Chief of Ordnance I came across this which is the returns for the stock of weapons at least initially held by the U.S Forts and Arsenals (some of which would have been seized by the rebels).

Of course not all the arms and forts fell into rebel hands but out of 2,795 sea coast guns as of 18th some 1,303 would have been at the very least under threat by April 1861.

I would assume these are Army guns and thus exclusive of Navy owned ones.

 

[galveston bay]

Raiding the same list of letter and looking for reports by the Chief of Ordnance I came across this which is the returns for the stock of weapons at least initially held by the U.S Forts and Arsenals (some of which would have been seized by the rebels).

Of course not all the arms and forts fell into rebel hands but out of 2,795 sea coast guns as of 18th some 1,303 would have been at the very least under threat by April 1861.

I would assume these are Army guns and thus exclusive of Navy owned ones.

I know from recent reading about Pea Ridge and Wilson's Creek that Lyons (Federal) seized the Missouri arsenal.

Nearly all of the other arsenals in the Confederate States were seized by local forces

Harpers Ferry was technically in Virginia at that point, and was seized by the Confederates, who also seized the materials and machinery to make more guns (which obviously was moved further south as quickly as possible)

The other states are pretty straight forward.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I know from recent reading about Pea Ridge and Wilson's Creek that Lyons (Federal) seized the Missouri arsenal.

Nearly all of the other arsenals in the Confederate States were seized by local forces

Harpers Ferry was technically in Virginia at that point, and was seized by the Confederates, who also seized the materials and machinery to make more guns (which obviously was moved further south as quickly as possible)

The other states are pretty straight forward.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but John. B. Floyd was responsible for sending a large number of guns to Southern arsenals before secession correct?

 

[galveston bay]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but John. B. Floyd was responsible for sending a large number of guns to Southern arsenals before secession correct?

I am not certain, it has been a while since I read "The Coming Fury" or "Battle Cry of Freedom" .... I remember that, but I could be wrong on the details. I do recall him assigning as many pro-Southern officers as possible to key positions but Scott had some say on that too.

He was worried enough to flee and surrender responsibility to poor Buckner at Fort Donelson as he was worried about facing treason charges if he got caught by the Union Army.

(American politics this year were depressing enough that I didn't want to read up on the events leading to the Civil War because I was afraid it would depress me even more)

(edit: wikipedia says that Floyd did get accused of that, but as I said I haven't looked at him in a long time in terms of what he did or did not do)

 

[Saphroneth]

Of course not all the arms and forts fell into rebel hands but out of 2,795 sea coast guns as of 18th some 1,303 would have been at the very least under threat by April 1861.

The question then becomes - how many of those remaining guns ended up in the DC Fort Circle, and how many went elsewhere...






Note - this is an attempt to produce an overestimate for number of guns.

States for which seacoast guns would be captured either in Trent war or Civil War:

VA (remaining guns in Fort Monroe captured or unavailable)
SC
GA
FL
AL
LA

States for which seacoast guns would be unavailable in Trent war

CA

Total guns serviceable at start of Civil War

2+138+100+49+506+213+56+310 = 1374

Maximum possible additional gun production by Trent war start = (33 per week x 42 weeks = 1386)


Guns recieved by army after Gettysburg =
8-inch Rodman Guns, 123 delivered from a total of 213 produced.
10-inch Rodman Guns, 1270 of 1301 total produced.
15-inch Rodman Guns, 313 out of 323 produced.
10-inch Parrott Rifles, 40 out of 42 produced.
8-inch Parrott Rifles, 69 out of 91 produced for the Army.
6.4-inch Parrott Rifles, 98 out of 233 produced for the Army.


The above suggests that most of the production of the foundries was in field guns, not siege guns. Removing guns known to not be produced in any number until post-Trent:



Guns recieved by army after Gettysburg =
8-inch Rodman Guns, 123 delivered from a total of 213 produced.
10-inch Rodman Guns, 1270 of 1301 total produced.
6.4-inch Parrott Rifles, 98 out of 233 produced for the Army.

Time from war start to Gettysburg ~ 120 weeks (one third of which time is from Civil war start to Trent war start)

Pro rata heavy gun production for army by Trent war start =

41 8" guns
423 10" guns
33 6.4" rifles

Total fort defense guns = 1871


Known number of guns in the DC fort ring = at least 480, of which some field guns

Armed (heh) with this estimate, it should be possible to look at the requirements for the seacoast forts apart from Fort Monroe in terms of gun count (along with Fort Monroe IF we can find how many guns got sent there after the war started), and then to go from that to how many guns the US has which are not committed to seacoast forts - or, alternatively (and IMO more likely) the scale of their deficit.

 

[Saphroneth]

And your Canadian militia timeline needs severe editing.

But you said

On December 20, Williams also began training one company of 75 men from each battalion of the Sedentary Militia, about 38,000 men in total, with the intention of raising this to 100,000.

And I said

3 January
First tranche of Canadian militia officially completes mobilization. 38,000 rank and file (>40,000 All Ranks) are mobilized, in addition to the 5,000 Class A active militia and additional newly raised volunteers. These troops are all armed with Enfield rifle-muskets, and begin drill and target practice with training from NCOs of the 30th and 47th Foot.

So you say that one company of 75 men each (i.e. 38,000 men) start training on December 20th, and I say that the mobilization of 38,000 men is on 3 January, and you think my timeline requires editing. I suppose it does, if one agrees with your post - I should have them having two weeks more training.

The XI-in gun when proofed to destruction handled 60lb charges without any signs of distress.

Citation? The regular powder charge of the XV" is about 50-60 lbs or so of powder - you'd think the Union would be using more of the potential of this wonder gun if the 11" could cope with a larger powder charge than British heavy AP rifles from a decade later. (powder charge of 9" RML = 50 lbs; penetration at muzzle 11.4" solid wrought iron, 3,680 foot tons of energy).
I can't find any mention of the 50 lbs charge from Chickasaw either, so a citation of that would be nice too.

Once battle was joined, both guns were restricted in using their maximum ranges due to masking terrain and black powder clouds.

And yet the Krupp guns are regularly used for rapid fire at ~1800 "paces" and for distant fire at as much as ~4000 "paces" - if the pace is 30 inches, then that's about 3,200 yards or two miles.

3. I have a very extensive library and access to the Combined Arms Library at Ft. Leavenworth (CG&SC), the Army War College and the Army Center for Military History, along with lending privileges from the libraries at the Pentagon and the USMA.

Then it's a real pity, frankly, that you state such clear silliness as you do at times. I don't think much of the libraries in question if the conclusion you draw is (e.g.) that the British moved 10,000 troops through New York in 1862, when actually it was a couple of dozen through Maine.

The attack would be carried out with two companies forward and skirmishing and eight companies in a two rank line. The skirmishing company, at the least, would have rifles or rifle-muskets. These could be the .54 or .58 M1841 "Mississippi" rifles (over 125,000 still in service as of 31 Jan 62), the .69 M1842 musket rifled between 1856-61 (50,000 in service 31 Jan 62), the .58 M1855 rifle or rifle musket (about 30,000 still in service), the .58 M1861 rifle-musket (Springfield, of which 50,000 had been received by the US Army by 31 Jan 62), the .577 Enfield rifle or rifle-musket (over 300,000 had reached the US by 31 January 1862, bought by the US and state governments, Massachusetts and NY among them, from the British government production, which meant they had interchangeable parts, as the government manufactured Enfield was produced on machinery bought from the US in 1856), or the .54 Lorenz rifle or rifle-musket (over 100,000 imported from Austria by 31 Jan 62).

Since this section of yours suggests 655,000 rifles in service in the Union armies by 31 Jan 1862, the question arises as to why the Union was still issuing smoothbore muskets. I've previously questioned the citation and numbers, but I'd also like to question the basic logic behind it too - since the US PFD at the time was less than 500,000, for them to issue smoothbores with 150,000 spare rifles knocking about seems frankly mad.

Average daily movement of a force of 50,000 men - 10-20 miles
Average daily movement of a wagon or siege train - 10 miles

How does a force of 50,000 men move faster than their wagons?

 

[cerebropetrologist]

The XI-in gun when proofed to destruction handled 60lb charges without any signs of distress.

Citation?

More importantly- how was it 'proofed to destruction' if it showed 'no sign of distress'? How could the 11in Dalhgren only handle a 30lb charge 20 times, but a 60lb charge with 'no sign of distress'?

These could be the .54 or .58 M1841 "Mississippi" rifles (over 125,000 still in service as of 31 Jan 62)

It's impressive that there are 125,000 still in service, when there were only 92,807 built. Not only did none end up in the hands of the Confederacy, despite them being in Confederate arsenals at the outbreak of the war, but they found another 30,000 from somewhere.

at the Battle of Mobile Bay, the captain of the USS Chickasaw, a two turret river/coastal monitor with the XI-in gun, up the charge to 50lbs on his own authority, and the cored shot could be seen to nearly penetrate the casemate of the CSS Tennessee

I can't find any mention of the 50 lbs charge from Chickasaw either, so a citation of that would be nice too.

The report of Gunner John A. MacDonald lists 4 steel shot, 48 cast iron shot, and 52 20lb charges as having been expended against the Tennessee. Not only is it impossible to double-charge a gun to 50lbs with 20lb charges, but he fired 52 charges and 52 shot.

the .577 Enfield rifle or rifle-musket (over 300,000 had reached the US by 31 January 1862, bought by the US and state governments, Massachusetts and NY among them, from the British government production, which meant they had interchangeable parts

Apart from the horrendous overstatement of the numbers bought, is there any particular reason you're lying about these weapons being interchangeable?

One coup was buying the current and future production of the factories producing the government model of the 1853 rifle and rifle-musket, leaving the insurrectionists to buy from independent gun-makers that ensured that that parts would not be interchangeable.

'Watson's letter described the kinds of arms Hartley was to buy; grouping them into five classes in descending order of merit:
1. The machine-made English Enfield, with interchangeable parts, manufactured only by the London Armoury Company.
2. The hand-made English Enfield.' (William B. Edwards, Civil War Guns, p.72)

'When Schuyler got to London on August 12, 1861, he scouted around and spent the week fruitlessly discovering that Rebel buyer Caleb Huse, and other agents, including those from the Northern states, had tied up the London and Birmingham factories. The London Armoury, the only private machine-made Enfield source, which a short time before had refused to do business with Southern agent Caleb Huse, now turned the cold shoulder to Yankee Schuyler; they were all booked up by the Confederacy.' (William B. Edwards, Civil War Guns, p.67)

'Within a few days I succeeded in closing a contract under which I was to have all the arms the Company could manufacture, after filling a comparatively small order for the United States agent. This Company, during the remainder of the war, turned all its output of arms over to me for the Confederate army.' (Caleb Huse, The Supplies for the Confederate Army: How they were obtained in Europe and how paid for)

(Note: this was a mistake before it was corrected; it has now become a lie)

 

[Saphroneth]

...the British leadership expected to have to defend Canada at a 1 to 3 force ratio at a minimum and, more likely, at 1 to 6 odds.

Let's take that "more likely" and examine it closer. In the first case I'm not at all sure it's credible, but let's take some lowball and highball estimates of militia numbers, and add the British regulars to them.

1) Lowball.
The Province of Canada only produces 38,000 militia and 5,000 volunteers.
Total regulars alerted to move to Canada 18 battalions, of which 8 battalions actually sent. Pro rata this is about 25,000 regulars in Canada, counting other arms (21 infantry battalions) -nb. this number may be low.
Grand total 68,000. This is the minimum sensibly expected number of troops in Canada, as it completely ignores New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and assumes prewar callouts are it.
3:1 force ratio means about 200,000 American troops needed. 6:1 ratio means about 400,000 US troops needed.



2) Highball.
Province of Canada mobilizes 50,000 militia and 10,000 volunteers.
The Aroostock War saw 8,000 New Brunswickers and 25,000 Nova Scotians mobilized, so use the same again.
27 battalions left at home, call out the militia at home and send another tranche of battalions (18), while also sending battalions from the Mediterranean and other colonies (1/21, 1/14, 2/5 (West Indies and Mauritius) 2 of the 3 Corfu battalions, 4 of the 5 Gibraltar battalions, 4 of the 6 Malta battalions) for a total of 13 more. Total 52 battalions, which with other arms comes out at roughly 60,000 regulars. -nb this number may also be low.
Grand total 153000, which is not beyond the bounds of possibility as in most cases it relies on extant numbers; it's also about 90000 total Canadians mobilized, which is 1 in 30 of the population, where the Union pulled together about 1 in 14 at times.
This is a number for which a 3:1 ratio is 450,000 troops and a 6:1 ratio is 900,000 troops. This is of course completely impractical - heck, it takes 180,000 troops just to engage the regulars at 3:1 odds.


3) Overload limit.
Williams gets his 100,000 from the Province of Canada, along with 5,000 regulars.
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia both have roughly 60% population increase since 1838 (358,000 total goes to 582,000 total) so militia size goes up to about 53,000 between the two
Newfoundland + Prince Edward Island total size 200,000, they contribute 5,000 between them
Full militia and volunteer callout at home, plus draw down from India by 15% to get more regulars. 70 battalions sent, about 80,000 regular troops. (very roughly 1/3 of the total standing army)
Sum total 243,000, of which 163,000 Canadian - a rough mobilization of 1 in 18. This is the maximum you could get without getting frankly a little bit silly, where "silly" means sending over British militia (though it happened in the Boer War).
To put 6:1 force against this would mean instantly making peace with the Confederacy, tripling the size of the army, and sending it all north.

The report of Gunner John A. MacDonald lists 4 steel shot, 48 cast iron shot, and 52 20lb charges as having been expended against the Tennessee. Not only is it impossible to double-charge a gun to 50lbs with 20lb charges, but he fired 52 charges and 52 shot.

It also raises the question of why there were 20lb charges if we're assured the full authorized charge is 30 lbs.

Manufactured for the navy since March 1 1861:
Powder from foreign nitre: 2,676 tons
Powder from domestic nitre: 260 tons
Purchased from individuals: 44 tons

I make that 90% of nitre that was foreign sourced rather than domestic, and this the aggregate two and a half years into the war and nearly two years after the Trent crisis revealed US vulnerability to foreign nitre sourcing.

 

[Saphroneth]

Total guns on hand at start of rebellion

Army (incl. Virginia)
2915 heavy guns

Navy (incl. Norfolk VA, Pensacola FL)
1872 32-lbers of various types
575 8" of various types
27 10" shell guns
305 9" Dahlgren
19 10" Dahlgren
32 11" Dahlgren

Total 2830 of which 555 were on ships




Captured by Confederates at Norfolk Virginia
1195 "large caliber" guns

This therefore means that (as the total Army heavy guns in the whole of Virginia total just under 860) at least 335 heavy Navy guns were captured there as well.

Fort Monroe at Trent mounted 40 42-lber (water battery), 73 32-lber, 11 8" shell guns, 10 10" shell guns (barbette), up to 37 32-lbers (casemates)
Calhoun mounted 7 8" shell guns, 2 42-lbers

Total heavy guns to be captured/destroyed at Fort Monroe by Trent = 143-180

Total naval guns captured in Pensacola either by Trent or otherwise - unknown (more data appreciated)

Therefore...

Minimum number of heavy guns captured in the event of Trent (counting captures previously)
1338, plus whatever in the way of naval guns is captured at Pensacola, and whatever was captured in Virginia apart from at Hampton Roads

Maxmimum number of heavy guns remaining to the Union
4407, plus 1386 new build
n.b. "heavy guns" includes all calibres over 24 lber; maximum number means all foundries instantly sprang to full operation.

Guns available as per McClellan letter 3287 (of which 1327 too light for service - could be 24 pounders or small 32 pounders and 42 pounders)
Guns available for serviceable use by army 1960
Number of guns required for already-established forts as of Feb 1862 (i.e. not Trent war situation, but after it) 4891
Guns consumed by extant USN ships ? (Can look up on Wiki, but as we've seen armaments change regularly)


Guns left over for other purposes
Probably not many.

Useful information to know:

DC fort armament
Guns captured at Pensacola
Any other big gun captures or losses
Ship armaments Jan 1862

 

[RodentRevolution]

Guns left over for other purposes
Probably not many.

Robbing Peter to pay Paul is a juggling act that every officer commanding has had to perform at some point. While it is worth noting the guns have to come from somewhere what is clear is that the absolute number of guns to arm a reasonable Great Lakes force is available to the US. It is not going to have an instant armada but the evidence is that between existing guns and existing hulls it can contest the waters.