The Myth of Intervention and the ACW

[Mike Snyder]

At http://warsimsandhistoryplusscifi.com/ you can find a pair of studies on foreign military intervention on the side of the CSA in 1862 or 1864. In both cases, the act of recognition was useless without military intervention. And intervention by the British Empire, which would have to lead such an intervention, would have been very difficult if not impossible. The Southern dependence on foreign intervention was an exercise in denial that impacted their ability to gain independence.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Recognition without intervention would have been a political disaster for the Lincoln administration and would have massively improved the prospects of the Copperhead Democrats. As in: "Look how incompetent Lincoln and his Republicans are! If they're so close to beating the rebels, why has London sent a minister to Richmond?!?!" Moreover, the increased credibility the Confederate government would derive from diplomatic recognition would have greatly assisted its efforts to raise money on the bond markets in London and Paris, which would in turn have considerably improved its prospects for winning its independence.

Intervention by the British would almost certainly have led to Confederate independence, for the Royal Navy would both have made it impossible for the North to blockade the South with any effectiveness and also would have been able to sweep the seas of the Northern merchant marine, inflicting terrible damage on the Union economy. Assuming a land war along the Canadian border, while the British would surely be on the defensive and might lose Canada to a Union invasion, every regiment of soldiers the Union has to deploy to the north is one less regiment that they can deploy against the Confederacy.

 

[Mike Snyder]

Recognition without intervention would have been a political disaster for the Lincoln administration and would have massively improved the prospects of the Copperhead Democrats. As in: "Look how incompetent Lincoln and his Republicans are! If they're so close to beating the rebels, why has London sent a minister to Richmond?!?!" Moreover, the increased credibility the Confederate government would derive from diplomatic recognition would have greatly assisted its efforts to raise money on the bond markets in London and Paris, which would in turn have considerably improved its prospects for winning its independence.

Intervention by the British would almost certainly have led to Confederate independence, for the Royal Navy would both have made it impossible for the North to blockade the South with any effectiveness and also would have been able to sweep the seas of the Northern merchant marine, inflicting terrible damage on the Union economy. Assuming a land war along the Canadian border, while the British would surely be on the defensive and might lose Canada to a Union invasion, every regiment of soldiers the Union has to deploy to the north is one less regiment that they can deploy against the Confederacy.

1. I seriously disagree. The RN is not a "magic wand" that can be waved at a problem. You need to read my studies on the military posture of both the British Empire and France and their ability to mobilize such military and naval power for a major war across the Atlantic. You seem to assume that the RN could go from peacetime to wartime size and effectiveness in little time, when all evidence from the Crimean War on shows that six months would be too little time to return ships to RN bases to pickup wartime ammunition allocations and augment their peacetime crews, take ships out of reserve and ordinary, re-arm them and recruit crews, while stocking the forward operating bases with sufficient coal, ammunition and supplies for sustained operations off the US coast. It would take a year for the RN to put sufficient forces into Kingston and Halifax with the supplies to support an intervention in force. LOGISTICS. Again, the US blockade was inshore and in coastal waters, not just in the open sea. The ability of British steam ships of the line and armored warships with their deep draft and lengths and turning radius makes it questionable they could force the USN inshore force to give up the blockade. Moreover, as I point out, the RN had no effective armor-piercing or breaking gun available in 1862 and had only gotten started in replacing the Armstrong breechloaders in 1864. Ships like HMS Warrior were not completely rearmed by 1867. And if the Warrior or Black Prince tried to close on a USN force, they would be just as likely to go aground as CSS Virginia at Hampton Roads, only their gun batteries were too high to effectively engage USN "Passaic" class monitors at point blank range where the XI" Dahlgren with full charge could penetrate a 4" wrought iron plate backed by 24" of oak. BTW, the USN would have flushed out its own raiders in the year before the RN could effectively intervened, and it would have been the British merchant marine's turn to suffer. I as said in my essays, the impact on British shipping from US raiding in 1776-83 and 1812-15 was burned into the psyche of Lloyd's of London. The RN would have to secure its trade routes, its ports and create a convoy system, which would delay its ability to gather forces to intervene effectively in North America. Not to mention the need to dispatch forces to watch the Russians, whose navy was very active in this period.

2. As I point out it took the British 22 weeks to move 10,000 men from Britain to Canada in 1862 and most of them traveled through NYC. The industrial capability on the Lakes would have meant that the US would quickly seize control of the Lakes making reinforcement of the British garrisons and Canadian militia even more difficult. The intervention of Britain in the Civil War would have boosted recruiting, as I point out, and given the Lincoln Administration more power over calling the militia into Federal service. The militia would relieve the Volunteer forces like the Heavy Artillery regiments in Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, NYC and Boston, some 30,000 trained Volunteer Soldiers and the Volunteers and Regulars stationed in the West. The Lincoln Administration might even have been able to follow the Confederate example of Oct 62 by involuntarily and unilaterally extending the enlistments of volunteers, such that the Army of Potomac wouldn't lose over 25,000 experienced Soldiers during June 1863 when they're enlistments expired. The Intervention wouldn't require the US to divert ANY forces from the war with the Confederacy, rather it would strengthen political position of the Lincoln Administration and allow further mobilization of the nation. Not to mention speeding the recruitment of African-American regiments which didn't go into high gear until mid-1864. The US never fully mobilized for the war, when compared to the Confederate effort. A similar effort on the part of the US would provide more than enough ground forces to continue the war against the CSA AND occupy Canada. And KEEP IT.

3. As far as the US merchant marine and the US economy goes, while the monetary costs were staggering and the impact on trade AFTER the war dreadful, the Confederate raiders had little impact on the war-making capability of the US. As I pointed out, the US was self-sufficient in almost all military materials. British intervention would have spurred greater Federal intervention in the economy and further mobilized industry which had yet to be dedicated to war effort. A 30% increase over production in 1864 and 1865 is a conservative estimate. Imagine US cavalry FULLY armed with Spencer carbines and infantry with Sharps, Jenkins and Springfield breech-loading rifles by mid-1864. Regiments supported by Gatling guns using metallic cartridges. 20" Rodman and XX" Dahlgren cannon firing shot and shell. And every US advance into the South had resulted in the recovery of resources, such as cotton, that fed the US economy while being denied to the CSA. Adding Canada would increase those resources. The US DID NOT need British trade to fight its war. The British DID WANT US trade. It had learned to live without Southern cotton. The US was Britain's largest market for finished products in1862, surpassing Europe. A British intervention would hurt the British economy far more than the US.

4. As far as recognition improving the CSA's ability to float loans in Britain and Europe, the international laws on neutrality would have applied even more so to the CSA's ability to use such funds to purchase weapons, equipment and supplies. And during the year the RN mobilized, whatever supplies the CSA's agents in Europe were not going to get where it needs to go. The CSA was tapped out in 1864. It's internal transportation network was falling apart, it had lost control of the river and coastal waterways, it had no more room for the expansion of its war economy, which had been bled of men by the casualties of war and by the escape and liberation of slaves. It couldn't complete any number of iron-clads for lack of armor and machinery, while it produced enough ammunition, especially artillery shells, the quality had fallen off badly (only a fool would fire a Richmond built Sharps).Food was becoming more difficult to purchase in Richmond and Montgomery and Charleston. It would take a long time to turn this situation around even if the RN did break the blockade and Britain was willing to provide these products gratis. British intervention in mid-1863 after the Trent Incident might(!) have saved the CSA, but it would be a CSA without large parts of Virginia, Arkansas, and Tennessee or New Orleans. By mid-1864, the US would still overrun the CSA, the British intervention would have simply prolonged the agony.

 

[The Gunslinger]

At http://warsimsandhistoryplusscifi.com/ you can find a pair of studies on foreign military intervention on the side of the CSA in 1862 or 1864. In both cases, the act of recognition was useless without military intervention. And intervention by the British Empire, which would have to lead such an intervention, would have been very difficult if not impossible. The Southern dependence on foreign intervention was an exercise in denial that impacted their ability to gain independence.

@Saphroneth @EnglishCanuck

We have several threads about Trent intervention, and America doesn't fare spectacularly.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

These two articles are riddled with inaccuracies and overconfident assumptions about the Union's capabilities. This quote here:

by 1864, producing more pig iron, coal and steel than the British. Iron, coal and copper were available in sufficient quantities from domestic sources, while the primary overseas strategic requirement, saltpeter from India for black powder and tin, had been stock-piled and domestic production increased.

is just showing how little research the author has done.

 

[longsword14]

@Mike Snyder
This is one hot topic which is ardently defended by each side so I do not expect you to make any headway.
Although I do agree with you that butting heads with a continental opponent would be more difficult than many who wave the Empah wand around believe.
How the internal political situation changes for Lincoln is far more important than all the military assisstance Britain could possibly lend.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

1. I seriously disagree. The RN is not a "magic wand" that can be waved at a problem. You need to read my studies on the military posture of both the British Empire and France and their ability to mobilize such military and naval power for a major war across the Atlantic.

Quoting yourself won't make you many friends here.

 

[Saphroneth]

1. I seriously disagree. The RN is not a "magic wand" that can be waved at a problem. You need to read my studies on the military posture of both the British Empire and France and their ability to mobilize such military and naval power for a major war across the Atlantic. You seem to assume that the RN could go from peacetime to wartime size and effectiveness in little time, when all evidence from the Crimean War on shows that six months would be too little time to return ships to RN bases to pickup wartime ammunition allocations and augment their peacetime crews, take ships out of reserve and ordinary, re-arm them and recruit crews, while stocking the forward operating bases with sufficient coal, ammunition and supplies for sustained operations off the US coast. It would take a year for the RN to put sufficient forces into Kingston and Halifax with the supplies to support an intervention in force. LOGISTICS.

Are you aware of the fact that the Royal Navy had a major naval base at Bermuda, that ships were (as of Trent) ready to intervene on a timescale of days to weeks after the news of the war, and that the British Empire had an ironclad within four days' cruise of the Chesapeake? Along with considerably more combat power than the entire US navy - I can provide ship names if you're interested.

Again, the US blockade was inshore and in coastal waters, not just in the open sea. The ability of British steam ships of the line and armored warships with their deep draft and lengths and turning radius makes it questionable they could force the USN inshore force to give up the blockade. Moreover, as I point out, the RN had no effective armor-piercing or breaking gun available in 1862 and had only gotten started in replacing the Armstrong breechloaders in 1864.

HMS Terror, Glatton, Trusty, Thunderbolt, Erebus, Aetna, Thunder and I've missed a few. They're all inshore ironclads, most of them immune to US fort guns at their normal bombardment range and also immune to piercing US shipboard guns.
As for armour piercing guns, the RN has the 68 lber 95 cwt, a gun that Warrior carried plenty of and other ironclads carried some of, and which was a more effective piercer of armour than the 11" Dahlgren by some margin. Of course, as of the Trent (the most likely time for an intervention) the US is still some weeks from launching the Monitor and so shell guns will more than suffice.

If the intervention is later, there's the Somerset Gun, the 300 pounder, the Palliser shell, the 64 pounder RML and plenty of other guns that were OTL produced and then obsoleted very rapidly.

If you'd like to cite a time you feel the US has an insuperable advantage in ironclads compared to a single British ironclad, I'd be willing to compare Warrior or Prince Consort with your claimed time period - it might be a more rosy picture for the British than you think.

2. As I point out it took the British 22 weeks to move 10,000 men from Britain to Canada in 1862 and most of them traveled through NYC.

This is completely laughable. The British moved men through NYC because (one presumes) it was cheap in 1862, not because it was their only logistical route - the reinforcement echelons in the Trent crisis were as below:

Spoiler

Melbourne


Woolwich – Halifax, Departed Saturday 7th December 1861 (n.b. one week after news arrived in Britain)


E Battery, 4th Heavy Brigade RA (Capt Vasey)

30,000 Rifles for the Canadian militia

2.5 million Minie balls

12 Armstrong guns

1,500 Artillery shells


Cunard Steamer Persia


Departed 14th – 15th December 1861


Didn’t make it to port, but disembarked troops upriver, but had to depart with most of its stores. She carried the 1,100 men, mainly the 1/16th and an artillery battery* (approx 123 men and 6 guns) with a large quantity of ammunition. 5,000 Enfield rifles and ammunition for the militia and 300 tons of stores were also carried. The remainder of the troops and the stores were disembarked at St. Johns.


Cunard Steamer Australasian


Departed 14th – 15th December 1861


She carried 1,100 men, 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade (1,000 men) and an engineer company*. She also carried 6 guns with a large quantity of ammunition, 5,000 Enfield rifles and ammunition for the militia and 300 tons of stores.


Victoria


Attempted the journey down the St. Lawrence but turned back after sustaining damage, carrying the 96th. A 2nd run was attempted on 28th December which arrived at Halifax.


Royal Mail Steam packet Panara


Southampton – Halifax, Departed Thursday 26th December 1861


She carried over 1,000 troops, including 2nd Battalion, Scots Fusilier Guards (800 men), an artillery battery and 18th Coy, RE. She ran aground at Halifax, but was successfully unloaded.


Niagara


(not known)



Adriatic


Southampton – Halifax, Departed Thursday 26th December 1861


1st Bn, Grenadier Guards (820 men)

1st Bn, Military Train (460 men)

40 men of the Commissariat



Himalaya



Carried men of the Sappers, Miners and Engineers and their stores.



Peru


Sailed with munitions for the Pacific Squadron



Cunard steamer Hibernia


Liverpool – Halifax, Departed 28th December 1861?


4th Coy, RE (125 men)

G Battery, 4th Heavy Brigade RA (Capt Hosti, 262 men)

6th Battery, 10th Field Brigade RA (Capt Robinson, 123 men)

1 Coy of the 1/16th (151 men, stranded aboard the Persia)



Cunard Steamer Canada


Liverpool – Halifax, Departed Saturday 28th December 1861


7th Battery, 10th Field Brigade RA (Capt Child, 123 men) – bound for Halifax

8th Battery, 10th Field Brigade RA (Capt Robinson, 123 men) – bound for Newfoundland

5th Coy, RE (104 men) – bound for Bermuda

Staff for the Army

103 tons of stores



Calcutta and Adelaide


Cork – Halifax, Departed ?



Carried H Battery, 4th Heavy Brigade RA and a large quantity of stores and ammunition. (Calcutta appears to have made two runs)



Royal Mail Company steam packet Magdalena


Southampton – Halifax


Carried the 2/16th (1,000 men)



Cleopatra


Liverpool – Queenstown, Departed Sunday 29th December 1861



Carried the 2/17th (1,000 men) and stores.



Cunard steamer Asia


Liverpool – Halifax, Departed Saturday 28th December 1861


HQ Staff:

Colonel Wetherall, Chief of the Staff

Colonel Shadwell (late superintendent of the International Exhibition of 1862), Assistant Quartermaster-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Ross

Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock

Major Pearson

Major Burnby, R.E.

Captain Ellison

Captain Stokes

Deputy Inspector-General Frazer

Staff Assistant-Surgeon Woodfall

Assistant-surgeons Bryson, Robertson, and Gougan

Staff Surgeon-Major Menzies

Deputy-Purveyor Henderson

Mr. Leight, on special service

3rd Battalion, Military Train

5th Battery, 10th Field Brigade RA (Colonel Dunlop, C.B. (The Arty Commander, 123 men)

180 tons of stores



The HQ staff is the only portion of the Army moved on the Maine Grand Truck Railroad, all others were conveyed by sledge and Canadian railways.



It is still unknown which ship the 1/15th steamed on. Possibly the Adriatic.

Total reinforcements moved: 11 inf battalions, 16 artillery batteries, 50,000 rifles for the militia and all staff etc. The alert was 30 November, and by the time the news came of Lincoln backing down in mid-January there were movement orders ready to execute for seven more battalions.

This is well over 10,000 troops moved in 1861 (probably why you say 1862!) and it took about a month and a half.

4. As far as recognition improving the CSA's ability to float loans in Britain and Europe, the international laws on neutrality would have applied even more so to the CSA's ability to use such funds to purchase weapons, equipment and supplies.

The US purchased four hundred thousand Enfield rifles alone in the Civil War, neutrality laws clearly do not prevent national or private purchases of privately held weapons.

. British intervention in mid-1863 after the Trent Incident might(!) have saved the CSA

That's a frankly cartoonish picture of how long the RN took to send ships places. The Atlantic is not a hundred thousand miles wide, and the British North America squadron as of Trent could defeat the entire USN.

s I pointed out, the US was self-sufficient in almost all military materials. British intervention would have spurred greater Federal intervention in the economy and further mobilized industry which had yet to be dedicated to war effort. A 30% increase over production in 1864 and 1865 is a conservative estimate. Imagine US cavalry FULLY armed with Spencer carbines and infantry with Sharps, Jenkins and Springfield breech-loading rifles by mid-1864. Regiments supported by Gatling guns using metallic cartridges. 20" Rodman and XX" Dahlgren cannon firing shot and shell.

This is frankly cartoonish. Your image of the US as not fully committed to military production in 1864 is a fantasy, as the real Union was still purchasing weapons overseas for over half the war and had not managed to satisfactorily arm the entire Army of the Potomac with rifles (muzzle loaders, yet) by the Battle of Gettysburg; the idea of the US being able to fully arm the cavalry with Spencer carbines by mid-1864 is presumably based on the idea that the OTL pace (10,000 ordered December 1861; contract reduced to 7500 in 1862, first deliveries 31 December 1862, contract fulfilled June 1863 and next delivery October 1863) is increased by some startling factor simply through pure American Exceptionalism; the idea of 20" Dahlgren and Rodman guns in use in 1864 is comical at best as a grand total of eight were made OTL and this took an average of a year per gun (Dahlgren 1864-7; Rodman 1864-9, 4 guns each).

The Intervention wouldn't require the US to divert ANY forces from the war with the Confederacy, rather it would strengthen political position of the Lincoln Administration and allow further mobilization of the nation.

This idea frankly relies on the idea that the US (strapped heavily for small arms in early 1862) could simply conjure up further fully armed and trained regiments on a moments' notice.
It also assumes that the idea of fighting Britain was one which would result in a massive rally-to-the-flag effect; rather, OTL there was a run on the banks at the very prospect.

only their gun batteries were too high to effectively engage USN "Passaic" class monitors at point blank range where the XI" Dahlgren with full charge could penetrate a 4" wrought iron plate backed by 24" of oak.

This is frankly disingenuous if not outright false - the 11" Dahlgren when fired with double charge could not penetrate a Warrior like target (inferior to the actual Warrior) and was actually more likely to explode than to penetrate the Warrior. The tests performed by Dahlgren showed that the 11" when loaded with 30 lbs of powder and fired against a 4.5" forged plate backed by 20" of oak produced merely cracking of the plate at a range of 20 yards; the real Warrior used rolled plate and the 11" gun's service charge was 15 lbs, with a 20 lbs battering charge authorized mid-war.
The 15" gun can pierce at close range when using shot, but a single 15" cannonball will not disable Warrior even if it hits.

The Passaic class could fire each gun about once every fifteen minutes owing to the manner of loading (hoisting a 440 lb round up with a hoist with the turret locked fore and aft); at close range the RN can simply board them and at more than a few dozen yards they can fire on the down-roll (thus hitting the lightly armoured deck, or heavily damaging the turret). It's worth noting that the average British heavy broadside piece (68 pounder, 110 pounder) has a reload time of one minute and that Warrior had an 18 gun broadside, so in the time the Passaic class ships can fire two shots the Warrior can fire (18 guns x15 minutes ) 270 shots back.

The US DID NOT need British trade to fight its war.

430,000 Enfield rifles, several hundred tonnes of saltpetre, the only source of iron that could be used to reliably manufacture rifles at Springfield, large numbers of percussion caps. These are not the kind of things which inspire confidence in the autarky of the USA.


If you would like a more detailed examination of any of these points, do let me know. However, at this point I'm unimpressed as you seem to have missed the only operational ironclad in American waters as of the Trent affair and not bothered looking at the logistics or actual situation of the Royal Navy beyond complaining about it.


Here, have some primary source.

Times, 9 Jan 1862:

Preparations for a naval war continue to be made with undiminished energy at Portsmouth. Nearly 4,500 men are at present employed in the dockyard alone, and this number is exclusive of seamen riggers and men from the Steam Reserve. The foregoing number of men at work in the yard comprises 1,279 shipwrights, 879 of whom are of the established class, and the remainder are hired hands; 80 established and 13 hired caulkers, 147 established and 90 hired joiners, 11 wheelwrights, 200 established and 89 hired smiths, 76 established and 60 hired millwrights, 59 coppersmiths, 47 at the wood mills, 90 sawyers, 181 established and 764 hired labourers, about 60 locksmiths, braziers, and painters, and in the steam factory department about 750. All this crowd of men are fully employed, and many of them are working extra hours to complete some of the most pressing portions of the work, as in the mast-making department, which is now working up to 8 p.m., to complete the masts and yards for the Black Prince, Glasgow, and Octavia. The smiths' shop, with its 102 fires, seven furnaces, and seven Nasrnyth's hammers ranging from a 10 cwt. to a 5-ton head - the latter having attached to it an hydraulic crane with a 50-ton lift, - is as busily employed throughout as the other departments in providing for the wants of the ships preparing for the pennant. The ten docks possessed by the yard, are all occupied in one way or another, and in the majority of them swarms of workmen may be seen engaged on every part of the vessels, in carrying out the necessary repairs, &c. In No. 1 is the Coquette, 5, screw, now nearly complete for commission. In No. 2 the remains of the Meteor, iron-cased floating battery, are being broken up as rapidly as possible to render the dock available for the general work of the yard. In Nos. 3 and 4 are the Highflyer, 21, screw, and the Rosamond, 6, paddle; the former unopened, but requiring heavy repairs, and the latter partially repaired and destined for a floating steam factory. From both these vessels the men hitherto employed on them have been withdrawn, and placed upon more pressing work. In No. 3 is the Esk, 21, screw, with stem out, and partially stripped of bow planking, disclosing a very rotten and defective state. Her time for being out of the dockyard hands is given for the 9th of May, but at present she has not quite 50 hands upon her. In No. 6 is one of the harbour steamtugs. In Nos. 7 and 10, the double dock, is the Black Prince, the great trouble of the dockyard officials. Internally she is a vast workshop, in which artisans of every kind are busily at work with but little hope of finishing their labours by the time given for her to be out of hand - the 30th of April next. The teak lining forward and aft of her armour plating is being completed, and the scuppers leading to the "main sewer" are being enlarged and increased in number. Another bridge is also being constructed across the quarter-deck. In addition to the construction of the model for her fish-head, and the general fitting of her main and upper decks, an immense deal remains to be yet done - such as the construction of her hammock-nettings, alterations and additions to her head rails, netting, and fitting of her cabins below. In the Black Prince, as in the Warrior, the crew sleep and mess on the main deck, in lieu of the lower deck as in ordinary frigates, owing to the iron ships below the main deck being divided into compartments. These consist of, in the after part of the ship abaft the armour plating, -1st compartment from stern, store-rooms; 2d compartment, the officers' mess-room and cabins, or ward-room; and the 3d compartment, next to the armour plating, containing the clerks' office in the centre, with a mess-room on each side, one for the midshipmen and the other for the engineer officers. The next compartment, inside the armour plating, contains the magazines, store and light rooms, succeeded by five others within the armour plating, containing respectively the engine-room, chain and shot lockers, shell-rooms and coal-rooms, after boiler space, fore boiler space; and, lastly, the fore hold and fore magazine. Forward of the armour plating is the cable tier, prisons, and provision-rooms, the warrant officers' cabins, the sick bay, and lastly, in the bows, warrant officers' store-rooms. Outside the ship the bilge pieces on the bottom are nearly affixed to the angle irons, and the scraping of the ship's bottom has been begun, to prepare it to receive a coating of the patent composition, prepared by the Admiralty chymist, Mr. Hay, with which also the bottom of the Resistance, at Chatham, is ordered to be coated. One serious defect, of an almost if not quite irremediable character, exists in the construction of iron-cased ships as constructed at present, and is fully exemplified in both the Warrior and Black Prince. This evil is the penetration of water between the teak and armour-plates. This water naturally forces for its exit a passage between the joints of the armour plates, and the opinion at present is that nothing can remedy this under the circumstances of tongued and grooved edged plates hung on a ship's sides by through bolts. Caulking is stated to be useless, and that cannot be wondered at considering the slung weight to be dealt with, and the ship's motion at sea. But the effect of the action of the water in the grooves of the plates and upon the iron bolts can only be expected to be such that in four or five years from the time of commission each ship will require replating. In No. 8 dock, the Glasgow, 51, screw, is being caulked and prepared to receive her copper. Her time for being out of the dockyard hands is the 28th proximo. No. 9 dock has been used of late, for breaking up old ships, but it has been cleared during the past week, and yesterday received the Chanticleer, 17, screw, Commander C. Stirling, and is therefore now added to the list available for general service. In the steam-basin are the Prince Regent, 89, screw, complete in machinery; the Octavia, 50, screw, ordered to be finished by the 1st of March; the gunboats Swinger and Savage received their 100-pounder Armstrongs to-day, and were to be ready for sea this evening; the gunboat Jasper, of 89-horse power, being brought forward as quickly as possible by the shipwright and factory departments; the Hazard, with Capt. Cowper Cole's shield model, and the Wallace, steam tender. Alongside the north wall of the basin is the Dart, 5, three-masted screw schooner, nearly complete in rig stores and armament; and the four gunboats, Earnest, Foam, Cracker, and Pheasant, only requiring each their 40-pounder (they have their carriage and equipment on board) to make them ready to proceed to sea as soon as their crews and powder could be sent on board. In the ship basin the Tribune, 28, screw, has her machinery in order, and is being hurried forward in the other parts of her outfit; the Fancy, gunboat, is completing heavy repairs to her hull; the Sultan is fitting for a receiving ship, and the Juno fitting for a police ship. Her upper deck seams have been payed on opposite sides by the patent waterproof glue and ordinary pitch, to test the merits of the former, of which much is expected. The poop of Her Majesty's ship Victory is also to be caulked with it, as are two ships to be named by the Admiralty, one of which will be despatched on service in a hot climate, and the other in a cold one. The Britannia, naval cadet ship, Capt. R. Harris, is to be taken into this basin on the 14th inst. to complete her outfit for Portland. Alongside the shear jetty of the ship basin the Duncan, 101, screw, is carrying on her outfit, to be completed by the 28th inst., and yesterday shipped her Griffiths propeller; while off in the stream, moored in a line with each other, at about a cable's length apart, lie, ready to proceed to sea at an hour's notice, three of the finest 50-gun screw frigates in the world - the Euryalus, Shannon, and Sutlej. In the building slips there is no great bustle, all the labour of the yard being devoted to bringing forward the craft most urgently wanted. In No. 1 slip the Helicon, paddle-wheel despatch vessel of 835 tons and 200-horse power, has her timbers in position, with the exception of a portion of her stern. In No. 2 the Harlequin, 17, screw, 950 tons, 200-horse power [cancelled in 1864], is in frame and nearly ready for planking. ln the next slip the Dryad, frigate, of 51 guns, 3,027 tons, and 600 horse-power, is complete in her framing, getting her deck beams in position &c. The next slip is empty, but is designed for the Kent, iron-plated frigate [cancelled in 1863]. In the last slip stands the Royal Alfred, laid down for a 91, but now converted to a frigate of 50 guns, and to be cased with 4½-inch plates from the manufactory of Messrs. Brown and Co., the Atlas Steel and Iron Works, Sheffield. One peculiarity in these plated frigates will be that they will have a stem falling inboard from the water line, and carry no projecting figurehead. In addition to the number of men we have quoted as being employed in the yard by the Government, there are also a number of others employed by private contractors in the construction of No. 11 dock (to be capable of receiving ships of the Warrior class) and other works. The only part of the yard, however, which is really inactive in the midst of all this bustle is the coaling jetty erected by a contractor at the south end of the yard. This work projects some 60 feet from the dockyard into the harbour for a length of 600 feet and upwards, and its cost for the jetty alone (saying nothing of the expensive hydraulic machinery, not yet erected) was 15,000l. Its professed purpose was to fulfil the duties of a grand embarkation and disembarkation stage for troops from large transports, and to coal two such ships as the Warrior and the Black Prince at one and the same time. Its fulfilled duties have been that a merchant transport discharging troops on one occasion grounded at low water and proved it to be at present totally unsuited for the purposes for which it was constructed. It may be rendered serviceable, and perhaps for the duties for which it was originally intended, but at the present time it is useless. The work consequent on the outfit of the ships and gunboats at Portsmouth is not confined to the dockyard alone, the Royal Clarence Victualling Yard at Gosport and the ordnance and military store department having also their share of the work to carry out.

The steam transport St. Andrew, Capt. Dutton, now embarking materials of war for America at the Royal Arsenal pier, Woolwich, has shipped 300 tons of heavy Armstrong guns, shot and shell, 900 tons of light stores, consisting of cases of small arms, bales of warm clothing, accoutrements, hospital comforts, and other miscellaneous articles, and 85 tons of powder. Notwithstanding her superior cabin accommodation no positive orders had been received up to last night for the embarcation of any passengers.

The hired steamship Brunette yesterday, moored off Woolwich Arsenal, and will take up the berth of the St. Andrew to ship 500 tons of shot, shell, and other stores for Bermuda.
The steam transport Parthenon yesterday commenced receiving about 500 tons of heavy cargo, - namely, shot and shell, for Jamaica.

By your one-year logic, this should be ten and a half months before the RN is capable of intervening.


ED: alternatively, of course, you're welcome to contest my Trent TL If They Will Not Meet Us On The Open Sea (link in my sig) where I have done my utmost to show the consequences of a Trent war.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

This is completely laughable. The British moved men through NYC because it was cheap in 1862, not because it was their only logistical route

Hmm must have missed this but the article is wrong in stating troops moved through New York City. The un-uniformed staff officers from the Melbourne boarded the Grand Trunk Railway terminus in Portland Maine (well north of New York City) after the Melbourne was delayed and the officers needed to get up to Montreal quick. The remainder moved overland from the Maritimes to Quebec.

Right on the money otherwise Saph.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hmm must have missed this but the article is wrong in stating troops moved through New York City. The un-uniformed staff officers from the Melbourne boarded the Grand Trunk Railway terminus in Portland Maine (well north of New York City) after the Melbourne was delayed and the officers needed to get up to Montreal quick. The remainder moved overland from the Maritimes to Quebec.

Right on the money otherwise Saph.

That was 1861, though, not 1862 - one assumes, at least.
If it really is that troop movement, though, then it's inaccurate in all sorts of ways. I thought it had to be something else.

 

[unprincipled peter]

I can't cite specifics, but I'm guessing that any recognition and subsequent ability to procure loans is beneficial to the CSA. Also hurtful to northern resolve. Also find it hard to believe the world's premiere Navy will just be brushed aside, with no impact of the ability of CSA to import goods. Also have to subtract all the goods the north was importing. OK, maybe some of the goods. even if the goods are sold, the RN has the ability to send a lot of it to the ocean floor. And, if the US turns it's attention to taking Canada, the south will have a field day attacking north. the north can hang on against the south (as in OTL), OR it can attack Canada. hard to believe it can do both. It's possible the north gets more aggressive, looking to defeat the south before any foreign nation can intervene (move aside McClellan). That puts the south on the defensive, which is a definite advantage for the south. Let the north spill their blood, further ruining their resolve.

In a best case scenario (for the north), there's recognition, but no intervention. with intervention, it's quite likely game over for the north. no intervention likely means covert intervention which is going to disrupt the effectiveness of the blockade, which will not be respected by the recognizing nations. the north HAS to back down, or risk full fledged intervention. This means the south has funding and access to foreign supplies. If either side was close to self sufficiency, OTL, it was the south, out of necessity. give them more supplies, and the war very likely turns out different.

 

[Saphroneth]

Also, because it's lying around - the positions of all US ships of anything remotely resembling force, and the RN formations in equivalent positions. Milne is the commander of the North America and West Indies squadron and had been on a war warning posture for about a month as of the climbdown, his subordinate Dunlop had also recieved war warnings and was planning to hit the Gulf Blockading Squadron on reciept of news of war.


(This is from my notes that informed ITWNMUOTOS)




US ships in a moderately fightable condition

Spoiler

Ships of the Line
Vermont: Boston
All others no longer workable vessels

Frigates
Steam
Mississippi: Gulf
Susquehanna: Port Royal squadron
Powhatan: hunting down Confederate commerce raiders?
Wabash: Port Royal
Roanoke: Hampton Roads
Colorado: Gulf
Minnesota: Hampton Roads
Niagara: Gulf
Sail
Brandywine: Hampton Roads, storeship
Congress: Hampton Roads
Constitution: unavailable
Independence: Pacific, recieving ship
John Adams: training ship, theoretically available (Newport RI)
Potomac: Storeship, Mobile Bay (thus captured or burned)
Sabine: Atlantic blockading squadron, somewhere (Port Royal?)
Santee: lost off the Gulf
St Lawrence: Port Royal

Sloops
Steam
Saranac: Pacific
Wyoming: Pacific
Tuscaroa: Southampton (captured)
Dacotah: Not in commission as of PoD (New York)
Seminole: Port Royal
Narragansett: Pacific
Saginaw: Hong Kong (captured)
Pocahontas: Port Royal
Brooklyn: Gulf
Hartford: Not out of Chesapeake
Richmond: repairs, NY Naval Yard
Lancaster: Pacific
Pensacola: sailing south for the Gulf
Kearsarge: about to commission in Maine
Mohican: Port Royal
Iroquois: patrolling the Caribbean
Oneida: commission 28 Feb in NY
Wachusett: commission 3 Mar in Boston
Canadaigua: launch 28 Mar in Boston
Housatonic: commission 29 Aug in Boston
Juniata: launch 20 Mar in Boston
Adirondack:: commission 30 June in NY



Sail
Constellation: Mediterranean
Cyane: Pacific
Dale: Port Royal store/guardship
Decateur: Ordinary, Mare Island
Falmouth: Colon, storeship
Granite: just acquired (where?)
Jamestown: Port Royal
Marion: Gulf
Portsmouth: Gulf
Saratoga: Delaware
St. Louis: Philadelphia Navy Yard
St Mary’s: Pacific
Vincennes: Gulf
Warren: stores ship (Pacific)

Note that the sail ships are nigh useless against a steam frigate or indeed a heavy steam sloop, for a number of reasons. The RN is almost totally steam by this point and the USN is not.




North America and West Indies squadron of the Royal Navy:

Spoiler

And the RN unit positions as of 24 Jan 1862. OTL this was where things were winding down from a possible Trent War, but in an actual Trent War this is a reasonable estimate of when Milne would begin offensive operations against the Hampton Roads blockading squadron and against Fort Monroe.

Ironclads:

Milne had indicated he was going to leave Terror at Bermuda until that harbour was secure.

Line of battle ships. (Each of these is steam powered and very heavily armed, the superior of any US vessel afloat at any point in 1862 except possibly the New Ironsides.)

Nile is back from Rum Key, Hero, Agamemnon and Aboukir have arrived by the 24th.

Donegal historically was sent to Rum Key and then back to Dunlop to relief St George (ordered home). Here she'd either be at Rum Key or returning to Bermuda.

Mail Steamer Cleopatra was at Bermuda 24th Jan 62 and Milne was holding her to send dispatches.

Frigates etc. (Many of these are heavy units in their own right, as powerful as the heaviest US ships and with technical advantages on them.)

Immortalite on the 24th still hadn't returned from the Chesapeake. Milne sent her to Annapolis to embark Lyons (who indicated he'd go to NY and embark on Rinaldo in the meantime). While she was there she'd basically be conducting a covert recce. However she made extremely heavy going and didn't get back to Bermuda until the 30th.

Diadem and Landrail (gunvessel) arrived 1st February from Rum Key with the last of Conquerors crew.

Mersey, Liffey and Melpomene are at Bermuda

Corvettes (lighter ships, the USN doesn't have an equivalent class but they're basically heavy sloops by USN reckoning. Both are steam.)

Orpheus has arrived

Cadmus historically was guarding St Thomas

Sloops etc.

Rinaldo (screw sloop) - historically took Mason and Siddell off. ITTL probably took off Lyons and is at Bermuda

Hydra (Paddle Sloop) - was left at Halifax, and probably would remain there to guard that port

Greyhound historically ran down to Rum Key on the 21st, and would be the vessel carrying the war despatch for Dunlop and the ships at Rum Key.

Spiteful and Bulldog (both paddle sloops) were down at Rum Key, and one of them would likely carry despatches top speed to Dunlop.

Medea (paddle sloop) and Racer (screw sloop) were historically at New York, being used as dispatch ships between Lyons and Milne. In this scenario they would have withdrawn to Bermuda when relations broke down.

Spiteful (paddle sloop) came back from Dunlop with Mersey

Cygnet (screw gunvessel) went down to Rum Key and historically went onto Jamaica - with Milne here.

With Milne at Bermuda available for attack:

Battleships: Nile, Hero, Aboukir, Agamemnon and probably Donegal
Frigates: Mersey, Liffey and Melpomene
Sloops: Rinaldo, Spiteful (paddle), Medea (paddle), Racer (paddle)
Gunvessel: Cygnet


With Dunlop, available for attack

St. George (battleship)
Sans Pareil (battleship)
Ariadne (frigate)
Phaeton (frigate)
Challenger (corvette)
Jason (corvette)
Desperate (sloop)
Barracouta (paddle sloop)
Bulldog (paddle sloop)
Steady (gunvessel)

(all screw except the two paddle sloops)

The following were ordered to Commission on 5-6 Dec (along with others like Orlando that did arrive OTL) and would be coming in during the end of Jan:

Frigates: Shannon, Severn, Euryalus
Corvettes: Barrosa, Rosario
Sloops: Devastation, Peterel
Gunvessel: Vigilant, Lee (Lee ordered later)

Emeralds move was suspended, but she was to bring the gunboats Amelia and Escort over. The gunvessel Lee was ready to go.

The new first class reserve (vessels to be immediately manned and stored in event of war) are now:

Battleships: Duncan, Princess Royal, Meeanee and Defiance (the latter ordered forward)
Frigates: Sutlej, Phoebe, Galatea
Corvettes: Rattlesnake
Sloops: Stomboli (paddle), Styx (paddle)
Gunvessels: Victor, Pandora, Sparrow

The first class of the gunboat reserve (18) and the second class (also 18) were ordered to Commission.

Terror and the 2 gunboats Nettle and Onyx were at Bermuda and were intended to guard it. The old paddle steamer HMS Kite was also there

Note that both Dunlop and Milne have squadrons more powerful than the entire USN, with reinforcements ordered to America also more powerful than the USN.

Maitland also has a strong squadron on the US west coast (far stronger than the Union one) and so the gold convoys are de facto stopped; this is of course a disaster for the Union.

It's possible the north gets more aggressive, looking to defeat the south before any foreign nation can intervene (move aside McClellan).

Frankly I think that's simply not possible at the time. OTL as of Trent 1/3 of the Army of the Potomac was armed with weapons considered inadequate to take into battle, and it's only massive imports over the first half of 1862 which rectify this. If the RN has blockaded the US coast - and, I stress, the RN had a larger navy than the USN simply already in American waters - then those weapons don't make it and in many cases are simply not sent for fear of seizure.
Of course, OTL the bold, daring plan to win the war at a stroke (without running into the Confederate defences before Richmond) was McClellan's Peninsular Campaign; that's completely impossible with any hint of intervention as the Army of the Potomac would end up relying on a sea supply line, and if the RN or the MN shows up in the Chesapeake the entire Army of the Potomac loses their supply line and can be compelled to surrender. This would be an utter disaster.

I find myself unable to come up with a way that a Trent-war Union can maintain their relative strength, let alone win. The balance of land force is essentially inverted in pure ratio terms (and the British regulars are substantially better man-for-man) and the US is essentially bereft of a navy and heavily vulnerable to shore raids or outright bombardment. The RN probably wouldn't demand the surrender of New York, but they have the capability to land 20,000 infantry pretty much anywhere along the coast and the US is going to have to strongly garrison the coast to prevent this - say - destroying Springfield.




As for the Great Lakes, of course, some RN all-up warships can make it up the Welland Canal and thus control of the Lakes passes to them. (A half-dozen RN gunboats with 68 pounders can beat most any hastily armoured and armed Lake steamer.)


ED: as an example of a gunboat of the type I mean, consider the Albacore class.

In 1839 the government of Upper Canada approved the purchase of shares in the private canal company in response to the company's continuing financial problems in the face of the continental financial panic of 1837. The public buyout was completed in 1841, and work began to deepen the canal and to reduce the number of locks to 27, each 45.7 by 8.1 m (150 by 27 ft). By 1848, a 2.7 m (8.9 ft) deep path was completed, not only through the Welland Canal but also the rest of the way to the Atlantic Ocean via the St. Lawrence Seaway.

150 feet by 27 feet by 8.9 feet max dimensions.


HMS Albacore (name ship of a 98-gunboat class) was 106 feet by 22 feet by 6.75 feet and carried a 68 pounder SBML gun able to punch through any armour in theatre.

 

[ben0628]

Where is TF Smith when you need him. He could have put this debate to rest easily.

 

[The Gunslinger]

Where is TF Smith when you need him. He could have put this debate to rest easily.

We currently have two timeliness thoroughly researched that are in direct opposition to his so I'd say his bias in the debate is pretty obvious... and coincidentally his adherence to it is what played a huge role in his absence.

 

[longsword14]

We currently have two timeliness thoroughly researched that are in direct opposition to his so I'd say his bias in the debate is pretty obvious... and coincidentally his adherence to it is what played a huge role in his absence.

So some say.Your argument can be flipped around too, the two well researched timelines show bias and are superficial etc.
This cycle never ends.

 

[Captain Jack]

So some say.Your argument can be flipped around too, the two well researched timelines show bias and are superficial etc.
This cycle never ends.

Indeed. And, as with so many things, the answer is almost certainly somewhere in the middle. Moreover, all of these arguments over whose interpretation is right are futile because we're never actually going to get a correct answer. Historical analysis, no matter how well done, can't answer a what-if question, which is why history as a discipline doesn't do what-ifs. All it can do is give us the parameters of plausibly whitin which any answer could be correct. I think everyone would have a much better and more productive time if we stopped worrying quite so much over who has the right interpretation or whose timeline is exactly how an alternate scenario would have gone, and focused more on understanding the forces that will shape and construct our alternate scenarios.

 

[Saphroneth]

Where is TF Smith when you need him. He could have put this debate to rest easily.

He was banned from the site for accusing people of pro-slavery attitudes as a result of almost completely unrelated short stories.

So some say.Your argument can be flipped around too, the two well researched timelines show bias and are superficial etc.

If you believe that my TL (which is one of them) shows bias and is superficial, then I'd be interested to hear why.

If I wanted to highlight an example of bias in Burnished Rows of Steel, then I could find several easy examples - just one of them being that at least one loyalist Canadian militia officer is listed specifically as a pro-Union renegade:

Smith:

Garrard’s troopers, the 5th Ohio Cavalry, Col. W.H. Taylor; the 11th Illinois Cavalry, Col. Robert G. Ingersoll; and the 1st Canadian Volunteer Cavalry Battalion, Col. Arthur Rankin, the first mounted unit raised by the Provisional Government, and led by a renegade Canadian militia officer.

Reality:

‘Col. ARTHUR RANKIN, of Canada, who lately attempted to raise a regiment of Lancers in the United States service, but resigned when it became probable that we were to be involved in a war with England, has written a letter to the Deputy Adjutant at Quebec, offering his services to fight for England. The Colonel is enthusiastically loyal and congratulates himself upon being again "under the shelter of that glorious flag which no subject of Her Majesty venerates more earnestly than he does."’

(New York Times, 9 January 1862; here, or here if you’ve used your allowance of free articles)

 

[RodentRevolution]

At http://warsimsandhistoryplusscifi.com/ you can find a pair of studies on foreign military intervention on the side of the CSA in 1862 or 1864. In both cases, the act of recognition was useless without military intervention. And intervention by the British Empire, which would have to lead such an intervention, would have been very difficult if not impossible. The Southern dependence on foreign intervention was an exercise in denial that impacted their ability to gain independence.

You know it might help if you actually studied even just available American sources before making such claims...

In regards to 1862....this is what the New York Times came up with when they studied the available British land forces, it rather contrasts with your assessment. Not only that but the idea the Guards were sent in lieu of a strategic reserve shows a thorough lack of understanding of the British concept of operations, the entire British regular force in the home area minus their depot companies was the strategic reserve.

"First, the total ground forces that were available to the British Empire in 1860 were 150,000 regulars and 75,000 Volunteers and Yeomanry." Claim you

Men. Horses. Guns.


Regular troops, of all arms...218,971 30,073 366

British local & colonial troops. 18,249 -- 248

Foreign and colored troops,

chiefly in India..............218,043 -- 58

Military Police in India....... 79,264 -- --

Total......................534,527 30,073 672



Reserves available for the defense of the Kingdom, in case of war:


Pensioners..................... 14,768 -- --


Militia........................ 45,000 -- --


Yeomanry Cavalry............ 16,080 16,080 --


Irish Constabulary............. 12,392 -- --


Volunteers.....................140,000 -- --

Claim the New York Times basing their figures on the lecture given by Captain Petrie to the United Services Institute.

"When they reinforced their Canadian garrison in early 1862 with 6,000 troops, they had to pull two battalions of the Guards, due to the lack of any form of strategic reserve."

"It is doubtful whether the British Empire could have collected a force greater than 50,000 strong for a campaign in North America." your claim.

However the NYT with exacting break down lists 67,000 regulars in the Home Area (that strategic reserve you reckon does not exist) in addition to 28,000 troop in depot units whose purpose was to train the follow on drafts of recruits or even in extremis the men required for an expanded Army. Further but the British could, would and did also use forces raised and stationed in India elsewhere when the need arose. But don't take my word for it, let us look at an American source on the matter...

On page 57 of the elegantly titled Notes and Statistics of Organization, Armament and Military Progress in American and European Armies in a section subtitled Employment of the Indian Army outside of India it notes deployments in 1801 and 1810, 1842 and 1856-57 and after the Mutiny another deployment of troops to China in 1860...it then goes on to list a number of post-Trent deployments which of course contemporary Americans would not be aware....but you have no such excuse.

The problem with your analysis exists at several points but on the area I am addressing (and others have addressed other areas above) we see your claim of only 150,000 regulars holds so long as you ignore regulars stationed in India, some but not all of which would be available for operations elsewhere, your claim that there are only 75,000 Volunteer Force and Yeomanry does not make sense, the regular reserves (noted as pensioners in reference to their receiving a stipend in the NYT article), Militia and Yeomanry themselves added up to 75,000 and then there is the 140,000 strong Volunteer force....going by what at least some Americans of the time actually knew.

As to the absence of a strategic reserve claim, that shows a lack of understanding of the British concept of operations. All the regular troops sans their depot units were the strategic reserve as no one was getting past the Royal Navy in the period and if they did they would have found literally hundreds of thousands of Militia and Volunteers waiting for them.

Now we all make factual errors...it is why we present papers for peer review and cite sources even on the internet so checks can be made for this but your analysis would be a lot stronger if you used some of the many good and systematic investigations into the British military of the period. Now politically any British intervention would only be the result of dramatic US blunders in diplomacy but one of the reasons the US at the time avoided those blunders was they were at least somewhat aware of the huge disparity of force between them and the British.

 

[Saphroneth]

"First, the total ground forces that were available to the British Empire in 1860 were 150,000 regulars and 75,000 Volunteers and Yeomanry." Claim you

He does what!?

225,000 total troops to access in the British Empire? There were 220,000 British regulars (150,000 home and colonial establishment 70,000 Indian establishment of British-sourced troops) along with another 240,000 troops sourced from the colonies and India, and about another 114,000 militia all ranks present at inspection in 1861 and 163,000 enrolled volunteers in 1863.

This comes to well over half a million, more than double the number given; obviously not all of these can be sent over, but in time of war about 100,000 could be in extremis:

Most of the home battalions, with militia replacing them for home defence

Some of the battalions garrisoning the colonies like Malta, with militia who volunteer for overseas service replacing them as needed.

And then the depot battalions absorb volunteers to send as reinforcements once trained up.


Add this to about 100,000 militia in Canada and one sees that the problem of the British Imperial armies in Canada is very substantial.



ED: of course, it's also worth noting that the British did send reinforcements and movement orders OTL for the Trent affair - the general estimate was that by the time of the spring thaw they could have at least a corps of troops in Canada to supplement the militia and that 50,000 was not impossible by any means. Given that these are all long-service regulars who are trained to use their rifle to the limits of their abilities (as in, as well as the US Sharpshooters) and that they have quite possibly the finest artillery in the world at the time... then this is the kind of thing the Army of the Potomac could not stop alone if the British regulars were all deployed in one place.

 

[RodentRevolution]

He does what!?

225,000 total troops to access in the British Empire? There were 220,000 British regulars (150,000 home and colonial establishment 70,000 Indian establishment of British-sourced troops) along with another 240,000 troops sourced from the colonies and India, and about another 114,000 militia all ranks present at inspection in 1861 and 163,000 enrolled volunteers in 1863.

This comes to well over half a million, more than double the number given; obviously not all of these can be sent over, but in time of war about 100,000 could be in extremis:

Well yes, my point is more that American sources and more importantly American contemporary sources reveal a sharp divergence with the claimed numbers... if you go to articles and click on Intervention 1862 at the right hand side you can view the word document in which the statements quoted were made.

Now from where I stand claiming the US might still win, for a given value of winning, in the event of Trent intervention is fine so long as you take a realistic look of the capabilities of the potential adversaries at the time. However I am sure Colonel Synder will want to update his analysis in light of the new information. There are in fact reasons why the British would have thought they had a damned good chance if push came to shove.