If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)

[Major Major]

TFSmith is banned for some reason.

The proximate cause of his banning was accusing me of subscribing to the Black Confederate Soldiers myth. The main cause was that he'd got something like ten kicks or warnings in public and several more in private; he finally ran out of second chances.
I can't say I'm upset, though I'm not especially happy either. Maybe the right word is relief.

He's gone over to the NavWeapons board:
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/

Specifically, he's reposting "Burnished Rows of Steel"
http://warships1discussionboards.yu...STEEL-A-History-of-the-Great-War#.V1b66L70Mbw

 

[Saphroneth]

Since it'll be important for the summer campaign, here's how I plan to show McClellan.

1) He is very much a man who does not want to get too many Americans killed.
2) His style of battle is focused more on "do not be in a position you can lose" than "be in a position you can win". This makes him disinclined to gamble.
3) He has the bad luck of being in charge during the time the Rebels have basically got an advantage. Their deployable manpower at this point is almost as large as the US (they have broadly as many small arms), and their front line strength is actually a bit higher (since the mass use of slaves in the CS supply train means that 40,000 white soldiers means 38,000 bayonets on the front line rather than ~30,000 or so).

The combination of these three mean he is likely to manoeuvre heavily rather than fighting heavily.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

And here we are! It's a good source on the opening and closing of navigation on the major waterways in the era!

 

[benjamin]

Saphroneth, great timeline. I'd really like to believe the Union could defeat both the CSA and the UK but while that's a possibility it's far more likely to go the way you have stated. Of course if Lincoln and company are willing to fight a long war Britain will begin to run into trouble. That's not likely though. A final thought is that no matter how the Brits want to pretend otherwise, intervention means aiding the slave holding South. I could easily see that becoming a major political issue in the House of Commons; what we're likely to see in the peace treaty is a very concillatory UK that seeks to keep a strong Union that has the potential to become a major trade partner once again (case in point were the differing views held by the UK, America's enemy, and Spain + France, her supposed allies during negotiations in Paris circa 1780-1783). The CSA and the UK will very quickly grow apart.

Regarding McClellan, he was a good organizer but as you said, overly cautious. Being low on arms and powder would make this a good thing at the strategic level. Tactically it leaves the army very vulnerable to any bold movement by the Confederates. You say he is likely to maneuver heavily, but I'm doubtful that will be done in a timely manner. He tended to over analysis and hesitate where quick action was needed.

Benjamin

 

[Saphroneth]

Frankly it's a question of if the Union's able to fight a long war. At this point their total small arms production (domestic) is about 12,000 rifles a month, and while that will rise as time goes on it's nowhere near enough to fight a war, not when your opponent can access the resources of Europe.
That's just one of the problems the blockade brings on, there's others. Actually I've deliberately had the British hold back because they've not:

1) Bombarded Washington.
2) Coordinated with the CSA in any meaningful way.
3) Invaded the US (apart from taking a few miles south of the St Lawrence and the rail junctions in Maine). The Canadian militia and fifty thousand British Regulars at least are in Canada by mid-June (44 battalions of infantry alone) and frankly they could just roll south and there's not a lot in their way.

As such, the only way the US can fight a long war in any way more effective than "France in 1871" is if it's not actually at war with Britain any more.

As far as the British are concerned, this more or less serves the Union right (since the British view is that the Union was deliberately picking a fight, indeed Seward said that would be his foreign policy). It's regrettable it aids the CSA, but independence for the CSA is seen as "going to happen anyway" and having it sooner avoids bloodshed.

The peace treaty is going to be a bugger, though, since the single border state the CSA has the strongest claim on is Maryland and that would make Washington DC completely impossible to hold as capital.
I'm kind of leaning towards the Union and Confederacy having incompatible aims for the peace conference, until Britain (which already got what it really wanted by this stage - Right of Search, for which Palmerston has plans) steps in and suggests a Solomonic solution of splitting the border states into pro-CS and pro-US areas. This would sadly still mean bad things for DC - even if the CS gets none of Maryland it's going to be in a worse position than Korean Seoul, so the Union might have to pick a new capital if East (pro-CS) Maryland gets transferred to the CSA.


As to what happens then... well, I'm a believer in the idea that "borders create nationalities". A unification war a decade hence seems unlikely since by then the two Americas will be... well, sort of divergent in multiple ways.

I don't think either America will have a trouble-free ride for the rest of the 19th century.

 

[benjamin]

Frankly it's a question of if the Union's able to fight a long war. At this point their total small arms production (domestic) is about 12,000 rifles a month, and while that will rise as time goes on it's nowhere near enough to fight a war, not when your opponent can access the resources of Europe.
That's just one of the problems the blockade brings on, there's others. Actually I've deliberately had the British hold back because they've not:

1) Bombarded Washington.
2) Coordinated with the CSA in any meaningful way.
3) Invaded the US (apart from taking a few miles south of the St Lawrence and the rail junctions in Maine). The Canadian militia and fifty thousand British Regulars at least are in Canada by mid-June (44 battalions of infantry alone) and frankly they could just roll south and there's not a lot in their way.

As such, the only way the US can fight a long war in any way more effective than "France in 1871" is if it's not actually at war with Britain any more.

As far as the British are concerned, this more or less serves the Union right (since the British view is that the Union was deliberately picking a fight, indeed Seward said that would be his foreign policy). It's regrettable it aids the CSA, but independence for the CSA is seen as "going to happen anyway" and having it sooner avoids bloodshed.

The peace treaty is going to be a bugger, though, since the single border state the CSA has the strongest claim on is Maryland and that would make Washington DC completely impossible to hold as capital.
I'm kind of leaning towards the Union and Confederacy having incompatible aims for the peace conference, until Britain (which already got what it really wanted by this stage - Right of Search, for which Palmerston has plans) steps in and suggests a Solomonic solution of splitting the border states into pro-CS and pro-US areas. This would sadly still mean bad things for DC - even if the CS gets none of Maryland it's going to be in a worse position than Korean Seoul, so the Union might have to pick a new capital if East (pro-CS) Maryland gets transferred to the CSA.


As to what happens then... well, I'm a believer in the idea that "borders create nationalities". A unification war a decade hence seems unlikely since by then the two Americas will be... well, sort of divergent in multiple ways.

I don't think either America will have a trouble-free ride for the rest of the 19th century.

The Union is in a much better position to fight a long war in 1861 than America was in 1775 and yet the outcome is now well known. It would be difficult but the situation is in very little way comparable to France in 1871. Besides Britain has her own number of issues to consider both domestically and foreign affairs wise when contemplating a long war in North America.

As for Britain "holding back" I'd say you have her acting as policy would have dictated.
1.) Bombarding Washington is risky and not much of a military target.
2.) A non-starter, coordinating with the slave South is political suicide opens the way for a change in government.
3.) Invading the North opens a lot of problems and while possible if the war continues, in reality the British greatly feared the loss of Canada should war come against America. The memory of Saratoga lingered for a very long time.

Seward's bellicose attitude has become an over used misrepresentation on these forums. Seward was a realist and a long term politician. His statements were aimed at the American public not as a statement of intended actions. IOTL he spoke out of turn as he believed Lincoln to be an uneducated country bumpkin, and his hope was that the historical American fear of Britain would unite the public. He did not actually intend to start a foreign war and once he took the measure of Lincoln fell very much in line with the "one war at a time" sentiment. His primary mistake, one shared with nearly every other Northern politician, was his inability to believe that the Southern slaveocrats were willing to commit national suicide to protect their vile institution. Once at work as Secretary of State he got on rather well with Lyons from what I've read.

Of course the CSA and US will have incompatible terms at the treaty negotiations. As for borders create nationalities...well, you could get Switzerland or Bosnia. Either way I still have trouble seeing the UK remaining a CSA ally for long. Of course you could have the UK move in a conservative nasty direction, but I don't think you'll being doing that.

Benjamin

 

[galveston bay]

The Union is in a much better position to fight a long war in 1861 than America was in 1775 and yet the outcome is now well known. It would be difficult but the situation is in very little way comparable to France in 1871. Besides Britain has her own number of issues to consider both domestically and foreign affairs wise when contemplating a long war in North America.

As for Britain "holding back" I'd say you have her acting as policy would have dictated.
1.) Bombarding Washington is risky and not much of a military target.
2.) A non-starter, coordinating with the slave South is political suicide opens the way for a change in government.
3.) Invading the North opens a lot of problems and while possible if the war continues, in reality the British greatly feared the loss of Canada should war come against America. The memory of Saratoga lingered for a very long time.

Seward's bellicose attitude has become an over used misrepresentation on these forums. Seward was a realist and a long term politician. His statements were aimed at the American public not as a statement of intended actions. IOTL he spoke out of turn as he believed Lincoln to be an uneducated country bumpkin, and his hope was that the historical American fear of Britain would unite the public. He did not actually intend to start a foreign war and once he took the measure of Lincoln fell very much in line with the "one war at a time" sentiment. His primary mistake, one shared with nearly every other Northern politician, was his inability to believe that the Southern slaveocrats were willing to commit national suicide to protect their vile institution. Once at work as Secretary of State he got on rather well with Lyons from what I've read.

Of course the CSA and US will have incompatible terms at the treaty negotiations. As for borders create nationalities...well, you could get Switzerland or Bosnia. Either way I still have trouble seeing the UK remaining a CSA ally for long. Of course you could have the UK move in a conservative nasty direction, but I don't think you'll being doing that.

Benjamin

agreement from me... indeed I cannot think of a bombardment of an urban center bringing about capitulation in the 19th or 20th Century. Even at Alexandria the bombardment silenced the forts so that a landing force could be put ashore. The Germans bombarded Paris for weeks during the siege in 1870 and that is not why it surrendered. Cities were bombed for years during both world wars. Urban populations were shelled and for that matter starved for lengthy periods throughout the 15th - 19th Centuries. I really do not see what shelling an American city would do other than pissing off the Americans further.

As to the border adjustments.... we are well past the age of Kings where provinces could be traded at will. The 19th Century is marked by its intense nationalism. As the Dutch could tell you when the Belgians revolted, the Austrians could attest about the Italians, and for that matter Alsace Lorraine poisoned German / France relations for two more wars. A British imposition of a border is not going to be anything but a prescription for further conflict.

Saph claims that a Trent War is about injured British honor. We can argue for years about whether conflict is in the British interest but assuming what Saph states is true, than once the British get their apology and financial settlement, why would they continue any alliance with the South?

Assuming of course that the United States accepts defeat (it didn't twice before) and doesn't choose to make take measures to punish the British right back. Victory and defeat are after all a matter of perception in most wars. Rarely do you see armies marching through capitals imposing a surrender.

 

[Lost Freeway]

He's gone over to the NavWeapons board:
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/

I do wonder how he'll get along with HMS Pinafore.

 

[Saphroneth]

The Union is in a much better position to fight a long war in 1861 than America was in 1775 and yet the outcome is now well known. It would be difficult but the situation is in very little way comparable to France in 1871. Besides Britain has her own number of issues to consider both domestically and foreign affairs wise when contemplating a long war in North America.

But the Union isn't in a better position to fight the kind of war it fought in 1775. The war of 1775 was a guerilla war fought by a nation without a solid capital or anywhere it really had to defend - it was a "civilized enemy" in an "uncivilized country".
In the intervening eighty-five years the Union has built cities and tamed the countryside, has in short become a "proper" nation. As such it has become somewhere the army cannot simply justify abandoning half the country to retreat into the interior and avoid destruction any more than the Confederacy could do the same (since the CSA set itself up as a proper nation from the get-go).

1.) Bombarding Washington is risky and not much of a military target.
2.) A non-starter, coordinating with the slave South is political suicide opens the way for a change in government.
3.) Invading the North opens a lot of problems and while possible if the war continues, in reality the British greatly feared the loss of Canada should war come against America. The memory of Saratoga lingered for a very long time.

1) Generally bombarding the capital is not a good thing for the national will to fight.
2) Perhaps so, but it would make things far worse for the Union. Even an informal understanding to all attack on the same date would do it.
3) As I understand it the plan was to invade the Union for forward defence. And since the British aim is to fight a relatively short war, a "short sharp shock" seems the best way of getting that.
For example, there's not much the US could do to prevent the British reaching New York, Springfield, West Point or Chicago.

Understand that what I mean is that it's possible to do a lot more damage to the Union's ability to fight than I'm doing.

Seward's bellicose attitude has become an over used misrepresentation on these forums. Seward was a realist and a long term politician. His statements were aimed at the American public not as a statement of intended actions. IOTL he spoke out of turn as he believed Lincoln to be an uneducated country bumpkin, and his hope was that the historical American fear of Britain would unite the public. He did not actually intend to start a foreign war and once he took the measure of Lincoln fell very much in line with the "one war at a time" sentiment. His primary mistake, one shared with nearly every other Northern politician, was his inability to believe that the Southern slaveocrats were willing to commit national suicide to protect their vile institution. Once at work as Secretary of State he got on rather well with Lyons from what I've read.

It's true, he wasn't quite as bellicose as it's sometimes stated - but he certainly came across as bellicose to the British. Their perception in late 1861 is that the Union are working up to attempt an invasion of Canada with the entire Union army! (This is a reason they feared for Canada - they thought they were about to face 200,000 reasonably good infantry.) His statements inform their view of him.

In 1860 Seward had informed the Duke of Newcastle at a public function that as soon as he got into office he would insult England. In April 1861, he issued a memorandum urging Lincoln to foment a foreign war as a means of reuniting North and South against a common enemy- a suggestion that was rapidly picked up by the New York Herald, at the time the most widely circulated paper in the world.
"We must CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION... FOR FOREIGN NATIONS, I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, Would convene Congress and declare war against them."

"Now that the confederacy is about to be shorn of more than half its strength in territory, and more than a third of its population, it is necessary to repair the loss, else we would sink to a third or forth-rate power. By peaceable means or force, therefore, Canada must be annexed... such is the decree of manifest destiny, and such the programme of William H Seward premier of the President Elect"- New York Herald, February 1861

"What, then, is the American Government to do with the immense fighting mass which will be left on its hands when the Southern war is over?... Cuba and Canada must be annexed at one blow to the United States." New York Herald, January 1862

 

[Saphroneth]

8 April
James B. Eads is contracted to build some small ironclads upriver of Baltimore, with the intent being to open the Chesapeake and ideally to sail up the Potomac and sink the Virginia. Eads has a number of ideas, though is dismayed when he starts calculating the required protection - the failure of the Monitor to successfully resist British shot means that either extremely thick layering or a single plate beyond the current capacity of the Union will likely be required. (There is a rolling mill in America which can produce 2" rolled plate, but it is in Richmond.) The alternative is to create hammered plates exceeding five inches, and this is likely to take many months.
He is promised either 15" Rodman guns or 8" (or even 10" once designed) Parrott guns, though he also has an idea about sleeving an 11" Dahlgren down to around nine inches and rifling it and will raise this with Dahlgren as soon as possible.
After much though, Eads decides to compromise with hammered 3" plates and layer them.


11 April
Breakup at the St Lawrence occurs at Quebec. The news is communicated to Cape Breton, and the Aetna makes for the river mouth.
At about this time the Leo, Sagittarius and Capricorn - all under tow - are passing the longitude of Greenland.


12 April
The railroad north from DC is cut. The supplies and munitions in the city are effectively all it has.
For this reason, McClellan determines to cut away from his supply lines in order to get out of the encirclement. This increases the supplies available in the city, and will also let his men move faster and across country (relatively speaking).
Arguments take place over how many troops he should take, and in the end all the soldiers who had been running his supply chain are left in the city. He will recruit more from Pennsylvania and NY, though this will mean contemplating the considerable risk of unarmed supply chain soldiers.

15 April
Aetna passes Quebec. Also on this date, the Welland canal opens for the year.

16 April
The hastily armed screw steamer the Buffalo (formerly the Bay State) attacks Fort Henry, attempting to make her way into Kingston. The old fort is quite decrepit, but serves as a workable base for the entire armament of the HMS St Lawrence (of the War of 1812, now a pier). Around sixty 32-lber guns defend Kingston, as well as smaller weapons, and the Buffalo finds the attack hard going as her own guns are not heavy or numerous enough to do the same thing to the fort which British rifled breechloaders did to US forts.
The battle lasts around half an hour, after which the Buffalo withdraws.

 

[edgeworthy]

I do wonder how he'll get along with HMS Pinafore.

I would Imagine badly!

And probably not well with HMS Troutbridge or Mudfladdy either.
(Or me although I have long since refused to engage directly with him)
And 67th Tigers is still active over there.

 

[Saphroneth]

18 April
Richard Gatling begins work on a modified form of his Gatling Gun. Based on the observation that the large number of smaller British 32-lber shells was as destructive to the American wooden ships struck as the smaller number of large shells, he determines to use shells of around two pounds in great quantity and thus permit a small ship to effectively threaten a very large one.
It is his hope this will allow for small ships to do the work of large ones, thus removing the prospect of large casualties in naval battles.
(There is a flaw in his logic here.)


19 April
Aetna makes Kingston, stopping there for refuelling - she has been steaming hard and needs to coal up. This process will take a few days to complete.
Meanwhile, the first three Zodiac class ironclads reach Quebec. They will be towed upriver as far as possible and then make their own way further up, with the interim plan being to place two on Lake Erie and two on Lake Ontario. Diverting one to Lake Champlain has been considered but rejected for now - defence is still the priority.

22 April
Buffalo returns to Kingston, accompanied by two more armed vessels - both paddle steamers, one of them armoured with boilerplate to keep out shells, and equipped with some 8" guns the local commander has managed to scare up. The news of Aetna's arrival had not made it to Rochester by the time the Union ships sailed, or else the attack would not have taken place at all - in the event, the Union flotilla retreats quickly once 110-lber and 68-lber fire begins to arrive from Aetna as she sallies.
This event is widely reported in the newspapers.

24 April
The news of Aetna's arrival (and which has been correlated with the other three ironclads that have now joined her at Kingston) raises alarm in the Union troops holding the northern frontier. The risk of British ironclads surmounting Niagara falls at the Welland canal is thought to be considerable, and as such it is decided to make an attack to reach the Welland canal.
Available for the attack are about three divisions of Union infantry (16,000 men) and a small quantity of artillery (~30 guns) - this area, like other contact points with Canada, has been stripped of troops as far as possible to help handle other requirements, and the remaining 5,000 men who will be left on the defensive is considered to be quite risky. (There are also 20,000 troops at Detroit, 15,000 spread over the rest of Michigan, 10,000 as strategic reserve in New Hampshire, and 20,000 each along the St Lawrence Frontier and at Lake Champlain - this total of 100,000 would be very useful further south, but since there are 160,000 British + Canadian troops in Canada by this point it is also dangerously small. Effectively every Union force is faced by a greater Canadian/British one.)
The choice of where to attack is a difficult one. Niagara Falls cuts a deep gorge rendering almost 1/3 of the river impractical to attack over, while further south the crossing is easier but the distance to the Welland is further.
After consulting plans, the local general determines to make the crossing a little south of Youngstown.

 

[Saphroneth]

So, I'm plotting out the Battle of the Welland Canal, and I've got a few basic assumptions going into it.

1) This area has about 30,000 British + Canadian troops.
2) This consists of five regular infantry battalions (i.e. about 5,500 men) plus one regular cavalry battalion (18th Hussars) plus two Canadian militia cavalry regiments, plus two field batteries (12 Armstrong 12 lber) and two batteries Canadian artillery (12 12-lber smoothbore). The rest of the troops are Canadian militia.
3) This means:
5,500 British regulars
1,000 British regular cavalry
12 Armstrong 12lber
12 12-lber smoothbore
2,000 Canadian militia cavalry
18,000 Canadian militia infantry

All infantry are armed with the Enfield, and even the militia have had about two months drill on average. The Canadian militia cavalry have short Enfields, the Hussars have the Terry carbine.
4) The British plus Canadian troops are mostly spread out along the Welland canal with small units further forward.
5) The Union attack has strategic surprise and as such the British have not reacted beforehand.
Thus:
6) For the battle itself, there are 16,000 Union infantry (armed largely with muskets) and 30 12-lber guns facing about 30% of the British force listed above - two Infantry regular units, one Cavalry militia unit (with the 18th Hussars joining in later), one battery militia artillery and one battery Regular artillery, and about 5,000 Canadian militia.
7) More troops will march north as the news spreads.

Also
8) The battlefield is essentially flat, no major terrain features except small towns, and is far enough from the water that fire support cannot be done.

 

[Saphroneth]

Incidentally, when I started doing force allocation from the POV of an American commander it really shocked me how sparse everything is forced to be. The British army has a much higher average quality (it's 1/3 British Prewar Regular and has rifled breechloading artillery, while most of the US force is armed with smoothbore muskets, and the British siege train is 40-lber Armstrongs that can chew through several feet of masonry), so simply to defend everywhere they need to deploy numbers about matching the British plus Canadian forces in Canada... which pretty much amounts to 110,000 Union infantry as the absolute minimum (the British have 150,000 counting militia and could go higher - 80,000 from two militia callouts, 20,000 from the Maritimes, and 50-60,000 reinforcements from Britain and the colonies).
The coasts need something like 70,000 troops to man the forts and provide land defences (this is to prevent the British landing 10,000 troops and simply marching inland somewhere important - like, say, Springfield - and due to the coastal states screaming for troops. Even if you just flat out abandon Maine it's not much better.)

So, very roughly 180,000 troops taken from an army which has less weapons deployed than OTL summer 1862 and has no reserve. This is the "hold what you've got" defensive mode, it's not enough for an offensive.

Now imagine how the CSA could do in 1862, with tens of thousands of extra troops freed up from coastal garrison and the Union having to reduce their front line forces by over a hundred thousand troops. As far as I can tell what it results in is that the Union can still man armies at all the contact points - but that it doesn't have any significant reserves anywhere, so if a major defeat happens there's nothing to plug the gap without robbing Peter to pay Paul.

 

[Captain Jack]

24 April
The news of Aetna's arrival (and which has been correlated with the other three ironclads that have now joined her at Kingston) raises alarm in the Union troops holding the northern frontier. The risk of British ironclads surmounting Niagara falls at the Welland canal is thought to be considerable, and as such it is decided to make an attack to reach the Welland canal.
Available for the attack are about three divisions of Union infantry (16,000 men) and a small quantity of artillery (~30 guns) - this area, like other contact points with Canada, has been stripped of troops as far as possible to help handle other requirements, and the remaining 5,000 men who will be left on the defensive is considered to be quite risky. (There are also 20,000 troops at Detroit, 15,000 spread over the rest of Michigan, 10,000 as strategic reserve in New Hampshire, and 20,000 each along the St Lawrence Frontier and at Lake Champlain - this total of 100,000 would be very useful further south, but since there are 160,000 British + Canadian troops in Canada by this point it is also dangerously small. Effectively every Union force is faced by a greater Canadian/British one.)
The choice of where to attack is a difficult one. Niagara Falls cuts a deep gorge rendering almost 1/3 of the river impractical to attack over, while further south the crossing is easier but the distance to the Welland is further.
After consulting plans, the local general determines to make the crossing a little south of Youngstown.

If the Union position in the North is so poor and insufficient for an offensive, why are they risking an attack toward the Welland Canal? Is there really that much danger in letting Aetna get through onto Lake Erie? Similarly, where are the Union pulling the troops for the offensive from, if they're that thinly stretched? It seems unlikely that they would be willing to risk other areas of the border by concentrating enough troops for an attack in Niagra.

Relatedly, are there any British plans to take advantage of the US' weakness and attack anywhere else on the US-Canada border? Based on what you've outlined so far in terms of the British war aims, it seems unlikely, but the Union attack in the workings strikes me as having the potential to ratchet up the conflict in the region. i.e, the Union attacks the Welland canal, so British forces attack somewhere else on the border to draw troops away. If the war on the Canadian border does intensify, that strikes me as the best British strategy. Launch a number of attacks in different areas to make use of local and generally higher troop quality and pull the US forces in as many different directions as possible. the logic being that if they get pulled in ten different directions at once they have to give somewhere, probably multiple somewheres of they try to split their resources too much. Combine that with naval attacks and raids along the Great Lakes coast and I see the Union as having a serious problem there. Although, as I said above it seems like Britain would be disninclined to pursue the war in that manner as it doesn't rrally fit their war aims.

So, I'm plotting out the Battle of the Welland Canal, and I've got a few basic assumptions going into it.
snip

What's the corresponding US order of battle? It sounds like the attacking forces don't have any cavalry available, in which place the openness of the battlefield will favor the British-Canadian cavalry. However, the crossing itself seems like a potentially dicey prosepct in itself. It depends on how they're positioned, but if the British and Canadian troops get to the crossing point fast enough they can put some serious hurt on the US attempt, what with superior artillery and rifles. Regardless, the battle seems destined to go poorly for the US as they're attacking against a force with better equipment and about equal quality of troops (speaking of, what are the training/quality levels of the troops involved? My guess would be the British regulars are better than the Union soldiers, who are in turn better than the Canadian militia.)

Richard Gatling begins work on a modified form of his Gatling Gun. Based on the observation that the large number of smaller British 32-lber shells was as destructive to the American wooden ships struck as the smaller number of large shells, he determines to use shells of around two pounds in great quantity and thus permit a small ship to effectively threaten a very large one.
It is his hope this will allow for small ships to do the work of large ones, thus removing the prospect of large casualties in naval battles.
(There is a flaw in his logic here.)

Am I correct in thinking that the logical flaw is the applicability of the concept to armoured ships? Seems like the idea would work great against wodden ships as the small shells will still do damage when they detonate, so the cumulative affect will be significant. Against an armoured ship however, the small shells won't have any meaningful effect unless they're fast and heavy enough to penetrate the armor.

Lastly, what's the situation in San Francisco? Last we heard, the British fleet had defeated the American force and several ships had escaped to sea as commerce raiders. Did the British leave after that or did they occupy the city/

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, quickly:

The Welland thing is the local commander acting. I'll admit I'm not sure if it's sensible, but the alternative is for them to just let ironclads onto the upper lakes (thus at a stroke giving them to the British and making Detroit unsafe).

The US ORBAT contains some cavalry, but not a great deal and it's like most Union cavalry in 1862 - not very good.

The US troops have been training for about as long as the Canadian militia, perhaps a bit longer on average, but the Canadians have been training with prewar regulars - a luxury the Americans do not have. That said, smoothbores have the advantage of buck and ball if you can get close so it's almost more effective for non rifle trained troops than rifles would be.

The logical flaw is the idea that navies would accept building only a few ships. It's like how his idea for the Gatling gun was that it would make war less dangerous by making armies smaller and therefore reducing the impact of disease. (There's also several implementation problems, including but not limited to: Ironclads, the shock of firing deranging the mechanism, and that a two-pound shell won't even penetrate more than an inch or two into good white oak.)

And in San Francisco the British have basically got control of the city, but no further inland (they only have their Royal Marines and small arms men). This cuts off the gold convoys though.
They've not taken over all of California, though there's discussion going on as to whether to send a few battalions of Indian troops to help out on the Pacific Slope. Ironically if they knew about it they could literally sail a gunboat into Sacramento, the city is several feet underwater in early 1862

 

[galveston bay]

nearly every Civil War naval battle that I am familiar with that involves ironclads, be it ship vs ship or ship vs forts, resulted in the upper works of ironclads being heavily damaged after prolonged exchanges of fire. Smoke stacks riddled or shot away completely (meaning smoke is not sucked out of the interior, raising the heat and lowering the air quality inside as well as reducing the effectiveness of the engines), spars and masts riddled, damaged or shot away, boats and other items stored on deck riddled or destroyed and of course heavy personnel casualties of those crew exposed above decks. While not in themselves fatal, it does mean that a stop at a yard is necessary after a particularly fierce action.

So while penetrations are not common, damage is still suffered. Heavy shells of course will sometimes also penetrate, but more commonly they cause the type of spalling effect that you see in tank battles. Casualties are suffered from splinters and indeed several Rebel ironclads were knocked out or forced to retire (and a few Union ones too) because of damage inflicted in spite of no serious penetrations of the armor.

So when you talk about naval combat in the early years of armored warships, this is something that should be kept in mind because historical experience tells us that it happened.

And of course compartmentalization is either rudimentary or non existent, so as we see at the Battle of Lissa (1866), Mobile Bay and several encounters off Charleston and on the Mississippi, a collision (such as ramming) or of course hitting a mine will result in quick destruction of the affected vessel all too frequently.

I am also curious how well British ironclads could handle the heavy seas of a hurricane, as history tells me that the 1862 hurricane saw several major hurricanes that traveled off the Northeast coast of the United States between July and December of that year, which would make blockade duty pretty exciting (in a bad way). That by the way is a pretty typical hurricane season for the East coast of North America. I don't know how many Northeasters occurred, but they are common November - April, and sometimes as early as September and as late as June (similar to hurricanes as far as sea states are concerned)

Blockade duty off the Northeast Coast of the US can lead to interesting times for ships.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not sure why you feel the need to emphasize spalling, since it's been a fairly major feature in most ironclad engagements I've written. Remember, the British ships usually had about a foot or two of wooden backing precisely to absorb things like spall.
I've also tended to have a few days of pause after each action for exactly this kind of "repair, refit and so on" - you don't need a yard for much of the work, the crew can do it to a large extent. What you need a yard for is replenishing the spares (spars and the like) as well as correcting actual defects in the armour and of course cleaning the bottom. (As for funnels, Warrior has two and the British ships can all sail as well as steam.)

As to compartmentalization - that may be the case for many of the ships actually in the battles in question, but Warrior is actually extremely well subdivided for the time, with everything outside the armoured belt heavily subdivided (and that means half the ship) - can't find good diagrams otherwise. She also (in common with the other British ironclads) has a lot of reserve bouyancy, a feature emphatically not present on most American ironclads. (If the outside-the-armour section flooded completely, Warrior would sink about two and a half feet and have fourteen feet of freeboard left. If the inside-the-armour section flooded completely instead, she'd certainly be a lot more unstable but she'd still float.)

As for ramming at Lissa, the ramming that actually sank a ship at Lissa involved three attempts (two of them causing no significant damage) and took place on a stopped ship. Ramming is simply not a practicable tactic in the age of steam except against a ship already otherwise disabled - Lissa involved dozens if not hundreds of ramming attempts, only one successful.


And in terms of handling hurricanes... the British Crimea-type ironclads are not very low freeboard but would probably prefer being inshore (i.e. one of the anchorages the British have secured). It's not a completely new problem and the Royal Navy knows how to deal with it.
The Warrior, Defence, Resistance and Black Prince, on the other hand, are very well suited to ride out storms. They have over sixteen feet of freeboard (Warrior) and hence have sea characteristics that are really rather good - and, of course, they're built by a navy which has the North Atlantic on one side and the North Sea on the other, so I doubt they built ships unable to take most normal bad weather. (Warrior is specifically noted to be a good seaboat.)

Of course, if hurricanes and so on make blockading the Northeast coast of the US hard, then the Royal Navy knows about it - it did it fifty years ago, and it worked then! (Since then they've gotten steam engines on their ships.)


And, finally... we've only reached June so far even in outline, and if there's a hurricane then there's not going to be anything slipping through the blockade - not if the hurricane's wrecking warships!

 

[galveston bay]

I'm not sure why you feel the need to emphasize spalling, since it's been a fairly major feature in most ironclad engagements I've written. Remember, the British ships usually had about a foot or two of wooden backing precisely to absorb things like spall.
I've also tended to have a few days of pause after each action for exactly this kind of "repair, refit and so on" - you don't need a yard for much of the work, the crew can do it to a large extent. What you need a yard for is replenishing the spares (spars and the like) as well as correcting actual defects in the armour and of course cleaning the bottom. (As for funnels, Warrior has two and the British ships can all sail as well as steam.)

As to compartmentalization - that may be the case for many of the ships actually in the battles in question, but Warrior is actually extremely well subdivided for the time, with everything outside the armoured belt heavily subdivided (and that means half the ship) - can't find good diagrams otherwise. She also (in common with the other British ironclads) has a lot of reserve bouyancy, a feature emphatically not present on most American ironclads. (If the outside-the-armour section flooded completely, Warrior would sink about two and a half feet and have fourteen feet of freeboard left. If the inside-the-armour section flooded completely instead, she'd certainly be a lot more unstable but she'd still float.)

As for ramming at Lissa, the ramming that actually sank a ship at Lissa involved three attempts (two of them causing no significant damage) and took place on a stopped ship. Ramming is simply not a practicable tactic in the age of steam except against a ship already otherwise disabled - Lissa involved dozens if not hundreds of ramming attempts, only one successful.


And in terms of handling hurricanes... the British Crimea-type ironclads are not very low freeboard but would probably prefer being inshore (i.e. one of the anchorages the British have secured). It's not a completely new problem and the Royal Navy knows how to deal with it.
The Warrior, Defence, Resistance and Black Prince, on the other hand, are very well suited to ride out storms. They have over sixteen feet of freeboard (Warrior) and hence have sea characteristics that are really rather good - and, of course, they're built by a navy which has the North Atlantic on one side and the North Sea on the other, so I doubt they built ships unable to take most normal bad weather. (Warrior is specifically noted to be a good seaboat.)

Of course, if hurricanes and so on make blockading the Northeast coast of the US hard, then the Royal Navy knows about it - it did it fifty years ago, and it worked then! (Since then they've gotten steam engines on their ships.)


And, finally... we've only reached June so far even in outline, and if there's a hurricane then there's not going to be anything slipping through the blockade - not if the hurricane's wrecking warships!

my point is that even if American guns fail to penetrate British armor, they will still inflict considerable damage, often enough to inflict a mission kill (damage sufficient to cause retirement). As for weather, major hurricanes and Northeasters have sunk ships far far larger than what the 19th Century saw in terms of normal tonnage, including major warships, so don't underestimate the effects of mother nature. This is also an area of the world where rogue waves sometimes show up. While sixteen feet freeboard sounds pretty good, consider that hurricanes frequently generate seas as high as 50 feet with chop running in the 20-30 foot average. An interesting thing about the sailing ships of the War of 1812 era... they were frequently more seaworthy than mid century warships. After all, they were near the pinnacle of the technology for the age of sail (the true pinnacle was about 20 years later), while the warships of this era are noteworthy for having unreliable engines and construction of uneven quality. In other words they leak a lot. I am not saying the RN is going to sink. I am saying that a realistic appraisal of the situation you are postulating should account for losses to combat and weather, as well as frequent trips to the yard to repair engines, repair damage and the like.

Also how much endurance in terms of coal storage and efficiency as well as engine reliability do these ships have? Unlike the age of Sail fuel is a major factor, and this includes steaming time to go to base to refuel (coaling is usually at least a couple of days of work by the way). In short, how long can your average British blockader stay at sea and how many ships are needed to maintain a reasonably leakproof blockade?

Charleston usually had at least 6 steamers on station by 1862, so how many do the ports of the United States need?

 

[aegis03florin]

Hi Guys!

This is a wonderful timeline!
I have only a small question: How is France not involved? Napoleon III was firmly ally with England and also quite sympathetic to Confederation.