13 August
Battle of Netherby,
The action commences early in the morning of a beautiful day, when a Fenian attack on the 1/14th at Stevensville discovers that there are no longer any British troops present. This leads to a discussion, which leads in turn to the Fenian brigade splitting into three regimental units (of about eight hundred each) and advancing towards Netherby on a wide front.
At about 11 am, the fighting begins in truth. After a quick exchange of volleys around Netherby itself (with a Fenian formation encountering the skirmish screen of the 1/14th, and having to quickly go to ground in the face of heavy Snider fire - the two-company skirmish screen is putting out an enormous quantity of bullets for such a small formation), the filibuster troops begin to spread out and feel around the flanks of the British-Canadian formation. It quickly transpires that there are Canadian militia battalions forming both flanks of the position, and the Fenian unit which aims to hook around the British right flank is soon bogged down in a loud but inconclusive exchange of fire about half a mile south-west of Netherby crossroads itself.
The Fenian formation moving to the east to hook around the British left flank performs better. It has the great good fortune to not only manage to approach through a wooded defile a mile or two to the northeast of Netherby (thus garnering important cover from enemy fire) but also to run into a militia unit recently re-armed with American-purchased repeaters by a perhaps overzealous colonel.
The result is that the first Fenian platoon to emerge from the defile takes a sudden barrage of fire, wounding many of them, but not disabling as many as would be expected due to the small calibre of the repeater bullets. With their repeaters empty, the Canadian militia now have to pause to reload - and, due to poor drill, this takes place for the entire militia detachment at once (and with a considerable length of time required).
Initially shocked, the Fenian regiment quickly presses their unexpected advantage and breaks the Canadian militia line with a bayonet charge - taking some casualties at close range from those who manage to reload their repeaters in time, but getting in among the Canadian line and causing a pell-mell retreat.
Unfortunately for the Fenians, however, the time taken to march to this defile has also allowed the 1/14th to win their firefight with the Fenian formation in front of them, suppressing them, and also to disable their artillery. With his front not under undue threat, the 1/14th's commander moves his reserve into skirmish line to refuse his left flank, and the chance to roll up the British line is lost.
For much of the day, the firing is sparse - the British infantry have a new appreciation for how hungry the Snider is of ammunition compared to the Enfields they used to fight with, and the Fenians are mostly staying under cover - with the British formation bent around in a V-shape but not under undue stress. Things pick up again around four PM, when the Port Colborne battery arrives accompanied by a battalion of Canadian militia. In a somewhat hair-raising piece of improvisation, one of the light field howitzers is directed by a militiaman sitting on top of a pile of hay bales, and this fire (while inaccurate) causes the left flank of the Fenian position to recoil.
Militia cavalry arrives shortly thereafter, and the filibusters unravel - to an extent which makes a precise estimate as to the number engaged quite difficult, as it is estimated that more than a third of the Fenians present simply cast away their weapons and accoutrements and make their own way home. (Efforts to count the rifles on the field are stymied by how many are collected as mementos by the soldiers and militia, and how many Fenians keep their weapons on the retreat.)
In analysis after the battle, it is noted that the Canadian militia - while certainly quite capable as militia - are not necessarily as conversant with how to use ground as the regulars are. They were covering a wide front, it is true, but men with a proper appreciation of their weapons and the terrain could have kept the defile stopped up without an undue commitment of troops.
With this mistake once made, the 1/14th were unable to properly commit to an advance against an enemy of uncertain quantity and numbers (being under threat on two fronts, and with the risk of losing their line of retreat).