An overlooked typo from a previous draft of mines.
Fair enough.
This sounds a lot like "actually the US won in South Vietnam" type of historical reinterpretation based one or two repelled major VC attacks.
Militarily successs in Afghanistan? Only if you consider holding a few major cities that aren't connected to each other, then yeah.
Otherwise, the Soviets ventures into the countryside yielded gloomy results, even before the stingers came.
Even when the Soviets launched a massive campaign and won an area via brute force, the Mujahideen would wear them down and undo all their gains. As seen in the many Panjshir valley campaigns.
Hm, well, the real winning move almost certainly didn't involve invading Afghanistan, so yeah you have a point. (I only say "almost certainly" because while I can't see how the invasion made anything better, it is possible for me to be wrong.)
The invasion actually undermined Soviet aims in the country and alot of conscripts and Afghans suffered and died to get those aims to a slightly better place than they were pre-invasion.
But unlike with the US in Vietnam, those achievements only collapsed when the Soviet Union itself collapsed and couldn't subsidize the urban government. As worn out as the Soviets were militarily, the Mujahideen were even more worn out. And withdrawing opened the door for negotiations that by the end of the 80s all sides in Afghanistan could see were necessary. No one faction could not win completely, and for as long as Soviet backing had continued, the urban government would have had the strongest bargaining position. Then the Soviets collapsed, and everything was in play again.
The Soviets won a war (admittedly, one they shouldn't have been fighting in the first place) then lost the peace. By contrast, when the US withdrew from Vietnam, the South Vietnamese had the least bargaining power with the North than they'd ever had, and were pretty much fed to their enemies by Nixon. (Part of this, it must be said, is down to the Mujahideen being very different to the North Vietnamese - one was a coalition of groups fighting for different reasons, most of whom could be negotiated with to achieve a satisfactory compromise, and in Vietnam, the enemy was a European-style government that claimed the whole country and who'd pay a political price if they ever admitted they couldn't unite all Vietnamese together.)
The government control was limited to only 10% of the country by the start of 1991. Khost fall in March 1991, even before the August coup. So I imagine lack of Soviet Aid only speeded up the inevitable.
Sure, but it was the 10% of the country where most of the people and resources were. So long as the government could negotiate with most of the tribes and contain the groups who didn't negotiate, things were fine. Indeed, the Soviets actually gained from Afghanistan being internally divided, since the Afghans had a long claim to the tribal borderlands that the country had lost to British conquerors and the Soviets didn't want a regional war kicking off with Pakistan.
What does this have to do with anything? The USSR didn't give a damn if Afghanistan was socialist, they only wanted a pro-Soviet government which would not support Jihadism.
Heck, part of why the USSR intervened is they thought that Hafizullah Amin was too Socialist!
Regards,
fasquardon