Red Alert - Our 1953 USSR

as you wish:

Please write down how from now on nuclear technology and power should be utilized by the USSR?
I think we should diversify into three sections, civil, scientific and military.
In the scientific sense, an organization can be created that involves other communist nations so that they can develop nuclear technology, working to make it more efficient, safer, being able to develop safety protocols, waste treatment...
In the civil sphere, nuclear power plants can be strengthened and developed in the territory of the Soviet Union and other communist nations (in a system of co-ownership, part of the USSR, part of the nation in which it is built) to supply its own energy system and see the possibility of being able to export it to third nations, gaining influence and currency in the process.
On the military issue, continue with bombs and rockets, continuing to investigate nuclear energy in uses of the navy, collaborate so that other communist nations can begin to possess a small nuclear arsenal, and as a result of this collaboration, offer a treaty to the USA on nuclear weapons, to establish limits on the number, commitments that no new weapons will be built for X years...
 
Chapter Five: Berlin Conference (November 1953 - March 1954) Part II
Berling.jpg

(Meeting of the former allies in divided Berlin)

The Berlin Conference of 1954 stands as a significant juncture in the annals of Cold War history, an important moment where the world's major powers convened to confront the pressing challenges of their time. Against the backdrop of recent conflicts and simmering tensions, the gathering of the "Big Four" foreign ministers – representing the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union – was fraught with geopolitical significance and the weight of global expectations. Central to the conference's agenda was the lingering aftermath of the Korean War, a devastating conflict that had torn the Korean Peninsula asunder and left a profound imprint on the global consciousness. Although the guns had fallen silent with the signing of the armistice, the underlying divisions between North and South Korea remained as stark as ever, casting a long shadow over the prospects for lasting peace and stability in the region. Against this backdrop of unresolved conflict, the ministers grappled with the daunting task of charting a course towards reconciliation and détente in one of the Cold War's most volatile theaters. Simultaneously, the specter of the First Indochina War loomed large over the conference proceedings, casting a pall of uncertainty over the future of Southeast Asia. The struggle between French colonial forces and the Vietnamese nationalist movement, led by the charismatic Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh guerrillas, had become a lightning rod for international tensions, drawing in external powers and igniting fears of wider conflict in the region. As the war raged on with no end in sight, the conference participants confronted the urgent need to find a pathway towards peace and stability in a region ravaged by violence and upheaval.

Yet, amidst the swirling currents of geopolitical intrigue and strategic maneuvering, the Berlin Conference offered a glimmer of hope for a world weary of war and conflict. As the major powers sat down at the negotiating table, they recognized the imperative of preventing escalation of conflicts in Asia. From resolving regional conflicts to managing the competing interests of rival blocs, the conference provided a forum for the world's leaders to engage in a delicate dance of diplomacy and negotiation, seeking common ground amidst the deep-seated divisions of the Cold War. However, beneath the veneer of diplomatic civility, the conference was characterized by the underlying tensions and rivalries that defined the Cold War era. The Soviet Union, emboldened by its control over Eastern Europe and its expanding sphere of influence, sought to advance its strategic interests and safeguard its position on the world stage. Meanwhile, the Western powers, led by the United States, remained steadfast in their commitment to defending the principles of democracy, determined to resist Soviet expansionism and contain the spread of communism. While the conference ultimately fell short of achieving a comprehensive settlement to the pressing issues of the day, it nonetheless laid the groundwork for future dialogue and cooperation between the major powers, offering a glimmer of hope amidst the darkness of the Cold War.

51265180017_3c1c61345d_b.jpg

(French paratroopers during Operation Castor)

Operation Castor was a French airborne operation in the First Indochina War. The operation established a fortified airhead in Điện Biên Province, in the north-west corner of Vietnam and was commanded by Brigadier General Jean Gilles. The Operation began at 10:35 on 20 November 1953, with reinforcements dropped over the following two days. With all its objectives achieved, the operation ended on 22 November. Castor was the largest airborne operation since World War II. The French paratroopers of the 6ème Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux (6 BPC) and the 2nd Battalion of the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (II/1er RCP) dropped over Dien Bien Phu on the first day in order to secure the airstrip built by the Japanese during the occupation of French Indochina by Japan from 1940 to 1945. The operation took 65 of the 70 operational C-47 Dakota and all 12 C-119 Flying Boxcar transport aircraft the French had in the area, and still required two trips to get the lead elements into the valley. Also dropped in the first wave were elements of the 17e Régiment de Génie Parachutiste (RGP) ("17th Airborne Engineers Regiment") and the Headquarters group of Groupement Aéroporté 1 (GAP 1), ("Airborne Group 1"). They were followed later in the afternoon by the 1er Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux (1 BPC) and elements of 35e Régiment d'Artillerie Légère Parachutiste (35 RALP) and other combat support elements. Just after its landing, the 6 BPC ran into contact with the Việt Minh 910th Battalion, 148th Regiment, which was conducting field exercise in the area along with a battery from the 351st Artillery Division and an infantry company of the 320th Division. Fighting persisted until afternoon when the Việt Minh units eventually withdrew to the south.

The following day, the second airborne group, "GAP 2" – consisting of 1er Bataillon Etranger de Parachutistes (1 BEP), 8e Bataillon de Parachutistes de Choc (8 BPC), other combat support elements and the entire command and Headquarters group for the Dien Bien Phu operation under Brigadier General Jean Gilles – was dropped in. While on another drop zone, the heavy equipment came down and the engineers quickly set about repairing and lengthening the airstrip. On 22 November, the last troops of the initial garrison, the 5e Bataillon de Parachutistes Vietnamiens ("Battalion of Vietnamese Parachutists", 5 BPVN), jumped into the valley. In the same "stick" as the commander of 5 BPVN was Brigitte Friang, a woman war correspondent with a military parachutist diploma, and five combat jumps. These troops raised the Dien Bien Phu garrison to its full planned strength of 4,500. On November 30, orders were issued for the garrison to guarantee free use of the airfield, to hold the position to the last man, and to conduct attacks to retard buildups of Viet Minh forces. General Navarre created the outpost to draw the Việt Minh into fighting a pitched battle. That battle, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, occurred four months after Operation Castor.

atomic-art-detail-of-3-cent-atoms-for-peace-stamp-cropped-0cb2ca-small.jpg


"Atoms for Peace" was the title of a speech delivered by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly in New York City on December 8, 1953. I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new—one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare. The United States then launched an "Atoms for Peace" program that supplied equipment and information to schools, hospitals, and research institutions within the U.S. and throughout the world. The first nuclear reactors in Israel and Islamabad in Pakistan were built under the program by American Machine and Foundry, a company more commonly known as a major manufacturer of bowling equipment. The speech was part of a carefully orchestrated media campaign, called "Operation Candor", to enlighten the American public on the risks and hopes of a nuclear future. Both Operation Candor and Atoms for Peace were influenced by the January 1953 report of the State Department Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, which urged that the United States government practice less secrecy and more honesty toward the American people about the realities of the nuclear balance and the dangers of nuclear warfare, which triggered in Eisenhower a desire to seek a new and different approach to the threat of nuclear war in international relations.

"Atoms for Peace" was a propaganda component of the Cold War strategy of containment. Eisenhower's speech opened a media campaign that would last for years and that aimed at "emotion management", balancing fears of continuing nuclear armament with promises of peaceful use of uranium in future nuclear reactors. The speech was a tipping point for international focus on peaceful uses of atomic energy, even during the early stages of the Cold War. Eisenhower, with some influence from J. Robert Oppenheimer, may have been attempting to convey a spirit of comfort to a terrified world after the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of the nuclear tests of the early 1950s. It presented an ostensible antithesis to brinkmanship, the international intrigue that subsequently kept the world at the edge of war. Eisenhower wanted to make sure that the European allies would go along with the shift in NATO strategy from an emphasis on conventional weapons to cheaper nuclear weapons. Western Europeans wanted reassurance that the U.S. did not intend to provoke a nuclear war in Europe, and the speech was designed primarily to create that sense of reassurance. Eisenhower later said that he knew the Soviets would reject the specific proposal he offered in the speech. Eisenhower's invoking of "those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in" the UN Charter placed new emphasis upon the U.S. responsibility for its nuclear actions—past, present, and future. This address laid down the rules of engagement for the new kind of warfare: the Cold War.

Prior to Eisenhower's speech, the state of atomic development in the world was under strict secrecy. The information and expertise needed for atomic development was bound by the secret Quebec Agreement of 1943 and thus not devoted to peaceful processes, but instead as a weapon to defend against other countries which were developing and using the same weaponry. With atomic development thus far under wraps, there were no safety protocols and no standards developed. Eisenhower's speech was an important moment in political history as it brought the atomic issue which had been kept quiet for "national security" into the public eye, asking the world to support his solution. Eisenhower was determined to solve "the fearful atomic dilemma" by finding some way by which "the miraculous inventiveness of man would not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." However, Eisenhower was not completely effective in his repurposing; Eisenhower himself approved the National Security Council (NSC) document which stated that only a massive atomic weapon base would deter violence from the Soviet Union. The belief that to avoid a nuclear war, the United States must stay on the offensive, ready to strike at any time, is the same reason that the Soviet Union would not give up its atomic weapons either. During Eisenhower's time in office the nuclear holdings of the US rose from 1,005 to 20,000 weapons. The "Atoms for Peace" program opened up nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed nuclear technology. Eisenhower argued for a nonproliferation agreement throughout the world and argued for a stop of the spread of military use of nuclear weapons. Although the nations that already had atomic weapons kept their weapons and grew their supplies, very few other countries have developed similar weapons—in this sense, it has been very much contained. The "Atoms for Peace" program also created regulations for the use of nuclear power and through these regulations stopped other countries from developing weapons while allowing the technology to be used for positive means.

SKorolow-776x1024.jpg

(Sergei Korolev - director of Sovcosmos)

In January 1954, against the backdrop of the Cold War's escalating tensions and the race for technological supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union, a pivotal moment unfolded within the hallowed halls of Soviet bureaucracy. It was a time of unparalleled scientific ambition, geopolitical intrigue, and ideological competition, as the two superpowers vied for dominance in the uncharted realms of outer space. In this charged atmosphere, the Soviet Union took a momentous step forward with the establishment of Sovcosmos, an institution that would forever alter the course of human history and redefine humanity's relationship with the cosmos. At the helm of this audacious initiative stood Sergey Korolev, a visionary engineer whose name would soon become synonymous with the Soviet Union's meteoric rise in space exploration. Korolev, with his boundless intellect, unwavering resolve, and unbridled imagination, was uniquely suited to lead Sovcosmos into uncharted territory and propel the Soviet Union to the forefront of the Space Age. Sovcosmos, officially known as the Soviet Committee for Space Exploration, was tasked with a monumental mandate: to oversee all aspects of the Soviet Union's ambitious forays into space, from launching satellites and conducting cosmonaut missions to spearheading cutting-edge research in aerospace technology. With Korolev at the helm, Sovcosmos would serve as the linchpin of the Soviet space program, orchestrating the efforts of scientists, engineers, and cosmonauts across the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. The establishment of Sovcosmos heralded a new era of scientific discovery, technological innovation, and geopolitical competition as the Soviet Union sought to harness the power of space exploration for both scientific advancement and ideological supremacy. In the midst of the Cold War, space became the ultimate frontier, a battleground where competing visions of progress and ideology clashed amidst the stars. Under Korolev's visionary leadership, Sovcosmos embarked on an ambitious agenda that would captivate the imagination of people around the world and solidify the Soviet Union's reputation as a trailblazer in space exploration. The organization's primary objectives were threefold: to conduct space flights, advance cosmonautics programs, and spearhead groundbreaking aerospace research that would push the boundaries of human knowledge and achievement.

From its inception, Sovcosmos faced daunting challenges and formidable obstacles on its path to greatness. The nascent field of space exploration was fraught with technical complexities, logistical hurdles, and inherent risks that demanded unparalleled courage, ingenuity, and determination. Yet, undeterred by these formidable challenges, Korolev and his team forged ahead with unwavering resolve, driven by a shared vision of reaching for the stars and unlocking the mysteries of the cosmos As Sovcosmos continued to blaze new trails in space exploration, Korolev and his team faced mounting pressure to maintain their lead in the space race and uphold the Soviet Union's status as a global superpower. The organization's ambitious goals demanded unprecedented levels of funding, resources, and manpower, as well as a relentless commitment to innovation and excellence Despite these challenges, Sovcosmos remained steadfast in its mission to explore, discover, and conquer the cosmos, guided by Korolev's visionary leadership and the unwavering support of the Soviet government. Throughout its storied history, Sovcosmos would go on to achieve a multitude of groundbreaking milestones and scientific breakthroughs that forever altered our understanding of the cosmos and humanity's place within it. Korolev's legacy lived on in the hearts and minds of all who dared to dream of reaching for the stars, inspiring future generations of Soviet scientists, engineers, and explorers to carry on his quest for knowledge and discovery.

President_Gamal_Abdel_Nasser.jpg

(Gamal Abdel Nasser - new premier of Egypt)

On February 25, 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the mantle of premier in Egypt, inaugurating a new chapter in the nation's history characterized by his formidable leadership and transformative agenda. Nasser's ascent to power marked a watershed moment in Egypt's post-colonial trajectory, encapsulating the aspirations of a nation striving for independence, dignity, and progress. Born in 1918 in the humble village of Bakos, Nasser's journey to premiership was marked by a trajectory of unwavering commitment to the cause of Egyptian nationalism and self-determination. As a young officer in the Egyptian military, Nasser distinguished himself with his visionary zeal and dedication to the ideals of liberation and sovereignty. His leadership style was characterized by a potent blend of charisma, pragmatism, and uncompromising resolve, earning him widespread acclaim and support among the Egyptian populace. Nasser's assumption of the premiership came at a pivotal juncture in Egypt's history, marked by the aftermath of British colonial rule and the abdication of King Farouk in 1952. With the departure of British forces, Egypt found itself at a critical crossroads, grappling with the challenge of charting its own course amidst the tumult of regional politics and global power dynamics. As premier, Nasser wasted no time in charting a bold and ambitious course for Egypt's future, grounded in the principles of Arab nationalism, socialism, and economic development. His tenure was characterized by a relentless drive to modernize and revitalize Egypt's economy, society, and institutions, with a particular emphasis on uplifting the most marginalized and oppressed segments of society. One of Nasser's foremost priorities as premier was the implementation of sweeping land reform initiatives aimed at dismantling the feudal structures that had long plagued Egypt's rural landscape. By redistributing land to the landless peasantry and empowering small farmers, Nasser sought to address the entrenched inequalities that had perpetuated social and economic injustice for generations. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for a more equitable and inclusive society, where prosperity and opportunity were accessible to all.

In addition to his efforts to reform Egypt's agrarian economy, Nasser embarked on a comprehensive program of industrialization and modernization designed to propel Egypt into the ranks of the world's leading nations. Under his leadership, the Egyptian government invested heavily in infrastructure projects, including the construction of roads, bridges, and irrigation systems, as well as the expansion of key industries such as textiles, manufacturing, and petrochemicals. These initiatives not only stimulated economic growth and development but also fostered a sense of national pride and unity among the Egyptian people. Yet, Nasser's vision for Egypt extended far beyond the realm of economics and development. As a staunch advocate of Arab unity and solidarity, he sought to position Egypt as a champion of the Arab cause and a beacon of resistance against imperialism and colonialism. His leadership in the establishment of the Arab League and his unwavering support for the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation endeared him to millions of Arabs across the region, who saw in him a visionary leader and a symbol of hope for a brighter future. Nasser's premiership was not without its challenges and setbacks, however. His ambitious plans for economic and social transformation were often hampered by bureaucratic inefficiencies, corruption, and resistance from vested interests. Moreover, his confrontational stance towards Western powers and Israel inevitably invited criticism and opposition from those who sought to maintain the status quo and preserve their own interests. Despite these challenges, Nasser's legacy as premier of Egypt endures as a testament to his vision, courage, and determination in the face of adversity. His efforts to modernize and transform Egypt laid the foundation for future generations to build upon, while his unwavering commitment to Arab unity and independence inspired millions across the Middle East and beyond. As Egypt continues its journey towards progress and prosperity, the spirit of Nasserism remains a guiding force, reminding the nation of its rich heritage and its potential to shape its own destiny.

ph4_001.jpg


The U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, signed on March 8, 1954, in Tokyo, marked a pivotal moment in the post-World War II security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and the specter of communist expansionism, the accord forged a robust security partnership between the United States and Japan, laying the groundwork for a new era of military cooperation and strategic collaboration. At the heart of the agreement were eleven articles and seven annexes, meticulously crafted to delineate the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of both signatories. Under the terms of the agreement, both the United States and Japan committed to mutual support in the event of external aggression or security threats. This commitment was enshrined in Article I, which underscored the shared resolve of the two nations to safeguard their respective interests and uphold regional stability. Central to the agreement was the provision allowing the United States to station its troops and military assets on Japanese soil, a critical component of the U.S. strategy to contain the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region. This provision, outlined in Article II, granted the United States access to strategic bases and facilities in Japan, enabling it to project military power and deter potential adversaries. In return for hosting U.S. forces, Japan assumed the responsibility of protecting its own territory and bolstering its defense capabilities. Article III of the agreement mandated that Japan rearm for defensive purposes only, a carefully calibrated measure aimed at balancing Japan's security needs with regional stability and the sensitivities of neighboring countries.

The agreement's emphasis on defensive rearmament reflected Japan's post-war pacifist constitution, which renounced war as a sovereign right and prohibited the maintenance of armed forces for aggressive purposes. By authorizing Japan to rebuild its military capabilities within the confines of self-defense, the agreement sought to assuage concerns about Japanese remilitarization while empowering Japan to contribute to its own security and the broader defense of the region. Following months of negotiations and deliberations, the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was formally ratified on May 1, 1954, cementing the alliance between the two nations and heralding a new chapter in their strategic partnership. The agreement represented a strategic alignment of interests and a shared commitment to collective security, serving as a bulwark against external threats and a cornerstone of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Throughout the subsequent decades, the U.S.-Japan security alliance would evolve and adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics and security challenges, remaining a linchpin of regional security and a pillar of the U.S. strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific. From the Korean War and the Vietnam War to the rise of China and the emergence of new security threats, the alliance between the United States and Japan would endure as a testament to the enduring bonds of friendship, cooperation, and shared values. In conclusion, the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 stands as a landmark agreement in the history of U.S.-Japan relations, embodying the principles of collective defense, mutual assistance, and strategic cooperation. By forging a security partnership rooted in shared interests and common values, the agreement laid the foundation for decades of collaboration and partnership between the United States and Japan, contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
 
1. Should USSR pursue similar program to American "Atoms for Peace"?
A) Yes
B) No

2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Let referendum decide

3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?

4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
 
1. Should USSR pursue similar program to American "Atoms for Peace"?
A)Yes
If anything we can use this opportunity to push the use of nuclear weapons in peace time with things like using them as a major landscaping tool to create major earthworks. Maybe we can get Nasser to agree to create a connection between the Qattara Depression and the Mediterranean to fill up the region and make a new inland lake/sea.
2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
b)no
Lets not give the Ukrainians anything and lest not even bring up Crimea at all. Really just leave the island alone. If anything we maybe should just allow the Tatars to return to the region instead to further develop it but honestly it might be better to fully complete its Russification.
3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?
I would say giving people greater liberty to own their own land and produce their own crops would be an easy way to do things since it would give people some much needed understanding of agriculture. If possible bring drought resistant crops to Central Asia and grow that instead of Cotton. Push for a major adventures out into the world to discover new potential crops to bring back to the Soviet Union and grow them there if possible along with a major program to study any plants that could with domestication become new food crops.

Also just stop selling our food to pay for things and actually let the people eat it instead.
4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
I mean while having the Arabs on our side would be helpful, considering their incompetence and how they were a major liability to us in OTL, I would say try to at least maintain some distance and try to interact only on economic terms. Plus its not like the Pan-Arabs were exactly socialists and they are and were far more interested in their own goals over socialism.
 
1)A
2)B. Why is this question even an issue? OTL Khrushchev needed the support of the General Secretary of Ukraine (and several other secretaries), so he gave Crimea as a sign of goodwill (we all understand why). Here is a near army like seizure of power without paranoia(?) from Zhukov with his supreme status
3)Shall we just continue Stalin's work?
OTL it brought huge benefits and results, but ended with Stalin's death as Khrushchev decided to spend the money on other projects.
4)Let's try to establish friendly regimes (with emphasis on Iran and Saudi Arabia)
 
1. Should USSR pursue similar program to American "Atoms for Peace"?
A) Yes
B) No

2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Let referendum decide

3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?

4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
I agree with the plan put forward by @Lord Enot
 
1 A

2B No if anything we should consider giving Kalingrad to Lithuania or East Germany to strengthen instead.

I must admit there is a economic and geological argument to transferring Crimea to the Ukrainian USSR given the river system however by that same logic we might consider transferring pieces of Eastern Ukraine to Poland for similar reasoning of placating the local communist party and diluting it ethnically and them being a ''natural extension''.

That and our efforts to crack down on corruption and cronyism would face a massive setback if empowered the senior members of Ukrainian communist party in exchange for favours.

3
Lord Enot

4 Wait and see approach for Pan Arabism and Nasser, I think this position reflects both our strategic position and what would be in character for our soviet union. Pan Slavism showed the danger of Pan nationalists movements in how states can get dragged into wider conflicts and Nasser is a young officer from a recently made free nation.
 
OTL it brought huge benefits and results, but ended with Stalin's death as Khrushchev decided to spend the money on other projects.
Just an addendum that the plan was also led by a scientific committee that included Lysenko, aka a pseudoscientist that knew jackshit about evolution or biology, and a lot of those methods of planting trees were untested. That’s not to say there aren’t any benefits to planting trees to change the ecosystem or to boost agriculture, just maybe first we probably replace the leadership with people who actually know what they’re doing instead of following some pseudoscientist???
 
1. A
2. C
3. The program for planting trees to prevent desertification although led by anyone but Lysenko, and also investing in agricultural colleges to push For better methods and to train people in ways of farming, as well as giving people on collective farms more liberty
4. @Fratsup plan
 
Please write down how from now on nuclear technology and power should be utilized by the USSR?
I support @ruffino
1. Should USSR pursue similar program to American "Atoms for Peace"?
A) Yes
B) No

2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Let referendum decide

3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?

4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
A)Yes
B) No
3. I support @Beaux Arts & Crafts
4. I agree with @Fratsup
 
If anything we can use this opportunity to push the use of nuclear weapons in peace time with things like using them as a major landscaping tool to create major earthworks. Maybe we can get Nasser to agree to create a connection between the Qattara Depression and the Mediterranean to fill up the region and make a new inland lake/sea.
Even if this works, the main problem will be that the object will not be available for operation for many years due to radiation.

1. Should USSR pursue similar program to American "Atoms for Peace"?
A) Yes

2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
A) Yes
Either we return the Crimean Tatars, or we transfer the management of the region to Kyiv.

3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?
First of all, it is better to start by reducing the tax burden of peasants and expanding household plots. It is necessary to increase purchase prices for grain and meat, connect collective farms to a unified electrical system, increase the production of tractors, start selling building materials to collective farms, and strengthen machine and tractor stations with professional personnel.
In the longer term, it is necessary to make the Soviet collective farm system more flexible. In the new type of collective farms, when distributing income, the land contribution of each member of the production cooperative was taken into account and, most importantly, livestock was not socialized. Homestead taxes should be abolished over the next ten years. It is possible to allow the creation of fishing cooperatives, in which peasants, in their free time from field work, can engage in the manufacture of goods at home and their subsequent resale on the market. Settlements with MTS, previously carried out with products, should be converted into monetary form, strictly fixed in each region and not depending on the volume of the harvest.

4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
Moderate support and diplomatic recognition. If confrontation with the West begins, use Arab nationalists as a battering ram against Western Imperialism.
 
2. Should Crimea be transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR?
A) Yes
Yes, Crimea should be ceded to Ukraine, with the ultimate goal of making Ukraine more loyal to the USSR. Together with the gift of Crimea, Ukraine's regional oblasts should be given the option to teach Russian plus the languages they want to teach. Lviv wants it's people to learn Russian and Ukrainian? Fine. Donetsk wants its kids to learn just Russian? Better. We shouldn't push Ukrainian nationality building down the throats of the Russian peoples of Odessa, Kharkov, Donetsk, etc. To the contrary, these regions should work as anchors of Russian loyalty and patriotism inside Ukraine.

We should remember that it was Ukraine's drive for secession and the independence the force that ultimately killed the USSR. Most Ukrainians wanted some kind of reform to decentralize the USSR and turn it in a mix between a confederation and a international organization by 1990, Gorbachev was both a driver and a victim of said calls.

That Russia was the first of the main constituents to declare formal independence was just a technicality caused by the August Coup, as the idea of a USSR was already dead by then.
 
Last edited:
3. Please write down, how agricultural output and productivity can be increased in the USSR?
We should slowly adopt the household-responsability system applied by Deng Xiaoping in China. The system stipulates that the land belongs to the commune/state, but the individual family farmers keep part of the production for themselves and can sell excess in the market. At the end of the day, instead of big collective farms were peasants are employees, this turn all the peasants into state-tenant farmers with a much lower degree of oversight. This system has greatly increased the output of Chinese agriculture, which is much more pressing and existential matter to the Chinese state due to population pressures and food shortages.
 
Last edited:
4. Please write down, how should the USSR deal with the new Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism?
Pan-Arabism should be supported, considering it will case great harm to the interests of the western states in the Middle East. We should try to court Gamal (with weapons, tech and some cash) and make him more amenable to a somewhat decentralized and multiparty United Arab Republic. This way we can use our influence among Egyptian and Syrian socialists and communists to side with him.

Either way, Egypt will lose the Suez War.
 
Top