Red Alert - Our 1953 USSR
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If we put aside all the controversial issues related to censorship and other things, then there is one big problem that will not allow us to do this - there is simply no money. From 1943 to 1953, economic ruin and shortages of materials meant that fewer than 30 films were made per year. The distribution was actively filled with trophy and allied films (including those shot in Germany). Only by 1956 did the industry normalize and more than 100 films were produced annually. In such conditions, there is no way to pay Hollywood stars the usual fees (which is why this issue was not raised at all).
Oh boy I wonder what will happen also guys we should make our own UN (which is the comitern) that slowly turns all of the Soviet nations into a world government also the chairman of the comitern or well it should be called the internationals should be voted in so all nations follow their ideology as best they can (note they don’t have to change their ideology just well the methods the chairman ask the nations want them to.) with this and making each nation mandate eachother slowly they will transition into one leading us into a future where this world government will be the most powerful one in the world
I mean we can still be in the UN just let the communist version of the UN become a world government in the future
Chapter Five: Berlin Conference (November 1953 - March 1954) Part I
(German prisoners of war in the USSR)
During the post-Stalin period, the Soviet government faced a myriad of challenges regarding the release of German prisoners of war (POWs) held in Soviet imprisonment. As the aftermath of Stalin's death settled, the fate of these POWs became a matter of intense deliberation within Soviet leadership circles. The decision to release German POWs was a weighty matter that required consideration of various factors including political and international implications, and practical considerations related to post-war reconstruction efforts. The Soviet government recognized the need to strike a delicate balance between acknowledging need of addressing the issue of German prisoners in the USSR and safeguarding the interests of the Soviet state and its allies. Foremost among the considerations for the Soviet government was the fragile state of East Germany's resources and infrastructure in the wake of the war's devastation. The nation lay in ruins, its economy decimated, and its populace grappling to rebuild amidst the ravages wrought by the conflict. Against this backdrop, the sudden and mass release of POWs had the potential to overwhelm existing systems and exacerbate the socio-economic challenges confronting the country. To address these concerns, the Soviet government advocated for a systematic and phased approach to the release of German POWs. This method aimed to ensure a smooth transition and minimize disruptions to post-war reconstruction efforts. By releasing POWs in controlled stages, the Soviet government could effectively manage the influx of returning individuals and provide the necessary support for their reintegration into society.
Central to the Soviet government's approach was the implementation of a rigorous screening process to ascertain the eligibility of POWs for release. This process entailed the assessment of various criteria, including the prisoners' professions, educational backgrounds, marital statuses, health conditions, and ages. By prioritizing the release of POWs who possessed valuable skills, educational qualifications, or personal circumstances conducive to successful integration, the Soviet government sought to facilitate the reintegration process and promote stability in East Germany. In addition to practical considerations, the Soviet government also recognized the imperative of ideological alignment in post-war reconstruction efforts. They acknowledged the risks associated with the resurgence of fascist ideologies and endeavored to counteract such tendencies through proactive measures. As part of the release process, the Soviet government provided education in socialist ideology to POWs, aiming to instill socialist values and deter any potential anti-socialist sentiments among the released individuals. Furthermore, the Soviet government emphasized the necessity for ongoing support and monitoring of released POWs to ensure their successful reintegration into society. This support encompassed various facets, including access to vocational training, employment opportunities, housing assistance, and social services. By furnishing comprehensive support, the Soviet government aimed to address the root causes of potential recidivism and promote long-term stability in East Germany.
(Streamlining of bloated Soviet bureaucracy was a goal of Zhukov's reforms)
The Zhukov administration embarked on a comprehensive reform agenda aimed at combating corruption, streamlining bureaucracy, and fostering a culture of efficiency within the Soviet Union. Recognizing the entrenched nature of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies inherited from the Stalinist era, the administration pursued a multifaceted approach to address these systemic challenges and promote good governance. At the forefront of the reform agenda was a thorough audit of all government departments and ministries. This audit sought to identify redundant and superfluous departments, as well as opportunities for consolidation and streamlining. Once the audit results were available, the administration moved swiftly to eliminate duplicate entities, merge ministries with overlapping functions, and rationalize bureaucratic structures to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. In tandem with administrative restructuring, the Zhukov administration launched a concerted anti-corruption campaign. Central to this campaign was a two-pronged strategy aimed at incentivizing voluntary surrender by corrupt officials and imposing stringent penalties on those found guilty of corruption. The administration offered corrupt individuals a deadline to come forward and surrender, promising certain indulgences such as retirement or discreet demotions in exchange for cooperation. However, those who failed to avail themselves of this opportunity faced the full force of the law, with the newly established secret police tasked with investigating and prosecuting corrupt individuals. Harsh and exemplary sentences were meted out to serve as a deterrent and root out entrenched corruption networks. Moreover, the administration recognized the need for fundamental reforms to overhaul the bureaucratic apparatus and mitigate the risk of corruption. Acknowledging the legacy of Stalinist Nomenklatura, which perpetuated self-serving interests and hindered effective governance, the administration proposed a radical reorganization of the bureaucracy. This reorganization entailed removing obsolete or unnecessary positions, reducing the number of serving bureaucrats, and instituting tighter standards for recruitment and promotion. Additionally, the administration advocated for the infusion of "new blood" into the bureaucracy, appointing dynamic individuals to key positions to inject fresh perspectives and drive innovation.
Furthermore, the Zhukov administration introduced a novel approach to instill accountability and foster a culture of continuous improvement among Soviet citizens. Building on the concept of key performance indicators (KPIs), the administration mandated that all citizens, excluding military personnel, incorporate KPIs into their daily activities to qualify for benefits. This initiative aimed to incentivize productivity and excellence across all sectors of society, promoting a sense of ownership and responsibility among individuals. In addition to individual accountability, the administration encouraged collective action through the implementation of anonymous whistleblower mechanisms and periodic competitions for improvement ideas. Soviet and Warsaw Pact citizens were invited to submit proposals for enhancing efficiency, innovation, and collaboration, with winners receiving substantial rewards and recognition. By fostering a culture of joint ownership and teamwork, the administration sought to harness the collective ingenuity and creativity of the populace to drive positive change and advancement. Moreover, the administration recognized the transformative potential of technology in modernizing governance and facilitating information management. Proposals for substantial investments in computerization and data infrastructure were put forth, envisioning a centralized and interconnected network of computers to streamline administrative processes, enhance decision-making, and combat corruption. By leveraging technology to enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency, the administration aimed to usher in a new era of governance characterized by integrity, responsiveness, and effectiveness.
(Zhukov with Polish military leadership during the Warsaw Summit)
General Secretary Zhukov's participation in the summit in Warsaw marked a pivotal moment for the allied communist states of Eastern Europe as they convened to address pressing issues and chart a course for collective progress. The summit agenda encompassed critical areas such as the economy, infrastructure, defense, security, and regional cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Foremost among the summit's objectives was a comprehensive assessment of the state of the economy, including both agricultural and industrial production. Recognizing the importance of economic cooperation and development in advancing the socialist cause, leaders underscored the need for robust economic policies to bolster the prosperity of their respective nations and promote solidarity among the working class. Emphasis was placed on enhancing productivity, efficiency, and technological innovation to fuel economic growth and improve living standards for all citizens. In addition to economic considerations, the summit attendees deliberated on the state of infrastructure and explored avenues for closer integration through initiatives such as a common track gauge. The proposed standardization of railway systems aimed to facilitate the seamless transportation of people and goods across borders, fostering greater connectivity and economic exchange within the region. Leaders recognized the potential of infrastructure development to enhance regional cooperation and promote mutual prosperity. The summit also addressed the critical issue of defense and self-defense capacity in the face of external threats, particularly from NATO forces. Leaders emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong and capable armed forces while also exploring opportunities for collective defense within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Strategies to enhance military readiness, interoperability, and strategic coordination were discussed to ensure the defense of socialist states and deter aggression from imperialist powers.
Furthermore, the summit sought to strengthen collaboration among intelligence and security agencies to counter internal and external threats effectively. Leaders emphasized the need for improved intelligence sharing, enhanced surveillance capabilities, and greater cooperation in detecting and neutralizing double agents, infiltrators, and subversive elements. The initiative aimed to safeguard the integrity and security of socialist states while preserving internal stability and social order. Additionally, the summit delegates deliberated on measures to enhance the effectiveness and autonomy of COMECON, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Leaders proposed initiatives to streamline decision-making processes, improve governance structures, and empower COMECON to play a more prominent role in coordinating economic policies and initiatives across member states. The goal was to foster greater economic integration, resource sharing, and mutual support among socialist nations to strengthen their collective resilience and prosperity. In line with the broader objectives of fostering solidarity and cooperation among Warsaw Pact nations, leaders advocated for the facilitation of easier movement of people across borders. Initiatives to streamline visa procedures, promote cultural exchanges, and encourage tourism were proposed to enhance people-to-people contacts and foster a sense of shared identity and fraternity among citizens of allied states. By promoting greater interaction and understanding, leaders sought to strengthen the bonds of friendship and solidarity within the socialist bloc. The summit in Warsaw represented a significant opportunity for allied communist states to reaffirm their commitment to collective progress and solidarity. Through strategic collaboration and concerted efforts in key areas such as the economy, defense, security, and regional cooperation, leaders sought to advance the socialist cause, safeguard the interests of their nations, and promote peace, prosperity, and stability in the region.
General Secretary Zhukov's address on the legacy of Joseph Stalin marked a pivotal moment in the history of the Soviet Union, signaling a profound shift in the nation's approach to its past and future trajectory. The decision to embark on a process of de-Stalinization was not taken lightly, as it required a delicate balancing act between acknowledging Stalin's contributions and confronting the dark chapters of his reign. General Secretary Zhukov's address on the legacy of Joseph Stalin underscored a nuanced perspective, recognizing Stalin's contributions while acknowledging his shortcomings. In a calculated move, Zhukov emphasized a paradigm where Stalin's actions were deemed 70% right and 30% wrong, advocating for a gradual process of de-Stalinization. This approach was strategic, aiming to navigate the delicate balance between honoring Stalin's achievements and addressing the darker aspects of his rule. At the core of Zhukov's discourse was the imperative to dismantle the pervasive cult of personality surrounding Stalin. This cult had elevated Stalin to an almost mythical stature, obscuring his fallibility and fostering an environment of fear and subservience. Zhukov's measured critique sought to dispel the myth of Stalin as an infallible leader, encouraging a more critical and introspective examination of his legacy among Soviet citizens. By challenging the idolization of Stalin, Zhukov aimed to foster a culture of intellectual independence and historical inquiry, laying the groundwork for a more enlightened and progressive society.
Moreover, Zhukov outlined a meticulous plan to revise Stalinist laws and policies that had stifled dissent and curtailed individual freedoms. These laws, wielded as tools of repression, had silenced dissenting voices and quashed political opposition, perpetuating a climate of fear and suspicion. Zhukov's proposal to modify these laws was a testament to his commitment to justice and fairness, seeking to restore confidence in the legal system and safeguard the rights of all citizens. Crucially, Zhukov did not shy away from acknowledging Stalin's mistakes and misjudgments. While recognizing Stalin's pivotal role in modernizing and defending the USSR, Zhukov confronted the dark chapters of Stalin's rule, including the purges, show trials, and forced collectivization. By openly acknowledging these atrocities, Zhukov aimed to confront the painful truths of Soviet history and promote healing and reconciliation within society. In line with his vision of gradual de-Stalinization, Zhukov advocated for the rehabilitation of politicians and intellectuals who had been unjustly purged or marginalized during Stalin's reign. These individuals, victims of political persecution, had seen their reputations tarnished and their contributions erased from official records. By restoring their honor and recognizing their contributions, Zhukov sought to rectify past injustices and promote unity and solidarity within Soviet society. Zhukov's address represented a judicious and forward-thinking approach to addressing Stalin's legacy. By acknowledging Stalin's achievements while confronting his failings, Zhukov laid the groundwork for a more enlightened and compassionate society. Through gradual de-Stalinization, Zhukov envisioned a future where the Soviet Union could reconcile its past and embrace a brighter, more hopeful future.
General Secretary Zhukov's decision to hold Kim Il-sung accountable for his failure to win the Korean War represented a watershed moment in the complex tapestry of East Asian politics. As the dust settled from the conflict, Zhukov recognized the need for a decisive shift in North Korea's leadership to realign its priorities with the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The plan crafted by Kim Il-sung to reunify Korea under his leadership had ended in resounding failure, exposing his weakness to finish what he started. Zhukov, ever the pragmatic leader, seized upon this moment of vulnerability to assert Soviet control over North Korea and shape its future trajectory in accordance with Soviet objectives. In Pak Kum-chol, Zhukov saw a potential ally whose leadership style and political ideology were more closely aligned with the Soviet Union's vision for the region. As a trusted figure within North Korea's political elite, Pak Kum-chol offered a semblance of stability and continuity while also signaling a departure from the military failure of Kim Il-sung. However, Zhukov was acutely aware of the delicate geopolitical dance that lay ahead. Any move to oust Kim Il-sung would need to be carefully orchestrated to avoid provoking China, a key ally and neighbor with vested interests in the Korean Peninsula. Recognizing the importance of maintaining cordial relations with Beijing, Zhukov embarked on a diplomatic charm offensive to secure Mao Zedong's tacit approval for Kim Il-sung removal.
The offer of economic and industrial support from the USSR to China served as a strategic bargaining chip, enticing Mao with the promise of much-needed assistance for China's own ambitious development plans. In exchange for China's acquiescence to the leadership change in North Korea, Zhukov leveraged Soviet resources to bolster China's economic growth and infrastructure projects, solidifying the burgeoning partnership between the two communist giants. With Mao's blessing secured, Zhukov moved swiftly to implement the leadership transition in North Korea. Kim Il Sung found himself unceremoniously ousted from power, his legacy tarnished by the specter of failure in the Korean War. Alongside his family, Kim Il Sung was escorted to China under the protective umbrella of Chinese hospitality, effectively ending his reign over North Korea. For Zhukov and the Soviet Union, the successful removal of Kim Jong Il marked a triumph of realpolitik and strategic foresight. By installing Pak Kum-chol as the new leader of North Korea, Zhukov had cemented Soviet influence in the region while also placating China's concerns. The ripple effects of this bold maneuver would reverberate across East Asia, reshaping the geopolitical landscape for years to come. Yet, the transition of power in North Korea was not without its challenges and uncertainties. As Pak Kum-chol assumed the mantle of leadership, he inherited a nation grappling with the aftermath of war and the specter of external influence. The road ahead would be fraught with obstacles, but for Zhukov and his vision of a stable, Soviet-aligned North Korea, the journey had only just begun.
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We did it guys we can now show the South Koreans in the future that the north is the best when it’s rebuilt and stable
Its first part, covering only last votes, but you can make, sure
Something tells me that the Cold war will get Hot a lot due to the Soviets doing better here in time and this means that the western Allies can’t have that right @panpiotr
You mean like war? I think they will adapt to the developing USSR on various levels, but the West does not want to end the world, no matter what USSR will get stronger in the future.
I meant standoffs like the former Soviet Union but in the 1980s quest that you did @panpiotr
Nice. I believe we had done quite a lot here. Now when we are speaking about Mao and change of N.Korean leadership i believe that most important thing for Mao was that he was asked and that concessions were made. It shows that we are actually taking him and China seriously and hopefully this will keep unity in Communist block at least on core issues. Honestly i believe that this is also the reason why we succeeded in overthrowing Kim family, otl Soviets and Chinese tried but they probably failed due to not having a common ground and they attempted to place their own puppet candidates. Here China and USSR probably came to a compromise and had put forward a viable candidate.
For N. Korea in a long run this is a wonderful news, otl N. Korea gdp growth was actually higher then in the South until the 60s and living standards were the same until 1976. With better leadership and USSR (and potentially China) doing a lot better we can see North probably keeping up with the South.
I can say that given that we are starting this quite early we may actually take approach in which we try to "win Cold war", or at least make the world more socialist. So opposed to past quest where we were basically busy with internal matters here we may actually be quite outside focused.
I mean people are already planning to win the Moon race.
For N. Korea in a long run this is a wonderful news, otl N. Korea gdp growth was actually higher then in the South until the 60s and living standards were the same until 1976. With better leadership and USSR (and potentially China) doing a lot better we can see North probably keeping up with the South.
I can say that given that we are starting this quite early we may actually take approach in which we try to "win Cold war", or at least make the world more socialist. So opposed to past quest where we were basically busy with internal matters here we may actually be quite outside focused.
I mean people are already planning to win the Moon race.
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