Malaya What If

[Ltlconf]

"Marines" is a title and always capitalized, it's never lower case...ever. Marines tend to take that personally.

How true this is, I leave this to others to debate, but in matters of the debate over the night fighting abilities of the IJN, I've heard many experts, both purely academic and Naval historians, that it wasn't just the high quality of the IJN equipment. Rather, it was also the men chosen to utilize it. Where the USN simply assigned to night watch duty whomever was on the roster at the time, the IJN personnel where specifically chosen for their excellent night vision capacity, exceptional distance eyesight, ability to discern details under poor conditions, and determine shapes and outlines all under high stress conditions. And doing night watch would often be their ONLY duty on the ship.
If true I can see why IJN night fighting was of such high quality at an individual ship fighting level, whatever their fighting skills at the group tactical level leadership, which I agree could be uneven.
The IJN had a early edge due to their intense training levels, excellent individual fighting doctrine, and (in many cases, not all) excellent newer destroyer and cruiser designs. Also, their carrier doctrine had made some correct operational and tactical assumptions whereas the USN had not (we simply got damned lucky at Midway, and some flight leaders and pilots made gutsy calls). I agree the RN has had a couple of years to shake off the rust, figure out their strengths and weaknesses, weed out some deadwood, and plug some holes in doctrine. The IJN is a different animal, but unlike the USN the RN isn't starting cold nor completely blind to the potential threat. They've seen what aircraft can do to warships around Crete and during convoys, and I agree even if they've not a clue what the Type 93 can do (no one does, and it was still routinely underestimated even into early 1944 despite the publishing of its capabilities), it's not decisive in and of itself. Plus while American, I agree the RN has a more mature, and aggressive, destroyer and cruiser doctrine than the USN at this time. They won't rattle as easily from torpedo attacks they didn't see coming. They're more likely to turn into them and close in!
Mind, it's what USN commanders WANTED to do but weren't ALLOWED to do by higher ups! But in the RN, apparently having your destroyer outnumbered 10 to 1 is no excuse not to attack...
Anyway I assess it, this is going to be brutal!

As for the British comms issue. As I opined much earlier, I had read in an assessment of the Malay Campaign that one of the crippling issues the Commonwealth Forces had was piss-poor communications, chiefly radio communications. Moreover, this seemed an issue (if a declining one, but one that never went away completely) right up to the end of the war. But the RAF is NOT part of this issue. Their radios work, and if they've communications issues with the Army or Navy, it's apparently often a matter of miscommunication or coordination, not poor radio quality (or in the case of Market-Garden, the Army handing out the wrong crystals to talk to the RAF). Or so it seems. I could be completely off on this.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

"Marines" is a title and always capitalized, it's never lower case...ever. Marines tend to take that personally.

Hi Ltlconf, apologies, fixed

 

[Merrick]

Also, due to arrive on the 4th December was the George G Henry, a WW1 built tanker which had left the Dutch East Indies, via Singapore, carrying 69,500 barrels of oil. She would be lucky enough to avoid the Japanese airstrikes and after discharging her entire cargo, escape on the 15th. In mid-April 1942, she would be taken in service by the US Navy, armed and renamed Victoria (AO 46).

Is this a spoiler I see before me?
I'm assuming all this is as OTL.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Is this a spoiler I see before me?
I'm assuming all this is as OTL.

Hi Merrick, yes this is all OTL, but as you say, her usefulness could possibly see her divert from her historical path in my TL. Having said that I don't think she was capable of underway replenishment.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Hi Merrick, yes this is all OTL, but as you say, her usefulness could possibly see her divert from her historical path in my TL. Having said that I don't think she was capable of underway replenishment.

Sir while she might have been unable to conduct abeam underway replenishment, I would expect that she was capable of astern underway replenishment, which while not very efficient, most ships were capable of.

RR.

 

[JWilly48519]

1941, Monday 01 December;

Also, due to arrive on the 4th December was the George G Henry, a WW1 built tanker which had left the Dutch East Indies, via Singapore, carrying 69,500 barrels of oil.

DEI of course had plenty of wells, but also various refineries. http://www.combinedfleet.com/Oil.htm

What was in the tanker...crude oil, or a refined product?

Crude oil is highly flammable, due to its significant fraction of benzene, toluene and other light aromatics/aliphatics. Refined oils, at least other than the lightest grades, are much less so. Bunker oil is hardly flammable at all, without fairly extreme heating.

A refined product, ready for use, would be much more convenient to have on hand in the event that war commences. Operating refineries are very flammable targets for bombing. During WWII, they also typically could not be operated in a "blackout" mode because they necessarily had open-flame "flares" to get rid of unwanted gaseous byproducts.

 

[Parma]

DEI of course had plenty of wells, but also various refineries. http://www.combinedfleet.com/Oil.htm

What was in the tanker...crude oil, or a refined product?

Crude oil is highly flammable, due to its significant fraction of benzene, toluene and other light aromatics/aliphatics. Refined oils, at least other than the lightest grades, are much less so. Bunker oil is hardly flammable at all, without fairly extreme heating.

A refined product, ready for use, would be much more convenient to have on hand in the event that war commences. Operating refineries are very flammable targets for bombing. During WWII, they also typically could not be operated in a "blackout" mode because they necessarily had open-flame "flares" to get rid of unwanted gaseous byproducts.

As I understand most oil tankers where transporting refined oil products. Benzine/Petrol, Kerosine, Diesel, and heavy bunker oil. Before the 50ties it was very common to refine the crude oil near or as close by the oil well/ oil fields.

The refining of the oil near the oil fieds was, apparently at that time, economically favourable. Safety wise, in our modern view, was obviously another thing, but at that time safety seems not such a big issue as it is today and on the other hand in nearly all cases tankers loaded with bensine or kerosine hardly never blow up before the war. Of course nobody would forseen torpedo attacks by submarines or merchant raiders who shoot the tankers into floating petrolbombs

 

[JasTysoe]

"Marines" is a title and always capitalized, it's never lower case...ever. Marines tend to take that personally.

How true this is, I leave this to others to debate, but in matters of the debate over the night fighting abilities of the IJN, I've heard many experts, both purely academic and Naval historians, that it wasn't just the high quality of the IJN equipment. Rather, it was also the men chosen to utilize it. Where the USN simply assigned to night watch duty whomever was on the roster at the time, the IJN personnel where specifically chosen for their excellent night vision capacity, exceptional distance eyesight, ability to discern details under poor conditions, and determine shapes and outlines all under high stress conditions. And doing night watch would often be their ONLY duty on the ship.

Interesting. I've done a lot of long ocean races in yachts and noticed that there's a very wide variation in the ability of people to see and have situational awareness at night. Some people can tell one yacht from another just from the relative motion of the nav lights as the different boats move through the seaway, but most have no idea. This variation seems to exist irrespective of relative experience.

It's also nice to see a post that is clearly not biased by nationalism.

 

[Butchpfd]

Most American civilian tankers did not have the capability to refuel underway or broadside, until the advent of the T3 class of oilers,which the USN Cimmaron class fast fleet oilers were part of. After late 1943 all tankers in the Pacific were equipped to transfer u derway. All USN oilers with AO designations had some type of broadside underway fueling ability. Though those sold into civilian service during the interwar years, had the booms and hoses removed. Those brought back into Navy service had that capacity restored when the had yard time and AAA also installed.
Remember tankers job was to move POL from point A to Point B, and there transfer to barges, shore tanks or Fleet Oilers. Fleet Oilers, AKA Oilers, job was to transport POL from point B to ships of the fleet, either at anchorages or underway.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

On the subject of abeam refuelling at sea, l have always wondered just how accurate the section of the film Battle of the River Plate was when it showed the German tanker Altmark refuelling the Graf Spee in the abeam position. Did the Germans in 1939 have the ability and skill to conduct abeam refuelling at sea, and was Altmark set up and equipped to do so. I know that this was a skill that the British were deficient at and mostly learned the skill from the Americans, as at the time British practice was for astern refuelling at sea, and the last time they prepared for this was during the Falklands conflict in the eighties, TTBOMK.

RR.

 

[Butchpfd]

On the subject of abeam refuelling at sea, l have always wondered just how accurate the section of the film Battle of the River Plate was when it showed the German tanker Altmark refuelling the Graf Spee in the abeam position. Did the Germans in 1939 have the ability and skill to conduct abeam refuelling at sea, and was Altmark set up and equipped to do so. I know that this was a skill that the British were deficient at and mostly learned the skill from the Americans, as at the time British practice was for astern refuelling at sea, and the last time they prepared for this was during the Falklands conflict in the eighties, TTBOMK.

RR.

I'm not sure but I think the Germans could do along side at full stop, or anchored. I looked at photos of the Graf Spee's oiler Altmark, she does not carry the masts or booms necessary for underway alongside refueling.

 

[Nevarinemex]

Most American civilian tankers did not have the capability to refuel underway or broadside, until the advent of the T3 class of oilers,which the USN Cimmaron class fast fleet oilers were part of. After late 1943 all tankers in the Pacific were equipped to transfer u derway. All USN oilers with AO designations had some type of broadside underway fueling ability. Though those sold into civilian service during the interwar years, had the booms and hoses removed. Those brought back into Navy service had that capacity restored when the had yard time and AAA also installed.
Remember tankers job was to move POL from point A to Point B, and there transfer to barges, shore tanks or Fleet Oilers. Fleet Oilers, AKA Oilers, job was to transport POL from point B to ships of the fleet, either at anchorages or underway.

I don't have my Fahey's nearby. So I have to defer to NavSource here. This lists 5 ton booms, which from the photos, appears to be refueling the inboard surviving four stackers from the Asiatic Fleet. Are the booms adequate for Unrep? Maybe.

An aside, the USS Victoria seems to be named after the Australian river.

Fleet Oiler (AO) Photo Index

STARBOARD BROADSIDE VIEW OF THE TANKER USS VICTORIA (AO-46) (EX-GEORGE G.HENRY). SHE HAS BEEN ...

www.awm.gov.au

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/2g8hp1

 

[Admiral Jellicoe]

l have always wondered just how accurate the section of the film Battle of the River Plate was when it showed the German tanker Altmark refuelling the Graf Spee in the abeam position.

Whilst I love that film and especially that it includes the proper Achilles and Cumberland I don't think that the niceties of alongside or stern fueling were high on the list of historical accuracy for the makers

I also love the fact that they were able to borrow the USS Salem (still afloat today) to use as the Graf Spee and HMS Sheffield for Ajax and HMS Jamaica for Exeter respectively

 

[El Pip]

The RN was well aware of alongside refuelling while underway. Link below to the Mediterranean Fleet practising it in 1936, something so routine they felt happy putting it in news reel footage;

Fleet Off Malta - AP Newsroom Archive

 

[Nevarinemex]

The RN was well aware of alongside refuelling while underway. Link below to the Mediterranean Fleet practising it in 1936, something so routine they felt happy putting it in news reel footage;

Fleet Off Malta - AP Newsroom Archive

It's interesting to see how the careers advance and mileposts reached by junior ranks.

Here's some additional material.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/january/value-unrep-time

Chester Nimitz and the Development of Fueling at Sea

© 1993 by Thomas Wildenberg

www.history.navy.mil

When Dreams Confront Reality: Replenishment at Sea in the Era of Coal | International Journal of Naval History

Warwick Brown King's College, London This paper examines in the forty years leading up to the First World War how different navies, particularly the British and American, approached the problem of providing “free and unrestricted movement of their fleets” by replenishment at sea. Today the...

www.ijnhonline.org

How the Bismarck and Prince Eugen did refuelling

 

[Nevarinemex]

"Marines" is a title and always capitalized, it's never lower case...ever. Marines tend to take that personally.

How true this is, I leave this to others to debate, but in matters of the debate over the night fighting abilities of the IJN, I've heard many experts, both purely academic and Naval historians, that it wasn't just the high quality of the IJN equipment. Rather, it was also the men chosen to utilize it. Where the USN simply assigned to night watch duty whomever was on the roster at the time, the IJN personnel where specifically chosen for their excellent night vision capacity, exceptional distance eyesight, ability to discern details under poor conditions, and determine shapes and outlines all under high stress conditions. And doing night watch would often be their ONLY duty on the ship.
If true I can see why IJN night fighting was of such high quality at an individual ship fighting level, whatever their fighting skills at the group tactical level leadership, which I agree could be uneven.
The IJN had a early edge due to their intense training levels, excellent individual fighting doctrine, and (in many cases, not all) excellent newer destroyer and cruiser designs. Also, their carrier doctrine had made some correct operational and tactical assumptions whereas the USN had not (we simply got damned lucky at Midway, and some flight leaders and pilots made gutsy calls). I agree the RN has had a couple of years to shake off the rust, figure out their strengths and weaknesses, weed out some deadwood, and plug some holes in doctrine. The IJN is a different animal, but unlike the USN the RN isn't starting cold nor completely blind to the potential threat. They've seen what aircraft can do to warships around Crete and during convoys, and I agree even if they've not a clue what the Type 93 can do (no one does, and it was still routinely underestimated even into early 1944 despite the publishing of its capabilities), it's not decisive in and of itself. Plus while American, I agree the RN has a more mature, and aggressive, destroyer and cruiser doctrine than the USN at this time. They won't rattle as easily from torpedo attacks they didn't see coming. They're more likely to turn into them and close in!

Apparently the IJN also lead in fast oilers at the onset of war.

Were Tankers the Key to Imperial Japan’s Early Wartime Success?

Japan had come to appreciate the value of at-sea replenishment for its navy early on.

thediplomat.com

The Japanese had the most to gain. The UK had the most to lose. The US ended up with the most overall?
The IJN and RN are arguably better than the USN in 1941. However, the USN will become such a
behemoth in 1944, that quantity will overwhelm quality.

 

[Butchpfd]

1941, Monday 01 December;

Reinforcements for the Army in the Philippines continued to flow, on the 18th November, convoy 4001 left Pearl Harbor, made up of the army transport President Grant, and steamers American Leader, John Lykes and Dona Nati, escorted by the Brooklyn class light cruiser USS Boise, carrying munitions and other war material, arriving in Manila on the 4th December. Leaving with them was the steamer Cape Fairweather, which although Manila bound, would call into Hong Kong first.

Also, due to arrive on the 4th December was the George G Henry, a WW1 built tanker which had left the Dutch East Indies, via Singapore, carrying 69,500 barrels of oil. She would be lucky enough to avoid the Japanese airstrikes and after discharging her entire cargo, escape on the 15th. In mid-April 1942, she would be taken in service by the US Navy, armed and renamed Victoria (AO 46).

The US Army was not alone in reinforcing the Philippines, as well as the help MacArthur was receiving, Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet was also growing, abet in a more realistic way, there was only limited resources the US Navy could send. The USS Guadalupe, a newly commissioned Cimarron-class fleet replenishment oiler, had delivered six PT boats as deck cargo, which had formed Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three in September.

But a much more useful addition was the sixteen Salmon and Sargo class submarines of Submarine Squadron 2 that had been sent, eight arriving on the 8th November, the other’s, along with the big submarine tender, USS Holland, by the 22nd. Based at Cavite naval base, they brought the total of submarines in the Asiatic Fleet to 29. While the six short ranged S-class boats were only useful for coastal operations, the seven Porpoise, along with the Salmon and Sargo’s provided a real potent threat to any Japanese invasion fleet.

Britain had taken the decision to withdraw her garrisons and gunboats from China, Hong Kong excepted, much earlier, but finally on the 10ths November, Admiral Hart’s requests to do the same were agreed, and he’d quickly started redeploying some of his gunboats to the Philippines. He’d been able to withdraw both the big gunboats, USS Tulsa and her sister USS Asheville late spring, early summer, re-employing them on coastal patrol duties around Manila Bay.

This left just five gunboats, four on the Yangtze Patrol and one on the South China Patrol. The USS Tutuila was marooned too far up the Yangtse to escape, was moored at Chungking, the Chinese wartime Capital, and her crew evacuated, early 1942, handed over to the Nationalist Chinese Navy. Her sister, USS Wake would remain at Shanghai, with a much-reduced crew, acting as a station ship. USS Oahu and the USS Luzon, with Rear Admiral William Glassford, commander of the Yangtze Patrol onboard left Shanghai on the 28th November, bound for Manila, sailing through a typhoon, arriving on the 5th December. USS Mindanao, a sister to Luzon, based at Hong Kong, left there on the 4th December, arriving in Manila on the 10th.

And lastly, Hart had been able to get his wish to move the 4th ‘China’ Marines Regiment to the Philippines. In some haste two passenger/cargo ships of the American President Lines, the SS President Madison and SS President Harrison, were chartered by the US Navy, sent to Shanghai, where after a quick conversion to carry troops, loaded half each of the Marine Regiment, along with evacuated US Citizens, and sailed to Manila. SS Harrison arrived on the 30th November, SS President Madison on the 1st December.

What arrived was a Marine Regiment of two battalions, 1st and 2nd, headquarters company and service company totalling 44 officers and 728 men, one company short in each battalion and each company down to two platoons. Some of the missing platoons were rebuilt by disbanding the regimental band and absorbing the Marine detachment at Olongapo. The regiment’s overall shortage of manpower was due to the Marines sent out to replace the sick, service expired and transferred out, from Shanghai, had been held back in Manila to minimise the potential loss of the regiment in China. Those Marines had been formed at the beginning of May, into the 1st Special Defense Battalion, equipped with 3-inch AA artillery and heavy machine guns. At the beginning of the new year, they would be absorbed back into the 4th Marines, becoming its 3rd battalion. Little did the rank and file know of the storm that was to be unleashed on them in the coming weeks and months.

The Marines assigned to the Defense Battalion were in 2 groups the Cavite AAA Batteries and the Olopongo AAA Batteries. The Cavite Batteries operated 3 batteries of fixed 3"/50 Cal AAA guns, 4 guns to a battery, spread between Cavite and Sangley Point 1 battery of 3"/23 cal AAA guns along the Cavite waterfront and a Battery of .50 cal AA MG, spread between the 3 " batteries. The Olonpongo batteries were 4 x 4 M-3, 3" mobile Army AAA guns with trucks for prime movers, and 1 battery of .50 cal AAAMG, again spread between the guns.

 

[Butchpfd]

I don't have my Fahey's nearby. So I have to defer to NavSource here. This lists 5 ton booms, which from the photos, appears to be refueling the inboard surviving four stackers from the Asiatic Fleet. Are the booms adequate for Unrep? Maybe.

An aside, the USS Victoria seems to be named after the Australian river.

Fleet Oiler (AO) Photo Index

STARBOARD BROADSIDE VIEW OF THE TANKER USS VICTORIA (AO-46) (EX-GEORGE G.HENRY). SHE HAS BEEN ...

www.awm.gov.au

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/2g8hp1

I believe that as long as speed were slow enough the 5 ton booms would be sufficient.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

What was in the tanker...crude oil, or a refined product?

Crude oil is highly flammable, due to its significant fraction of benzene, toluene and other light aromatics/aliphatics. Refined oils, at least other than the lightest grades, are much less so. Bunker oil is hardly flammable at all, without fairly extreme heating.

A refined product, ready for use, would be much more convenient to have on hand in the event that war commences. Operating refineries are very flammable targets for bombing. During WWII, they also typically could not be operated in a "blackout" mode because they necessarily had open-flame "flares" to get rid of unwanted gaseous byproducts.

Hi JWilly48519, I don't know what oil she carried, or if it was a mix of cargo, if she had several tanks, but she delayed fleeing Manila, still at pier 7 pumping oil to storage tanks on 12th December. However her history prior to this is one of refuelling ships at anchor, or storage tanks, and having left Manila on the 14th, I believe, she filled her tanks with bunker oil at Balikpapan on the 20th. I've held the understanding that you couldn't just fill up the tanks with whatever oil took your fancy, unless you were able to then clean the tanks, thus avoiding contamination of oils. So my presumption is she was simply a carrier of fuel (bunker) oil, but I may be wrong.

As to her replenishment capabilities, clearly she was able to replenish while moored, with ships alongside, using her 5 ton booms. She did this during late 1941 and early 1942, before she had her extensive conversion. This happened between April and November 1942, at Sydney, Australia., where she was given a large armament fit. I can imagine an improvement of crew quarters, in part due to the increase in number owing to the added gun crews, probable improvements in comms equipment and a general clean and overhaul of the ship, including a hull scrap, shed been reduced to a mere 7 knots due to seaweed growth. But I don't know about any improvements in replenishment capabilities.

However https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/8108.html has plenty of entries of the now newly named USS Victoria in underway replenishment exercises with various ships, training them in the art.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Monday 01 December;

They sailed out in divisions, first the three submarines I.53, I.54 and I.55 of SubDiv 18, then half an hour later I.56, I.57 and I.58 of SubDiv 19, the other half of SubRon 4, leaving their flagship, the light cruiser Kinu, submarine tender Nagoya Maru and Rear Adm Yoshitomi Setsuzo, in Samah harbour, Hainan. An hour later four minelayer submarines, loaded with 42 mines each, I.121, I.122, I.123 and I.124, set sail, on the same course. Yoshitomi, in his flag ship, Kinu, would sail later with the invasion fleet, and cruise off the island of Poulo Condore, SE Indochina, maintaining a radio link with his submarines, while later, the submarine tender would sail with other support ships, and re-base in Cam Ranh Bay.

Their orders were sealed, other than those to precede south at 10 knots, heading for a point south of Saigon, before opening their letters, unless they received the signal Climb Mt Niitaka, in which case they were to open them immediately. Given what they were, and Japan’s tactical use of submarines, it wouldn’t be hard to determine their use, which in this case was for SubDiv 18 to form a picket line SE of Kuantan, between the islands of Tioman and Jemaja, while SubDiv 19 would do the same off Dungun, from Pulau Tenggol. I.121 and I.122 to lay mines along the Malayan coast off Benut, before forming a patrol line across the edge of the Singapore Straits. The other two minelayers were attached to the Philippines invasion forces, and would soon divert away, I.123 tasked with laying mines in the Balabac Straits of the tip of northern Borneo, and I.124 laying mines off Manila Bay. All boats were to be in place by 18.00, 6th Dec, except minelayers I.121 & I.122, which wouldn’t be at the Straits until 24 hours later.

Late on the afternoon of the second day a USN Catalina flying a long-range reconnaissance mission sighted ten submarines sailing in formations, heading south, and duly reported back to Manila, news of the sightings forwarded onto Singapore and Batavia.

However, there had been a change of plan, not to these units, but to SubRon 5, which on the 26th November, had left Sasebo for the Japanese Mandate Island of Palau, in the South Pacific, to provide support to the Philippines invasion. This unit was led by Rear Adm Daigo Tadashige, in his flagship Yura, a sister ship of Kinu. It was a smaller unit, with only 4 submarines, I.62 and I.64 in SubDiv 29, and in SubDiv 30 were I.65 and I.66.

Two days later, while at sea in transit, in response to the news of Force Z, they were reallocated to the Malaya invasion force, and diverted to Samah, Hainan Island. It was decided all four submarines would reinforce the Dungun picket line, extending it out to 100 Nmi off the coast, at 10 Nmi intervals, but would be late on station, as would not be able to leave Samah until the 5th December, the Yura would play the same role as Kinu as a radio relay, cruising south of Cape Ca Mau.