1941, Wednesday 26 November;
Despite the loss of the 5th South African Bde, and the mauling of XXX Corps, Auchinleck took a different view to the situation than Cunningham, and on arriving at his Eighth Army HQ, cancelled Cunningham’s orders to retreat, and gave him written orders to continue the attack. He reasoned that although XXX Corps tank losses were grievous, the Germans must have suffered heavy losses as well, and their supplies, never good, must be severely stretched at this point. The Tobruk garrison was now transferred under XIII Corps, and Heath was given responsibility for capturing the El Duda and Sidi Rezegh ridges, while XXX Corps would now screen them from the south.
Rommel, however, was having very different thoughts, and instead of the more conventional strategy of holding Sidi Rezegh, and finishing off XXX Corps, concerned over the plight of his frontier garrisons, he chose a more daring option, to relieve the pressure on them by driving east, getting behind the British lines, capturing their supply dumps, and routing the 8th Army, exactly what Cunningham feared. Despite Cruwell’s, CO of the Afrika Korps, prostrations, by 10am, Monday 24th, Rommel was with the leading elements of the Korps, making “the dash for the wire”.
They drove hard and fast, those British formations caught in their path scattering, desperate to avoid destruction. A few units on the peripheral of the advance chipped away at the passing German units, but their effect was negligible. In six hours, they drove 100 Kms, closing on the Libyan/Egyptian frontier, but as yet they hadn’t found any supply dumps. Rommel formed a plan for 15th Panzer Division to turn north, retake Fort Capuzzo, and relieve Bardia, while 21st Panzer would continue east, behind the 4th Indian Division, before swinging north and nicely capturing it in a pocket. But the hurried drive east, meant that both Panzer divisions were strung out and needed the night to regroup.
Owing to the large clouds of dust raised, RAF reconnaissance struggled to give a clear picture of what was happening, but enough for Cunningham to become increasingly alarmed, ordering units everywhere to take defensive measures. Auchinleck, who hadn’t left Eighth Army HQ yet, tempered Cunningham’s instructions, and only the 5th Indian Bde was moved back to cover the railhead at Misheifa, the rest of 4th Indian Division would stand fast where they were, while the 22nd Guards Bde was moved south to cover the two big forward supply dumps in the desert.
While his forces prepared for their coming attack, Rommel pushed on east, crossing the wire alone with his personal staff in the captured British Dorchester armoured command truck, now named Max, to reconnoitre the Halfaya Pass. Nothing of interest was found but, and with night falling, they turned back, unfortunalty the truck broke down out on open ground. Fortune favoured him, passing British vehicles showed no interest in a lone ‘British’ senior officer’s vehicle and after an hour he was picked up, but the driver got lost in the dark, missing the path through the wire, and they had to wait until dawn next morning, before re-crossing the wire and returning to the Panzer Divisions.
Tuesday 25th, and the German plan unfolded badly, the 21st Panzers attacked the Indian 7th Bde near Sidi Omar, but the defenders were ready, and in a bruising encounter, with 25 Pdrs of the British Artillery, the Germans were beaten back, a second attack in the afternoon met the same fate. Leaving the Indians, 21st Panzer continued northwards towards Sollum. The 15th Panzers, west of the wire, weren’t having much luck either, still badly disorganised, and running short of supplies, they were harried by the RAF as they moved north towards Sidi Azeiz on the Trigh Capuzzo. By the end of the day, little had been achieved.
Meanwhile, for the British, this German diversion of effort had produced some good news, despite the fear and confusion in Cunningham’s HQ. Firstly, these quiet days had allowed 7th Armoured Division to rest, repair and regroup. 7th Armoured Brigade was withdrawn to Egypt for a refit, it’s few remaining tanks given over to 4th and 22nd Bdes, who, along with 7ths Support Bde, were able to regain some strength. Furthermore, with the 5th Bde left at Sidi Azeiz, and outside Bardia, the rest of the New Zealand Division was steadily pushing along the Trig Capuzzo towards Sidi Rezegh, putting the German and Italian defenders under pressure and threatening to link up with the Tobruk garrison.
Rommel met his Afrika Corps leader, Cruwell in the morning to discuss what to do next. The news from Tobruk wasn’t good, the British were getting close to breaking the siege, but despite Cruwell’s request that they head back to Tobruk, Rommel still wanted to relieve the pressure on his frontier garrisons. Nevertheless, still somewhat disorganised, short on supplies, their efforts gained little. 21st Panzer continued northwards, re-crossing the frontier, and smashing through the New Zealand 28th Maori battalion, reaching Bardia by midnight, where they could resupply. 15th Panzer reached Sidi Azeiz, overrunning the New Zealand 5th Bde HQ, and capturing its commander, Brigadier James Hargest. In the evening Rommel spoke with Cruwell and his divisional commanders, instead of a spectacular success, with the British routed, the “dash to the wire” had proved to be a failure, while the situation around Tobruk was dire. The initiative had been lost, along with a good portion of the potency of the Afrika Korps, and a humiliating withdraw back to Tobruk was called for.
But Cunningham wasn’t around to see Rommel’s withdraw, he’d been relieved of command and was on his way to hospital, being admitted as sick! Auchinleck had lost faith in him, convinced he had lost his nerve. Cunningham was worn out, had never really got to grips with managing tank formations, relying too much on junior, ‘expert’ tank commanders and the only reason he hadn’t gone sooner was for a lack of a replacement. The two obvious commanders Auchinleck could have replaced him with were the two Corps commanders, Norrie and Heath, but this would have disrupted things right in the middle of battle as their replacement would have reverberated all the way down the chain of command, as officers left units to take promotions. Auchinleck didn’t have a ready replacement, couldn’t wait for one to be flown out of Britain, so he promoted his own deputy Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Neil Ritchie, who, although clearly capable, had never commanded anything higher than a battalion, and was very junior in rank to both Norrie and Heath. But Auchinleck reasoned, that he would remain to guide Ritchie through the rest of the battle.
And so, we leave this see saw battle, with Rommel now desperately heading back to Sidi Rezegh, having failed to deliver the knockout blow, while Auchinleck will now manage the British forces through the very green Ritchie, his infantry close to gaining the escapements south of Tobruk.
