ctayfor

Monthly Donor
Or, to quote @David Flin from a discussion over on Sea Lion Press:
Amateurs talk tactics, Intense Nerds With An Unhealthy Interest in War talk Logistics, Professionals talk women/sport/promotion prospects - delete as appropriate (*and food, as pointed out later)
:)
But yes, I agree that too many authors neglect/ignore supply lines (not just here - published authors too), so it's great to see logistics being covered appropriately ITTL.
As a veteran of the New Zealand Army, I don't think the intense nerd characterisation quite fits me, but I do have to admit the realistic quality of what professionals usually talk about.


Oh, and I too have long been an admirer of Bill Slim.
 
Last edited:
As a veteran of the New Zealand Army, I don't think the intense nerd characterisation quite fits me, but I do have to admit the realistic quality of what professionals usually talk about.


Oh, and I too have long been an admirer of Bill Slim.
I agree. As a veteran of the Australian Army I am a little bit closer to Bill Slim, than you. I was always impressed after I read if him as Governor-General receiving a Parade and he stood deliberately out from under the canopy in order to receive the salute in the rain. If his troops were to get wet so was he! It was the attention to detail which endeared him to his troops. He had on display the surrendered swords of Japanese commanders he had defeated in WWII. When the Japanese PM visited Oz in 1956 he called on Slim out of courtesy. Slim had the Swords placed on prominent display and the Japanese PM studiously ignored them but an underling did not and allowed a look to appear on his face which told what was thought of the matter. Slim was a master General!.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
First Battle of Alamein.

Auk planned to stop Rommel and he did.
Hi Mark1878, I hold the opinion that maybe Auchinleck was promoted above his best level, if he had been commander of the Eighth Army instead of Cunningham, I think Rommel's reputation would have been somewhat less than it is. Unfortunately he'd already been promoted, taking over from Wavell, but I wonder how the Wavell/Auchinleck team would have worked. That's not to say he wasn't capable as a theatre commander, but he wasn't good at identifying talent, he made some poor choices.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Or, to quote @David Flin from a discussion over on Sea Lion Press:
Amateurs talk tactics, Intense Nerds With An Unhealthy Interest in War talk Logistics, Professionals talk women/sport/promotion prospects - delete as appropriate (*and food, as pointed out later)
:)
But yes, I agree that too many authors neglect/ignore supply lines (not just here - published authors too), so it's great to see logistics being covered appropriately ITTL.
Hi FriendlyGhost, the combat element of any battle, campaign, war is always the sexy bit, logistics are for the anoraks, just look at how many books there are on logistics. I would write more on this side of warfare, but getting the information of how much a truck, plane, train or ship can carry, how far they can go, and how fast, the loading and unloading, and systems used to manage all that is difficult. If anyone who can point me towards more detail on this subject, I'd be grateful.
 
Hi Mark1878, I hold the opinion that maybe Auchinleck was promoted above his best level, if he had been commander of the Eighth Army instead of Cunningham, I think Rommel's reputation would have been somewhat less than it is. Unfortunately he'd already been promoted, taking over from Wavell, but I wonder how the Wavell/Auchinleck team would have worked. That's not to say he wasn't capable as a theatre commander, but he wasn't good at identifying talent, he made some poor choices.
There is some wisdom to that, but Auchinleck also does a fairly good job as Commander in Chief in India, particularly with the mobilisation of the non-martial races.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The to my mind greatest British General of WWII, Uncle Bill, William Slim, even during his most challenging campaign, the race from Mandalay to Rangoon in 1944. Didn’t seek to use Japanese resources, despite being on the wrong end of a very torturous supply chain, while he did require his troops to go on half rations towards the end, he never planned to use Japanese supplies. And he was so confident of his victory, that he told his armoured forces that they could dump their tanks into the sea, which some did, and he would get them new tanks as replacements. Not only did he make good on his promise, the replacement tanks were better than those they had been using, they exchanged their broken down Honey’s for brand new Sherman’s. That is an example of not only a brilliant General, but also a fantastic logistics manager, who in some of the most difficult terrain in the world at the time, at the end of probably the most convoluted supply chain of the war, was able to both defeat an enemy and supply his forces.

RR.
Hi RampRat, did I read somewhere that Bill Slim pointed out the fantastic logistical support he was receiving was in part, thanks to Auchinleck?
 

Mark1878

Donor
Hi Mark1878, I hold the opinion that maybe Auchinleck was promoted above his best level, if he had been commander of the Eighth Army instead of Cunningham, I think Rommel's reputation would have been somewhat less than it is. Unfortunately he'd already been promoted, taking over from Wavell, but I wonder how the Wavell/Auchinleck team would have worked. That's not to say he wasn't capable as a theatre commander, but he wasn't good at identifying talent, he made some poor choices.
I have seen other commentators say that Auchinleck made bad choices of subordinates (although the main example seems to be Dorman-Smith) but at that time the UK did not have many successful generals. Cunningham had just done a good job in clearing East Africa so was in theatre and so might have been chosen by any commander. The error in choosing army commander was probably not replacing Ritchie as soon as possible by one of the Corps Commanders who were better fits as suggested in your write up of the battle.
 
Last edited:
MWI 41112715 Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act (1941)

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 27 November,

It had all begun with the sailing of the 27th Australian Brigade to Singapore back in August, and a previous commitment made that Australia would provide troops to garrison a number of strategic Dutch islands to the north, part in defence of the Dutch East Indies, and part in a forward defence of Australia, herself. With the 27th Brigade, the last troops of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force, raised to fight on foreign soil, gone, who would garrison these outposts.

Australia still had plenty of troops for home defence, the Citizen Military Forces or Militia, but by the government Defence Act of 1903 these forces were precluded from serving outside Australian territory. One answer was to raise yet more 2nd AIF units, but the idea of serving as garrison units in the backwaters of island chain was less than appealing. And there was a moral argument that Australia shouldn’t be relying on her volunteers for her defence, the conscripted should play a bigger part. So, the other answer was modifying the Defence Act, and allow Militia units to rotate duties there.

The Australian government under Robert Menzies had only managed to remain in power thanks to the support of two independents, it remained so when Menzies resigned and Arthur Fadden took his place, but only lasted another 40 days, when the two independents crossed the floor and joined the Australian Labour party in opposition, causing the government to fall. Governor-General Lord Gowrie was reluctant to call an election for a Parliament barely a year old, especially given the international situation. He summoned Coles and Wilson (the independents) and made them promise that if he named John Curtin, the Labour leader, Prime Minister, they would support him for the remainder of the Parliament to end the instability in government. The independents agreed, and Curtin was sworn in as Prime Minister on 7 October.

Still a minority government, but with the promised backing of the two independents, Curtin could effectively make some changes and one thing he looked at was the strategic defence of Australia. The way Australian troops had been used by Churchill and the British Chiefs Of Staff was something he was very unhappy about, and he was determined to ensure that there was more accountability as to their use. But what came with that was Australia having to play a more active role in her own defence, and not rely on the Singapore Strategy to defend her, a plan that was increasingly unlikely to happen, should Japan attack. And Japan was coming south, of that he was sure, it was just the when and how, which meant Australia had to be ready.

Despite opposition from some members of his own party, a number of opposition MPs supported him, and he was able to get the Defence (Citizens Military Forces) Act (1941) passed through parliament on the 27th November 1941. This extended the area the Militia (CMF) were allowed to serve in from the 110th to the 159th meridians of longitude up to the equator, for the duration of the war and up to six months of Australia ceasing to be involved in hostilities. From now on the Dutch East Indies islands to the north of Australia could have Australian Militia garrisons if the Governor General declared them as being territories of strategic importance to the defence of Australia.
 
Last edited:

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
OK, before Vetinari wakes up, I need to make you all aware this act didn't come into play until January 1943, about 13 months later, historically. So this is a major change, and we may well have some debate about how hard this would be for Curtin to effect in my timeline.
 
OK, before Vetinari wakes up, I need to make you all aware this act didn't come into play until January 1943, about 13 months later, historically. So this is a major change, and we may well have some debate about how hard this would be for Curtin to effect in my timeline.
Too late, cobber! If I can call you a cobber? Yes it is early, far too early for Australia. Australia had been assured for decades that Singapore was the key to it's defence. Menzies had harped on it many times in Parliament and even Curtin had backed it for at least a decade before. Australia had fought a hard battle against the imposition of conscription in WWI. It had fought two referenda and both had been defeated. We had a history of conscription for home defence but not for overseas service. We simply did not believe in compelling men to fight foreign wars overseas, so any changes had to be subtle and limited initially to how Australian territory was defined so New Guinea and the New Guinea islands were OK but Dutch islands in Indonesia or anywhere else were not. This feeling has lasted to today, the Vietnam War experience proved that. We don't mind fighting overseas, in fact we rather enjoy it but we don't like being compelled to do it. It took the imposition of an existential threat from Japan to make us question it.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Hi Vetinari, I'm a Tottenham Hotspurs fan (I've spelt that out fully for our American cousins who might think I like basketball), so Cobber sits very well with me at the moment! I'm a little confused by some of this, but as I understand it, the CMF could be sent to Port Moresby and Rabaul as theses were part of Papua New Guinea, which was an Australian administered League of Nations mandate, but not to Timor, part of the Dutch East Indies.
 
Too late, cobber! If I can call you a cobber?
If you won't I will. Fatboy has been more than fair regarding Australian efforts.
However, I do agree with Vetinari. Curtin was fervently opposed to doing anything other than defend Australia with conscripts. Look at his WW1 efforts! This is a serious change in Australian politics and I do not think it has the legs it needs to stand on. There was a way to fix this as conscript unts were able to opt to be AIF rather than Militia if IIRC 70% voted to change. Not sure when this was enacted or the percentage so may need a bit more research. Or just bring it forward. Just suggest that certain units, say most of a particular Brigade voted to be AIF and the problem is solved. The benefits. among others, were subsidised home loans, veterans assistance for medical problems, and others that I can't recall at this moment but I know my dad was grateful for. And with a depression behind them, such assistance backed by govt decree was looked on as well worth the effort, probably in this case, if they were only expected to garrison some obscure Dutch islands.
 
Hi FriendlyGhost, the combat element of any battle, campaign, war is always the sexy bit, logistics are for the anoraks, just look at how many books there are on logistics. I would write more on this side of warfare, but getting the information of how much a truck, plane, train or ship can carry, how far they can go, and how fast, the loading and unloading, and systems used to manage all that is difficult. If anyone who can point me towards more detail on this subject, I'd be grateful.
I‘d to go public domain first:

The various US Service histories cover logistics- Naval History and Heritage command has a monograph expressly devoted to the development of the fleet train, and the Army has a green book on Army Service Forces. In addition, logistics operations are woven through the campaign histories. For example, the “Fall of the Philippines” has a ration table as an appendix. They’re a good start, but I’ve found them to be long on the fighting and somewhat short on the fueling and fixing. There are some narrower scope histories- for example, the US Army Transportation Corps has a monograph on logistics over the shore (LOTS) that breaks down different landing craft and handling equipment as well as case studies. I’d also recommend old issues of branch magazines- despite “Armor“/“Cavalry Journal“ clearly being the best, ”Quartermaster”, “Army Logistician”, and others have some good work. Finally, the various service schools and some universities have papers, etc available- many senior U.S. Army logisticians have digitized interviews and documents on file at the Army Heritage and Education Center, and others are publicly accessible in university libraries (LSU and Texas A&M both had good collections). The Amphibious Warfare School and the Combined Arms Center libraries are both great search points as well.

Logistics can tend be to make dry reading, especially when you get into the details (what’s more interesting: the S6 getting sat-modems to connect the biometric computers or 3rd platoon catching theater HVI #188 after a successful raid and biometric confirmation?). That said, little logistical details can make a real impact on operations. Imagine the difference small things, like somebody ensuring availability and issue of mosquito nets for every trooper on Bataan, would make in history. First hand memoirs from line soldiers to strategic leaders tend to be pretty heavy on the impact of logistics (for example, how many times does George MacDonald Fraser talk about food and resupply in Quartered Safe Out Here).

“Beans+Bullets=Buttkicking”- Support Platoon Motto
 
Last edited:
I'm very limited in my knowledge of 1940's Australian politics, but I agree that getting the Militia to garrison Dutch territories is a big enough change that it wouldnt have happened without a POD caused by the changes made so far in this time line.

Perhaps the greater efforts and urgency shown by the command team in Malaya is being noted in Australia, with the Australians coming to the conclusion that the Poms clearly think war with Japan is imminent so they had better do something about their own defence. Or perhaps a less ASB option would be that one of the independent MP's thinks this and strongly favours getting the Milita to defend Australia further forward, this becomes their price to support the Curtin government?
 
Would the Dutch national government in exile have been willing to entertain some sort of transfer or complex sharing with Australia of "ownership" of territories, in order to finesse the question?

Obviously it would have less value for the Dutch to "own" 100% of Japanese-occupied territory, than some share, at least via cultural and economic ties, of an ally's territory
 
Last edited:
Hi FriendlyGhost, the combat element of any battle, campaign, war is always the sexy bit, logistics are for the anoraks, just look at how many books there are on logistics. I would write more on this side of warfare, but getting the information of how much a truck, plane, train or ship can carry, how far they can go, and how fast, the loading and unloading, and systems used to manage all that is difficult. If anyone who can point me towards more detail on this subject, I'd be grateful.
To be honest, I don't think your TL actually needs that level of detail. There's a fine line between acknowledging the difficulties / noting good/bad events (which you've done) and delving so deep into the numbers that the big picture disappears. There's a place for that sort of thing, but it's in logistical studies, not here - at least in my opinion*. I'm really enjoying your TL just as it is.

Having said that, if you want some more information, here's some links (the first listed is probably the most useful):
The author of the PhD thesis mentioned above later wrote a book with more detail: Military Economics, Culture and Logistics in the Burma Campaign, 1942–1945 by Graham Dunlop.
* I have been known to be wrong occasionally, though ;):p
 
Would the Dutch national government in exile have been willing to entertain some sort of transfer or complex sharing with Australia of "ownership" of territories, in order to finesse the question?
Certainly not. Not in the least because such a diplomatic move will run the risk of Japanese intervention before the treaty would in fact be signed.
EDIT: OTL colonial sensitivity mandated that the Dutch had to at least be nominally in control.
 
I‘d to go public domain first:

The various US Service histories cover logistics- Naval History and Heritage command has a monograph expressly devoted to the development of the fleet train, and the Army has a green book on Army Service Forces. In addition, logistics operations are woven through the campaign histories. For example, the “Fall of the Philippines” has a ration table as an appendix. They’re a good start, but I’ve found them to be long on the fighting and somewhat short on the fueling and fixing. There are some narrower scope histories- for example, the US Army Transportation Corps has a monograph on logistics over the shore (LOTS) that breaks down different landing craft and handling equipment as well as case studies. I’d also recommend old issues of branch magazines- despite “Armor“/“Cavalry Journal“ clearly being the best, ”Quartermaster”, “Army Logistician”, and others have some good work. Finally, the various service schools and some universities have papers, etc available- many senior U.S. Army logisticians have digitized interviews and documents on file at the Army Heritage and Education Center, and others are publicly accessible in university libraries (LSU and Texas A&M both had good collections). The Amphibious Warfare School and the Combined Arms Center libraries are both great search points as well.

Logistics can tend be to make dry reading, especially when you get into the details (what’s more interesting: the S6 getting sat-modems to connect the biometric computers or 3rd platoon catching theater HVI #188 after a successful raid and biometric confirmation?). That said, little logistical details can make a real impact on operations. Imagine the difference small things, like somebody ensuring availability and issue of mosquito nets for every trooper on Bataan, would make in history. First hand memoirs from line soldiers to strategic leaders tend to be pretty heavy on the impact of logistics (for example, how many times does George MacDonald Fraser talk about food and resupply in Quartered Safe Out Here).

“Beans+Bullets=Buttkicking”- Support Platoon Motto

Logistics: Bullets, Beans, and Black Oil (US Navy Logisitcs in WW2)

(Truth be told, I haven't read this yet myself, but I have heard this book praised to the skies by several respected members on this site)
I have read it and have a copy. Absolutely necessary to understand the Pacific war.
It is the true primer to logistics at sea. Also You Tube video "6 Oilers"
 
Top