Hell honestly by modern standards unless you have CVN's, its a bloody long way to go.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Hell honestly by modern standards unless you have CVN's, its a bloody long way to go.
Allegedly in shallow waters the river pilot could walk ahead of the Insect class to show them the way.
It took about 40% of the Imperial navy's oiler fleet, and the final run in included barrels of oil strapped to destroyer decks, and the option to scuttle destroyers if necessary.
It is probably the best example of a High Risk High Reward naval operation in the 20th Century.
Mark1878
Donor
In theory but in practice not.
Look at what Grey agreed with France and other things without fully telling the Cabinet let alone Parliament before 1914.
Not much, actually. That was part of the problem. Grey initially encouraged already existing staff discussion between Britain and France to continue. He informed Haldane (Secretary of War) and they shortly after informed the PM. These three agreed to not bring it in front of the rest of cabinet.
And that’s about the extent of it. At pretty much every opportunity Grey reiterated previously agreed diplomatic support for France but rejected any and all suggestions that Britain was bound to support France militarily in the event of war, in spite of his personal belief that such a course was necessary for Britain to maintain her interests.
He could, perhaps, be considered to be insufficiently clear in communication at times, allowing his opposites to form incorrect opinions. But he did not enroll Britain in a war without their knowledge.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
And had he been asked a question by someone who was informed, in the chamber, he would have had no option other than to give a true explanation of his actions. However as ArtosStack points out he did inform the PM and SoW of the nature of his decisions, and it was their collective decision not to report to their fellow members of Cabinet, or the House, what was going on. After WWI, the opportunity of any Foreign Secretary to indulge in such secret activities, was virtually nil, though the PM during the Suez Crisis in 1956, manage to pull a fast one over Parliament, with the Anglo, French, Israeli deal.
RR.
I would agree that there are sheer distances involved. However, there were the USN Fleet Problems XIX and XXI in near time, 1938 and 1940 respectively. These addressed the Hawaiian waters. There are various other Fleet Problems which involved attacks on the Panama Canal Zone defenses. The one that comes to mind is Fleet Problem IX.
It was in 1938 that then CNO ADM Leahy directed RADM Nimitz to develop the side by side UNREP. This replaced, for the most part, the towline refuel system. There was
a requirement to figure out how to maintain the fleet over long transits.
I mention this, as these concepts were coming from the "Big Gun Navy" types. The CZ and TH are seen as vulnerable outposts by the "hide bound" USN Admirals. There
is an understanding that "excessive distances" will require better replenishment techniques. So there is some understanding of what is involved for both sides to attack each other,
And FDR goes and fires his most attuned Admiral, ADM Richardson, so that he can play Lord of the Realm himself. Perhaps GEN Willoughby was advising not only Field Marshall MacArthur, but also FDR.
If you are using modern standards, let's not forget SSN's...
USS Louisville (SSN-724) - Wikipedia
USS Louisville (SSN-724) - Wikipedia
14,000 nm. Point Loma (San Diego) to launch point Lat. (classified), Long. (classified); Red Sea.
We are discussing surface action/ Air GroupsIf you are using modern standards, let's not forget SSN's...
USS Louisville (SSN-724) - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
The distance from Mayport, FL to the Red Sea is maybe 6400 nm. The boiler fired Saratoga CV-60, made a high speed run from
Mayport to the Red Sea in August 1990. The distance was covered in 15 days. They stayed on station for five months, before
attacking Iraq with CAW 17 in January 1991.
The distance from Etorofu to Pearl Harbor is around 3000 nm. The Kido Butai force launch and recovery points were near
300 miles North of Pearl, although the distance is about the same from the Kuriles.
The distance from Pearl to the Coral Sea is somewhere around 3300 nm. The sortie to interdict Shokaku, Zuikaku and Shoho
likely exceeded the outbound distance for of the IJN Pearl Strike.
I make mention of this as it points to Naval warfare was morphing away from the Battle Line concept. Certainly the RN, IJN and
USN leadership are aware of this. They are incorporating the concepts into their strategies. It was a bold gesture by the IJN, to
venture as far East as they did. However, it was a natural evolution in Naval Warfare.
The Armies and Air Forces, as well as public opinion were less well informed. So the Strike was seen as either an affirmation of
Divine National Spirit or as a Devilish Perfidious Treachery. It depended upon whether one was the bomber or the bombed.
The Naval professionals are a bit surprised as to the results, as well they should have been. Conclusive success versus abject
failure doesn't happen all that often. And in this case, the bookend to finish the war mirrors the one at the start of the war.
Just to highlight - it was Ernest King who had Saratoga strike Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Pearl Harbor NAS from the northwest in Fleer Problem XIX.
Rozhtdestvensky may have coaled at Cam Ranh Bay on the way to Tsushima in 1904, but it's really quite a long way from St. Petersburg to get there.
The USN had been doing UNREP since 1916 to get short-legged destroyers across the Atlantic.
In 1929, Fleet Problem IX had Saratoga's escorts "run out" of fuel and abandon it, leading to a requirement that capital ships be able to refuel escorts. Fleet Problems XIII and XIV in 1932 & 33 specifically included replenishment-at-sea exercises to that end.
Distance wasn't an issue; replenishment wasn't an insurmountable issue. Peacetime inertia was the Achilles' Heel for PH, in an institution that was not yet at war.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
First off are you referring to the American campaign in the Pacific, the British campaign in the Far East, or the combined Anglo American campaign against Japan? In the context of the Americans especially in the Pacific and the Philippines, very little has changed, other then a few meetings between MacArthur, Hart and the British commanders in Malaysia. If you are referring to the British in the Far East, London has appointed a new command team civil and military, while setting up a separate command based in Singapore, that also covers Hong Kong. And this is the major difference between OTL, and TTL, and from which all subsequent differences follow. This command team, has by a combination of mostly minor changes, especially in the attitude of the military and civil administration, improved training of the forces available, and integrating equipment that is functional obsolete in Europe only fit for training. But still has combat capabilities in the Far East against the Japanese, into the forces available, a prime example would be the Boys Anti Tank rifle, which was basically obsolete in Europe, but would be devastating against the week Japanese armour. While the general course of the war outside of Malaysia has progressed very much as it did IOTL, the changes made in primary Malaysia, mean that there is a very good chance, that the Japanese will fail to capture Malaya and Singapore, which will effect their campaign in Burma, and the DEI, and thus the entire Anglo American campaign against the Japanese.
RR.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The principal difference between all the Axis powers and two and a half of the Allied powers right from the start of the war, which can be said to be the Japanese campaign in China in 1937, was resources and logistics. Between the Americans and the British, they not only had access to a secure industrial base America that had a massive reserve capacity, but also the resources of skilled and semiskilled manpower, materials, and a safe secure environment to manufacture in. Britain too had access to a massive world wide secure supply of materials, and once the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, was able to operate its own very large industrial base, with very little fear of being bombed. The British merchant fleet was at the time the largest in the world, and with the addition of the refugee Dutch, Norwegian and Greek merchant fleets, plus the additional of a vastly expanded American merchant marine, was able to ship men and materials in quantities inconceivable to the Axis powers. The ability of the Cunard Queens to ship a complete American division across the Atlantic, was something that the Germans could only dream of. Between the Americans, British and Canadians, in addition to all the other ships that they built, they were able to build over 4,000 basic merchant ships during the war, that’s over twice the number of Tiger Tanks that the Germans produced. While at the same time they were able to build close to 50,000 four engine bombers, which enabled them to conduct intense bombing missions against Germany, Italy and Japan. Note that the British and the Americans, were able in addition to supplying all of their own needs, furnish equipment for the various Free Nations, and in the case of the British most of the equipment for the various dominion and colonial forces, while also supplying the Soviets and Chinese. In the Pacific once the Americans had gotten over the initial shock and failures, they unlike the Japanese were able via an ever expanding supply service, provide their forces with everything they need, including ice cream up to the front line. Unlike the troops and workers of the Axis Powers, no British or American worker went hungry, and the British weekly meat ration was greater than the German monthly ration, while American workers were able to eat meat twice a day. At no time during the war were the allies trying to capture resources to enable them to continue fighting, were as from day one, all of the axis powers had their eyes on capturing vital resources.
RR.
RR.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Apologies all, I've had a little email blip, which does tend to stifle ones abilities, but all sorted now.
I've enjoyed the discourse over the Hull note, and some of the background around it
I've enjoyed the discourse over the Hull note, and some of the background around it
Last edited:
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Parma, thank you for this, I will be exploring submarine strategy, both Allied and Japanese in coming posts, there's a lot to cover off!
MWI 41112609 The Kido Butai
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 26 November;
They had been anchored here for four days now, but finally, on the fifth day, with dawn just breaking, the signal lamps began to flicker, the fleet maintaining radio silence, and the ships began to raise steam and weigh anchor. 9am they left Hitokappu Bay, in the Kurile Islands and headed eastwards out into the North Pacific. Gradually they began to take station, following sailing orders. An economical speed was set, a steady 13 knots, so as to conserve fuel as much as possible, and also in recognition of the sea states they were sailing in.
A screen of the light cruiser Abukuma and four destroyers led the way, followed by the main body in two parallel columns, flanked by more destroyers. The heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma led the columns, followed by fleet carriers, Akagi, Kaga and Shokaku on the starboard side, and Soryu, Hiryu and Zuikaku on the port side. Following them were seven fleet oilers, assigned to one of two supply groups, group one with four oilers and group two with another three and joining them all was a supply ship. Lastly at the end of the columns were the fast battleships Kirishima and Hiei.
The presence of the seven oilers was critical, without them, they didn’t have enough fuel to get to Hawaii, and return, as it was, they had barely enough, certainly not enough for any complicated manoeuvres around Hawaii. And the refuelling would also be weather dependant, heavy seas would curtail any such activities. Indeed, if refuelling problems arose on the way there, the plans allowed for a reduced attack force of only the carriers Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku, sending the others back. On the return leg, the solution was a more drastic one of sacrificing the destroyers, and scuttling them.
The previous days had seen the aircrews of all six carriers assembled in the flagship, Akagi, where the plan of attack on Pearl Harbour was outlined by Vice Admiral Nagumo. This was followed up with more detail being given, using a mock-up of Pearl Harbour, by Captain Genda, who had planned the attack and Commander Fuchida, who would lead the first wave. Particular targets on the diorama were pointed out, while reference to the present status of warships based there, number of aircraft basing on every airfield and AA gun positions was given. Everyone was given pictures of American ships, islands near Oahu which could be used for forced landings, and told that friendly submarines would be at the marked positions to pick them up if they had to ditch.
Morale was high, all the hard training done in previous months now made sense, the reasons for the modified torpedoes now self-explanatory. The sheer breath-taking audacity of the plan filled them with excitement and pride that their seniors felt they were good enough to do such a thing. For many days coming they would be immersed in the minor details of their own roles in the attack, as they studied their orders.
The plan was to approach Hawaii from the north, appear out of nowhere and attack, and just as quickly, disappear back into the vast Pacific Ocean. On the return leg, back to Japan, they would be met by Yamamoto, and the six battleships, south of the Bonin Islands, and escorted back.
A well planned and elaborate system of false signalling using signalmen transferred from each of the ships assigned to the Kido Butai had been going on for several weeks now, with the ships gradually be phased over, the ships going silent, and an office on shore taking over, providing the US Naval Intelligence with ship transmissions to monitor, enabling the USN, through triangulation to fix the ships roughly in Japanese harbours.
Yesterday Nagumo had hosted a ceremonial banquet to the future victory, with the senior officers of the fleet. It had all ended with a toast from Nagumo, “good fight and good luck” to which the response was deafening. Now, at last, they were off, and for Nagumo, his Flag officers and planners, the next several days would be fraught with worry that they would be discovered, despite staying away from shipping lanes, as the force closed in on Pearl Harbour.
They had been anchored here for four days now, but finally, on the fifth day, with dawn just breaking, the signal lamps began to flicker, the fleet maintaining radio silence, and the ships began to raise steam and weigh anchor. 9am they left Hitokappu Bay, in the Kurile Islands and headed eastwards out into the North Pacific. Gradually they began to take station, following sailing orders. An economical speed was set, a steady 13 knots, so as to conserve fuel as much as possible, and also in recognition of the sea states they were sailing in.
A screen of the light cruiser Abukuma and four destroyers led the way, followed by the main body in two parallel columns, flanked by more destroyers. The heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma led the columns, followed by fleet carriers, Akagi, Kaga and Shokaku on the starboard side, and Soryu, Hiryu and Zuikaku on the port side. Following them were seven fleet oilers, assigned to one of two supply groups, group one with four oilers and group two with another three and joining them all was a supply ship. Lastly at the end of the columns were the fast battleships Kirishima and Hiei.
The presence of the seven oilers was critical, without them, they didn’t have enough fuel to get to Hawaii, and return, as it was, they had barely enough, certainly not enough for any complicated manoeuvres around Hawaii. And the refuelling would also be weather dependant, heavy seas would curtail any such activities. Indeed, if refuelling problems arose on the way there, the plans allowed for a reduced attack force of only the carriers Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku, sending the others back. On the return leg, the solution was a more drastic one of sacrificing the destroyers, and scuttling them.
The previous days had seen the aircrews of all six carriers assembled in the flagship, Akagi, where the plan of attack on Pearl Harbour was outlined by Vice Admiral Nagumo. This was followed up with more detail being given, using a mock-up of Pearl Harbour, by Captain Genda, who had planned the attack and Commander Fuchida, who would lead the first wave. Particular targets on the diorama were pointed out, while reference to the present status of warships based there, number of aircraft basing on every airfield and AA gun positions was given. Everyone was given pictures of American ships, islands near Oahu which could be used for forced landings, and told that friendly submarines would be at the marked positions to pick them up if they had to ditch.
Morale was high, all the hard training done in previous months now made sense, the reasons for the modified torpedoes now self-explanatory. The sheer breath-taking audacity of the plan filled them with excitement and pride that their seniors felt they were good enough to do such a thing. For many days coming they would be immersed in the minor details of their own roles in the attack, as they studied their orders.
The plan was to approach Hawaii from the north, appear out of nowhere and attack, and just as quickly, disappear back into the vast Pacific Ocean. On the return leg, back to Japan, they would be met by Yamamoto, and the six battleships, south of the Bonin Islands, and escorted back.
A well planned and elaborate system of false signalling using signalmen transferred from each of the ships assigned to the Kido Butai had been going on for several weeks now, with the ships gradually be phased over, the ships going silent, and an office on shore taking over, providing the US Naval Intelligence with ship transmissions to monitor, enabling the USN, through triangulation to fix the ships roughly in Japanese harbours.
Yesterday Nagumo had hosted a ceremonial banquet to the future victory, with the senior officers of the fleet. It had all ended with a toast from Nagumo, “good fight and good luck” to which the response was deafening. Now, at last, they were off, and for Nagumo, his Flag officers and planners, the next several days would be fraught with worry that they would be discovered, despite staying away from shipping lanes, as the force closed in on Pearl Harbour.
