If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?No, King and Nimitz wanted a fight, and quick, so the Navy wouldn't end up second fiddle to the Army, and they considered the Japanese almost a personal enemy.
If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?No, King and Nimitz wanted a fight, and quick, so the Navy wouldn't end up second fiddle to the Army, and they considered the Japanese almost a personal enemy.
I wonder if many people are aware of the distances and the incredible vastness of the operational theater. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies alone were at least of the same size as Europe, probably even larger, not to mention the distances from Japan and the distances to the other fronts.Pearl Harbour and certainly Brisbane are incredibly far from the DEI-Japan SLOCs. If a relatively safe harbour can be found in the DEI or somewhere in the SWP or Northern Australia those are much more preferable. Closer to SLOCs means more time for subs to hunt Japanese shipping.
If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?
Hi Merrick, thank you for entering the thorny issue of the alternative strategies of the Allies, if Malaya/Singapore are held, and the Japanese capture of the DEI is now contested. I agree, as I think most people will, on your assessment that the Japanese will remain true to their initial goals.None at all. The Japanese priority is to secure the Southern Resource Area. That's the whole point of the war. If they could think of a way to get Borneo and Sumatra without having to fight their way through the RN and USN they'd go for it, but that's not practical, so their objectives are:
1) Eliminate the major USN and RN bases at Manila/Subic Bay and Singapore
2) Grab Borneo, Java and Sumatra, plus as much else as they can get. The tin and rubber of Malaya would be nice, but the oil of Sumatra and Borneo is essential.
Until Borneo, Java and Sumatra are secured (and you can't secure Sumatra without at least neutralising Singapore), the Japanese aren't likely to be gadding off to New Guinea, Guadalcanal, Burma, Midway or anywhere that isn't the Philippines, the DEI or Malaya. Rabaul is a possibility - it's a nice harbour and it makes a good flank guard against the USN coming West.
I can't see FDR being able to allow this, given as without US help, the British and Dutch will fail to hold the DEI, and therefore Malaya/Singapore. The strategic planners, very conscious of the Japanese achilles heel being oil, would want to continue to try and deny them the DEI oilfields. Both the British and probably the Dutch oilfields in Borneo will be lost, but retaining Java would allow a constant interdiction of the Japanese oil tankers routes, as well as continued interruption of its production.In a mid-1942 where Midway hasn't happened and the Japanese are still bogged down in Java and Malaya, why send ships into the DEI, within range of Japanese land-based air and thousands of miles from Sydney or Perth, never mind Hawaii? Better to let the British and Dutch bleed the Japanese, while you build up for the first phase of the Central Pacific drive, probably in the Gilberts.
Hi Merrick, thanks for this, there is a big question over MacArthur, and I'll say now, I'm not going down the easy route of killing him off. So, asking all our American contributors really, who may be better versed at answering this, how do the political machinations of MacArthur, King, the British and anybody else play out in the command roles to be given under a working unified command.While dunking on MacArthur is the default position on this board, it's worth remembering that without him, there may have been no South-West Pacific command at all. The USN (especially) did not want to see its forces divided between the Central and South-West Pacific theatres, with the possibility of the Japanese concentrating on one and defeating them in detail. Without MacArthur stomping around Australia vowing to return, the US might well decide that the best way to prosecute the war is to leave the British to hold the Japanese in Burma, the Australians to hold the Japanese in New Guinea and concentrate everything on the Central Pacific drive to the Home Islands.
At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured. It could very well mean that the decisive battle falls in favour of the Japanese.If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.
Hi Aber, yes this is a major question for the timeline going forward.If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?
Hi Parma, I think a lot of people don't realise the distances, and the logistical challenges that brings.I wonder if many people are aware of the distances and the incredible vastness of the operational theater. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies alone were at least of the same size as Europe, probably even larger, not to mention the distances from Japan and the distances to the other fronts.
I thought the Japanese did not use the convoy system, which contributed to the large losses of shipping tonnage inflicted by USA submarines later in the conflict OTL.
Hi Sekhmet_D, yes it's hard not to see the Kido Butai not being committed, but quite where, when and how many carriers is the question.If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.
Hi HJ Tulp, Ouch! but a major Allied defeat won't mean the end of the war, but possibly extends it!At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured. It could very well mean that the decisive battle falls in favour of the Japanese.
Hi Parma, I think a lot of people don't realise the distances, and the logistical challenges that brings.
Didn't stop the USN IOTL. They aggressively took the fight to the Japanese almost from the outset in a way completely disproportionate to their outwardly inferior strength.At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured.
Yeah, Guadalcanal was the outer limits of US logistics then. And losing those transports was not something the Navy wanted to contemplate over too much, either. However, if Nimitz thinks the prize is worth the risk, he'll go for it, and damn the consequences of failure. Sure, it'll set things back by six months, but in six months he'll have replaced those losses and then some. However, not having that fleet train will be a pain in the ass in the meantime. If, however, the battle attrits the Japanese something fierce? Well, the US can replace their fleet train in months...it'll take the Japanese a year or more.Hi Aber, yes this is a major question for the timeline going forward.
While the British and Dutch hold, the Americans must come and help, as there is little more the British can give.
Denying the Japanese the ability of using what oilfields they have captured underlines the initial strategy of cutting off their oil supplies, and in my mind, has to be pursued.
We have a American political problem with retaining MacArthur in a command role
And the USN fleet train was very poor, it badly needed building up, before anyone says just move the US Pacific fleet to, lets say Australia, for arguments sake, that's logistically impossible. At best we are looking at a limited task force, but I'll ask the question now, can it include carriers, and how many?
The opening WW2TV show in their Philippines week overlaid the lower 48 states on the Philippines, very informative.![]()
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Maybe these maps helps,
British Malaya, Sarawak and British Guinea are unfortunatly not on it.
Hi Parma, that nails it, huge!![]()
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Maybe these maps helps,
British Malaya, Sarawak and British Guinea are unfortunatly not on it.
Hi Ltlconf, so are you suggesting Halsey replacing Hart (or his replacement), or more likely just commanding any carrier task force?Yeah, Guadalcanal was the outer limits of US logistics then. And losing those transports was not something the Navy wanted to contemplate over too much, either. However, if Nimitz thinks the prize is worth the risk, he'll go for it, and damn the consequences of failure. Sure, it'll set things back by six months, but in six months he'll have replaced those losses and then some. However, not having that fleet train will be a pain in the ass in the meantime. If, however, the battle attrits the Japanese something fierce? Well, the US can replace their fleet train in months...it'll take the Japanese a year or more.
Same with the Kido Butai. I agree that the Japanese hadn't been attrited at this point, but they still had the bulk of their A-Team at Midway and Nimitz knew his own air crews were nowhere near at good. And it showed: We got gutted too.
However, if we do go into the East Indies and pick our fight, he'll send the carriers in under Halsey's command, and he's creative. He'll pick his ground, likely one where land based aircraft can create a scenario where the Allies make up for their difference in skill with sheer mass...and then he'll go for it. Plus Halsey at this point wasn't drinking his own cool aid yet (that was years off), and the only Allied admiral with real skill at carrier ops so he will be the choice. In fact, many say he was better than Nagumo by a long ways even then. Nagumo was competent, but very by the book, cautious, and deliberate. Halsey was decisive, quick thinking, aggressive, and routinely thought outside the box. Halsey may lose alot of pilots, maybe even all of his carriers (remember, aggressive), but you know damn well know he'll play merry Hell with the Japanese too and he understands he's not there primarily just to win a battle, but the war. And they can't take the losses, the Japanese can't.
This is the guy who led the carrier raids deep into the Japanese Mandates early in the war, after all, then took on the Japanese in the Solomons, kicking their ass. Guy doesn't do doubt or fear, he just figures out how to make the other guy hurt, alot.
Oh, and Halsey thought MacArthur was a egotistical ass.
Of course, the general consensus is that in the long run the Japanese Empire is going to lose the war. And with good reason. The end is - practically - always going to entail a Japanese defeat, but that doesn't make all endings identicalHi HJ Tulp, Ouch! but a major Allied defeat won't mean the end of the war, but possibly extends it!
True. Though not in SEA. If it had been up to Hart the Asiatic Fleet would have given up the DEI and Malaya and ran to Australia.Didn't stop the USN IOTL. They aggressively took the fight to the Japanese almost from the outset in a way completely disproportionate to their outwardly inferior strength.
Wouldn't a lot depend on the fate of ABDACOM? If it's never disbanded then there will not be a British or American theater of operations, not SEA at least.Hi Ltlconf, so are you suggesting Halsey replacing Hart (or his replacement), or more likely just commanding any carrier task force?
And with such a big USN commitment, can this be placed under a British Theatre Commander?, if not, where do we redraw the theatre boundaries?