No, King and Nimitz wanted a fight, and quick, so the Navy wouldn't end up second fiddle to the Army, and they considered the Japanese almost a personal enemy.
If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?
 
Pearl Harbour and certainly Brisbane are incredibly far from the DEI-Japan SLOCs. If a relatively safe harbour can be found in the DEI or somewhere in the SWP or Northern Australia those are much more preferable. Closer to SLOCs means more time for subs to hunt Japanese shipping.
I wonder if many people are aware of the distances and the incredible vastness of the operational theater. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies alone were at least of the same size as Europe, probably even larger, not to mention the distances from Japan and the distances to the other fronts.
I thought the Japanese did not use the convoy system, which contributed to the large losses of shipping tonnage inflicted by USA submarines later in the conflict OTL.
 
If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?
If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
None at all. The Japanese priority is to secure the Southern Resource Area. That's the whole point of the war. If they could think of a way to get Borneo and Sumatra without having to fight their way through the RN and USN they'd go for it, but that's not practical, so their objectives are:
1) Eliminate the major USN and RN bases at Manila/Subic Bay and Singapore
2) Grab Borneo, Java and Sumatra, plus as much else as they can get. The tin and rubber of Malaya would be nice, but the oil of Sumatra and Borneo is essential.
Until Borneo, Java and Sumatra are secured (and you can't secure Sumatra without at least neutralising Singapore), the Japanese aren't likely to be gadding off to New Guinea, Guadalcanal, Burma, Midway or anywhere that isn't the Philippines, the DEI or Malaya. Rabaul is a possibility - it's a nice harbour and it makes a good flank guard against the USN coming West.
Hi Merrick, thank you for entering the thorny issue of the alternative strategies of the Allies, if Malaya/Singapore are held, and the Japanese capture of the DEI is now contested. I agree, as I think most people will, on your assessment that the Japanese will remain true to their initial goals.
In a mid-1942 where Midway hasn't happened and the Japanese are still bogged down in Java and Malaya, why send ships into the DEI, within range of Japanese land-based air and thousands of miles from Sydney or Perth, never mind Hawaii? Better to let the British and Dutch bleed the Japanese, while you build up for the first phase of the Central Pacific drive, probably in the Gilberts.
I can't see FDR being able to allow this, given as without US help, the British and Dutch will fail to hold the DEI, and therefore Malaya/Singapore. The strategic planners, very conscious of the Japanese achilles heel being oil, would want to continue to try and deny them the DEI oilfields. Both the British and probably the Dutch oilfields in Borneo will be lost, but retaining Java would allow a constant interdiction of the Japanese oil tankers routes, as well as continued interruption of its production.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
While dunking on MacArthur is the default position on this board, it's worth remembering that without him, there may have been no South-West Pacific command at all. The USN (especially) did not want to see its forces divided between the Central and South-West Pacific theatres, with the possibility of the Japanese concentrating on one and defeating them in detail. Without MacArthur stomping around Australia vowing to return, the US might well decide that the best way to prosecute the war is to leave the British to hold the Japanese in Burma, the Australians to hold the Japanese in New Guinea and concentrate everything on the Central Pacific drive to the Home Islands.
Hi Merrick, thanks for this, there is a big question over MacArthur, and I'll say now, I'm not going down the easy route of killing him off. So, asking all our American contributors really, who may be better versed at answering this, how do the political machinations of MacArthur, King, the British and anybody else play out in the command roles to be given under a working unified command.
 
If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.
At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured. It could very well mean that the decisive battle falls in favour of the Japanese.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
If the Japanese are slowed in Malaya and DEI, where will the US Navy want to fight?
Hi Aber, yes this is a major question for the timeline going forward.

While the British and Dutch hold, the Americans must come and help, as there is little more the British can give.
Denying the Japanese the ability of using what oilfields they have captured underlines the initial strategy of cutting off their oil supplies, and in my mind, has to be pursued.
We have a American political problem with retaining MacArthur in a command role
And the USN fleet train was very poor, it badly needed building up, before anyone says just move the US Pacific fleet to, lets say Australia, for arguments sake, that's logistically impossible. At best we are looking at a limited task force, but I'll ask the question now, can it include carriers, and how many?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I wonder if many people are aware of the distances and the incredible vastness of the operational theater. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies alone were at least of the same size as Europe, probably even larger, not to mention the distances from Japan and the distances to the other fronts.
I thought the Japanese did not use the convoy system, which contributed to the large losses of shipping tonnage inflicted by USA submarines later in the conflict OTL.
Hi Parma, I think a lot of people don't realise the distances, and the logistical challenges that brings.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
If the US Navy barges full force into the DEI to help the Brits and the Dutch, their presence could turn the stalemate into an Allied victory and expel the Japanese from the archipelago. Given how important the DEI is to the Japanese, it is easy to envision the Kido Butai being ordered straight to the Indies to provide naval support and accelerate the delayed timeline. Stage will be set for a decisive carrier battle between USN and IJN in Indonesian waters.
Hi Sekhmet_D, yes it's hard not to see the Kido Butai not being committed, but quite where, when and how many carriers is the question.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured. It could very well mean that the decisive battle falls in favour of the Japanese.
Hi HJ Tulp, Ouch! but a major Allied defeat won't mean the end of the war, but possibly extends it!
 
Hi Parma, I think a lot of people don't realise the distances, and the logistical challenges that brings.
NederlandsIndie-versus-Europa.jpg
UBBC_DigTentoonstellingen_Missie20%20-%20Talenkaart.jpg

Maybe these maps helps,
British Malaya, Sarawak and British Guinea are unfortunatly not on it.
 
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At this point IJN and IJA (air)power hasn't been artritted though, and on the allied side the build up hasn't occured.
Didn't stop the USN IOTL. They aggressively took the fight to the Japanese almost from the outset in a way completely disproportionate to their outwardly inferior strength.
 
Hi Aber, yes this is a major question for the timeline going forward.

While the British and Dutch hold, the Americans must come and help, as there is little more the British can give.
Denying the Japanese the ability of using what oilfields they have captured underlines the initial strategy of cutting off their oil supplies, and in my mind, has to be pursued.
We have a American political problem with retaining MacArthur in a command role
And the USN fleet train was very poor, it badly needed building up, before anyone says just move the US Pacific fleet to, lets say Australia, for arguments sake, that's logistically impossible. At best we are looking at a limited task force, but I'll ask the question now, can it include carriers, and how many?
Yeah, Guadalcanal was the outer limits of US logistics then. And losing those transports was not something the Navy wanted to contemplate over too much, either. However, if Nimitz thinks the prize is worth the risk, he'll go for it, and damn the consequences of failure. Sure, it'll set things back by six months, but in six months he'll have replaced those losses and then some. However, not having that fleet train will be a pain in the ass in the meantime. If, however, the battle attrits the Japanese something fierce? Well, the US can replace their fleet train in months...it'll take the Japanese a year or more.
Same with the Kido Butai. I agree that the Japanese hadn't been attrited at this point, but they still had the bulk of their A-Team at Midway and Nimitz knew his own air crews were nowhere near at good. And it showed: We got gutted too.
However, if we do go into the East Indies and pick our fight, he'll send the carriers in under Halsey's command, and he's creative. He'll pick his ground, likely one where land based aircraft can create a scenario where the Allies make up for their difference in skill with sheer mass...and then he'll go for it. Plus Halsey at this point wasn't drinking his own cool aid yet (that was years off), and the only Allied admiral with real skill at carrier ops so he will be the choice. In fact, many say he was better than Nagumo by a long ways even then. Nagumo was competent, but very by the book, cautious, and deliberate. Halsey was decisive, quick thinking, aggressive, and routinely thought outside the box. Halsey may lose alot of pilots, maybe even all of his carriers (remember, aggressive), but you know damn well know he'll play merry Hell with the Japanese too and he understands he's not there primarily just to win a battle, but the war. And they can't take the losses, the Japanese can't.
This is the guy who led the carrier raids deep into the Japanese Mandates early in the war, after all, then took on the Japanese in the Solomons, kicking their ass. Guy doesn't do doubt or fear, he just figures out how to make the other guy hurt, alot.
Oh, and Halsey thought MacArthur was a egotistical ass.
 
As for MacArthur, as I've stressed, the guy was a celebrity and national hero, across party lines, to the masses back home, and this was before the war. The spin he'll put on things in the Philippines will make him more so. They can't just shove him off. Due to his status, the point of sending him to Australia was showing the Australians that they'd not be written off. After all, MacArthur was too big to be ignored...though many in Washington wished they could!
However he was very much at the end of the list for men and material, and Nimitz only VERY reluctantly gave him any Naval assets, and then only on his own terms. MacArthur was kept on a shoestring to keep him on a leash. And it worked until his PR machine effectively blackmailed everyone into the Philippines Campaign. So MacArthur, like a cold sore, is going to stick around, very much a pain you just have to learn to live with. Maybe Sutherland can catch something and die? That'll help alot!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Yeah, Guadalcanal was the outer limits of US logistics then. And losing those transports was not something the Navy wanted to contemplate over too much, either. However, if Nimitz thinks the prize is worth the risk, he'll go for it, and damn the consequences of failure. Sure, it'll set things back by six months, but in six months he'll have replaced those losses and then some. However, not having that fleet train will be a pain in the ass in the meantime. If, however, the battle attrits the Japanese something fierce? Well, the US can replace their fleet train in months...it'll take the Japanese a year or more.
Same with the Kido Butai. I agree that the Japanese hadn't been attrited at this point, but they still had the bulk of their A-Team at Midway and Nimitz knew his own air crews were nowhere near at good. And it showed: We got gutted too.
However, if we do go into the East Indies and pick our fight, he'll send the carriers in under Halsey's command, and he's creative. He'll pick his ground, likely one where land based aircraft can create a scenario where the Allies make up for their difference in skill with sheer mass...and then he'll go for it. Plus Halsey at this point wasn't drinking his own cool aid yet (that was years off), and the only Allied admiral with real skill at carrier ops so he will be the choice. In fact, many say he was better than Nagumo by a long ways even then. Nagumo was competent, but very by the book, cautious, and deliberate. Halsey was decisive, quick thinking, aggressive, and routinely thought outside the box. Halsey may lose alot of pilots, maybe even all of his carriers (remember, aggressive), but you know damn well know he'll play merry Hell with the Japanese too and he understands he's not there primarily just to win a battle, but the war. And they can't take the losses, the Japanese can't.
This is the guy who led the carrier raids deep into the Japanese Mandates early in the war, after all, then took on the Japanese in the Solomons, kicking their ass. Guy doesn't do doubt or fear, he just figures out how to make the other guy hurt, alot.
Oh, and Halsey thought MacArthur was a egotistical ass.
Hi Ltlconf, so are you suggesting Halsey replacing Hart (or his replacement), or more likely just commanding any carrier task force?

And with such a big USN commitment, can this be placed under a British Theatre Commander?, if not, where do we redraw the theatre boundaries?
 
Hi HJ Tulp, Ouch! but a major Allied defeat won't mean the end of the war, but possibly extends it!
Of course, the general consensus is that in the long run the Japanese Empire is going to lose the war. And with good reason. The end is - practically - always going to entail a Japanese defeat, but that doesn't make all endings identical :)
Didn't stop the USN IOTL. They aggressively took the fight to the Japanese almost from the outset in a way completely disproportionate to their outwardly inferior strength.
True. Though not in SEA. If it had been up to Hart the Asiatic Fleet would have given up the DEI and Malaya and ran to Australia.

An important factor to consider is that Japan had interior lines of communication. If the United States Navy sends it's main fleet to SEA, it will take quite some time to get there and quite some time to get back if the Japanese decide to start operations in the Pacific instead. Of course we know that the IJN wasn't capable of an invasion of Hawaii, but the US didn't know that and had to plan for that eventuality.
 
Hi Ltlconf, so are you suggesting Halsey replacing Hart (or his replacement), or more likely just commanding any carrier task force?

And with such a big USN commitment, can this be placed under a British Theatre Commander?, if not, where do we redraw the theatre boundaries?
Wouldn't a lot depend on the fate of ABDACOM? If it's never disbanded then there will not be a British or American theater of operations, not SEA at least.
 
MWI 41102612 Attacking The Pillboxes

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Sunday 26 October;

The exercise was an attack by RED force on the defences of BLUE force around Aldwych Bay. Light infantry forces (RED) had landed in the bay and were now heading along the coastal road eastwards towards Lyemun barracks, and west to Taikoo Dockyards. The HKVDC manned pillboxes were the BLUE defending forces, along the coastal road, while two companies of the 1st battalion, Hong Kong (Chinese) Regt played as the RED force. B company HKCR had been stopped dead, her commanding officer dead along with half a platoon, from the fire of a pillbox set in a rocky outcrop, around a corner of the road. Major (T) Cyril Jones of the Royal Scots, was taking great delight as umpire, in killing off their progress.

The company, like the rest of the battalion had been ‘milked’ of a number of officers and men in September, for the 2nd battalion, and were still short of about 20 men, but more importantly had to again bed in new men, with, for the most part, recently promoted Officers and NCO’s. Which is why Lieutenant Willie Miller, being the senior officer deemed left alive, now found himself in command of the company. The original plan in the exercise had been to simply rush the pillbox, but the Scottish umpire was having none of that, so here they were.

He’d noticed a small brook trickling out of the heavy undergrowth, down to the beach, about 50 yards back. Telling the two young 2nd Lt’s and the CSM to keep everybody’s heads down, except for a squad who were ordered to give harassing fire onto the pillbox, Miller took an ex HKVDC NCO, who had transferred over, along with half a dozen men and began following the brook back up into the undergrowth. For about thirty minutes they climbed, hacking their way forward, before Miller had them turn right onto a small animal trail, which they had to crawl along for part of the way. He estimated the distance they had already travelled, and now had them slowly descend, taking care to keep the noise down.

Suddenly his point man stopped, raising his hand up, halting their movement. Miller slowly crawled down to him. They were just above and 10 yards west of the pillbox, and could look down at it. There was a small clearing behind the pillbox, which had its big iron door open, cigarette butts scattered on the floor, and a couple of soldiers smoking, sitting on upturned ammo boxes. Miller looked back and with his fingers indicated what he wanted his men to do. For a couple of minutes, they gradually eased in to position, before Miller swung his arm up and then sharply down, and they rushed out of the undergrowth, down into the clearing, two pointing bayonets at the two smokers, while Miller and the others rushed into the pillbox. A red faced, fat and elderly HKVDC solder refused to accept they were all captured or dead and tried wrestle with one of the men, Miller simply swung his revolver into the side of the man’s head and down he went.

The Royal Scots Major called out from down on the road what was the cause of all the fuss up there, and Miller took great delight in walking down the steps to report the capture of the pillbox. After that the other two pillboxes fell relatively easy, both taken from the rear, and by noon they had accomplished the objective of the exercise. A very disgruntled private of the HKVDC, a bookmaker in real life had made a complaint about a physical assault, but the rest of his section had agreed it was all an accident, and so nothing came of that.

At Lyemun barracks Major General Maltby, Brigadier Wallis and Col Rose, CO of the HKVDC, had been monitoring the progress. What Maltby had witnessed bore out what he thought. The pillboxes in this area were fine for resisting a beach landing, and reasonably well camouflaged with paint schemes and bamboo screens, meaning they were hard to pick out at a distance, but once ashore, an enemy would quickly expose their lack of all-round defence, and secondly the HKVDC manning the pillboxes were only good for fixed defences, being incapable of any mobile defence, owing to training, but more so, to age and fitness. But also worrying was the poor performance of the HKCR, C Company had lacked initiative, referring everything back to the company commander, while moving eastwards, taking far too long to clear their three pillboxes, while B Company had to lose their commanding officer before they found any initiative.

Maltby was happier witnessing both the drills the coastal batteries had performed, recruited Chinese providing most of the gunners, and was especially happy with the Chinese manned engineer field company, which had performed its task, quickly and efficiently. And on reflection, accepting the fact that he’d just recently raised the 2nd battalion of the HKCR from cadres of the first, it was to be expected that performance would have dropped. The only thing they could do was for Wallis to continue to have them on company field exercises during the week days, and joint exercises with other units at the weekend, when the volunteers were again available, which is what he was doing.

But on a much darker note, he despaired for the Royal Scots, who had been a garrison battalion for far too long. He felt the battalion was badly run, had been for a long time, and had been glad to see the going of its commanding officer Lt Col McDougall, posted to Burma, an officer he’d considered sodden with gin. Unfortunately, he didn’t feel the new CO, Lt Col White was much better, and had privately suggested to Brigadier Wallis that he should replace him. Wallis didn’t disagree, but pointed out he didn’t have any one with sufficient experience who was any better, to replace him with. Furthermore, they had been forced to promote officers who simply weren’t good enough, but needs must. It told on the battalion, which had witnessed far too many court-martials, officers included, had a lot of VD cases, and had performed poorly in some exercises. In general, he thought the rank and file were of good stuff, but they had suffered a lot of malarial cases too, and were short of men, he hoped that with the high number of exercises the garrison was undertaking, that things would improve.
 
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