The Allies are also heavily outnumbered, and nothing has happened to change that. Spitfires aren't getting into theater till mid 1943, and I don't think any Mustangs got there till early 1944. Till then the Allies have to make do with P-40 Warhawks.
This hinges on the relative priorities of the Mediterranean and the Far East; ITTL the key individuals sent to Malaya show a change of priority.

IIRC Tedder obtained air superiority in North Africa from the middle of 1941 and never lost it again (apart from the special case of Malta), with Hurricanes and P-40s against ME 109Fs and appropriate tactics:
The greatest threat to their supremacy--the new Me.l09F, which had an unpleasant habit of 'picking off' stragglers--they kept in check by fresh tactics. Instead of flying straight during offensive sweeps, with one or two 'weavers' in the rear, whole squadrons of Hurricanes and Tomahawks now 'weaved'.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Once pilots go over 10,000 feet, they go on oxygen anyway. So, if you're at 12,000 ft or 20,000 it makes no difference from that perspective. It is a lot colder at 20,000. The rule of thumb is for every 1,000 ft temps drop about 3 degrees Fahrenheit so, that adds to crew fatigue. The IJNAF made a mess of Clark Field, and Cavite Naval Base from 20,000 ft. Many factors can affect bombing accuracy, the most obvious is visibility, and then wind. Weather is a fickle thing.
Hi Belisarius II, Thank you for this, for some reason I thought oxygen was used at a higher altitude than 10,000ft. I also have an understanding that the Japanese oxygen setup for aircrew was somewhat primative compared to the allies, can anyone confirm that?
 
You don't need P51's to take on the IJN/IJA aircraft. Even the F4F Wildcat, Hurricane, and P40 if flown in the correct way beats them easily. Look at what the Cactus Airforce did in the Southwest Pacific area with the aircraft they had. Imagine if they are able to get things like the Thatch weave and such going sooner or listen to Chennault from what they are saying is happening in China.

The P51 is not the end all be all, it gets all the fanboy but other aircraft are just as good if not better in the Pacific. Personnally if I had to have a later war aircraft in the Pacific theater I would want the Corsair, Hellcat, P47D,M, or N model, F7F Tigercat, Spitfire later models and the P38.
The F4F Wildcats, and other fighters on Guadalcanal had the advantage of Coast Watchers giving them led time information. That gave them time to gain altitude to use to intercept incoming strikes. At Guadalcanal the Zeroes were near the limit of their range since for most of the campaign they had to come all the way from Rabaul. The F6F Hellcat didn't enter combat in the Pacific till about August of 1943. The F4U's arrived in U.S. Marine units about February 1943, along with the P-38. The P-47 didn't arrive till 1944. Spitfire MK, V didn't arrive till mid 1943, and the F7F Tigercat missed the war.

For the first year plus, you'll have to make do with Hurricane's, F4F's, P-39's, and P-40's. Zero's, Oscar's, and the more advanced army fighters like the Ki-44 Tojo, and Ki-61 Tony which outclassed the P-40, were all formidable opponents. The problem with Japanese aircraft is the shortage of strategic metals which caused engine reliability problems. By the time they had really formidable fighters like the Ki-84 Frank they didn't have enough well-trained pilots to take advantage of them.
 
Hi Belisarius II, Thank you for this, for some reason I thought oxygen was used at a higher altitude than 10,000ft. I also have an understanding that the Japanese oxygen setup for aircrew was somewhat primative compared to the allies, can anyone confirm that?
Very sparse details. Seems the parts are good but the principles of design are not.

As one would expect the oxygen cylinders are unprotected, doubtless to save weight, so if they get hit they will explode. Survivability and durability are for Western cowards, a true son of Nippon craves only manoeuvrability regardless of the cost.
 
Hi Belisarius II, Thank you for this, for some reason I thought oxygen was used at a higher altitude than 10,000ft. I also have an understanding that the Japanese oxygen setup for aircrew was somewhat primative compared to the allies, can anyone confirm that?
I understand it was and is pretty standard to put on masks at over 10,000 ft. Pilots in WWI flew at 14,000, and even higher without it, but we don't really know how many fliers became disoriented from doing that. If a pilot passed out, or started acting weird we might never know about it unless he recovered before crashing. In the last few years, the USAF lost I think 2 F-22 Raptors because of the oxygen generation system having a problem. Flying fighters will never be a safe occupation. The Japanese may have pushed the limits more than the Allies did, but if their up at 20,000 ft they have to have oxygen.

You might want to add the issue of the cold temps at high altitudes to your story, just to add more realism. The cold was a major issue for both sides in the Bomber War over Germany. With aircraft flying close to 30,000 feet, it took a lot of ingenuity to keep your men from freezing their asses off. Lots of men came back with frostbite. In the Pacific fighting almost never occurred at over 20,000 ft, but at 20,000 ft it's still bitter cold. Any chance we see any Foo fighters?
 
I don't know who is in for a bigger shock. The RAF pilots have very little experience dealing with fighters that are more maneuverable than themselves. They found themselves in this situation against Italian Biplanes and learned to use their speed advantage. In this case a Hurricane IIC is only slightly faster in level flight with a slower climb rate against a Ki-27 Nate, or Ki-43 Oscar. In the vertical they're at a distinct disadvantage. They ended up having to strip their Hurricane's to have any chance. The Allies are also heavily outnumbered, and nothing has happened to change that. Spitfires aren't getting into theater till mid 1943, and I don't think any Mustangs got there till early 1944. Till then the Allies have to make do with P-40 Warhawks.
The same issues could be said of the P40s, and certainly of the Wildcat, but the Allies not only made do, they held their own once they learned to not get cocky and use energy tactics, trust in their airframe's resilience, their fire power, and learn their enemy's weaknesses. It can be done. The trick is to live long enough to do so.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Hi Belisarius II, Thank you for this, for some reason I thought oxygen was used at a higher altitude than 10,000ft. I also have an understanding that the Japanese oxygen setup for aircrew was somewhat primative compared to the allies, can anyone confirm that?
The standard for airlines is that you drop to 10,000ft if you lose pressurisation. US regs for private airplanes:
Most pilots don't think too much about using portable oxygen. Sure, everyone knows that you have to use supplemental oxygen if you fly more than 30 minutes at cabin pressure altitudes of 12,500 feet or higher. And that at cabin altitudes above 14,000 feet pilots must use oxygen at all times. And that above 15,000 feet each occupant of the aircraft must be provided supplemental oxygen.
So certainly a factor over 10,000ft, but considerable wriggle-room.
 
You don't need P51's to take on the IJN/IJA aircraft. Even the F4F Wildcat, Hurricane, and P40 if flown in the correct way beats them easily. Look at what the Cactus Airforce did in the Southwest Pacific area with the aircraft they had. Imagine if they are able to get things like the Thatch weave and such going sooner or listen to Chennault from what they are saying is happening in China.

The P51 is not the end all be all, it gets all the fanboy but other aircraft are just as good if not better in the Pacific. Personnally if I had to have a later war aircraft in the Pacific theater I would want the Corsair, Hellcat, P47D,M, or N model, F7F Tigercat, Spitfire later models and the P38.
It was the P40 and the P38 that did the grunt work for the ASAAF, and the Wildcat and later the Corsair for the USMC/USN, in the SW Pacific theater and won the air superiority war long before the Mustang, or even the Hellcatby some months, showed up. The P38, after all, was the mount for the highest scoring US ace of the war, Bong (and the no2 USAAF ace as well, but won't swear on that), and he used it against Japanese aircraft still being flown by experienced pilots, not the later green cannon fodder.
Yeah, the Mustang is excellent, but it made it's bones when both of the enemy air forces were already on the ropes. So I tend to appreciate the previous aircraft more, just me, YMMV of course, and rightly so.
 
Spitfire MK, V didn't arrive till mid 1943,
First were deployed outside the UK in spring 1942; first arrived in Australia in August 1942.

It's a question of priorities for the UK; the key decision point is probably mid December with the Italian attack at Alexandria which removes British naval superiority in the Mediterranean. Depending on what is happening in Malaya, a switch to the defensive in the Med and giving the Far East priority for fighters might be more effective.
 
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Tsuji watched them fall behind, and as the plane headed out over the sea towards what they called home, the big new airfield at Konpong Trach, Cambodia, a smile formed on his face, he was content.
This chap?
Tuji_Masanobu.jpg

Unfortunately he seems to have survived this time...
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Very sparse details. Seems the parts are good but the principles of design are not.

As one would expect the oxygen cylinders are unprotected, doubtless to save weight, so if they get hit they will explode. Survivability and durability are for Western cowards, a true son of Nippon craves only manoeuvrability regardless of the cost.
Hi El Pip, thank you for this
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I understand it was and is pretty standard to put on masks at over 10,000 ft. Pilots in WWI flew at 14,000, and even higher without it, but we don't really know how many fliers became disoriented from doing that. If a pilot passed out, or started acting weird we might never know about it unless he recovered before crashing. In the last few years, the USAF lost I think 2 F-22 Raptors because of the oxygen generation system having a problem. Flying fighters will never be a safe occupation. The Japanese may have pushed the limits more than the Allies did, but if their up at 20,000 ft they have to have oxygen.

You might want to add the issue of the cold temps at high altitudes to your story, just to add more realism. The cold was a major issue for both sides in the Bomber War over Germany. With aircraft flying close to 30,000 feet, it took a lot of ingenuity to keep your men from freezing their asses off. Lots of men came back with frostbite. In the Pacific fighting almost never occurred at over 20,000 ft, but at 20,000 ft it's still bitter cold. Any chance we see any Foo fighters?
Hi Belisarius II, thanks for this. Silly question, at 20,000 ft up does it get colder at night?

Anyway, you asked for Foo Fighters, and I'm right up for that, so take it away Dave
 
The F4F Wildcats, and other fighters on Guadalcanal had the advantage of Coast Watchers giving them led time information. That gave them time to gain altitude to use to intercept incoming strikes. At Guadalcanal the Zeroes were near the limit of their range since for most of the campaign they had to come all the way from Rabaul. The F6F Hellcat didn't enter combat in the Pacific till about August of 1943. The F4U's arrived in U.S. Marine units about February 1943, along with the P-38. The P-47 didn't arrive till 1944. Spitfire MK, V didn't arrive till mid 1943, and the F7F Tigercat missed the war.

For the first year plus, you'll have to make do with Hurricane's, F4F's, P-39's, and P-40's. Zero's, Oscar's, and the more advanced army fighters like the Ki-44 Tojo, and Ki-61 Tony which outclassed the P-40, were all formidable opponents. The problem with Japanese aircraft is the shortage of strategic metals which caused engine reliability problems. By the time they had really formidable fighters like the Ki-84 Frank they didn't have enough well-trained pilots to take advantage of them.
There were no zeroes in malaya, as that was an army area.
The initial IJA airforce, december 41, had only 35 Oscars, and 138 Ki-27 Nates.
So while the Allies will need to make do with Hurricanes, the Japanese will need to make do with Nates and a sprinkling of Oscars.
And, in total, a lot less of them than I would have thought. 170 fighters in total doesn't seem like a lot.
Oscars were new in '41, with production not really ramping up until second half of '42.
So any replacements in the first few months will probably be mostly Nates.

Tojo existed only as experimental in December '41, with 9 at Saigon being all of them.
Tony was prototype only in December '41, not entering combat until '43.
 
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MWI 41102521 Burma

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 25 October;

Dinner was finished, they were on the brandy, just the three of them, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Governor of Burma, Maj Gen Kenneth McLeod, GOC Burma, and General Archibald Wavell, CinC India, here on an inspection visit. Wavell was holding court, his head up, eyes closed as he recited poetry from memory. “Half a league, half a league, half a league onward, all in the valley of Death rode the six hundred”. They were talking about the ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’ which had happen today, eighty-seven years ago.

He had arrived five days ago, today was his last, before taking a flying boat back to India in the morning. Eager to better understand the problems of defence, that Burma offered, he’d needed to be on the ground, so to speak, and see for himself what he had here. A considerable amount of time had been spent here in Rangoon, but he’d found time to go up to Toungoo, where Maj Gen Bruce Scott, CO of the 1st Burma Division, had his headquarters. There was the Sittang Bridge, standing on it he’d had a great view of the river, which was thought of as a potential defensive line. He hadn’t expected much, but the Division was really in name only, for admin purposes, being extremely short of Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Medical and Transport units, its Brigades and battalions scattered along the Burmese border. There was no brigade training, indeed many units lacked battalion training, still trying to digest the large number of new recruits that expansion had brought in.

The afternoon was taken with visiting the ‘Flying Tigers’, as its leader, Claire Chennault was calling his American Volunteer Group, who were training at Toungoo airfield. Officially they were part of the Chinese Air Force, but both pilots and ground crew were Americans, mercenaries, earning three time what they had been earning in the US armed forces, which they had left. Chennault was forming 3 Squadrons of fighters, to defend the Burma Road, one was to be based at Lashio, the other two in China. Wavell watched a couple of flying displays by American pilots in already assembled P40’s, and finishing off the afternoon with quite a frank and detailed talk with Chennault about the AVC, its mission role, and capabilities.

After the day in Toungoo, he taken the train on to Mandalay, meeting Brigadier Alfred Curtis, CO of the 13th Indian Brigade, who had arrived in April. He’d watched one of its battalions, the 1st Battalion, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles, go through some exercises, only achieving them with some considerable difficulties, the few seasoned Officers and NCO’s they had, mostly leading everybody through it. Alf had confessed, the other two battalion weren’t any better, the continued milking of his best Officers and NCOs had drastically reduced all the battalion’s effectiveness.

The next day he’d flown up to Lashio, where the rail line from Mandalay ended, and the Burma Road began, to see the extensive array of warehouses and storage sheds, along with a small vehicle repair workshop. This is where the USA Lend Lease supplies for China were transferred from rail cars to motor vehicles, for the long and dangerous road journey over the mountainous terrain into Kunming, in southeast China. While there, he inspected a large platoon of the Burma Auxiliary Force, the town’s garrison, made up of part-time soldiers, British, Anglo-Burmans and Anglo-Indians. In the afternoon, he flew back to Rangoon, arriving just before nightfall.

Early the next morning, he’d travelled out to Mingaladon airfield, 9 miles north of Rangoon, visiting the hangers where CAMCO, the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company, was assembling the 100 Curtis P40B fighter aircraft that the AVC were being equipped with, which had been shipped in wooden crates. Here also was the HQ of RAF 221 Group, and its commanding officer, Grp Capt Eddy Manning, the senior RAF officer in Burma. Both the single bomber squadron in Burma, RAF 60, equipped with Blenheim I’s and the only fighter sqn, excluding the AVC’s, RAF 67, equipped with Buffalo’s, were based here. Manning had been here since March, working hard on establishing a string of airfields from Lashio, down to Mingaladon. Both squadrons were in need of more training, a lot of their pilots new, especially 67 Sqn, which had only been formed in March. The radar unit, 517 COL, was now fully operational, and Manning had it working with the Buffaloes of 67 Sqn, on intercepting potential air raids on Rangoon.

Today, he’d spent the most of morning with General McLeod, discussing the general strategy and defence of Burma. Apart from the internal security of the country, the first priority was defence of the air route to Singapore, protecting the airfields in Southern Burma, along the western side of the narrow strip of land, the Kra Isthmus, that led down to Malaya. The other main priority was the Burma Road, which was why the airfield at Lashio had been built.

The main defensive line in the south was to be on the Salween River, and the 13th Indian, and 1st Burma Brigades of the Burma Division would have to be redeployed to do that, moving into the Southern Shan States, while the 2nd Burma Brigade was in the Tenasserim Region, defending the string of airfields at Moulmein, Tavoy and Mergui, as well as both Tenasserim and Victoria Point, which were probably undefendable, given what resources they had. A few more reinforcements were on their way, in a few days’ time, the 4th Indian HAA Regt would arrive from Singapore, providing Rangoon, at least, with some semblance of an AA defence. Late next month, the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade would begin to arrive, but it was all so precious little.

“All the world wondered. Honour the charge they made! Honour the Light Brigade, Noble Six Hundred”. Wavell slapped his hand down onto the table, ending the poem, pleased he’d remembered it all unfailingly.
“Bravo, bravo, Archie, well done, and said with such passion, it was as if we were there with them!”
“I bet you’d have liked to have been there Kenneth”
“Only with one of my Cavalry Brigades, Reggie, I’d take either the Secunderbad or the Risalpur, marvellous bodies of men and horse”.

Wavell watch them both, deep in thought, how different the conversation would be if Eric and not his brother Reginald was here. He could hear him now, horses are finished, the Army has been far too slow to mechanise and it still doesn’t understand armoured warfare. Yes, Eric would have eaten dear old Kenneth for breakfast, bless him, which reminded him, if he was going to persuade Hutton to take over in Burma, he’d have to find a replacement for Chief of the General Staff in India, and Eric was looking for a job. Christ, Eric working with the Indian General Staff, there’d be a few feathers flying there, no, despite Eric’s brilliant mind, his propensity to rub noses the wrong way meant that was a non-starter. He looked at McLeod again, he’d have to find someone soon and quick, Kenneth was a nice old gentleman, but wasn’t going to get the job done.
 
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This hinges on the relative priorities of the Mediterranean and the Far East; ITTL the key individuals sent to Malaya show a change of priority.

IIRC Tedder obtained air superiority in North Africa from the middle of 1941 and never lost it again (apart from the special case of Malta), with Hurricanes and P-40s against ME 109Fs and appropriate tactics:
The Allies lost air superiority over the battlefield in May/June 1942. All though the period leading up to the summer of 42 loses of Hurricanes, and P-40's were far heavier than Bf-109F's. Fredrich's were tearing them up. The only thing that kept the Allies in the game was a steady stream of replacement aircraft that kept pace with loses. In this period the Hurricane was relegated to the role of fighter bomber leaving the Warhawk in the fighter role, and there loses in air combat were terrible. In the fall of 42 Spitfire V's started taking up the air superiority role.
 
First were deployed outside the UK in spring 1942; first arrived in Australia in August 1942.

It's a question of priorities for the UK; the key decision point is probably mid December with the Italian attack at Alexandria which removes British naval superiority in the Mediterranean. Depending on what is happening in Malaya, a switch to the defensive in the Med and giving the Far East priority for fighters might be more effective.
Thanks for the correction. Giving Malaya priority over Egypt in the first half of 1942 might not be a good idea. Losing Egypt would be strategically far worse than losing Malaya.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
And here we have a good example of the fundamental problem that the British Army had in the years leading up to WWII, and during the early years of the conflict. Due to the slow promotion during the inter war years, especially after the onset of the Great Depression, the most senior ranks are filled with men that are often well past their best before date, and a number are into their do not use after date. Both Burma and Malaysia were up until very recently basically military backwaters, as there was no major land threat, and only a naval threat to Malaysia, hence the construction of the major naval base in Singapore. However the construction of the road from Burma to China in 1938, made it a target for the Japanese, who wanted to effectively cut all connections between China and the outside world. While the collapse of France in 1940, and the subsequent occupation of FIC by the Japanese, and the pressure this enabled them to place upon the Thais, meant that there was no a serious land threat to Malaysia, from the north. Unfortunately unlike Malaysia Burma hasn’t benefited from a new and more vigorous civil and military command, with a younger Governor Andrew Caldecott prepared to seriously shake up the civil administration. While the appointment of Lord Gort as CinC Far East and AVM Park as CinC Air Malaysia, with Lt General Percival as Gorts deputy and Commander Land Forces Malaysia, has seen a dramatic change in the attitude towards the risk of a Japanese invasion. And an attitude of making the best of what’s to hand, which instituting a vigorous training regime, and a clear out of the worst stick in the muds. Malaysia is now far better prepared for a Japanese attack, than it was IOTL, even though it is seriously short of vital resources.

Burma however hasn’t benefited from the sort of changes that Malaysia has, and its preparations haven’t been perused with the vigour and imagination that is needed. Wavell, who in addition to his responsibilities as CinC India, an enormous task itself, with the responsibility of policing the country during a very turbulent time, and raising a substantial number of new troops to assist the British Army in its operations throughout the world. Has also the responsibility of ensuring that Burma is ready for the possibility of a Japanese invasion, along what is a very wild and difficult border, which has very underdeveloped infrastructure. Unlike in Malaysia where there has been a concentrated effort to improve the road and rail networks, and serious preparations to feed the population in the event of an invasion. Plus a major effort to provide some basic civil defence services, it appears that very little has been done in Burma. Wavell is right that there needs to be a change in the high and to an extent the middle level command structure of the Army. But he himself carries some responsibility for the present state of affairs, as he has concentrated on internal affairs in India, and he failed to keep a close eye on Burma, or appoint an officer to keep an eye on the area and report back to him. Is it too late to appoint a CinC Burma and expect him to accomplish anything worthwhile, yes. However starting the process of clearing out the dead wood, and installing someone more competent, is a good start. Wavell is lucky, the improvements made in Malaysia, mean that the Japanese are going to have a much harder time in attempting to conquer the peninsula. And given just how complex the Japanese plan is for the opening round of the coming conflict, a major delay in Malaysia, will seriously reduce the pressure on Burma, and allow the forces there to be reinforced and a better commander installed.

RR.
 
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