Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Monday 27 October;

William Steel had been expecting a letter over the last couple of weeks, ever since the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Indian HAA Regiments had been declared operational at the beginning of October. That he wasn’t posted to one of them, was thought of as good luck, but in truth, it was more down to the Chief Executive of Eastern Bank, his employer, who had lobbied hard not for him to be called up yet. Nevertheless, the clouds of war were gathering, as was evident with the ongoing preparations around Singapore, and it was only a matter of time before he was caught up in it. He'd opened the letter in his study, alone, steadying himself for what the contents might bring, read it, and then having composed himself, not without a considerable amount of relief, went and found his wife Mary, and told her the news.

Ever since he’d been passed out as Lieutenant, Indian Artillery, back in the beginning of April, and been made supernumerary to the 1st Indian HAA Regt, he’d been attending camp every Wednesday, along with some weekend exercises or courses. He’d done some training, commanding gun sections, up to a half battery of four guns, but had spent more time on the technical aspects of the job, capabilities of the 3-inch 20 cwt gun, the ammunition it used, the predictor, and how that worked, and gun deployment. He couldn’t say he was an expert, but he had an idea what to do now.

The letter was informing him, he was being made temporary Captain, and assigned to the 17th Battery, 6th Indian HAA Regiment, which as yet was non-operational. He was to report to Major Prescott, the commander of the battery, so old Johnny Prescott had been promoted too! The battery, indeed the Regiment was still based with the 1st HAA here in Singapore, and by no means had its full complement of men, guns, transport and equipment, but clearly the authorities intended to change that, charged with bringing both the 5th and 6th Indian HAA Regiments to operational status by January 1942. Anyway, he wasn’t to report in until next Monday, which gave him a week to put his affairs in order, and hopefully, the regiment would remain in Singapore, keeping him close to Mary.

 

[Butchpfd]

You had a short USMC reserve BN in Samoa that was available to help in the in the Islands around there.

I had only seen references to the standing Regular USMC Company. It was probably worked into the reserve Btn as Cadre.

 

[Belisarius II]

I believe that the war planning began in October 1914. That was when the British Government encouraged the Japanese Government to seize the Caroline, Northern Marianas and Marshall Islands from the Germans. The Carolines and Marshall Island were mandated permanently by the League of Nations about 1920. The Northern Marianas Islands were enshrined in the World War Two Insurance Treaty. Oops, I meant the Franco-British Treaty of Versailles.

According to Britannica, there was a secret agreement between Britain and Japan that would keep Japan in line. The American SLOC in the Pacific would interdicted. I would read this to mean that Japan would not knock about the European Asia empires, while the Europeans were engaged with Germany. The US will have to pick up the bill next time, to save the Empires as well.

The US has never left our Pacific SLOC open since then. As a famous American General told a famous British General. "I don't like to pay for the same real estate twice, Freddie."

I've always said the biggest mistake made in the interwar period was the Americans insisting on ending the Anglo/Japanese Alliance. Replacing it with the Washington Treaty System was a disaster. As long as it was in effect it was a restraint on Japanese conduct. Ending it left Japan adrift which made Japan feel isolated, and countries that feel isolation have no choice but to do whatever they feel they have to do to protect their interests.

The second biggest mistake was Britain & France imposing sanctions on Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935. Turning Italy from an ally to an enemy over the hypocrisy of saying Italy was an imperialist aggressor in Africa was absurd. Did ether of them think to take a look at what they, and other smaller powers had done to Africa since 1884? But their attitude was our imperialism was so much more enlightened than Italy's was. Could anyone really say that with a straight face?

 

[Sekhmet_D]

The second biggest mistake was Britain & France imposing sanctions on Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935. Turning Italy from an ally to an enemy over the hypocrisy of saying Italy was an imperialist aggressor in Africa was absurd. Did ether of them think to take a look at what they, and other smaller powers had done to Africa since 1884? But their attitude was our imperialism was so much more enlightened than Italy's was. Could anyone really say that with a straight face?

I'll go ahead and say it. The Brits brought much progress and improvement to the places they colonised (I hail from a country that considerably benefited from British rule). Can't quite say the same for the Italians in Ethiopia.

 

[Belisarius II]

I'll go ahead and say it. The Brits brought much progress and improvement to the places they colonised (I hail from a country that considerably benefited from British rule). Can't quite say the same for the Italians in Ethiopia.

Many people around the world could argue that they gained things from being colonial subjects, but that doesn't make imperialism a good thing. For a European State to argue that another one expanding its empire is morally and legally wrong while maintaining a far bigger empire of their own is rank hypocrisy. Imperialism can only be justified by a degree of racism, and sense of cultural superiority over the people being colonized. The rationalization for slavery beyond rank racism was often that the enslaved were being civilized by their contact with the superior values of their masters. It truly is a fallen world.

 

[Belisarius II]

I would say the sense of cultural superiority took precedence over race in the 17th Century. That would explain as to the how's and why's as to The Crown would sponsor African slavery arriving in the America's. They were only their colonials over there. No better than former indentures or slaves themselves to those in Windsor.

The Germanic George III dismissed the opinions of actual English PM's Pitt. The American colonials were generally infused with British, Scotch and Welsh DNA. It can be debated as to how much DNA for the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha's was British.

What makes it interesting, is that the European wars from the late 18th Century to the mid-20th Century may never have occurred. The UK would have been overwhelmingly strong and wealthy. No European Empire could have withstood for long.

I'm a little unclear what you mean by you last 2 sentences. Do you mean that without the wars from the late 18th to the mid 20th Century the UK would've been so strong no one could resist them? That might be true. The UK grow so much in relative power in that period because its technological, and industrial growth was way in advance of most of the rest of the world. However, staying out of any major war for such a long period would be almost impossible to manage. Sometime other powers give you very little choice but to go to war.

 

[DDM]

I will always defer to those who know about US force generation than me. My point with the map was simply that there's a clear threat to the US SLOC posed by the Japanese ownership of the Marshall's and a potential loss of the British owned Gilbert's that SHOULD have been a greater priority for US Forces. In terms of where the forces would come from my assumption is the threat is large enough that it should habe resulted in a reallocation of units already training to go to Europe to cover those critical areas as although in Europe adding a brigade of Marines or Army Infantry is a drop in the bucket, on those islands it could make all the difference in the world. The final argument being planners should have been measuring the impact of loss of the Gilbert's to the supply and logistics system to see it would be relatively small investment to avoid a very large new liability. Whether that war planning started in 1936, 1938, 1940 is secondary to the recognition of the danger posed and the counters that 'could' have been explored to safeguard those areas.

Politics was still a problem at this time as it was difficult to get congress to approve funds they believed might escalate tension with the Japanese. That is why no attempt was made to reinforce Guam even though it had a good harbor and land for airfields.

 

[Butchpfd]

7th Defense Battalion
(December 1940-April 1944)​

Lieutenant Colonel Lester A. Dessez formed the unit at San Diego, California, as a composite battalion of infantry and artillery. In March 1941, he took the outfit to Tutuila, Samoa, as one of the Rainbow Five. The 7th later deployed to Upolu and established a detachment at Savaii. Colonel Curtis W. LeGette took command in December 1942, and in August of the following year, the battalion moved to Nanoumea in the Ellice Islands in preparation for supporting operations against the Gilbert Islands. Lieutenant Colonel Henry R. Paige took over in December 1943 and brought the unit to Hawaii where, on 16 April 1944, it became the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. As an antiaircraft outfit, it deployed to Anguar, Palau Islands, in September 1944, where it served in the garrison force for the remainder of the war.

Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II (Battalion Summaries)

The Cavite and Olopanago Marine Battalions in the Philippines, were also composite battalions,, with each having 6 AA Batteries as well as their infantry components. Cavite had 3 x 3"/50 cal DP fixed mount batteries, 1 x 3"23 Cal AA fixed, and 2 Batteries each of 10 x .50 cal AA MG. The Olopanago Battalion's batteries were organized similarly with 4 batteries each with 4 x 3" M-3 mobile AA guns and 2 batteries each with 10 x .50 Cal AA MG. Note: All gun batteries were made up of 4 guns each.​

 

[Palantir]

The second biggest mistake was Britain & France imposing sanctions on Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935. Turning Italy from an ally to an enemy over the hypocrisy of saying Italy was an imperialist aggressor in Africa was absurd. Did ether of them think to take a look at what they, and other smaller powers had done to Africa since 1884? But their attitude was our imperialism was so much more enlightened than Italy's was. Could anyone really say that with a straight face?

Ethiopia was a member of the SDN, not reacting to its invasion would be the end of the international order of the time.
Plus, this was hardly the biggest mistake of the interwars, by far. The UK failed to support the post-Versailles order from the get go.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

William Smiths call up, is an indication that the High Command is increasingly looking at the reality of the situation, and are convinced that there is going to be a Japanese attack within the next few months. Up until now his work in the bank has outweighed any usefulness his military service, might provide given the circumstances, lack of equipment being the major one. He has been training for his role, in his spare time, and now just needs that final polish to make him a good replacement for any other officer who becomes incapacitated by wounds, illness or incompetence. He is not a front line soldier, as he isn’t in the infantry, engineers, armoured or field artillery. He doesn’t need to be fighting fit, he just needs to be fit enough to do his duties, which given the present situation, are not going to require him to man his post 24/7. By the time of the outbreak of hostilities, he will be able to ether assume command of an existing gun troop, or form a new troop with additional weapons that become available.

RR.

 

[Merrick]

Well, that got sidetracked a long way. Going back to TTL, and how the USN (and the US generally) might approach things.

Looking at the map (great map, @CB13 !), you can see how the main US fleet base in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor, is all the way to the East, cut off from both SE Asia and the Japanese home islands by the Japanese-held Marshalls and Carolines in the Central Pacific. (You can also see how a Japanese push south-west into Malaysia and the DEI does not move the action any closer to the US. The DEI - and anything west of the Philippines - are actually harder to get to from Hawaii than Japan is).

USN pre-war planning, dominated by the "gun club" of battleship admirals, was always built around a naval drive across the Central Pacific to defeat the Japanese fleet. (This was the plan the Japanese Kantai Kessen doctrine was designed to counter. In a very real sense the USN and the IJN were both planning to re-fight Tsushima, with the USN intending to get it right this time). The major argument on the USN side was whether the US should first withdraw to a defensive posture in the East Pacific in order to build up forces before attacking, or attack from the outset.

USN planning was complicated by the existence of the Philippines. The original plan was to build and fortify a major fleet base in Manila Bay or Olongapo, but Congress wouldn't fund it and then the Washington Treaty banned fortifications in the Pacific. USN planners looked at the logistics and concluded that the Philippines were indefensible - the Japanese could pour troops onto the islands far faster than the US could respond. But they could hardly come up with a plan that began "Step 1: Abandon the Philippines", so the various inter-war Orange scenarios usually had the USN battling through the Marshalls and Carolines to relieve the heroic defenders of Manila. As the USN planners began to appreciate the difficulty of advancing through the Central Pacific (particularly the Carolines, with the IJN's major Pacific base at Truk) so the timescales got longer. The final estimate was that it would take at least 18 months for the USN to break through to Philippine waters. It was of course impossible for the Philippine garrison to hold out that long, but it was even more impossible to admit that the Philippines would be lost.

MacArthur and the Philippine Army were the attempt to resolve that problem as the war-clouds gathered. If the Philippines could field a locally-raised force of, say, 200,000 men, it would be able to resist invasion and Manila Bay would be in US hands (and able to operate as the West Pacific fleet base) when the USN completed its drive across the Central Pacific. But it was all left far too late, and when the balloon went up the Philippine Army was a muddle of half-trained recruits with obsolete weapons.

Then war broke out in Europe, the Germans overran France and the Netherlands, and Japan began to tilt towards the Axis. It began to look as if the upcoming war would be a two-front affair against Germany-Japan in alliance with the British. By 1941, serious discussions had begun about a joint strategy. The British were focussed on defending Malaya and Singapore. The US were far from keen to defend British colonialism in Asia. The USN also had its doubts about the practicality of the British strategy, believing (correctly as it turned out) that Singapore was under-equipped and under-supplied and that the whole "Malay Barrier" was less formidable than the British appeared to think. When the British asked for USN forces to be based in Singapore, the USN replied that they would be better used to distract the Japanese by offensive operations against the Marshalls and Carolines. Eventually an agreement was made to transfer US ships to the Atlantic, to allow the RN to send more ship East. This did not sit particularly well with the USN, who viewed the Pacific as their theatre and the Atlantic as good way to end up holding the coats of the Army and the British. It was however consistent with the major outcome of the discussions, which was the "Europe First" strategy, already agreed by the summer of 1941.

So, as the clock ticks down in late 1941:
The USN remains committed to the Central Pacific advance, starting in the Marshalls.
MacArthur is planning to defend Luzon with his mighty Philippine Army.
The USAAF is ready to sweep the IJN from the seas with their B-17s.
The US Army is thinking "Europe First".
Washington is trying to juggle all the above, plus the British, plus the Chinese, plus the neutrals, while trying not to start a war they still hope to avoid.
And everything is further complicated because no-one knows if, when or how that war will start.

 

[Butchpfd]

One issue was Washington believed Mac Arthur that all was going well with training his Philippine Army! It wasn't He had the Philippine Government call up too many men for the Instructors and Weapons he had. He called up 200,000, and had small arms weapons for a third of that and enough instructors to adequately train 150,000 men if given until Late Spring 1942. In addition to the existing Philippine and American units in the Islands.

 

[Belisarius II]

Ethiopia was a member of the SDN, not reacting to its invasion would be the end of the international order of the time.
Plus, this was hardly the biggest mistake of the interwars, by far. The UK failed to support the post-Versailles order from the get go.

Making Italy an enemy enabled Hitler to occupy Austria in 1938, which made the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia possible, which then made the invasion of Poland workable. Until then Italy was prevented Hitler from annexing Austria. Making Italy an enemy opened the whole Mediterranean theater in WWII. Tying down the RN in the Med made defending the Far East next to impossible. Most of these things were foreseeable in 1935 and were not worth the sense of moral satisfaction that was gained. besides it was plain to see the sanctions would be ineffective in helping Ethiopia since they didn't even include oil, so nothing was gained but a huge amount was lost.

Even in the 1920's a degree of German revanchism was predictable, but they couldn't overthrow Versailles by themselves. Having Italy & Japan as allies would've been invaluable in maintaining global stability. Your right that the UK's failure to support France during most of this period was a huge blunder but adding Italy & Japan to the list of Germany, and the Soviet Union as countries to watch was even worse. Just how many chainsaws did they think they could juggle?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Well, that got sidetracked a long way. Going back to TTL, and how the USN (and the US generally) might approach things.

Looking at the map (great map, @CB13 !), you can see how the main US fleet base in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor, is all the way to the East, cut off from both SE Asia and the Japanese home islands by the Japanese-held Marshalls and Carolines in the Central Pacific. (You can also see how a Japanese push south-west into Malaysia and the DEI does not move the action any closer to the US. The DEI - and anything west of the Philippines - are actually harder to get to from Hawaii than Japan is).

USN pre-war planning, dominated by the "gun club" of battleship admirals, was always built around a naval drive across the Central Pacific to defeat the Japanese fleet. (This was the plan the Japanese Kantai Kessen doctrine was designed to counter. In a very real sense the USN and the IJN were both planning to re-fight Tsushima, with the USN intending to get it right this time). The major argument on the USN side was whether the US should first withdraw to a defensive posture in the East Pacific in order to build up forces before attacking, or attack from the outset.

USN planning was complicated by the existence of the Philippines. The original plan was to build and fortify a major fleet base in Manila Bay or Olongapo, but Congress wouldn't fund it and then the Washington Treaty banned fortifications in the Pacific. USN planners looked at the logistics and concluded that the Philippines were indefensible - the Japanese could pour troops onto the islands far faster than the US could respond. But they could hardly come up with a plan that began "Step 1: Abandon the Philippines", so the various inter-war Orange scenarios usually had the USN battling through the Marshalls and Carolines to relieve the heroic defenders of Manila. As the USN planners began to appreciate the difficulty of advancing through the Central Pacific (particularly the Carolines, with the IJN's major Pacific base at Truk) so the timescales got longer. The final estimate was that it would take at least 18 months for the USN to break through to Philippine waters. It was of course impossible for the Philippine garrison to hold out that long, but it was even more impossible to admit that the Philippines would be lost.

MacArthur and the Philippine Army were the attempt to resolve that problem as the war-clouds gathered. If the Philippines could field a locally-raised force of, say, 200,000 men, it would be able to resist invasion and Manila Bay would be in US hands (and able to operate as the West Pacific fleet base) when the USN completed its drive across the Central Pacific. But it was all left far too late, and when the balloon went up the Philippine Army was a muddle of half-trained recruits with obsolete weapons.

Then war broke out in Europe, the Germans overran France and the Netherlands, and Japan began to tilt towards the Axis. It began to look as if the upcoming war would be a two-front affair against Germany-Japan in alliance with the British. By 1941, serious discussions had begun about a joint strategy. The British were focussed on defending Malaya and Singapore. The US were far from keen to defend British colonialism in Asia. The USN also had its doubts about the practicality of the British strategy, believing (correctly as it turned out) that Singapore was under-equipped and under-supplied and that the whole "Malay Barrier" was less formidable than the British appeared to think. When the British asked for USN forces to be based in Singapore, the USN replied that they would be better used to distract the Japanese by offensive operations against the Marshalls and Carolines. Eventually an agreement was made to transfer US ships to the Atlantic, to allow the RN to send more ship East. This did not sit particularly well with the USN, who viewed the Pacific as their theatre and the Atlantic as good way to end up holding the coats of the Army and the British. It was however consistent with the major outcome of the discussions, which was the "Europe First" strategy, already agreed by the summer of 1941.

So, as the clock ticks down in late 1941:
The USN remains committed to the Central Pacific advance, starting in the Marshalls.
MacArthur is planning to defend Luzon with his mighty Philippine Army.
The USAAF is ready to sweep the IJN from the seas with their B-17s.
The US Army is thinking "Europe First".
Washington is trying to juggle all the above, plus the British, plus the Chinese, plus the neutrals, while trying not to start a war they still hope to avoid.
And everything is further complicated because no-one knows if, when or how that war will start.

An excellent application of the situation as applied up to the installation of Lord Gort as C in C Far East ITTL, especially the attitude of Washington and MacArthur. However the situation has changed slightly, and while Mac is still failing to take the measures necessary to enable his forces to conduct a successful defence of the Philippines or Luzon. Lord Gort has managed to make best use of the resources available to him, and should be able to conduct a successful defence of Malaya and Singapore. I believe that by March or April, Mac will be surrounded in the Bataan peninsula rapidly running out of supplies, much as he was IOTL, while Gort will have managed to retain the Japanese in Malaya. The USN will still be perusing their War Plan Orange, and principally concentrating on trying to bring the Japanese to battle in the Central Pacific. And in the same way that Mac failed to adequately prepare for the Japanese assault, the USN thanks to their fixation with the Pacific, will have failed to prepare for the entry of Germany into the conflict. And thus the Germans will enjoy a second happy time, as their U-Boats are let loose along the American Atlantic seaboard. And this along with the better performance of the British in the Far East, plus Mac’s constant demands that the British do something to assist him. Will put Anglo American relations under a significant strain, for the next few months, and strengthen Winston's hand for a short time.

RR.

 

[Cuchulainn]

Hi Cuchulainn, thank you for your comments, I'd welcome any/all local colour you can add. To my disappointment, I've never visited Malaysia or Singapore, its only what I know by book, film or internet. Would also love to know more about the Chinese community in Penang, they suffered very badly when the British did their evacuation, leaving the community to its fate!

Well it's over 10 years since I was there, I visited for 6-7 weeks for 3 years in a row learning T'ai Chi direct from a Chinese association in Penang.
First off, Kuala Lumpur is Sodom & Gomorrah, nice for a few days but don't hang around & get drawn into the sleaze, although the Malaysian Police museum is worth a visit for it's collection of old time British armoured cars.
Penang, I must say that the Chinese people there were incredibly welcoming to me & took me into their busum (I remain in contact with some of them to this day), inviting me to join their foodie tours to the various corners of the city & retiring afterwards to their private bars for some serious drinking & partying (shame I've lost the fotos of the Halloween party, the girls all dressed up 🦇🤤). I had to insist that I also should buy a round because they were treating me too much as a guest. Between the T'ai Chi, the food and the alcohol, I didn't have much time to explore the history but did pick up a bit here & there, as well as some insight into the current political scene (defiantly not as harmonious as the official line states).
So, my impressions. The Chinese, while not wishing that the British hadn't left, were quite nostalgic for those times, I got the distinct impression that they would prefer the Brits as their political masters to the Malay majority. There seemed to be little or no mixing between the Chinese & the Malay (or for that matter the Indian) communities outside of business, work & the necessary politics. However while some of the Chinese maintained ties to China (mostly Southern Chinese Hakka ethnicity) most were Malaysian origin though business & work ties to Singapore & Taiwan were strong. There was also a few lost souls from Korea included in the social circle.
What I picked up from the history. I remember seeing some historic presentations & public details about the Japanese occupation, & yes you are right, the Japanese seem to have been pretty nasty to the Penang Chinese, the usual looting & arbitrary killings, with some collaboration from a minority of the Malay population. Most of the Malays seem to have adapted a passive attitude, trying to continue life as normal under new management.
While there was what was supposed to become a major British/Indian Army instillation on the island, it was apparently never developed as planned.

Penang War Museum: Hidden War Relic in Modern Day Penan

Emilia Ismail speaks to Jenny Johari, Manager of the Penang War Museum, to learn more about this hidden relic from a wartime era of the old Malaya.The Penang War Museum is reputed to be the largest

mypenang.gov.my

I visited this, a little underwhelming I should say but undeveloped means also preserved which is good for fast moving Asian economies.
Apparently the problem was that it was designed with defences seawards & the Japanese hijacked fishing boats & landed on the north of the island which was undefended, taking Georgetown (Penang City) from the rear.
Apparently also there was a plan to develop a submarine base as part of the Army complex but it was never realised. Army-Navy joint thinking, in comparison to the RAF.

The Existence of the RAAF in Penang

The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) is based in Butterworth on the North West coast of Malaysia, on the mainland of Penang. Officially opened in October

mypenang.gov.my

It seems that interservice rivalry was a big problem still in Malaya. The army still saw this "new service" as a subordinate party & in order to assert its independence & distance itself from the army's direct command, the RAF decided to build its airfield on the mainland, far away from the army base. Thinking of course that the Japanese, if they even dared to invade, would never get so far as the western side of Malaya. Of course the Tiger of Malaya proved this wrong & when his troops approached the RAF base.... they couldn't get the army there in time to resist 🙄.
Main points, the Chinese felt that the British had been incompetent & had run away leaving them to face the consequences. Disappointment more than disgust.
The Malays were mostly sitting on the fence, understandable really.
The Army & RAF were working at cross purposes.
Nobody had planned on the Japanese reaching the Western side of the peninsula.

As an aside, apparently around the same time that Singapore left the federation there was talk of Penang doing the same & becoming an independent city-state. Didn't happen, don't think it could happen now due to demographic changes, but an interesting possibile POD. Funnily enough now I think of it, the Chinese Communist rebellion never entered the conversations & I think it's seen as something irrelevant & better forgotten.

Ok, long post, sorry I don't have links to the actual details but it was more than a decade ago. Hope it gives you a feel for the background, especially for the Chinese community.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Battery, electric cord or gas powered?

The humor aside, did any nation in the lead up to WW 2 not make a fatal error?

While none of the major powers failed to make a significant error in the lead up to WWII, only three America, Britain and the Soviet Union, could afford to make repeated errors and survive. Germany, Japan and Italy, all started the war short of oil and in a desperate financial position, and once they stopped throwing six’s it was all downhill from then on.

RR.

 

[Merrick]

So how does this all play out going forward TTL? Nothing much has changed so far in the US deployments, so assume things start off as OTL. Assume that the British in Malaya do rather better - the Japanese invasion is slowed by successful actions at Kota Bharu or the Ledge, the British have their communications better set up so withdrawals don't routinely turn into chaos, there is no disaster at Slim River and by early January - an month into the war - the British have managed to temporarily stabilise a line in northern or central Malaya. Meanwhile, as OTL, the Japanese in the Philippines have bottled MacArthur up in Bataan/Corregidor and their Center Force is pushing south through Borneo and the Celebes. ABDA's naval forces are trying to interdict the advance, being hampered at all points by Japanese airpower.

So what does the US do now? The USN will go ahead with strikes against the Marshalls (again as OTL) both to distract the Japanese and to soften up the defences there for a later attack, once they've assembled the ships and Marines and amphibious transport. That uses the USN carriers, and the Pacific Fleet battleline is on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, so they don't have a whole lot left to send to the DEI even if they think it's a good idea. If they think reinforcements might save Java, they could scrape up some cruiser/destroyer forces to reinforce ABDA - possibly even from the Atlantic Fleet (it's not all that much further to Java from the US East Coast than from the West) - but it's about 3 weeks' sailing, so don't expect them soon.

The exception is submarines. These will be sent from Pearl Harbor all the way to the Philippine Sea to attack the Japanese lines of communication. They will take 2-3 weeks to make the crossing, and if there's a viable base in the area, the USN will be interested in using it - not to mention rebasing the Asiatic Fleet subs when Manila Bay becomes untenable. Singapore is a possibility, but I'd expect Surabaya to be the first option.

Aircraft of course are much faster to reposition, so expect air units intended for the China or the Philippines to be sent to wherever the front is when they arrive, probably eastern Java. More to follow if the campaign last long enough, but potentially not many more since the USAAF is still in its ramp-up stage and does not have unlimited planes or trained pilots.

There's also the issue that if the US look at the campaign and decide the Japanese can potentially be stopped in the East Indies, aircraft at nice, ships are nice but what is really needed is properly-trained, fully-equipped troops to give the KNIL a fighting chance against the IJA. The Navy won't want to commit the Marines to a long land campaign. The US Army is still in the middle of a major expansion, does not have too many fully-trained, fully-equipped units to send and the ones it does have are earmarked for Europe/North Africa, where Torch is already being planned. They won't want to have to find a division to send about as far from the US as it's possible to get and the politics of sending US boys to die defending Dutch colonies are horrible. If they think the East Indies are important enough, they might arrange a shuffle with US units going to the 8th Army in Egypt or to garrison duty in Syria/Palestine (and wouldn't that be fun) to free up more British or Empire troops to be sent East, but again that would be slow (any US troops to Egypt would have to go the long way round Africa). All in I suspect it's more likely the US will shrug its shoulders and say "no can do".

Remember that early 1941 is peak post-Pearl Harbor panic time and the US view the Japanese as seriously bad juju. MacArthur and the Philippine Division couldn't even slow them down - why would a bunch of British or Dutch colonial militia do any better? Throwing more underprepared troops or ships under the juggernaut could effectively be sending them straight to the PoW cages or Davy Jones. Much better to stick to the plan, which is Europe first and the prepared push through the Central Pacific with overwhelming force and keep the fleet where it belongs, which is between Japan and the US. Let the Europeans defend their own colonies.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

So how does this all play out going forward TTL? Nothing much has changed so far in the US deployments, so assume things start off as OTL. Assume that the British in Malaya do rather better - the Japanese invasion is slowed by successful actions at Kota Bharu or the Ledge, the British have their communications better set up so withdrawals don't routinely turn into chaos, there is no disaster at Slim River and by early January - an month into the war - the British have managed to temporarily stabilise a line in northern or central Malaya. Meanwhile, as OTL, the Japanese in the Philippines have bottled MacArthur up in Bataan/Corregidor and their Center Force is pushing south through Borneo and the Celebes. ABDA's naval forces are trying to interdict the advance, being hampered at all points by Japanese airpower.

So what does the US do now? The USN will go ahead with strikes against the Marshalls (again as OTL) both to distract the Japanese and to soften up the defences there for a later attack, once they've assembled the ships and Marines and amphibious transport. That uses the USN carriers, and the Pacific Fleet battleline is on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, so they don't have a whole lot left to send to the DEI even if they think it's a good idea. If they think reinforcements might save Java, they could scrape up some cruiser/destroyer forces to reinforce ABDA - possibly even from the Atlantic Fleet (it's not all that much further to Java from the US East Coast than from the West) - but it's about 3 weeks' sailing, so don't expect them soon.

The exception is submarines. These will be sent from Pearl Harbor all the way to the Philippine Sea to attack the Japanese lines of communication. They will take 2-3 weeks to make the crossing, and if there's a viable base in the area, the USN will be interested in using it - not to mention rebasing the Asiatic Fleet subs when Manila Bay becomes untenable. Singapore is a possibility, but I'd expect Surabaya to be the first option.

Aircraft of course are much faster to reposition, so expect air units intended for the China or the Philippines to be sent to wherever the front is when they arrive, probably eastern Java. More to follow if the campaign last long enough, but potentially not many more since the USAAF is still in its ramp-up stage and does not have unlimited planes or trained pilots.

There's also the issue that if the US look at the campaign and decide the Japanese can potentially be stopped in the East Indies, aircraft at nice, ships are nice but what is really needed is properly-trained, fully-equipped troops to give the KNIL a fighting chance against the IJA. The Navy won't want to commit the Marines to a long land campaign. The US Army is still in the middle of a major expansion, does not have too many fully-trained, fully-equipped units to send and the ones it does have are earmarked for Europe/North Africa, where Torch is already being planned. They won't want to have to find a division to send about as far from the US as it's possible to get and the politics of sending US boys to die defending Dutch colonies are horrible. If they think the East Indies are important enough, they might arrange a shuffle with US units going to the 8th Army in Egypt or to garrison duty in Syria/Palestine (and wouldn't that be fun) to free up more British or Empire troops to be sent East, but again that would be slow (any US troops to Egypt would have to go the long way round Africa). All in I suspect it's more likely the US will shrug its shoulders and say "no can do".

Remember that early 1941 is peak post-Pearl Harbor panic time and the US view the Japanese as seriously bad juju. MacArthur and the Philippine Division couldn't even slow them down - why would a bunch of British or Dutch colonial militia do any better? Throwing more underprepared troops or ships under the juggernaut could effectively be sending them straight to the PoW cages or Davy Jones. Much better to stick to the plan, which is Europe first and the prepared push through the Central Pacific with overwhelming force and keep the fleet where it belongs, which is between Japan and the US. Let the Europeans defend their own colonies.

Sir while I agree with much of what you say, I do take objection to you referring to the Australian and Indian troops in Malaya as colonial militias. Both forces were significantly more than mere colonial militias, and both the Australians and Indians, had a proud history, while these troops might be slightly green, they have been subjected to intense training.

RR.

 

[Merrick]

I believe that by March or April, Mac will be surrounded in the Bataan peninsula rapidly running out of supplies, much as he was IOTL, while Gort will have managed to retain the Japanese in Malaya. The USN will still be perusing their War Plan Orange, and principally concentrating on trying to bring the Japanese to battle in the Central Pacific.

I fear you may be being optimistic. Gort has done a good job with what's available, but he's not had much more to work with than was available OTL, he's still critically short on heavy equipment and many of his units are still under-strength, under-equipped and/or inexperienced. Taking on Yamashita's China veterans will be a tough ask, and there isn't much in the way of reinforcement on the horizon, while Yamashita can call on formations that OTL were used for the Burma invasion. Plus, if the campaign goes on long enough, Gort has the further problem that if the Dutch position in Java collapses behind him, he's finished even if he does manage to hold the line in Malaya.

OTL, the invasion of Malaya began in early December and Singapore surrendered in mid-February, so if Gort manages to do twice as well as Percival TTL he'll be surrendering sometime in late April, which is between the surrenders on Bataan and Corregidor OTL. The question is, can anything reasonably be done in those two months to change Singapore's fate?

Sir while I agree with much of what you say, I do take objection to you referring to the Australian and Indian troops in Malaya as colonial militias. Both forces were significantly more than mere colonial militias, and both the Australians and Indians, had a proud history, while these troops might be slightly green, they have been subjected to intense training.

I should have made it clear that this was how I imagined the American view of things. I can't see 1940s US Army brass rating Indian or KNIL troops very highly.

 

[Driftless]

I suppose it can't really be discussed in detail until the shooting and assaults start, but in OTL, didn't the Japanese shift significant numbers of Army forces between the PI, DEI, and Malaya, AND extracting some first tier units from ongoing operations in China?

In this TL, if Malaya proves a tougher nut to crack, then that historic shift of IJA forces gets scrambled, both in numbers and destinations

So far, we have mostly debated what Commonwealth, American, and KNIL land forces will start the fight and where they will be on day one, with some thought given to fall back plans.