That is a great pic! If you don't mind, I may use it later in this TL
By all means, though the image isnt my work I believe it's open to the public. Also here are some actual pictures of the General if you find them useful.
Zhirinovsky's Russian Empire
- Thread starter Pellegrino
- Start date
By all means, though the image isnt my work I believe it's open to the public. Also here are some actual pictures of the General if you find them useful.
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
We see Chechnya is going from bad to worse, and we now have the biggest curveball to date in regards to the question of who is in charge (Zhirinovsky or Lebed)
Some new names in this update:
The Roki Tunnel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roki_Tunnel
Gheorge Ghimpu, a Moldovan nationalist leader who emerges in TTL as president of Moldova:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gheorghe_Ghimpu
Transnistria:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria
Transistrian politican Pyotr Stepanov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Stepanov
General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov was head of Russian forces in the first Chechen war and was widely seen as a disasterous leader
General Konstantin Pulikovsky was head of Russian ground forces in OTL during the first Chechen war and was widely criticized for human rights violations and his poor performance as head of Russian forces during the Battle of Grozny in 1996
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the events leading up to the Constitutional Crisis of 1993.
BBC: Mr. Putin, you have been repeatedly ridiculed for your claims that there was a secret “junta” that controlled the UIS in 1993 over President Zhirinovsky. In the election of 2008, when you ran for President for fourth time, President Alexander Lebed ridiculed your autobiography by calling it “The Protocols of the Elders of Putin.” Once and for all, let us set the record straight. Who really was in control of the country in November of 1993?
Putin: General Alexander Lebed was.
BBC: So General Lebed allowed himself to be fired from the position of Marshal of the UIS as part of this ruse?! That seems absolutely absurd!
Putin: The title of Marshal of the UIS was meaningless. The real title that mattered was chairman of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense. As long as he headed the committee, he controlled the country.
BBC: Then how was it that he nearly was ousted from the committee?! How was it that he was sent off to Moldova while Generals that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky hand picked to fill the vacancies on the committee were put in charge of operations in Chechnya?!
Putin: You tend to forget that Moldova was just as dangerous an uprising as Chechnya was. General Lebed had a difference in philosophy with some of the Generals, yes. But he was more concerned with ending the rapid disintegration of the UIS, and although Chechnya was the catalyst for that disintegration, Moldova was no less important to the survival of the country.
BBC: That seems very hard to believe. The leader of the country deported himself to Siberia to fool everyone as part of a very elaborate ruse.
Putin (angrily): It was not Siberia! It was Moldova! And it was close to the heart of both Lebed and President Lukyanov. And I resent you putting words in my mouth! I didn’t say he didn’t face opposition. November 1993 was a very unstable time in the country, and there were constant threats to his leadership. He was almost ousted as chairman of the 16-man Committee. Almost.
Georgian, Moldovan Presidents seize control of local military forces; fears of expanding civil war loom in UIS
By Jeff Coleman
The Detroit Free Press
November 13, 1993
(Tbilisi, UIS) - As Russian troops continue to struggle in the breakaway Chechen Republic, fears that the entire Union of Independent States may be near collapse intensified as Georgian head-of-state Colonel Akaki Eliava invoked a Georgian version of what has increasingly become known as the “Zhirinovsky Act” on national television yesterday. The Russian version of the “Zhirinovsky Act” (as it is referred to by many in Russia) authorized the Russian president sweeping new powers, including the power to nationalize the military to combat terrorism and secessionists in the Chechen Republic. But Colonel Eliava’s proclamation on Georgian television of a new Georgian National Army, and his demand that “all troops loyal to the Georgian Republic disregard any orders originating in Moscow” has put many in the capital on edge and has drawn a sharp rebuke from the President of the UIS, Anatoly Lukyanov.
“Colonel Eliava is dangerously close to committing treason,” Lukyanov said firmly on Russian television, “and I would like to remind him that he is a Unionist officer in the Federal Military. He is expected to conduct himself accordingly and to defend the Constitution of this Union. We demand that he renounce his illegal claim to the office of president and take steps to allow President Shevardnadze to return to Tbilisi unmolested.”
However, hopes that the dispute between Georgia and Russia could be resolved diplomatically were dealt a serious blow by the extreme and confrontational outburst of Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky in front of the Russian Duma.
“I promise every Russian that I will personally see to it that Colonel Eliava is hung from the tallest tree in Tbilisi,” he said to the Duma, “Unless of course there are no trees left in Georgia after we are done bombing them into the Stone Age.”
Moldovan President proclaims ‘National Army’
Perhaps even more troubling for the UIS was the announcement by Moldovan President Gheorghe Ghimpu of the nationalization of “all Moldovan units into a National Army of the Bessarabian Republic”. The announcement at the Moldovan Parliament set off an eruption of cheers from the ethnic Moldovan delegates, and prompted all of the Russians and Ukrainian delegates to walk out.
“This was nothing short of a declaration of independence,” said lawmaker Pyotr Stepanov, “and we cannot continue to support this legislative body when it follows a disastrous path that will drag this Republic into civil war.”
Russian and Ukrainian delegates have announced plans to regroup in the City of Tiraspol, where they plan to create a “Loyalist Government in Exile”, prompting fears that the Moldovans will follow with a formal declaration of independence.
“The Moldovans are treated no better than the blacks in South Africa,” said a Moldovan woman after the announcement, “the Russians are allowed to seize our homes, and we have no way to appeal it whenever they do! How can they expect us not to seek independence when all they do is try and herd us into ghettos and rob us of our land, and our homes?!”
“Azerbaijan and Chechnya- “Profiles on the Russian "War on Terror”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – by John Miller
Routledge Press, (2007)
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
By November 15, 1993 the Russians had still yet to reach the outskirts of Grozny and were faced with what many felt was the greatest threat to the country as the now confident Chechen government took steps to formally shake off the chains of Russian domination.
“For a lot of Chechens living in Grozny, early November of 1993 were some of the happiest days of their life,” recounted a Chechen refugee, “we knew there was a war going on, and we received sad news everyday about a friend, or a nephew, or a son, who was killed by the Russians. But we felt free. We were free. We lived in a free and independent Chechnya and we were convinced that the Russians were about to abandon their foolhardy invasion and recognize our independence. Even the Marshal of the UIS, General Lebed, was calling the operation a mistake!”
General Lebed and several members of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense recognized that the entire Union was disintegrating, and once it became clear that the Chechen invasion would not be a rapid surgical strike, he immediately took steps to recall troops to prepare for the eventual blowback.
“General Lebed referred to what he called the Somali Line, a point of no return that the Russians could not afford to cross,” commented an aid to General Lebed in 1993, “after the Somalis kicked the Americans in the teeth in at the Battle of Mogadishu just one month prior, the Americans immediately announced they were pulling out troops. They knew they just walked into a quagmire they couldn’t win and they walked away from the mess. They had a black eye, sure. But nobody considered it a war; therefore nobody looked at it as a defeat like Vietnam or Afghanistan. They just considered it an operation that went poorly. General Lebed was desperate to recall troops while it could still be seen as an operation and not a war.”
General Lebed’s steps to recall the Russian troops were thwarted by other members of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense however. General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who was appointed by Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky to head the military operation in Chechnya, strongly opposed any move that could be seen as capitulation and was determined to push forward to Grozny. He was backed by General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, a hardliner on the 16-man Committee who replaced the moderate General Victor Ivanenko, a former Yeltsin aid who was awarded a lucrative private sector job by the Russian President.
“Lebed found himself being challenged by other Generals in the Committee,” the aid recalled, “he was furious that only 1,000 UIS troops were left to defend Tskhinvali, in the South Ossetian region of the Georgian Republic, and he was forced to overrule General Pulikovsky, who tried to usurp General Lebed and call nearly 6,500 Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia to assist in Chechnya.”
However, as Russians failed to reach Grozny after two weeks of fighting, it became clear that the Somali Line had indeed been crossed. General Lebed meekly offered his resignation as Marshal of the UIS to President Anatoly Lukyanov after being publically denounced by Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky on November 15th, the day that the civil war in Chechnya spilled over into neighboring Georgia.
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER FIFTY SIX
I sat quietly as the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense argued frantically with each other. General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the newest member of the committee was clearly siding with Zhirinovsky, who had called for indiscriminate bombing and the destruction of the town of Znamenskoye. He wanted to make an example of Znamenskoye and demanded more troops to help General Konstantin Pulikovsky crush the Chechen rebels. However, several members of the committee were arguing over the fact that the Russian government now was in control of large parts of the UIS military, a clear violation of the Constitution. General Lebed was arguing that the time to restore federal control of the armed forces had come, and was vocal in his opposition to any further operation in Chechnya. I just sat quietly. My term as Secretary of State was about to end in six weeks and I knew nobody was interested in my opinion anyways. If they had been they never would have embarked on this foolhardy plan.
“Marshal Lebed,” General Tikhomirov screamed, “we cannot win this war unless we make an example of the Chechens! We need to crush this rebellion before it spreads!”
“It is spreading now!” the Marshal retorted, “The Moldovans and Georgians are following your lead, and President Zhirinovsky’s lead! They have nationalized their armies as well and are poised to move on the Ossetians and the Transnistrians! We need to move fast to prevent this war from spreading!”
“And the best way to do so is to make an example of the Chechens!” Tikhomirov yelled back.
Suddenly a young officer walked into the meeting hall, interrupting the session with a look of absolute shock on his face. He was pale as a ghost and looked utterly stunned.
“Marshal Lebed,” the young Captain said nervously, “we have just received a report from Tskhinvali.”
“Did the Georgians launch an attack?” Lebed asked with no surprise in his voice, as if he had been expecting the news. “Are they trying to take Tskhinvali and drive the remaining Federal forces out?”
“They captured Tskhinvali,” the Captain replied, “the troops that were defending South Ossetia were overrun almost immediately.”
Lebed rubbed his eyes with his hands and waved the young soldier off, “Thank you Captain,” he said. “You may be excused.”
“Uh sir,” the Captain replied, “There is more. They also captured Kvurta and Kvaisi…and Nar.”
Suddenly I saw the color flood out of General Lebed’s face; he looked like a man who had just been shot.
“Nar?! But…but that is on the other side of the Roki Tunnel! That’s in North Ossetia!”
“Yes sir,” the young Captain said as his gaze dropped to the floor, “the town is under foreign occupation.”
“Georgia is not a foreign country!” General Tikhomirov screamed at the Captain, “It is part of the UIS!”
The young Captain lifted his head and glared at the General with a look of unmistakable contempt.
“Call them whatever you want,” he said unable to hide his anger, “But as of three o’clock this morning over twenty square kilometers of Russian soil is now under control of the Georgian Army. General, with all due respect, but whatever the Georgians are, they have just done something that nobody has accomplished in over fifty years. They have just successfully launched an invasion of Mother Russia!”
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
PART FORTY SEVEN: THE SOMALI LINE
We see Chechnya is going from bad to worse, and we now have the biggest curveball to date in regards to the question of who is in charge (Zhirinovsky or Lebed)
Some new names in this update:
The Roki Tunnel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roki_Tunnel
Gheorge Ghimpu, a Moldovan nationalist leader who emerges in TTL as president of Moldova:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gheorghe_Ghimpu
Transnistria:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria
Transistrian politican Pyotr Stepanov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Stepanov
General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov was head of Russian forces in the first Chechen war and was widely seen as a disasterous leader
General Konstantin Pulikovsky was head of Russian ground forces in OTL during the first Chechen war and was widely criticized for human rights violations and his poor performance as head of Russian forces during the Battle of Grozny in 1996
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the events leading up to the Constitutional Crisis of 1993.
BBC: Mr. Putin, you have been repeatedly ridiculed for your claims that there was a secret “junta” that controlled the UIS in 1993 over President Zhirinovsky. In the election of 2008, when you ran for President for fourth time, President Alexander Lebed ridiculed your autobiography by calling it “The Protocols of the Elders of Putin.” Once and for all, let us set the record straight. Who really was in control of the country in November of 1993?
Putin: General Alexander Lebed was.
BBC: So General Lebed allowed himself to be fired from the position of Marshal of the UIS as part of this ruse?! That seems absolutely absurd!
Putin: The title of Marshal of the UIS was meaningless. The real title that mattered was chairman of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense. As long as he headed the committee, he controlled the country.
BBC: Then how was it that he nearly was ousted from the committee?! How was it that he was sent off to Moldova while Generals that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky hand picked to fill the vacancies on the committee were put in charge of operations in Chechnya?!
Putin: You tend to forget that Moldova was just as dangerous an uprising as Chechnya was. General Lebed had a difference in philosophy with some of the Generals, yes. But he was more concerned with ending the rapid disintegration of the UIS, and although Chechnya was the catalyst for that disintegration, Moldova was no less important to the survival of the country.
BBC: That seems very hard to believe. The leader of the country deported himself to Siberia to fool everyone as part of a very elaborate ruse.
Putin (angrily): It was not Siberia! It was Moldova! And it was close to the heart of both Lebed and President Lukyanov. And I resent you putting words in my mouth! I didn’t say he didn’t face opposition. November 1993 was a very unstable time in the country, and there were constant threats to his leadership. He was almost ousted as chairman of the 16-man Committee. Almost.
Georgian, Moldovan Presidents seize control of local military forces; fears of expanding civil war loom in UIS
By Jeff Coleman
The Detroit Free Press
November 13, 1993
(Tbilisi, UIS) - As Russian troops continue to struggle in the breakaway Chechen Republic, fears that the entire Union of Independent States may be near collapse intensified as Georgian head-of-state Colonel Akaki Eliava invoked a Georgian version of what has increasingly become known as the “Zhirinovsky Act” on national television yesterday. The Russian version of the “Zhirinovsky Act” (as it is referred to by many in Russia) authorized the Russian president sweeping new powers, including the power to nationalize the military to combat terrorism and secessionists in the Chechen Republic. But Colonel Eliava’s proclamation on Georgian television of a new Georgian National Army, and his demand that “all troops loyal to the Georgian Republic disregard any orders originating in Moscow” has put many in the capital on edge and has drawn a sharp rebuke from the President of the UIS, Anatoly Lukyanov.
“Colonel Eliava is dangerously close to committing treason,” Lukyanov said firmly on Russian television, “and I would like to remind him that he is a Unionist officer in the Federal Military. He is expected to conduct himself accordingly and to defend the Constitution of this Union. We demand that he renounce his illegal claim to the office of president and take steps to allow President Shevardnadze to return to Tbilisi unmolested.”
However, hopes that the dispute between Georgia and Russia could be resolved diplomatically were dealt a serious blow by the extreme and confrontational outburst of Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky in front of the Russian Duma.
“I promise every Russian that I will personally see to it that Colonel Eliava is hung from the tallest tree in Tbilisi,” he said to the Duma, “Unless of course there are no trees left in Georgia after we are done bombing them into the Stone Age.”
Moldovan President proclaims ‘National Army’
Perhaps even more troubling for the UIS was the announcement by Moldovan President Gheorghe Ghimpu of the nationalization of “all Moldovan units into a National Army of the Bessarabian Republic”. The announcement at the Moldovan Parliament set off an eruption of cheers from the ethnic Moldovan delegates, and prompted all of the Russians and Ukrainian delegates to walk out.
“This was nothing short of a declaration of independence,” said lawmaker Pyotr Stepanov, “and we cannot continue to support this legislative body when it follows a disastrous path that will drag this Republic into civil war.”
Russian and Ukrainian delegates have announced plans to regroup in the City of Tiraspol, where they plan to create a “Loyalist Government in Exile”, prompting fears that the Moldovans will follow with a formal declaration of independence.
“The Moldovans are treated no better than the blacks in South Africa,” said a Moldovan woman after the announcement, “the Russians are allowed to seize our homes, and we have no way to appeal it whenever they do! How can they expect us not to seek independence when all they do is try and herd us into ghettos and rob us of our land, and our homes?!”
“Azerbaijan and Chechnya- “Profiles on the Russian "War on Terror”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – by John Miller
Routledge Press, (2007)
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
By November 15, 1993 the Russians had still yet to reach the outskirts of Grozny and were faced with what many felt was the greatest threat to the country as the now confident Chechen government took steps to formally shake off the chains of Russian domination.
“For a lot of Chechens living in Grozny, early November of 1993 were some of the happiest days of their life,” recounted a Chechen refugee, “we knew there was a war going on, and we received sad news everyday about a friend, or a nephew, or a son, who was killed by the Russians. But we felt free. We were free. We lived in a free and independent Chechnya and we were convinced that the Russians were about to abandon their foolhardy invasion and recognize our independence. Even the Marshal of the UIS, General Lebed, was calling the operation a mistake!”
General Lebed and several members of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense recognized that the entire Union was disintegrating, and once it became clear that the Chechen invasion would not be a rapid surgical strike, he immediately took steps to recall troops to prepare for the eventual blowback.
“General Lebed referred to what he called the Somali Line, a point of no return that the Russians could not afford to cross,” commented an aid to General Lebed in 1993, “after the Somalis kicked the Americans in the teeth in at the Battle of Mogadishu just one month prior, the Americans immediately announced they were pulling out troops. They knew they just walked into a quagmire they couldn’t win and they walked away from the mess. They had a black eye, sure. But nobody considered it a war; therefore nobody looked at it as a defeat like Vietnam or Afghanistan. They just considered it an operation that went poorly. General Lebed was desperate to recall troops while it could still be seen as an operation and not a war.”
General Lebed’s steps to recall the Russian troops were thwarted by other members of the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense however. General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who was appointed by Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky to head the military operation in Chechnya, strongly opposed any move that could be seen as capitulation and was determined to push forward to Grozny. He was backed by General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, a hardliner on the 16-man Committee who replaced the moderate General Victor Ivanenko, a former Yeltsin aid who was awarded a lucrative private sector job by the Russian President.
“Lebed found himself being challenged by other Generals in the Committee,” the aid recalled, “he was furious that only 1,000 UIS troops were left to defend Tskhinvali, in the South Ossetian region of the Georgian Republic, and he was forced to overrule General Pulikovsky, who tried to usurp General Lebed and call nearly 6,500 Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia to assist in Chechnya.”
However, as Russians failed to reach Grozny after two weeks of fighting, it became clear that the Somali Line had indeed been crossed. General Lebed meekly offered his resignation as Marshal of the UIS to President Anatoly Lukyanov after being publically denounced by Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky on November 15th, the day that the civil war in Chechnya spilled over into neighboring Georgia.
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER FIFTY SIX
I sat quietly as the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense argued frantically with each other. General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the newest member of the committee was clearly siding with Zhirinovsky, who had called for indiscriminate bombing and the destruction of the town of Znamenskoye. He wanted to make an example of Znamenskoye and demanded more troops to help General Konstantin Pulikovsky crush the Chechen rebels. However, several members of the committee were arguing over the fact that the Russian government now was in control of large parts of the UIS military, a clear violation of the Constitution. General Lebed was arguing that the time to restore federal control of the armed forces had come, and was vocal in his opposition to any further operation in Chechnya. I just sat quietly. My term as Secretary of State was about to end in six weeks and I knew nobody was interested in my opinion anyways. If they had been they never would have embarked on this foolhardy plan.
“Marshal Lebed,” General Tikhomirov screamed, “we cannot win this war unless we make an example of the Chechens! We need to crush this rebellion before it spreads!”
“It is spreading now!” the Marshal retorted, “The Moldovans and Georgians are following your lead, and President Zhirinovsky’s lead! They have nationalized their armies as well and are poised to move on the Ossetians and the Transnistrians! We need to move fast to prevent this war from spreading!”
“And the best way to do so is to make an example of the Chechens!” Tikhomirov yelled back.
Suddenly a young officer walked into the meeting hall, interrupting the session with a look of absolute shock on his face. He was pale as a ghost and looked utterly stunned.
“Marshal Lebed,” the young Captain said nervously, “we have just received a report from Tskhinvali.”
“Did the Georgians launch an attack?” Lebed asked with no surprise in his voice, as if he had been expecting the news. “Are they trying to take Tskhinvali and drive the remaining Federal forces out?”
“They captured Tskhinvali,” the Captain replied, “the troops that were defending South Ossetia were overrun almost immediately.”
Lebed rubbed his eyes with his hands and waved the young soldier off, “Thank you Captain,” he said. “You may be excused.”
“Uh sir,” the Captain replied, “There is more. They also captured Kvurta and Kvaisi…and Nar.”
Suddenly I saw the color flood out of General Lebed’s face; he looked like a man who had just been shot.
“Nar?! But…but that is on the other side of the Roki Tunnel! That’s in North Ossetia!”
“Yes sir,” the young Captain said as his gaze dropped to the floor, “the town is under foreign occupation.”
“Georgia is not a foreign country!” General Tikhomirov screamed at the Captain, “It is part of the UIS!”
The young Captain lifted his head and glared at the General with a look of unmistakable contempt.
“Call them whatever you want,” he said unable to hide his anger, “But as of three o’clock this morning over twenty square kilometers of Russian soil is now under control of the Georgian Army. General, with all due respect, but whatever the Georgians are, they have just done something that nobody has accomplished in over fifty years. They have just successfully launched an invasion of Mother Russia!”
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Not necessarily. Back in Part Fourteen: The Road to Alat what seemed to be a relatively inconsequential developent may now come into play:
although control of the Tbilisi Air Defense Army was somewhat contested between the Federal government and the Georgian Republic, the Georgians were not going to come to the aid of Azerbaijan. Not with 20,000 Russian and federal troops fortifying in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. The Tbilisi Air Defense Army was the air defense system of the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus regions in the Soviet Union
So if the Georgians took control of the Tbilisi Air Defense Army, the Russians may not be able to send bombers
Dang Pellegrino you spoil us
Lol, thanks! Where we are in the TL now is something that I envisioned early in (I had been preparing for the eventual Chechen rebellion and the Russian problems with combating it since the first post) so I have a lot of my research and ideas more fleshed out right now which allows me to move a bit quicker.
Plus I am eager to get to Part 50, if for no other resonance than to say I have 50 updates under my belt.
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Here is the interesting thing, we see the Georgians have struck at the poorly defended Osettian front. But they have made no moves in Azbakhia due to the strong federal presence there. This will come into play in the next post and we will gt a better idea how this conflict in Georgia will play out
By all means, though the image isnt my work I believe it's open to the public. Also here are some actual pictures of the General if you find them useful.
Man, these at GREAT! Thank you!!!!
yourworstnightmare
Banned
With Chechenya, Moldova and Georgia all exploding at once, committing alot of troops to the Balkans is starting to look like a terrible idea.
I think the biggest chance for the Russians would be with a neo-nazi type group. That said, I agree with Pellegrino Shots.
So I haven't commented on this in far too long, and I just wanted to say, by and large, well done, this is an AH masterpiece in the making!
I do, however, have one point. I have literally no idea how the Georgians were able to get through the Roki Tunnel ITTL, but considering how hard it was for even the Russians to mobilize in the region during the 2008 war, I find it hard to believe that the Georgians could just waltz over Ossetia with so few problems.
I do, however, have one point. I have literally no idea how the Georgians were able to get through the Roki Tunnel ITTL, but considering how hard it was for even the Russians to mobilize in the region during the 2008 war, I find it hard to believe that the Georgians could just waltz over Ossetia with so few problems.
Thank you! I appreciate all the support!
And as for the question of the Roki Tunnel, this is going to be explained in the next few posts. But what we have is a situation where the Georgians overwhelm a few hundred token Russian troops in Tskhinvali (less than 1000, after the bulk are relocated to Chechnya) and immediately take the S-10 highway north to the Roki Tunnel. Note that the captured towns are all on the S-10 highway, including the one in North Ossetia. Now the question is why would the Georgians want to actually enter North Ossetia? Especially since, from what we can tell, much of South Ossetia not on the S-10 highway is not under Georgian control? What could they possibly gain? They can't honestly expect to hold onto any conquered Russian territory for any period of time, and they are now dangerously exposed. Nor can they expect the Russians not to respond, even if right now they are preoccupied. Why would the Georgians want to invade a town 10 kilometers on the other side of the Roki Tunnel?
Well, the interesting thing is your comment gives strong hints as to the answer to those questions.
In OTL the mobilization of Russian troops in 2008 was done with much difficulty, but they did have one advantage that turned the tide of the 2008 war in the favor of the Ossetians: the Roki Tunnel was operational and under their control. Now without giving away too much, lets ask one question: what it the single most important thing the Georgians can do in this TL to ensure that the Russians are unable to move their heavy armor, T-80s, APCs, and troops into South Ossetia? What is the one thing they could destroy that would make an invasion of South Ossetia nearly impossible for the Russians? Holding onto Nar in North Ossetia may not be part of the plan at all, and its occupation may be simply to give the Georgians enough time to be rid of a huge weakness that leaves them exposed.
OK, maybe I have given away a lot there
With that being said, the Roki Tunnel is virtually impassible in the winter (and it is November in this TL). I realized that I have given the Georgians an awful lot of credit and the benefit of the doubt that they could move enough troops across a virtually impassible mountain pass in 24-hours. But although I think it would have been very, very, difficult, I don’t think it was impossible.
PART FORTY EIGHT: BLACK NOVEMBER
PART FORTY EIGHT: BLACK NOVEMBER
PART FORTY EIGHT: BLACK NOVEMBER
Well, we now see what this “invasion of Russia” really looks like, and how this Constitutional Crisis is beginning to play out. Some new names in this update:
Abkhazia is now coming into play:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia
The CH-53 Sea Stallion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CH-53
The Georgian Special Forces/White Eagles:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Forces_Brigade_(Georgia)
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2254a,4565c25f59f,3ae6ace8b,0,IRBC,,GEO.html
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing Black November, when the UIS nearly imploded in 1993.
BBC: You famously said that it was by the grace of God that the UIS was able to survive Black November in 1993. With the country paralyzed by an emerging constitutional crisis between the UIS and Russian governments, coupled with the shocking military success of the Chechens and Georgians, how did General Lebed and President Zhirinovsky weather that storm?
Putin: It was difficult, many of the Generals in the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense were furious with General Lebed. They thought this was proof that his military philosophy was wrong. But ironically, for Lebed, the Georgian invasion of North Ossetia was proof to him that he had in fact been right all along.
BBC: How so? It looked more like he had been badly embarrassed by being the first Marshal to see Russian soil occupied by a foreign power since the Nazis invaded during World War II.
Putin: He believed that the UIS Military needed to upgrade. He believed we needed to create a strong, disciplined army that focused not on brute force and strength of numbers, but on training and professionalism. He felt that the era of throwing hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers at an enemy was simply not enough.
BBC: So how did Georgia confirm this belief?
Putin: The Georgians outnumbered the Russians when they stormed Tskhinvali, this did not surprise him. He knew that General Tikhomirov had left the South Ossetian capital dangerously vulnerable. But the magnitude of the collapse shocked him. He expected the Russians to hold out for at least a day or two before being overrun. But they were so demoralized by poor leadership they surrendered without firing a shot.
BBC: Is that how the Georgians were able to capture so much territory in the first 48-hours of the conflict?
Putin: It was a big part. But the biggest reason was because of the emerging Constitutional Crisis. We were paralyzed in Moscow because of this power struggle between the federalists and the nationalists. All the while the Georgians were sending in their White Eagles to terrorize the border towns.
Excerpts from the book “Soldier: The Life of General Colin Powell ”
Written by Catherine Wilcox-Miller
Published by Random House © 2000
Chapter Nine
Although President Kerrey strongly supported Congressman Lazio’s plan to “flood Chechnya and Georgia” with Dragons, he also remained concerned about the impact of sending too many American weapons to such a volatile region of the UIS.
“President Kerrey knew that sending weapons to Georgia was a dangerous precedent,” former Secretary of State Walter Mondale said, “and could be interpreted as a declaration of war by the increasingly irrational Russian President.”
Although the Dragons and M-16 rifles were officially sold to Turkey as “spare parts”, the Americans knew that the UIS was not buying that story.
“Considering it was one of the biggest campaign issues in the Russian presidential race, we knew that they were not fooled for a second,” commented Mondale, “they knew we were lying when we said that we never had any intention of seeing the weapons in Chechen hands.”
However, as Congressman Lazio began taking a more active role in implementing the Powell Doctrine, he soon began to clamor for even more advanced weaponry to go to the nascent Georgian Army.
“He was assured by his sources that the Georgians would be able to control the skies if a conflict would emerge,” Mondale recalled, “we were not nearly as optimistic.”
Lazio clamored for the United States to send six CH-53 Sea Stallions; assault helicopters that could be used to maximum efficiency in the even of a conflict. As much of northern Georgia was mountainous, transportation was often difficult and Lazio believed that if the Georgians could assure air superiority the Sea Stallions would prove devastating. However, Mondale and Kerrey balked at the prospect of sending American CH-53s into Georgia.
“That would have been too much,” Mondale said, “its one thing to send a few rifles and anti-tank missile systems to the Georgians, but to start sending helicopters could have triggered World War III.”
Lazio was undeterred, and began recruiting foreign governments who would be willing to act as a straw man for the American government. Few were interested in the risky proposition.
“Even Pakistan was reluctant,” Mondale said, “everyone saw that getting too involved in this new Cold War would bring a lot of unwanted attention from Zhirinovsky and the KGB. They wanted no part of it.”
Lazio exhausted almost all of his options when he received a surprising phone call in the summer of 1993. Not only was this country willing to send CH-53s to Georgia, but they were even willing to provide their own so as not to raise unwanted attention to the Americans. The offer electrified Lazio and the Kerrey administration, who quickly agreed.
By the time Georgia had formally invoked its own version of the Zhirinovsky Act, and nationalized the Georgian Army, six Israeli Ch-53 Sea Stallions were already in Tbilisi and would soon embark on one of the most daring military missions of the twentieth century.
“When Eagles Soared: A Modern History of the Republic of Georgia”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – By Timothy Burnside
Routledge Press, (2005)
CHAPTER SIX
By the summer of 1993 the Georgian military, which had grown increasingly autonomous of President Shevardnadze (who was seen by many Generals as little more than a puppet of Moscow) began to openly prepare for the “liberation of the Georgian Nation.” The military spent much of the summer training for the eventual conflict that they were sure was soon to come.
“The war in Azerbaijan cowed many Georgians into submission,” commented one Georgian politician, “but we also knew that sooner or later an opportunity to be rid of the Russians would emerge, and we needed to be prepared to seize that moment when it arose.”
Colonel Akaki Eliava, who would soon emerge as head-of-state of Georgia after ousting Shevardnadze in a bloodless coup, was enthralled when Israel sent six assault helicopters capable of flying over the high mountains of northern Georgia. He began preparing for a daring operation that even many of his fellow officers considered foolhardy.
“Colonel Eliava knew that if Chechnya erupted in war that it was almost certain that the Russians would send the troops stationed in South Ossetia to Chechnya,” the politician added, “to him, this was when we needed to move. That would be the once in a lifetime moment that the Georgians needed to seize.”
However, as it became clear that Shevardnadze did not share his enthusiasm for independence, he also prepared for the eventual coup that would put him in power.
“Colonel Eliava knew that the Chechen war was the catalyst for everything,” the politician added, “It would be the catalyst for the coup. And for the liberation of South Ossetia. And for Georgian independence.”
The bloodless coup allowed Colonel Eliava to implement the second phase of his plan: the destruction of both the South Ossetian separatist movement and the destruction of the UIS Federal Army in Georgia. However, to his deep disappointment, the UIS did not withdraw troops out of the quasi-autonomous province of Abkhazia.
“He knew we couldn’t take on the 6,500 well armed Russian forces in the west,” an aid to Colonel Eliava recalled, “but he still recognized that there would never be another opportunity like the one before him in South Ossetia.”
Oddly enough, it was this bit of poor luck that proved immensely beneficial to the Georgian military. No longer needing to split their forces for two separate operations, the Georgians were able to launch a concentrated assault on Tskhinvali with devastating results. The 896 Russian troops remaining in South Ossetia were completely shocked when approached by the newly liberated Armed Forces of the Georgian Republic, which outnumbered them 4 to 1. Told that the Georgian Republic had invoked its own version of the Zhirinovsky Act, and that it had (like the Russians) nationalized its army to combat “terrorist separatists,” the UIS Federal Troops quickly surrendered without firing a shot.
“Although it seems strange in hindsight, what they were doing was technically legal,” A former federal solider who surrendered recalled, “thanks to the Zhirinovsky Act being passed in Russia, we all couldn’t argue with what they were doing. Russia had set the precedent: A republic could nationalize its military and fight a war with separatists if they so wanted. We had to go.”
Rather than have the Russians withdraw, Colonel Eliava took them into custody with the intent of sending them to Tbilisi, where they were promised a one way plane ticket back to Russia. None of the federal troops argued with the offer, and with the surrender the Georgian commander recognized that he now had a clear path north. He now could destroy the one thing that stood in his way of total victory: the Roki Tunnel.
“Veteran of the Georgian War of Independence recalls the heroic Operation Ice Storm”
Der Spiegel
August 25, 2000
Interviewer’s notes: Der Spiegel interview with Captain Zurab Khanishvili of the Georgian White Eagle’s Special Forces Unit.
DS: Operation Ice Storm is widely seen as the greatest military operation in modern Georgian history, and is widely celebrated in the Georgian community here in Germany as a national holiday. What does Operation Ice Storm mean to you?
Khanishvili: It was a daring operation. That much is true. But we knew that we needed to succeed. We could not afford to let the Roki Tunnel remain operational and to allow the Russians to take it from us. At the time we didn’t care if we lived or died, we just wanted to keep the Russians from taking that tunnel before we were done destroying it.
DS: Didn’t it frighten you that you were invading Russia? The country that had occupied Georgia for decades! You were about to do the unthinkable!
Khanishvili: To be honest, we didn’t think of it as an invasion, although that’s how the western media portrayed it after the fact. But we saw it as a military operation. We would go in, seize the town and create a perimeter around the tunnel so that our troops in the south could blow it to hell.
DS: What was the most frightening thing about the operation?
Khanishvili: I suppose the flight up to Nar. Colonel Eliava and the other Generals had spent almost all of 1993 training the Georgian Special Forces-
DS: The White Eagles
Khanishvili: Yes. We were highly trained, and prepared for this operation. We had seen some action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it was in 1993 that we really emerged. We became a world class fighting force that summer and we were supremely confident in the operation. Just not the flight.
DS: What do you mean?
Khanishvili: We flew over to Nar in six Israeli helicopters. We didn’t know anything about them, other then these were the same helicopters that the Americans were flying in Iran when the tried to rescue the hostages at the embassy in 1979. The same helicopters that crashed in the middle of the desert. We were going to fly these helicopters over 3,000 meters high, over the Caucasus Mountains in the middle of the night! And the pilots had only two months training! We also expected that the Russian would shoot us down immediately. An American made helicopter flying into Russia. I am sometimes surprised we didn’t trigger a nuclear war.
DS: Once it became clear that you made it into Russian airspace what did you expect from Nar?
Khanishvili: I was worried about triggering a gun fight. There were four helicopters with forty White Eagles on each of the helicopters. Basically one hundred and sixty of us to seize a town of eight hundred and hold it long enough to load several tons of dynamite into the Roki Tunnel. Well, thanks to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, we figured at least half of the villagers would be armed. Fortunately we were wrong.
DS: How did they respond to your arrival?
Khanishvili: How do you think? They were angry, but fortunately for us the Ossetians are cowards by nature. They did nothing but hide under their beds.
DS: Did you expect the Russian military to confront you.
Khanishvili: At first we figured we’d be in and out before they had time to respond. The whole operation was supposed to take no more than six hours. But there were problems with the demolition. Destroying a military grade tunnel designed to survive a NATO aerial strike is not an easy task. We waited, taking positions on the road just south of town, praying and hoping that we would get the call that we could withdraw. But after we had been there for over twelve hours we starting thinking that we had pushed our luck. That the Russians were en route and there was no way this was not going to end in a firefight. At that point we changed our thinking, focusing on the battle ahead.
DS: Were you surprised the Russians never came?
Khanishvili: At the time I was. But once we got back and we saw what was happening in Moscow we realized they were in no condition to do anything. The Marshal of the UIS, General Lebed, had just been fired from his position and nobody knew who was in charge of what. The whole country was in a complete state of chaos. The federalists were demanding to restore federal control of the military, calling the Zhirinovsky Act unconstitutional, but the Russian nationalists were refusing to surrender control of military operations in Chechnya.
DS: Did you think that was the end of the UIS?
Khanishvili: To be honest, I did. Nobody was willing to take the initiative and move against our position because they didn’t know who was in charge. The call it Black November in Russia now, and for good reason. It was the closest the UIS ever came to falling apart.
Georgian White Eagles prepare to withdraw from the Russian occupied town of Nar after 16-hours
PART FORTY EIGHT: BLACK NOVEMBER
Well, we now see what this “invasion of Russia” really looks like, and how this Constitutional Crisis is beginning to play out. Some new names in this update:
Abkhazia is now coming into play:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia
The CH-53 Sea Stallion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CH-53
The Georgian Special Forces/White Eagles:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Forces_Brigade_(Georgia)
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2254a,4565c25f59f,3ae6ace8b,0,IRBC,,GEO.html
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing Black November, when the UIS nearly imploded in 1993.
BBC: You famously said that it was by the grace of God that the UIS was able to survive Black November in 1993. With the country paralyzed by an emerging constitutional crisis between the UIS and Russian governments, coupled with the shocking military success of the Chechens and Georgians, how did General Lebed and President Zhirinovsky weather that storm?
Putin: It was difficult, many of the Generals in the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense were furious with General Lebed. They thought this was proof that his military philosophy was wrong. But ironically, for Lebed, the Georgian invasion of North Ossetia was proof to him that he had in fact been right all along.
BBC: How so? It looked more like he had been badly embarrassed by being the first Marshal to see Russian soil occupied by a foreign power since the Nazis invaded during World War II.
Putin: He believed that the UIS Military needed to upgrade. He believed we needed to create a strong, disciplined army that focused not on brute force and strength of numbers, but on training and professionalism. He felt that the era of throwing hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers at an enemy was simply not enough.
BBC: So how did Georgia confirm this belief?
Putin: The Georgians outnumbered the Russians when they stormed Tskhinvali, this did not surprise him. He knew that General Tikhomirov had left the South Ossetian capital dangerously vulnerable. But the magnitude of the collapse shocked him. He expected the Russians to hold out for at least a day or two before being overrun. But they were so demoralized by poor leadership they surrendered without firing a shot.
BBC: Is that how the Georgians were able to capture so much territory in the first 48-hours of the conflict?
Putin: It was a big part. But the biggest reason was because of the emerging Constitutional Crisis. We were paralyzed in Moscow because of this power struggle between the federalists and the nationalists. All the while the Georgians were sending in their White Eagles to terrorize the border towns.
Excerpts from the book “Soldier: The Life of General Colin Powell ”
Written by Catherine Wilcox-Miller
Published by Random House © 2000
Chapter Nine
Although President Kerrey strongly supported Congressman Lazio’s plan to “flood Chechnya and Georgia” with Dragons, he also remained concerned about the impact of sending too many American weapons to such a volatile region of the UIS.
“President Kerrey knew that sending weapons to Georgia was a dangerous precedent,” former Secretary of State Walter Mondale said, “and could be interpreted as a declaration of war by the increasingly irrational Russian President.”
Although the Dragons and M-16 rifles were officially sold to Turkey as “spare parts”, the Americans knew that the UIS was not buying that story.
“Considering it was one of the biggest campaign issues in the Russian presidential race, we knew that they were not fooled for a second,” commented Mondale, “they knew we were lying when we said that we never had any intention of seeing the weapons in Chechen hands.”
However, as Congressman Lazio began taking a more active role in implementing the Powell Doctrine, he soon began to clamor for even more advanced weaponry to go to the nascent Georgian Army.
“He was assured by his sources that the Georgians would be able to control the skies if a conflict would emerge,” Mondale recalled, “we were not nearly as optimistic.”
Lazio clamored for the United States to send six CH-53 Sea Stallions; assault helicopters that could be used to maximum efficiency in the even of a conflict. As much of northern Georgia was mountainous, transportation was often difficult and Lazio believed that if the Georgians could assure air superiority the Sea Stallions would prove devastating. However, Mondale and Kerrey balked at the prospect of sending American CH-53s into Georgia.
“That would have been too much,” Mondale said, “its one thing to send a few rifles and anti-tank missile systems to the Georgians, but to start sending helicopters could have triggered World War III.”
Lazio was undeterred, and began recruiting foreign governments who would be willing to act as a straw man for the American government. Few were interested in the risky proposition.
“Even Pakistan was reluctant,” Mondale said, “everyone saw that getting too involved in this new Cold War would bring a lot of unwanted attention from Zhirinovsky and the KGB. They wanted no part of it.”
Lazio exhausted almost all of his options when he received a surprising phone call in the summer of 1993. Not only was this country willing to send CH-53s to Georgia, but they were even willing to provide their own so as not to raise unwanted attention to the Americans. The offer electrified Lazio and the Kerrey administration, who quickly agreed.
By the time Georgia had formally invoked its own version of the Zhirinovsky Act, and nationalized the Georgian Army, six Israeli Ch-53 Sea Stallions were already in Tbilisi and would soon embark on one of the most daring military missions of the twentieth century.
“When Eagles Soared: A Modern History of the Republic of Georgia”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – By Timothy Burnside
Routledge Press, (2005)
CHAPTER SIX
By the summer of 1993 the Georgian military, which had grown increasingly autonomous of President Shevardnadze (who was seen by many Generals as little more than a puppet of Moscow) began to openly prepare for the “liberation of the Georgian Nation.” The military spent much of the summer training for the eventual conflict that they were sure was soon to come.
“The war in Azerbaijan cowed many Georgians into submission,” commented one Georgian politician, “but we also knew that sooner or later an opportunity to be rid of the Russians would emerge, and we needed to be prepared to seize that moment when it arose.”
Colonel Akaki Eliava, who would soon emerge as head-of-state of Georgia after ousting Shevardnadze in a bloodless coup, was enthralled when Israel sent six assault helicopters capable of flying over the high mountains of northern Georgia. He began preparing for a daring operation that even many of his fellow officers considered foolhardy.
“Colonel Eliava knew that if Chechnya erupted in war that it was almost certain that the Russians would send the troops stationed in South Ossetia to Chechnya,” the politician added, “to him, this was when we needed to move. That would be the once in a lifetime moment that the Georgians needed to seize.”
However, as it became clear that Shevardnadze did not share his enthusiasm for independence, he also prepared for the eventual coup that would put him in power.
“Colonel Eliava knew that the Chechen war was the catalyst for everything,” the politician added, “It would be the catalyst for the coup. And for the liberation of South Ossetia. And for Georgian independence.”
The bloodless coup allowed Colonel Eliava to implement the second phase of his plan: the destruction of both the South Ossetian separatist movement and the destruction of the UIS Federal Army in Georgia. However, to his deep disappointment, the UIS did not withdraw troops out of the quasi-autonomous province of Abkhazia.
“He knew we couldn’t take on the 6,500 well armed Russian forces in the west,” an aid to Colonel Eliava recalled, “but he still recognized that there would never be another opportunity like the one before him in South Ossetia.”
Oddly enough, it was this bit of poor luck that proved immensely beneficial to the Georgian military. No longer needing to split their forces for two separate operations, the Georgians were able to launch a concentrated assault on Tskhinvali with devastating results. The 896 Russian troops remaining in South Ossetia were completely shocked when approached by the newly liberated Armed Forces of the Georgian Republic, which outnumbered them 4 to 1. Told that the Georgian Republic had invoked its own version of the Zhirinovsky Act, and that it had (like the Russians) nationalized its army to combat “terrorist separatists,” the UIS Federal Troops quickly surrendered without firing a shot.
“Although it seems strange in hindsight, what they were doing was technically legal,” A former federal solider who surrendered recalled, “thanks to the Zhirinovsky Act being passed in Russia, we all couldn’t argue with what they were doing. Russia had set the precedent: A republic could nationalize its military and fight a war with separatists if they so wanted. We had to go.”
Rather than have the Russians withdraw, Colonel Eliava took them into custody with the intent of sending them to Tbilisi, where they were promised a one way plane ticket back to Russia. None of the federal troops argued with the offer, and with the surrender the Georgian commander recognized that he now had a clear path north. He now could destroy the one thing that stood in his way of total victory: the Roki Tunnel.
“Veteran of the Georgian War of Independence recalls the heroic Operation Ice Storm”
Der Spiegel
August 25, 2000
Interviewer’s notes: Der Spiegel interview with Captain Zurab Khanishvili of the Georgian White Eagle’s Special Forces Unit.
DS: Operation Ice Storm is widely seen as the greatest military operation in modern Georgian history, and is widely celebrated in the Georgian community here in Germany as a national holiday. What does Operation Ice Storm mean to you?
Khanishvili: It was a daring operation. That much is true. But we knew that we needed to succeed. We could not afford to let the Roki Tunnel remain operational and to allow the Russians to take it from us. At the time we didn’t care if we lived or died, we just wanted to keep the Russians from taking that tunnel before we were done destroying it.
DS: Didn’t it frighten you that you were invading Russia? The country that had occupied Georgia for decades! You were about to do the unthinkable!
Khanishvili: To be honest, we didn’t think of it as an invasion, although that’s how the western media portrayed it after the fact. But we saw it as a military operation. We would go in, seize the town and create a perimeter around the tunnel so that our troops in the south could blow it to hell.
DS: What was the most frightening thing about the operation?
Khanishvili: I suppose the flight up to Nar. Colonel Eliava and the other Generals had spent almost all of 1993 training the Georgian Special Forces-
DS: The White Eagles
Khanishvili: Yes. We were highly trained, and prepared for this operation. We had seen some action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it was in 1993 that we really emerged. We became a world class fighting force that summer and we were supremely confident in the operation. Just not the flight.
DS: What do you mean?
Khanishvili: We flew over to Nar in six Israeli helicopters. We didn’t know anything about them, other then these were the same helicopters that the Americans were flying in Iran when the tried to rescue the hostages at the embassy in 1979. The same helicopters that crashed in the middle of the desert. We were going to fly these helicopters over 3,000 meters high, over the Caucasus Mountains in the middle of the night! And the pilots had only two months training! We also expected that the Russian would shoot us down immediately. An American made helicopter flying into Russia. I am sometimes surprised we didn’t trigger a nuclear war.
DS: Once it became clear that you made it into Russian airspace what did you expect from Nar?
Khanishvili: I was worried about triggering a gun fight. There were four helicopters with forty White Eagles on each of the helicopters. Basically one hundred and sixty of us to seize a town of eight hundred and hold it long enough to load several tons of dynamite into the Roki Tunnel. Well, thanks to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, we figured at least half of the villagers would be armed. Fortunately we were wrong.
DS: How did they respond to your arrival?
Khanishvili: How do you think? They were angry, but fortunately for us the Ossetians are cowards by nature. They did nothing but hide under their beds.
DS: Did you expect the Russian military to confront you.
Khanishvili: At first we figured we’d be in and out before they had time to respond. The whole operation was supposed to take no more than six hours. But there were problems with the demolition. Destroying a military grade tunnel designed to survive a NATO aerial strike is not an easy task. We waited, taking positions on the road just south of town, praying and hoping that we would get the call that we could withdraw. But after we had been there for over twelve hours we starting thinking that we had pushed our luck. That the Russians were en route and there was no way this was not going to end in a firefight. At that point we changed our thinking, focusing on the battle ahead.
DS: Were you surprised the Russians never came?
Khanishvili: At the time I was. But once we got back and we saw what was happening in Moscow we realized they were in no condition to do anything. The Marshal of the UIS, General Lebed, had just been fired from his position and nobody knew who was in charge of what. The whole country was in a complete state of chaos. The federalists were demanding to restore federal control of the military, calling the Zhirinovsky Act unconstitutional, but the Russian nationalists were refusing to surrender control of military operations in Chechnya.
DS: Did you think that was the end of the UIS?
Khanishvili: To be honest, I did. Nobody was willing to take the initiative and move against our position because they didn’t know who was in charge. The call it Black November in Russia now, and for good reason. It was the closest the UIS ever came to falling apart.
Georgian White Eagles prepare to withdraw from the Russian occupied town of Nar after 16-hours
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