If Francis is not defeated at Pavia then, among other consequences he is not taken prisoner, so his sons are not taken as hostages, health of Dauphin Francis not deterioriate like IOTL. Also Bona would not resign from her marriage plans (double Jagiellon-Valois match, Isabella with Francis, Sigismund Augustus with Margaret, Isabella's Sforza blood would further strenghten Valois rights to Milan). Louis of Hungary is still retard and Habsburg pawn, his fate would not be significantly different from OTL, but Janos Zapolya should have bigger chances against Ferdinand, Bona would also urge Sigismund to claim Czech throne, but like usually, his action would be too slow. Meanwhile Henry VIII would be more pro-Habsburg, fearing growth of French power.
Consequences you listed are interesting but I was thinking mostly about those for the Western Europe. The pre-requisite of the whole schema is the early and very serious French military advantage over its Spanish/Hapsburg competitors, which may have additional implications. In OTL by the beginning of the Italian Wars France had the best artillery and arguably the best heavy cavalry (gendarmes). However, in general, its military system was getting obsolete because little had been done to create a "modern" national infantry: France was relying upon the Swiss mercenaries with the occasional additions of the German landsknechts or Italian infantry.
Was it realistic to France of the early XVI to became the greatest European military power? The first French regular infantry unit, Picardy regiment, had been created in 1479 and later Henry II created 5 or 6 more infantry regiments ("old regiments") so it is not unrealistic to assume that, rather than wasting gold on the foreign mercenaries the governments of Charles VII, Louis XI and Charles VIII are spending them on creation of the French infantry units and, based upon the experience of both the 100YW and the Burgundian Wars, are developing them as the pike and shot formations. Taking into an account that the social system of France did not change dramatically between the Italian Wars and the reign of Louis XIV, I don't see an objective "social" impossibility for such a development (at the time of Louis XIII NOT creating strong national army was for a while an explicit policy of Richelieu until byproduct of this policy were all over his face forcing to change the course). France had a greater population than Spain, approximately 16M vs. 8.5M, and while the HRE also had approximately 16M even Charles V had a limited control over its human and economic resources. AFAIK, by that time France also was MUCH better off economically that the Hapsburg states, which means that it could pay its troops much more regularly than the Hapsburgs did. Plus, of course, with at least marginally competent rulers (which admittedly was not quite the case during the period between the death of Louis XI and reign of Henry IV
) and Reformation in Germany, there always was a possibility to make life of any Hapsburg emperor at least slightly "more interesting".
Second component is a leadership. In OTL during most of the Italian Wars the French had been "blessed" with the incompetent generals. In its "traditional" armies this was if not inevitable than highly likely because everything was based upon the traditional structures and there is no doubt that most of these commanders had been personally brave knights of a high birth. But, while their Spanish, Italian and German counterparts also were not exactly born in the gutters (of course, Georg von Frundsberg was not an aristocrat), they had to deal with much more modern armies and to adopt to a new style of a warfare. Was this possible for the French? Why not? Being an aristocrat does not automatically make person a bad general.
Now, by the end of the reign of Louis XII French possessions in Italy can't be contested with a realistic chance for success. What's next?
1. Newly crowned Francis I does not have a basis of his OTL demagoguery about losses in Italy (seems to be one of his favorite subjects as a heir to the throne) but most probably still has an itch for a military glory. The most obvious are of application (absent Italy) would be "Burgundian Inheritance", which means earlier French-Hapsburg Wars on the Western and Northern borders of France and probably some action on the French-Spanish border. With the French hold on Naples and Milan, it is difficult if not impossible to bring the Spanish troops to the Netherlands or French Comte so on these fronts Charles would have only the Dutch and German forces. Short-term outcome is anybody's guess but long-term is probably along the OTL lines in the terms of the territorial grabs.
2. Spain is pretty much cut from Germany. If/when Charles V decides to partition his empire it is not quite clear how the Spanish Netherlands would work out unless Spain is in a prolonged peace with France. Would they go to the Austrian branch and if yes what would be the consequences?
3. OTOH, France is "blessed"/"saddled" with the territories in Italy and a need to govern them. For how long this schema would keep working?
