WI: WWI Delayed till 1920

[Chris S]

You guys forgot to mention the most important participant in WW1: the Ottoman Empire.

Assuming the war starts in 1920, what are the conditions? Do we have all the same countries joining? Do they all join on the same side as OTL?

At the very least, Ottoman entry to the war in 1920 allows more time for modernisation and reform. Will the Three Pashas still be governing the empire? Given their disastrous decisions OTL, one might hope not. Conversely, six more years for Mustapha Kemal to advance through the ranks...

This could be completely out there, but it is fascinating to imagine what might have happened if Ataturk had somehow come to power with the full territory of the Ottoman Empire at his disposal, instead of having to fight a war of independence just to free Anatolia and Istanbul. Given that he predicted the western Allies would win the war due to their dominance at sea, and given that he advised his successor to keep Turkey out of World War 2 just before his death in 1938, one might imagine the Ottoman Empire faces a very different future in this alternate timeline... the effects on the modern Middle East would be incalculable.

No Saudi Arabia, no Wahhabism, no Israel, no Iraq, no Syria, nor any of the countries we know today. History of the region would be completely changed beyond all recognition.

Yes that would make things interesting.

The fate of the Ottomans and Albania is what I think could really change things up between 1914 and 1920. While drawing closer to Germany, Ottoman manouvres in Albania in 1914 had the potential to keep Germany and the Ottoman Empire from really getting close enough to form an alliance if not for the War. Germany was one of the powers represented on the international control commission with governed Albania (and was intended to be in place for 10 years), a German prince was Albania's prince/king and German officers were being used in the international force there. But there was a local movement to restore Ottoman influence (though not control) by having an Ottoman prince installed IIRC. Serbia alerted the control commission of the plot which resulted in a raid on a port that seized Ottoman weapons and captured a some Ottoman soldiers.

Between Albania, Armenia and the Aegean there is a lot of scope for conflict (most of it involving the Ottomans), but can it lead to a world war? That part I'm sceptical about because of the likely changes in Russia, France, Germany, Austria, Britain and Italy

 

[Aphrodite]

Serbia: A much stronger and much better led Austrian army will have very different results compared to Serbia initially than they had OTL. OTL Austrian warplan against Serbia + Russia involved no Austria offensive against Serbia. OTL Potiorek had made an offensive anyway with cathastrophic results. Said offensive was idiotic in nearly every sense. As I aid Austrian top leadership was horrible and if you can get rid of them - mainly Conrad but Potiorek is the second on that list - that only will improve austrian performance tremendously. Also dont forget the Bulgarians. They will be much firmer on the CP camp than OTL and are ideally positioned to attack Serbia.
About Romania and Italy: I doubt they will have joined the entente. They will be either neutrals or still be nominally part of the Triple alliance. It took an immense amount of haggling to get them in to the war . Both - but especiallly Romania - have territorial aspirations against both alliances and OTL joined the side they thought would win and who promised more. On the other hand both have very easily defendably borders with Austria. OTL Austria could do nothing to fortify them before the war because they were borders with allies and that would have been diplomatically very unsound. If however either leaves the triple alliance that changes.

The Serbians were doubling the size of their army and modernizing their equipment as well. The Austrians will see much of their increased firepower devoted to Serbia. On Romania and Italy, they both join the Entente (Italy 1915, Romania 1916) they care only about who is going to win. By 1920, that is much more likely to be Russia.

the same goes for the Bulgarians and the Turks- they only join the CPs because they thought Germany would win

I dont said it will be East first but I think its a good possibility. What Im sure of is that it wont be some kind of modified Schilieffen plan. With the faster speed of Russian mobilization there is simply no time to try any such ideas. The germans will do what they will have to do. That means they have to accept that they cant have a swift victory and they can only win a long war (they can loose swiftly but I have doubts they want that). They will also have to accept that they need to rely more on their allies. If they can do any of this 2 things Germany might be much better prepared for the war than OTL. That means that whatever direction they go it wont be a try for a knock out blow. If they work together with much improved Austrians in the East that could do wonders. Russia could loose Poland and some of his armies pretty early while France futilly tries to break the defences of the border.

Love to see how the Austro-Germans are going to do wonders in Poland against a much stronger Russia while still holding the French off in the West. Some semblence of a plan would be nice- preferably a real one put forth by an Austrian or German general And what allies? They could only keep Austria because they came to Austria's aid

If they werent dependent on french money please explain the increasing amount of french money they borrowed. And Russia and Italy too have some Balkan pretension and Russians had for long time pretensions for Austria proper - at the least for eastern Galicia. Also Great Powers have a very hard time to give up on their pretensions. Because thats a huge blow to their status as Great Powers. And you still didnt solve the Alsace question for France - thats a pretension France is not ready to let go.

What loans are you talking about? The Russians borrowed very little after 1909, held huge stocks of gold and what they did borrow, they paid market rates on. They could borrow from just about anyone because their credit was good

Britain can offer neutrality to Germany if they regard Russia as just as or more dangerous and thats very interesting to the Germans. The germans can offer an d to the naval arms race and thats very interesting to the british. And as I said above: in an 1920 war scenario Germany would have to accept that it will be a long war.

Britain will never bargain away its neutrality. Nor would the British have any interest in antagonizing an increasingly powerful Russia. Germany offering to stop building ships because the russians and french are putting so much pressure on them is a reason to keep the entente with Russia- as is the fact that a victorious Franco-Russian coalition would turn on a neutral Britain

During the war Brittain went very far in the way of accepting the growth of Russian power because they thaught that the germans were the bigger threat. But they too feared the Russians: the crimean war was because of that and they allied Japan in 1902 to stop the Russian expansion in to China. Russia wasnt a threat to the Home Islands thats true. But it was a threat to China, to India (at least they thought so), to Persia, to the Mediterranean. If the naval arms race is over with Germany than Russia likely regains its status as number one threat to the British Empire. OTL the first signs that things were moiving in that direction have already appeared but war broke out before it really could get anywhere. Now we gave it time. The British would be mainly interested in preventing the war if they can and if they cant to contain the winners to resonable terms of peace. After years of fighting and exhaustion both side might be bullied in to accepting such.

thank you for agreeing. This is the main point- Britain sides with Russia and France because Germany is the greater threat to the homeland. Basically it works like this

If Germany wins, the British are all alone against a new more powerful country that can resume the Naval race and crush them in a few years

If France and Russia win, they will turn on a backstabbing neutral Britain and the British will be lucky if London isn't put to the torch

Neither side can spare much for the Far east. Japan can join the side he things will win and pick up everything the other side has. If Japan enters it will be much later and on that side. And on the entente side I want to add that France too has far eastern colonies. So Japan wouldnt only go after Russia if they decided on that course.

Russia cant abandon Serbia at that point and that would be first on Austrias list. Austria cant give up on the Balkans without admitting that they arent a Great Power. I think thats an impossible situation.

Neither side has much in the Far East either so Japan isn't getting much. The victors will then deal with Japan at their liesure

 

[BooNZ]

True, but Conrad's proposals likely helped keep Austria heading in a particular direction because he was proposing a hammer to the problems whether they were nails or not. I believe Moltke's removal of that plan, while limiting the options for Germany's foreign ministry didn't actually inhibit the foreign ministry from pursuing non-military options.

The German army was substantially independent of the German civilian administration, so there was ordinarily no nexus between German war planning and German diplomacy, so therefore Moltke's planning (or lack thereof) did not ordinarily limit the German Foreign Office. Those outside Moltke's war planning were not even aware the eastern option had not been updated and those familiar with Moltke's war planning suggest the eastern deployment could have been re-instated in days.

During the July 1914 crisis the full extent of Moltke's war planning was revealed to be a single inflexible option, which required Germany accelerate down the path to war and extend the scope of the war to include France, Belgium and Britain. Any pursuit of non-military options would have caused delays, which were incompatible with this piece of work.

What I think was more instrumental in dissuading the foreign ministry from not pursuing war as a means to an end was that after 1912 (at least), like Conrad he began calling for a preventative/pre-emptive war on France and Russia.

When did Conrad call for a preventative war against either France or Russia?

It seems very strong coincidence that it was only a couple years after both Austria's and Germany's chiefs of staff began thinking about a preventative war (and mere months after they were known to have met and had discussions on it) that it occurred at the very first real opportunity thereafter.

Or merely two year years after the French and Russians introduce offensive doctrines and strengthen their 'defensive' arrangements to both launch offensives on Germany within 15 days of mobilization - it was Russia that mobilised first after several days of 'pre-mobilisation'.

Curiously, you have not mentioned the German Imperial War Council 1912 where the Kaiser and German militarists made various warlike pronouncements. Aside from the Kaiser, members of German civilian leadership (including those responsible for diplomacy) were not present and had concluded the meeting amounted to nothing. However, if you are suspicious of coincidences, you can cling to the fact Tirpitz stated war should not be war contemplated until the expansion of the Kiel canal had been completed, which was completed June/July 1914.

Further, the scale of German industrial production of nitrates during the war was made possible by the identification of an iron oxide catalyst by Alwin Mittasch in early/ mid 1914. ​

One wonders what would have happened had Germany's military not come around to the idea of pre-emptive war (and this might explain why from 1906-1914, Conrad's frequent calls for war were not really acted upon - not because he was necessarily being ignored, but more because everyone else was not in favour of it without Germany's unconditional backing).

Using the same logic, should Britain have persisted with appeasement in 1939?

In context, Germany was a monarchy and Wilhelm had personal ties to FF. The Serbian regime had risen to power upon the murder of a monarch, proceeded to align itself with Russian rivals, destabilized the Balkans through ongoing cross border insurgencies, initiated formal hostilities with the Ottomans (a power Wilhelm had personally involved himself with, as the protector of Islam), along with other Balkan powers committed various documented atrocities, repeatedly reneged on diplomatic undertakings and had ongoing territorial aspirations incompatible with the integrity of the A-H empire - Germany's only significant ally.

A-H was an independent Great power and its foreign policy was not always inextricably linked to Germany. Calls for preemptive wars against minor powers during Russia's time of weakness would not have required German approval or assistance. Without Russia intervention, even a weak A-H military could have handily crushed both Italy and/or Serbia. It was with the re-emergence of Russian military power and influence in the Balkans when A-H required Germany to keep Russia off its back - increasingly from 1909 onward. Serbia became a genuine threat after the conclusion of the Balkan wars.

If only those peaceful A-H administrators had earlier trusted in Conrad's foresight and brilliance... ​

 

[Tibi088]

The German army was substantially independent of the German civilian administration, so there was ordinarily no nexus between German war planning and German diplomacy, so therefore Moltke's planning (or lack thereof) did not ordinarily limit the German Foreign Office. Those outside Moltke's war planning were not even aware the eastern option had not been updated and those familiar with Moltke's war planning suggest the eastern deployment could have been re-instated in days.

During the July 1914 crisis the full extent of Moltke's war planning was revealed to be a single inflexible option, which required Germany accelerate down the path to war and extend the scope of the war to include France, Belgium and Britain. Any pursuit of non-military options would have caused delays, which were incompatible with this piece of work.

Actually this is one of the questions im trying to understand since reading Zuber. Why did Germany need to declaring war on Russia and France when it did?

What I mean is the Germans knew that Russia was mobilizing hence the ultimatum. However im not even sure why Germany didnt simply start mobilization in reaction of Russia instead of declaring war. The only reason I can come up with for the german ultimatum to Russia is that they hoped that they could localize the war this way. But as the russians and french could have waited with their declaration of war till they were ready to attack why couldnt the Germans? Especially as Zuber laid greast stress on the point that Russia and France were ready earlier than Germany and launched their attacks before the germans - hence the first 2 battle's of the war Germany fought on either front were fought on german soil.

As France also had its plan to an early thrust in to Alsace for morals sake they would have been the first one among the great powers to attack another great power. Even if they scrapped this they would still be earlier than the germans as the agreement with russia required both of them to attack on the 15th day of mobilization - as you point out. The only thing I can come up with in regards the declaration of war on France was the Belgian situation but even than Germany could have simply adjusted its note to Belgium that they will occupy it for the eventuality of war etc.

Another question I have is why Austria didnt send an ultimatum similar to the german one to Russia. As Germany had only one war and deployment plan for 1914 it would have mobilized the same way whether the war starts in the east or the west - another reason they could wait with the war declarations. OTOH Austrian mobilization and war plan depended greatly and changed according to Russian involvement. Austria should have had as first priority to ascertain Russian behaviour. OTL Conrad went ahead with the Serbia only plan without doing this - the results we know. One of the biggest reasons Conrad is widely considered an idiot here I think.

So why couldnt the germans wait till they were ready to begin operations or shortly before that to declare war on Russia or at least on France. Even if they believed they would be ready first why the haste? Actually in this case it would have been France and Russia who declared war - they would have a good excuse in Belgium but it would be hard to cite Belgium as a reason for their mobilization as both have started mobilization earlier.

It seems unimportant but both alliances were defensive pacts and thus its important who is the attacker. I still dont think that Italy and Romania would have honoured their commitment but it would have been at least a bit harder to wiggle their way out. And it would also be handy when speaking of war guilt if Germany didnt go aroud declaring wars left and right at the start.

 

[iddt3]

+1
Necessity is the mother of progress. Changes in 1920 for a WW1 then are going to be almost all political, thought there probably will be SOME technological outliers that would have surfaced by then.

Aircraft and motorcar technology should both be evolving fairly quickly in the background, they certainly were prewar OTL.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Actually this is one of the questions im trying to understand since reading Zuber. Why did Germany need to declaring war on Russia and France when it did?

What I mean is the Germans knew that Russia was mobilizing hence the ultimatum. However im not even sure why Germany didnt simply start mobilization in reaction of Russia instead of declaring war.

IIRC the S-plan specifically hinged on beating France while Russia was mobilizing. Meaning as soon as Russia began mobilizing the viability of Germany's only war plan was on the clock.

 

[BooNZ]

The Serbians were doubling the size of their army and modernizing their equipment as well. The Austrians will see much of their increased firepower devoted to Serbia. On Romania and Italy, they both join the Entente (Italy 1915, Romania 1916) they care only about who is going to win. By 1920, that is much more likely to be Russia.

Do you have any reputable source support this?

Even before the Balkan wars the Serbian economy, finances and infrastructure were fragile and Serbia increasingly relied on French/Russian finance to support disproportionately high military spending. Some might suggest Serbia resembled more of an armed camp than a viable independent state.

The outcome of the Balkan wars did more-or-less doubled the size and population of the Serbian state, but did nothing to improve the underlying economic viabilty of the Serbian economic model. I don't recall the additional territory being particularly well developed and I doubt the vast majority of the new population would be considered reliable by the Serbian administration until they had been appropriately indoctrinated with visions of the greater Serbian state - I asume they would need to be trusted with political representation first.

Love to see how the Austro-Germans are going to do wonders in Poland against a much stronger Russia while still holding the French off in the West. Some semblence of a plan would be nice- preferably a real one put forth by an Austrian or German general And what allies? They could only keep Austria because they came to Austria's aid

By 1920 the Scheffien Plan would have been mothballed, so not only would Germany be stronger in absolute terms, it would be able to dedicate a far greater proportion of its miltiary to dealing with the Russians from the start.

Russia had a systemic manpower problem, which could not be easily resolved. Not only is there a shortage of suitably educated and experienced persons to serve in the Russian military and industry, it also suffered from endemic corruption, meaning as often as not the best persons are not appointed to the most important positions and/or competent persons are not always required to serve at all.

What loans are you talking about? The Russians borrowed very little after 1909, held huge stocks of gold and what they did borrow, they paid market rates on. They could borrow from just about anyone because their credit was good

You appear to be raising two contrary points. I do not find the first point very credible - around 1909 the Russian military expansion was at its peak, while Russia also had a rapidly expanding economy and infrastructure - both are ordinarily require capital and Russia had already spent a vast amount of treasure moving onto the gold standard, fighting the Russo-Japanese war and dealing with the outcomes of the 1905 revolution. Clearly with a significant portion of the Russian reserves tied up in gold, it would be 'extraordinarily challenging' for Russia to fund its own economic and military growth. Do you have any reputable source support the suggestion Russia did not have much in the way of borrowings circa 1910?

I don't have an issue with the second point you raise, aside from being substanitally inconsistent with your first point. Capital would ordinarily follow the best return as illustrated OTL when it initially looked like French creditors might provide the majority of the funding for the German Berlin to Bagdad railway, until the French and German authorities intervened.

Britain will never bargain away its neutrality. Nor would the British have any interest in antagonizing an increasingly powerful Russia. Germany offering to stop building ships because the russians and french are putting so much pressure on them is a reason to keep the entente with Russia- as is the fact that a victorious Franco-Russian coalition would turn on a neutral Britain

The obvious flaw in your calculation is the Franco-Russian coalition could not be victorious with a neutral Britain.

This is the main point- Britain sides with Russia and France because Germany is the greater threat to the homeland.

So to clarify, you claim the British would ultimately join the Franco-Russian coalition because they feared the Franco-Russian coalition, but the British would always fight against the Germans because they were an even greater threat. Is this an accurate reflection of your logic?

 

[Chris S]

Actually this is one of the questions im trying to understand since reading Zuber. Why did Germany need to declaring war on Russia and France when it did?

What I mean is the Germans knew that Russia was mobilizing hence the ultimatum. However im not even sure why Germany didnt simply start mobilization in reaction of Russia instead of declaring war. The only reason I can come up with for the german ultimatum to Russia is that they hoped that they could localize the war this way. But as the russians and french could have waited with their declaration of war till they were ready to attack why couldnt the Germans? Especially as Zuber laid greast stress on the point that Russia and France were ready earlier than Germany and launched their attacks before the germans - hence the first 2 battle's of the war Germany fought on either front were fought on german soil.

As France also had its plan to an early thrust in to Alsace for morals sake they would have been the first one among the great powers to attack another great power. Even if they scrapped this they would still be earlier than the germans as the agreement with russia required both of them to attack on the 15th day of mobilization - as you point out. The only thing I can come up with in regards the declaration of war on France was the Belgian situation but even than Germany could have simply adjusted its note to Belgium that they will occupy it for the eventuality of war etc.

Another question I have is why Austria didnt send an ultimatum similar to the german one to Russia. As Germany had only one war and deployment plan for 1914 it would have mobilized the same way whether the war starts in the east or the west - another reacon they could wait with the war declarations. OTOH Austrian mobilization and war plan depended greatly and changed according to Russian involvement. Austria should have had as first priority to ascertain Russian behaviour. OTL Conrad went ahead with the Serbia only plan without doing this - the results we know. One of the biggest reasons Conrad is widely considered an idiot here I think.

So why couldnt the germans wait till they were ready to begin operations or shortly before that to declare war on Russia or at least on France. Even if they believed they would be ready first why the haste? Actually in this case it would have been France and Russia who declared war - they would have a good excuse in Belgium but it would be hard to cite Belgium as a reason for their mobilization as both have started mobilization earlier.

It seems unimportant but both alliances were defensive pacts and thus its important who is the attacker. I still dont think that Italy and Romania would have honoured their commitment but it would have been at least a bit harder to wiggle their way out. And it would also be handy when speaking of war guilt if Germany didnt go aroud declaring wars left and right at the start.

And that bit is why it's important to establish how a Great Power conflict starts. Because two defensive alliances facing off against each other don't necessarily have to come to blows. NATO and the Warsaw Pact stared at each other for over 30 years (1955 when the Warsaw Pact was officially formed until late 1980s) and no war between them ever happened. If we are a little less strict in our definitions, then we could even go so far as to say that NATO and it's traditional foe (Soviet Union and allies/then Warsaw Pact officially/then Russia and allies) have been squaring off for nearly 70 years without a Great Power War occurring between them in Europe. So there isn't any inevitability about such a conflict.

Assuming that the assassination fails and further attempts also fail or aren't tried, then the real potential wildcard seems to be Albania. Salient questions seem to be how would Albania have turned out if World War I did not occur in 1914? How would Serb-Montenegrin talks on forming some kind of union progressed and what would be their joint and individual policies towards Albania and what would be the response of Italy, A-H and Greece?

Maybe you could get a Great Power war out of that, but then let's say Serbia and Montenegro support a faction in Albania that gains control and they send aid or occupy parts of the country and then A-H and Italy respond negatively. Wouldn't the dynamics be different? In that if A-H and Italy threatened Serbia and/or Montenegro with war, would Russia (and perhaps France) feel as if such a threat of war will actually threaten the outright independence of Serbia? Because much as in the case of the previous threat of war over Albania, the objective of any Austrian or Austro-Italian invasion would seem to be to force Serbia (and Montenegro) out, rather than to make potentially permanent changes in the way Serbia (and/or Montenegro) relate towards either Austria or Italy.

I wonder if anybody on the board can give more conjecture as to what would happen between 1914 and 1920 in Albania without WWI?

 

[Tibi088]

IIRC the S-plan specifically hinged on beating France while Russia was mobilizing. Meaning as soon as Russia began mobilizing the viability of Germany's only war plan was on the clock.

The whole point of Zuber is that there was no S-plan. The german warplan at the beginning of WWI wasnt the S plan.

And that bit is why it's important to establish how a Great Power conflict starts. Because two defensive alliances facing off against each other don't necessarily have to come to blows. NATO and the Warsaw Pact stared at each other for over 30 years (1955 when the Warsaw Pact was officially formed until late 1980s) and no war between them ever happened. If we are a little less strict in our definitions, then we could even go so far as to say that NATO and it's traditional foe (Soviet Union and allies/then Warsaw Pact officially/then Russia and allies) have been squaring off for nearly 70 years without a Great Power War occurring between them in Europe. So there isn't any inevitability about such a conflict.

Assuming that the assassination fails and further attempts also fail or aren't tried, then the real potential wildcard seems to be Albania. Salient questions seem to be how would Albania have turned out if World War I did not occur in 1914? How would Serb-Montenegrin talks on forming some kind of union progressed and what would be their joint and individual policies towards Albania and what would be the response of Italy, A-H and Greece?

Maybe you could get a Great Power war out of that, but then let's say Serbia and Montenegro support a faction in Albania that gains control and they send aid or occupy parts of the country and then A-H and Italy respond negatively. Wouldn't the dynamics be different? In that if A-H and Italy threatened Serbia and/or Montenegro with war, would Russia (and perhaps France) feel as if such a threat of war will actually threaten the outright independence of Serbia? Because much as in the case of the previous threat of war over Albania, the objective of any Austrian or Austro-Italian invasion would seem to be to force Serbia (and Montenegro) out, rather than to make potentially permanent changes in the way Serbia (and/or Montenegro) relate towards either Austria or Italy.

I wonder if anybody on the board can give more conjecture as to what would happen between 1914 and 1920 in Albania without WWI?

I dont say WWI was inevitable however the title and the whole point of the thread is that an ATL WWI breaks out in 1920 instead of 1914.

And in regards to the cold war: They had the added benefit that both sides knew that in case of war they would be destroyed. Thats a great incentive to avoid war. Here however both sides believed they could win. That points toward war - though doesnt ensure it.

 

[BooNZ]

Actually this is one of the questions im trying to understand since reading Zuber. Why did Germany need to declaring war on Russia and France when it did?

A good question and I don't have a definative answer, but I would speculate diplomatic naivety or some peculiar sense of appropriate conduct. In any case, due to the strict timetable of the Schlieffen Plan, a declaration of war would be expected to be made before the Germans start to cross the Belgium border on 4 August 1914.

What I mean is the Germans knew that Russia was mobilizing hence the ultimatum. However im not even sure why Germany didnt simply start mobilization in reaction of Russia instead of declaring war. The only reason I can come up with for the german ultimatum to Russia is that they hoped that they could localize the war this way. But as the russians and french could have waited with their declaration of war till they were ready to attack why couldnt the Germans? Especially as Zuber laid greast stress on the point that Russia and France were ready earlier than Germany and launched their attacks before the germans - hence the first 2 battle's of the war Germany fought on either front were fought on german soil.

As France also had its plan to an early thrust in to Alsace for morals sake they would have been the first one among the great powers to attack another great power. Even if they scrapped this they would still be earlier than the germans as the agreement with russia required both of them to attack on the 15th day of mobilization - as you point out. The only thing I can come up with in regards the declaration of war on France was the Belgian situation but even than Germany could have simply adjusted its note to Belgium that they will occupy it for the eventuality of war etc.

I understand the German thoroughfare through Belgium was expected to become far more challenging and time consuming if and when Belgium had fully mobilised and deployed its reserves to holding the fortress lines, but I'm not aware of the exact military calculus. As an aside, in my opinion the German decision to invade Belgium in 1914 was the most significant blunder of either war.

Another question I have is why Austria didnt send an ultimatum similar to the german one to Russia. As Germany had only one war and deployment plan for 1914 it would have mobilized the same way whether the war starts in the east or the west - another reacon they could wait with the war declarations. OTOH Austrian mobilization and war plan depended greatly and changed according to Russian involvement. Austria should have had as first priority to ascertain Russian behaviour. OTL Conrad went ahead with the Serbia only plan without doing this - the results we know. One of the biggest reasons Conrad is widely considered an idiot here I think.

Another good question with no obvious answer. I guess at least Conrad had more than one plan available to choose from.

So why couldnt the germans wait till they were ready to begin operations or shortly before that to declare war on Russia or at least on France. Even if they believed they would be ready first why the haste? Actually in this case it would have been France and Russia who declared war - they would have a good excuse in Belgium but it would be hard to cite Belgium as a reason for their mobilization as both have started mobilization earlier.

With the benefit of hindsight, a German invasion of Belgium would have brought Britain into the war irrespective of timing.

It seems unimportant but both alliances were defensive pacts and thus its important who is the attacker. I still dont think that Italy and Romania would have honoured their commitment but it would have been at least a bit harder to wiggle their way out. And it would also be handy when speaking of war guilt if Germany didnt go aroud declaring wars left and right at the start.

From 1912 the Entente was defensive in name only and the war planning and military doctrines of all major powers in 1914 empathized seizing the initiative to varying degrees, which in practice meant bold (and foolhardy) opening gambits. The best way to keep Italy and Romania on the sidelines would be for A-H to perform better OTL in 1914 or in a 1920 scenario, for A-H to proceed with the scheduled modernsing of its military.

 

[Tibi088]

A good question and I don't have a definative answer, but I would speculate diplomatic naivety or some peculiar sense of appropriate conduct. In any case, due to the strict timetable of the Schlieffen Plan, a declaration of war would be expected to be made before the Germans start to cross the Belgium border on 4 August 1914.

But why do they need to declare war on France? My point is the whole Belgian affair was a blatant aggression and a huge diplomatic blunder. At that point I think it shouldnt have mattered to the germans that they are in Belgium because they were already in war against France or because they expected the french declaration of war to arrive any minute. If it didnt arrive they could have sent it before crossing the franco-belgian border.

I understand the German thoroughfare through Belgium was expected to become far more challenging and time consuming if and when Belgium had fully mobilised and deployed its reserves to holding the fortress lines, but I'm not aware of the exact military calculus. As an aside, in my opinion the German decision to invade Belgium in 1914 was the most significant blunder of either war.

In 1914 it surely was. In an 1920 war things might be different. I was formerly on the opinion that the increase in size of the russian army and its faster mobilization would render a west first approach impossible. However thinking about it I think this assesment might be wrong. A significant increase of the size of the german army in those six years was possible. A bigger german army would create for the germans a west first approach as a possibility. What I mean is that OTL Germany was outnumbered in the western front - though barely. In the case of a significantly bigger german army they could concentrate most of the new forces east while even a small addition to the west might topple the balalnce in their favour. The thing is that France was not going to get a bigger army in those six years. The invasion of Belgium was a huge blunder because it both brought Brittain in the war and didnt result in the defeat of France. With additional german forces it might. And I seriously dont expect the russians to do better against Germany. Their problems would be not solved but increased by a much bigger army. Quality wise they might be even worse than OTL - though much more numerous.

I agree with the rest of what you have written.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

The whole point of Zuber is that there was no S-plan. The german warplan at the beginning of WWI wasnt the S plan.

And how well accepted is Zuber's ideas? There have been more than a half dozen rebuttals published, including one by the German military...

 

[Chris S]

I dont say WWI was inevitable

Oh no, no. I wasn't saying that you were saying it was inevitable. I was expounding on one of your points. Because how the war start (and if it can even start) can determine things like if Italy and Romania participates on the side of the Triple Alliance/Central Powers or Triple Entente/Allies. For example, if it starts over Albania, then perhaps Italy might have more of an interest in fulfilling the Triple Alliance (Romania might still go either way), but that changes the dynamics because now Austria-Hungary's southern border with italy is secure and instead France has another front to deal with along it's border with Italy.

And if it starts with France and Russia making the first move (and Germany not moving into Belgium) then Britain may well remain neutral.

But also quite a bit depends on the players involved. So if an Albanian crisis were to develop in the 1920s, but by then Russia hasn't descended into a revolution and possible civil war and Moltke is still of the opinion that the window of opportunity to hold off Russia while defeating France had actually closed in 1917 as I believe he had expected, then after 1917 the German general staff might be advising the government to be more cautious to avoid the outbreak of a general conflict, which in turn might lead to the German government not wholeheartedly backing A-H over Albania and A-H deciding to tone back any threats of war over Albania.

Alternatively, if Serbia-Montenegro (assuming a successful conclusion to the 1914 talks resulting in a customs union, joint military and joint foreign policy but still separate monarchies and officially separate countries) manage to piss off Germany and A-H and Italy in Albania we could see Germany and her Triple Alliance allies being very much prepared for war. This might be within Albania itself - so a German/Austrian/Italian force landing at Vlore or Durres in an echo of when the Great Powers (which sounds like Italy, France, Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary) sent naval ships to blockade Montenegro and pressure Montenegro, Serbia and Greece to evacuate Albania (in May 1913, October 1913 and March 1914 respectively)) and from there expelling any Serb-Montenegrin forces (and any Greek forces too that might have gone into southern Albania). Or it might be a more general war consisting of a German/Austrian/Italian force sent into Albania alongside an Austrian (and possibly German) push into Serbia and Montenegro (and maybe Italian naval landings in Greece). If the action is restricted to just Albania, then perhaps nothing further develops. If it involves Serbia/Montenegro and possibly also Greece then maybe that could be the spark for a wider conflict (this time with Germany/Austria/Italy all being allied).

And if Serbia-Montenegro managed to piss off the French and British in Albania (because remember that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, Britain and Italy all have representatives on the International Commission of Control that helps to govern Albania) then we could potentially see a lack of French support for Serbia and Montenegro and the British not being opposed to Great Power action against Serbia/Montenegro and maybe Greece. This will leave Russia more isolated in its support of Serbia, but Russia's military reforms by then might make even Russia by itself and any threat she might make if Germany/Austria/Italy go too far in actions against Serbia worth considering by Germany/A-H/Italy.

And in regards to the cold war: They had the added benefit that both sides knew that in case of war they would be destroyed. Thats a great incentive to avoid war. Here however both sides believed they could win. That points toward war - though doesnt ensure it.

Quite true.

 

[matzeskatze]

@Chris S
Was following the threat. Has anyone until now pointed out, that the Russians were switching from the army to the navy in their spending? At least that is what I have taken from talks in other threats.
So maybe the Russians will not be as strong as it is postulated here.

Another thing I read relativly often is, that the Russians while investing much, were still / would still be hindered by the systematic problems they displayed in OTL WWI. Like education, domestic production and a devided / bickering command.

 

[Grey Wolf]

The Russian Navy will be back at proper great power level, and potentially at least on paper have some of the most powerful battleships in the world

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I haven't read through this thread, so I don't know if this subject has been raised yet, but the French were set to adopt a self loading rifle, which would have been their Garand, around 1915-16, plus IIRC even and automatic rifle. So they may well have had a SLR/Auto-rifle based squad well standardized by 1920. Plus most nations would probably have fielded a genuine LMG by then, as there were a number of programs already started. That is on top of the French plans to modernize their heavy artillery and expand their overall artillery park.

 

[alexmilman]

Do you have any reputable source support this?
Russia had a systemic manpower problem, which could not be easily resolved. Not only is there a shortage of suitably educated and experienced persons to serve in the Russian military and industry, it also suffered from endemic corruption, meaning as often as not the best persons are not appointed to the most important positions and/or competent persons are not always required to serve at all.

While shortage of the educated cadres for the military could be addressed (at least to a certain degree), shortage of the qualified industrial workers would not go anywhere and the same applies for the heavy industry itself: unless AH Russia would manage to pull something similar to the Soviet 1st 5 Years Plan, Russian heavy industry still would be lagging behind the developed countries of Europe.

You appear to be raising two contrary points. I do not find the first point very credible - around 1909 the Russian military expansion was at its peak, while Russia also had a rapidly expanding economy and infrastructure - both are ordinarily require capital and Russia had already spent a vast amount of treasure moving onto the gold standard, fighting the Russo-Japanese war and dealing with the outcomes of the 1905 revolution. Clearly with a significant portion of the Russian reserves tied up in gold, it would be 'extraordinarily challenging' for Russia to fund its own economic and military growth. Do you have any reputable source support the suggestion Russia did not have much in the way of borrowings circa 1910?

Between 1898 and 1914 Russian foreign debt increased from 2.6B rubles to 4.6B. Percentages paid during that period were approximately 5B rubles.

1906 - French loan of 2,250M francs
1909 - loan of 1,400M francs to cover short-term debt of 1904 (1,220M - France, 150M - Britain, 30M - Netherlands)
Early 1914 - French loan of 665M francs

By January 1st, 1914 Russian debt was 3,000M rubles and by July 1914 - 4,600M

On March 1st 1914 Russia held 670M rubles in gold in the foreign banks. To pay interest on the loans in 1914 Russia needed 350M rubles to keep in the foreign banks and the rest was held as an insurance against a bad harvest. After assassination of FF and transfer of the funds from Germany and AH to Russia, the gold held abroad amounted to 540M, mostly in France.

Mobilization cost Russia 500M rubles. In August 1914 a sum needed for the rest of the year for the expenses abroad was assessed to 380M rubles. However, France declared moratorium on taking money of the banks allowing taking only 1/20 of account within certain interval of time and to use these money only inside France. Plus friendly France insisted that Russian government must be responsible for the percentages on the loans of Russian private companies as well. As a compensation France offered a new credit of 200M francs: 130M to pay debt on the loans, 25M to pay for the military purchases in France and the rest for payments outside French territories.

With Britain an agreement had been made to get a credit of 15 - 20M pounds with 7.5 - 10M pounds of Russian gold being received as a security. After covering of the earlier loans, and various expenses only 4M were available for the military purchases. The money did not become available until 1915.

http://ist-konkurs.ru/raboty/2014/1...a-anglo-frantsuzskom-denezhnom-rynke-1914-god

Taking into an account that Russia had to buy pretty much everything, its situation was really lousy.

 

[alexmilman]

The Russian Navy will be back at proper great power level, and potentially at least on paper have some of the most powerful battleships in the world

Yes, this was the naval argument which won the day. Unfortunately, the naval expenses proved to be mostly a big waste of money because the "global reach" scenario never materialized and most of WWI the Baltic fleet spent at Kronstadt. Bored to death sailors provided a great resource for revolutionary propaganda.

Perhaps army's point of view that the main task of the Russian navy should be a coastal defense was more realistic.

 

[DougM]

In a nutshell WW1 as we know it. Germany was worried about 1 thing. It was worried that it would get stuck at some point in a war with both Russia and France. If not 1914 then Matt 15 16 or 17. But they were pretty sure it would happen eventually. And with France that was not unreasonable to believe. Let’s be honest if anyone went to war with Germany then odds are France would jump on the band wagon in hopes of getting A-L back.

As for why Germany didn’t just sit back. Presumably they figured they could not stay out either because A-H needed them or because eventually they would get dragged into it, And the only chance Germany had was to Hit France, hit them fast and hit them hard and knock France out of the war before Russia gets mobilized. Because once Russia is mobilized then Germany has to worry them and can’t concentrate on France. So waiting for Russia to mobilize is completely defeating the reason that Germany went to war to begin with. Because it was scared of being caught in a two front war with Russia and France,

This is also why in 1920 Germany is not giving A-H a check. Blank or otherwise. Because by 1920 Russia should be able to mobilize much faster and thus Germany will not have time to take out France before Russia can attack Germany. It was this fear that caused Germany to write the check in 1914.
In 1914 It was basically Germany’s thinking that it was going to get into a war eventually so it was better to do so while they had a chance to take out France while Russia mobilized.
In 1920 Germany would be thinking. We can not mobilize any faster then a Russia and France so the war will be two fronts from day one. That sucks for Germany so we need to stay as far away from this as possible.

So basically any war in 1920 WONT have Germany as the instigator or even supporting A-H. Thus A-H will most likely back down. Add in that England won’t be as worried about the German Navy so they won’t declare war on Germany. Thus France won’t have the backing of England. So any war in 1920 will see Germany and England trying to avoid it vs rushing headlong into it.
And without the ‘Evil Germans” attacking those LPoor Britain’s and without England borrowing a ton of money The US won’t be getting in.
And this will radically effect everyone else one way or another. So I think the best you are going to get is a little Balkan War. Unless you can put together another chain. But that is unlikely as in truth it was a strange set of circumstances that existed for only a short time that saw the whole thing avalanche out of control, and those or similar conditions are not likely to happen again.

 

[Tibi088]

In a nutshell WW1 as we know it. Germany was worried about 1 thing. It was worried that it would get stuck at some point in a war with both Russia and France. If not 1914 then Matt 15 16 or 17. But they were pretty sure it would happen eventually. And with France that was not unreasonable to believe. Let’s be honest if anyone went to war with Germany then odds are France would jump on the band wagon in hopes of getting A-L back.

As for why Germany didn’t just sit back. Presumably they figured they could not stay out either because A-H needed them or because eventually they would get dragged into it, And the only chance Germany had was to Hit France, hit them fast and hit them hard and knock France out of the war before Russia gets mobilized. Because once Russia is mobilized then Germany has to worry them and can’t concentrate on France. So waiting for Russia to mobilize is completely defeating the reason that Germany went to war to begin with. Because it was scared of being caught in a two front war with Russia and France,

This is also why in 1920 Germany is not giving A-H a check. Blank or otherwise. Because by 1920 Russia should be able to mobilize much faster and thus Germany will not have time to take out France before Russia can attack Germany. It was this fear that caused Germany to write the check in 1914.
In 1914 It was basically Germany’s thinking that it was going to get into a war eventually so it was better to do so while they had a chance to take out France while Russia mobilized.
In 1920 Germany would be thinking. We can not mobilize any faster then a Russia and France so the war will be two fronts from day one. That sucks for Germany so we need to stay as far away from this as possible.

So basically any war in 1920 WONT have Germany as the instigator or even supporting A-H. Thus A-H will most likely back down. Add in that England won’t be as worried about the German Navy so they won’t declare war on Germany. Thus France won’t have the backing of England. So any war in 1920 will see Germany and England trying to avoid it vs rushing headlong into it.
And without the ‘Evil Germans” attacking those LPoor Britain’s and without England borrowing a ton of money The US won’t be getting in.
And this will radically effect everyone else one way or another. So I think the best you are going to get is a little Balkan War. Unless you can put together another chain. But that is unlikely as in truth it was a strange set of circumstances that existed for only a short time that saw the whole thing avalanche out of control, and those or similar conditions are not likely to happen again.

Its a good assesment of the situation and I agree with most of it.

However you dont take in to account a few things:
1. That there can be a war in 1920 even if Germany doesnt want it.
2. That Germany too could get much stronger by 1920 as well as Austria. As both of the CP's have a potential to massivly improve their military - and in the Russian army expansion a very good reason to do so. Its very likely that the armies of the CP's will be massivly stronger by 1920 than OTL 1914.
3. If an arms race breaks out the looser will be France. France cant expand its military further - only improve its quality. Germany has room to massivly increase its armies quantity and even its quality. Austria too can massivly increase both the size and the quality of its armed forces - I think they can improve the most by 1920. Russia has potential, however even in OTL the biggest problem with the russian army wasnt its size, its was its quality. It would be much harder to improve the quality of the russian army if you greatly increaze its size at the same time as this would actually make some of its OTL biggest quality problems worse. This means that even if Russia keeps expanding its army the CP's might be better off in relative strength compared to Russia and France than in 1914.
4. An arms race on land means that the germans will find it much easier to come to terms with Brittain in regards of the navy.

All in all Germany would really dont want a war in 1920. However despite what they themselfs might think IMO they would be actually better prepared to fight it. Especially if they abandoned plans that violate Belgium as in that case im pretty sure Brittain would stay neutral - im less sure of germans abandoning plans like that.