WI: WWI Delayed till 1920

[alexmilman]

Germany was the only European Great Power without vital interests in the Mediterranean. Of vital interest to the Russians was the grain flow out of the Black Sea. In a Franco-Russian vs CP war, Russia would expect to ship supplies to it's Med force through the Dardanelles with Turkey being neutral.

To a great degree the Russian naval buildup on the Black Sea was due to the Ottomans' planning purchase of 2 modern dreadnoughts so it was not going well with an idea of a neutral Ottoman Empire. OTOH, if the Ottoman Empire remained neutral then the problem with grain shipping did not require Russian naval presence on the Med where the French presence was already quite strong.

In November 1913 the navy called for a Dreadnought programme that would enable Russia to be able to have a force of 11 ships including Dreadnoughts and supporting ships in the Aegean by 1919. This was to support the Black Sea Fleet against the Turks.

So the Turks were not expected to be neutral after all?

The whole idea was approximately century too late and was a senseless repetition of the Russian Mediterranean expeditions of the XVIII and XIX centuries because supply problems for the modern ships were considerably more complicated than those of the age of sails and cannonballs and in the case of a hostile Ottoman Empire (and presumably hostile Germany as well), there would be very little chance for the Russian Med squadron to get back home or to get necessary supplies from home (Black Sea and Baltic Sea closed by the enemies leaving an option of carrying supplies either from Murmansk/Archangelsk (with a risk of being intercepted by the Germans) or all the way from Vladivostok. France, as WWI proved, was rather unreliable partner in the terms of supplies (memoirs of the Russian military attache in France during WWI depict quite depressing picture) or even usage of the Russian funds allocated in France (I already provided some data in an earlier post).

All these grand schemas had been a byproduct of 2 main factors: general obsession of the navies with Mahan's ideas (without any serious attempt to adjust them to the national specifics and interests) and idiotic ideas regarding the foreign policy propagated by the "Prince of the Straits", Izvolsky. Army's position that the main purpose of the Russian navy should be to help defending the coasts was solid and its implementation would be much less costly allowing to spend more money on army's rearmament (and perhaps building up domestic weapons production), which proved to be a critical issue during WWI while both Baltic and Black Sea fleets proved a marginal factor. Russia had limited financial resources and an ambitious naval program was a luxury it could ill afford.

 

[alexmilman]

Without loosing the war against Japan how would the russian army develope? Would there be such a massive army reform than OTL - that still left tham pretty bad in quality? How bad they would be come WWI without getting that bloody nose?

Of course, in OTL RJW was, indeed, a wake-up call. What could happen without it is anybody's guess but it is probably reasonably to assume that if the Russian government was intelligent enough to avoid the course which led to the war then it would be intelligent enough to start reforms without it just by looking at the world-wide developments.

Actually, certain changes already started happening before RJW. Russian army began switching to Mosin rifle (which survived, with some modifications) WWI, RCW, WWII and seems to be still in service but, with something like 3.8M made by 1904, most of the Russian troops engaged in RJW had been still using the old Berdan rifles. The modern 76mm field guns (survived all the way to the beginning of WWII) was in production since 1902 but the crews training and deployment concepts had been obsolete and supplies had been short on the explosive shells. As for the heavier calibers, by the time of the RJW Russian army still had a lot of the obsolete XIX century guns and, even with the OTL reforms, their replacement was planned only after 1914.

The rest is a guessing area.

Also I find it unlikely that a russo-japanese war of some sort is avoidable. They were too much on a crash course IMO.

The "crash course" could be easily avoided by sticking to the existing agreements and not caving to the (a) get rich fast schemes like Bezobrazov's Adventure and (b) to the naval theories popular at that time but not quite applicable to the Russian specifics on the Far East. Russian interests related to a naval trade on the Pacific had been at that time quite modest because most of the trade (with China) had been happening over land. Russia did not even have enough population on the Pacific coast to exploit its resources and was giving Japan licences for fishing off the Southern Sakhalin (in OTL Japan had oil concession on Northern Sakhalin until 1945).

An idea of a warm water port on the Pacific, which eventually led to the RJW, was costly (construction of Port Arthur and Dalni, construction of the railroad; all of which had been lost) was not justified by any real needs of the Russian economy: there was no major trade coming through the Pacific (and no trade "issues" with Japan) and having the main naval base outside the Russian territory proved to be idiotic, especially taking into an account that Port Arthur had BOTH lousy harbor (small and with a narrow exist allowing the battleships to get out only during a high tide and one by one) and that geography of the area was making construction of the effective fortifications unrealistic both in the terms of a cost and number of the troops needed for their defense. Not that any of the Russian ports on the Pacific had an infrastructure adequate for a fast repair of the serious damages to the battleships, etc.

 

[BooNZ]

Maybe but as I stated in one of my earlier post it depends greatly on the development on the german army. If it becones big enough they can have significantly bigger forces facing the russians than OTL and still have the same or higher number of forces available against France than OTL - while France's army will be either the same in size or even be smaller if the 3 years conscriptions law is scrapped - the last I consider unlikely in the case of a massive increase of the german forces. And even OTL the germans had plans to abandon East Prussia if they judge they cant hold it and defend the Vistula. If they are desperate enought to try KO France before facing an even bigger Russian army they actually might have a better chance of it working - if thy have more troops in the west which is a good possibility.

The OTL German plan was not expected to knock France out of the war, merely to draw significant French armies into battle where the Germans would defeat them decisively. However, the German planners thought even this modest goal was optimistic, believing the French forces were more likely to retire into the French interior than allow themselves to be totally destroyed.

Even before the Battle of Marne, Moltke mused that the war had already been lost.

And even if there is no initial push through Belgium its very hard to imagine that Belgium could stay out of war between Germany and France. Their own borders are far too well fortified and Belgium seems like an easy way around. The threat of Brittain might avert an invasion right away but if neither side can break through it will get more and more tempting. And the military leaders didnt have too high an opinion of the british army to begin with.

I could imagine some overflow through the Ardennes or even a concerted drive through the Ardennes, but that would represent a low risk/ low reward option from both a military and diplomatic perspective. As previously mentioned, the Belgium fortress line is likely to become far more formidable if it is augmented by the Belgium field armies and I would expect the BEF would have also been building in the interim.

The only circumstance I could imagine a late and wide German sweep through Belgium, would be to end the war following the collapse of the Russian war effort and I would expect the British to pressure the French to tap out before that happens.

 

[Dorknought]

To a great degree the Russian naval buildup on the Black Sea was due to the Ottomans' planning purchase of 2 modern dreadnoughts so it was not going well with an idea of a neutral Ottoman Empire. OTOH, if the Ottoman Empire remained neutral then the problem with grain shipping did not require Russian naval presence on the Med where the French presence was already quite strong.

The Turk naval buildup (beginning before the 1st Balkan war) was a program of national renewal and more aimed at their Greek rivals than Russia. They realised that the lack of naval power had contributed to the loss of Rumelia. Russia feared Turkey in an alliance allowing CP ships into the Black Sea, hence the need to have both Black Sea and Aegean ships to keep the Turks neutral.

 

[Dorknought]

Russia had limited financial resources and an ambitious naval program was a luxury it could ill afford.

Not really. They insisted that the ships and money was to be spent in Russia thus building up Russian industry. Rearmament was paid for partly by loans but more by increased indirect taxation. The focus was naval, the fashionable 'mariniste' doctrine that for Russia to be a great power she had to have a great fleet. With a powerful navy she would develop overseas trade, dominate the balance of sea-power between Britain and Germany, and thus be able to exact whatever political price she cared to name in return for her favors. Another aspect to the rearmament efforts was that the 1904 German-Russian Commercial Treaty that gave generous access to Russian Agriculture and Industrial sectors was due to run until 1918. Russia had been strong-armed into signing in 1906 due to Germany exploiting Russia's weakness during the Russo-Japanese War where Russia was unable to redeploy units from Europe to Asia.

 

[alexmilman]

Not really. They insisted that the ships and money was to be spent in Russia thus building up Russian industry.

Russian industrial build-up would be better targeted if the stress was on the army's weapons and railroads constructions. As it was, in OTL Russian army had shortage of pretty much everything while the Navy spent most of its time in the ports doing little or nothing.

Rearmament was paid for partly by loans but more by increased indirect taxation. The focus was naval, the fashionable 'mariniste' doctrine that for Russia to be a great power she had to have a great fleet.

I know that this was a fashionable doctrine formulated by Mahan and usually adopted without too much thinking. As far as Russian realities were involved, the doctrine was pretty much useless by the obvious reasons: geography and absence of any economic sense in the naval global power projection (Russia did not have a merchant fleet big enough to justify the expenses, AFAIK, most of the naval trade still had been done by the foreign ships and the overland trade required railroads, not ships).

The same goes for the main idea that a Great Power MUST have a great fleet. Mahant's theory heavily relied on experience of the British-Dutch wars and British-French wars. Of course, Britain without a great fleet would not be a great power but Russia was a great power without it and the same goes for France, Germany and AH.

With a powerful navy she would develop overseas trade,

A very interesting assumption which, as far as I can tell, puts things other way around: England had a growing overseas trade before it became a great naval power and the same goes for the Netherlands at the peak of their power and for the US in the late XIX. OTOH, Russia by the early XX never had any serious interest in developing its own merchant marine even when it had a reasonably powerful navy: during the reign of Catherine II Russian navy was operating on the Med but almost 100% of the imports/exports had been carried by the British ships and the Russians had been OK with the situation.

dominate the balance of sea-power between Britain and Germany, and thus be able to exact whatever political price she cared to name in return for her favors.

The most probable result would be that, before dominating anything, Russia would end up being on bad terms with both Britain and Germany. Anyway, why would that competition be of any interest to Russia at all? The answer is it would not. Unfortunately, out of all Russian rulers only Alexander III understood this obvious thing.

Another aspect to the rearmament efforts was that the 1904 German-Russian Commercial Treaty that gave generous access to Russian Agriculture and Industrial sectors was due to run until 1918. Russia had been strong-armed into signing in 1906 due to Germany exploiting Russia's weakness during the Russo-Japanese War where Russia was unable to redeploy units from Europe to Asia.

Sorry, and not having a heavy artillery in the Russian army would help situation how exactly?

 

[alexmilman]

The Turk naval buildup (beginning before the 1st Balkan war) was a program of national renewal and more aimed at their Greek rivals than Russia. They realised that the lack of naval power had contributed to the loss of Rumelia. Russia feared Turkey in an alliance allowing CP ships into the Black Sea, hence the need to have both Black Sea and Aegean ships to keep the Turks neutral.

Russia feared that 2 new dreadnoughts which the Ottomans were buying from Brazil would make the existing Black Sea fleet obsolete. The Aegean part as a factor would be a pure fantasy.

 

[fhaessig]

ONe question: it has been stated several times in this thread that the French army could not expend between 1914 and 1920. WHy is that? finance or population base?

If the later, what stops the French from expending limited conscription to the Empire? There is a powerful lobby against it, but if it is the only way to match the hated Boches and get Alsace Lorraine back, it will get through, and with union sacree support.

 

[Hoplophile]

The chief limit on the size of the army that France could have mobilized between 1914 and 1920 was the size of its European population.

In our time line, the Third Republic came close to that limit when, in 1905, it adopted a policy of universal military service for men living in European France and the Europeans living in Algeria. (The few healthy men who manage to avoid uniformed service under this system were the men of the "maritime inscription" who were surplus to the needs of the Navy. In 1913, the Army began to transfer responsibility for several coast artillery installations to the Navy, thereby creating positions for the surplus men of the maritime inscription.)

In 1912, the French government extended selective conscription to the Muslim population of Algeria and increased the number of units (particularly battalions of Algerian riflemen) composed of such men. However, the practice of brigading such units with battalions of Zouaves, which were composed of Europeans, set a limit on the number of Algerian Muslims who could be conscripted. The traditional ratio was one battalion of Zouaves to one battalion of Algerian riflemen. However, the program to increase the number of battalions of Algerian riflemen that followed the imposition of conscription upon the Muslim population of Algeria seems have been based on the assumption that formations of the "Army of Africa" could make do with a ratio of one battalion of Zouaves for every two battalions of Algerian riflemen.

Once the additional battalions of Algerian riflemen were formed, the French Army would have enough additional infantry to create two new infantry divisions.

The same practice in the Colonial Troops limited the ability of the French Army to raise units from the non-European populations of other parts of the French Empire. That is to say, for every two battalions of Tonkinese, Annamite, Malgache, or Senegalese riflemen it fielded, the Colonial Troops had to find a battalion of European Colonial infantry. (This was the ratio of European Colonial infantry battalions to battalions of Senegalese riflemen employed in the conquest of Morocco.)

As there was already 36 battalions of European Colonial infantry in Europe. Thus, the Colonial Troops could conceivably raise 72 battalions of native infantry (of various types) for service in Europe. This, in turn, would provide enough infantry for six additional infantry divisions.

To put things another way, full employment of the manpower of the French Empire would provide the French Army the infantry battalions needed to create eight additional infantry divisions for the direct defense of European France. (Where the artillery, cavalry, engineers, et cetera for such formations would be found is, alas, another question entirely, as is the problem of finding a sufficient number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and specialists for the new infantry units.) This translates to an increase of 17% or so in the number of active infantry divisions that could be mobilized in the event of a European War, or a little more than 10% of number of active and reserve infantry divisions.