A battle-ready USS Arizona, offshore, would make a big difference.
Well it is more likely to lose the WHOLE crew that way. The fleet sorties, assuming it goes in the right direction (which was about 160° different from what was actually expected) it gets caught in deep water with minimal fighter cover (AAF is going to stay inshore and defend the base, leaving only whatever the Fleet Reserve has to launch as cover for the fleet (10 F4F-3 and 8 F2A, Marines could contribute 11 more F4F-3). So you get 21 Wildcats and 8 Buffaloes to deal with the first wave of 171 aicraft (B5N of the 2nd Wave were armed with GP bombs, not the 800kg AP ship killers (converted 40cm AP shells) carried by the first wave or torpedoes). Figure four, maybe five heavies take enough damage (two torpedoes, couple 250kg GP bombs, MAYBE one or two of the 49 800kg bombs hit, but I'll bet the under on those) that they go down in open water, decent chance (50:50) at least one of the I-boat screen manages an attack, that happens and chalk up a BB or CA in addition to the air strikes.
U.S. KIA hit 4-5,000 (roughly double OTL).
Kido Butai loses probably 150, maybe 180, aircraft (including those with so much battle damage that they are simply pushed over the side, IIRC that was the fate of around 30 Japanese aircraft IOTL).
To the OP: If the fleet is clearly alerted several days ahead of time (which is the only way there are enough naval strike aircraft available to make even a decent strike) Nagumo's orders were to abort and haul ass back to Japan. On December 5th Nagumo was still 700+ miles out to sea, the U.S. would be hard pressed to conduct an attack at that range even if they wanted to. The
Enterprise was off Wake, the
Lexington was approaching Midway on December 5th, both carriers were deliver Marine aircraft (F4F to Wake, SBU2 to Midway), they are three days away from getting into strike range, and both TF will need to refuel their destroyers before taking off to attack the
Kido Butai The Japanese still have an active Consulate on Hawaii, the Battle Fleet sorties and anyone sitting on Ewa Beach (and the Japanese had folks watching) is going to see it happening.
As far as elsewhere -
The Philippines still depends on MacArthur. He screwed the pooch with what turned out to be half a day's warning. MacArthur's command was alerted to the Pearl Harbor attack at around 02:30 on December 8th (local time), Hap Arnold PERSONALLY called FEAF CO General Brereton at 08:00 (PI local) and warned him not to get his forces caught on the ground. At 11:30 (PI local)
MULTIPLE radar stations warned of an incomes strike. The Japanese hit Clark at 12:40 PM, two full squadrons of B-17s were caught on the ground. There is no reason to believe that MacArthur and his senior staff, especially his nitwit Chief-of-Staff Sutherland would do anything useful with extra warning time.
Wake may be able to have more fighters up (IOTL they had two of 12). That will further increase the cost to the Japanese in taking the Island.
Guam was indefensible. The Marine and milita forces only had enough personal weapons for 198 troops (170 M1903 Springfields, 13 Lewis Guns, 15 BAR) and the local police numbered 80 men with revolvers. No heavy weapons of any kind on the island. No fortifications, not even a minefield. Heaviest warship there was a 24 year old minesweeper with two 3' guns, and two harbor patrol boat, each with a single 1 pounder (i.e. 37mm) gun.
With better information the British may be able to get
PoW and
Repulse in position to tear up the initial Malaya landings before daylight when the IJNAAF will arrive and blow them out of the water.