WI: US Backed Argentina in the Falklands war

It's not the worth of the islands, it's the principle of resisting armed aggression against an ally. What if China invaded American Samoa? It's not worth much, and it's very far away, but the U.S. would fight to take it back.
We use “soft power” and economic/trade warfare. No one can match our military but we actually rather always use economic leverage first and only force when absolutely necessary or personal(public is pissed like seen after 911 and Iraq. Bull seeing red or in modern era green/Islam/half moon).

The UK is very economically dependent on US. We use cultural warfare like Soviets did too. We would not resist openly just mock, criticize(not politicians but media so “free press”) and raise trade barriers gradually so masses notice less
 
The POD is nearly absurd, but the British would lose the war. Without U.S. logistical, and satellite recon support, and new model AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles the chances of taking back the Islands would be very slim.
 
We use “soft power” and economic/trade warfare. No one can match our military but we actually rather always use economic leverage first and only force when absolutely necessary or personal(public is pissed like seen after 911 and Iraq. Bull seeing red or in modern era green/Islam/half moon).

The UK is very economically dependent on US. We use cultural warfare like Soviets did too. We would not resist openly just mock, criticize(not politicians but media so “free press”) and raise trade barriers gradually so masses notice less
Soft power can be very effective, but in both cases of the Falklands, and 9/11 it would be a grossly inadequate response. Failing to respond to an armed attack would cause such a loss of deterrence that it would endanger national security.
 
Essentially, as people have already said, this is unlikely to the point of ASB.

However, let's accept that ASBs somehow have USA decide to back Argentina in the conflict to a similar extent that they backed the UK in OTL. That is, intelligence and moral support, without actually getting involved.
The U.S. did more than 'moral support' We shipped munitions, supplies and equipment out of active U.S. units to the U.K. We supplied weapons such as the latest AIM-9Ls (and support equipment) and ECM gear directly from active U.S. stocks. We provided base support at Ascension via the established U.S. airfield management team (we actually ran the airbase there) If we provided the same level of support to the Argentinians they would have had ECM that could have overwhelmed the British defences and weapons that could have greatly improved their chances in (especially) air to air combat.
 
They lost a handful of Helicopters on the AC out of the total fleet available

3 Chinook (out of 4) and 5 HU.5 Wessex (the 6th was a HAS) where lost that day.

In terms of troops transport they had 'at the end of the campaign' 46 Wessex HU.5s (16 troops) , 1 Chinook (up to 81 troops apparently but officially up to 55) and 13 Sea King HU.4s (42 troops).

Certainly the loss of the 3 Chinooks put a crimp on things but that's still a big chunk of airlift left and a number of HAS Helicopters were repurposed during the campaign as the Sub threat disappeared.
 
Some interesting consequences despite the ludicrocity. AV-8B cancelled in this timeline, no T-45 Goshawk. L1011s grounded and engine-less. El Dorado Canyon direct out of MacDill anybody? :p

Wither SOSUS?
 
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CalBear

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Your intelligence is probably good it own(I would say Mossad is better especially for American interest but that’s besides point). How much stuff in otl do we know CIA or third party elements have gotten away with while everyone likely knows they had at least partial hand in it? Kennedy’s assassination(likely mob influences too), involvement in Years of Lead in Italy(local mafia families has role in that too), and numerous anti communist activists in first and third world, plus the trafficking of cocaine to the contre.

You know what happens if you “follow trail”? They blame some high profile Irish mobster they are after who has ties moles in fbi or cia. They persecute the bureaucrats and politicians caught red handed while blaming Irish mob for trafficking weapons to IRA. Which gives Americans to “clean bit house” at home. Like neo fascist in Italy they are often just pawns.

History shows no one likely will call out US during Cold War. The 90s and after might be different story and re opening of “cans of worms”.
Flogging conspiracy theories is not acceptable here. Full Stop.

See ya' in 7.
 
They lost a handful of Helicopters on the AC out of the total fleet available
Chinooks, they lost Chinooks.
3 Chinook (out of 4) and 5 HU.5 Wessex (the 6th was a HAS) where lost that day.
Correct.
In terms of troops transport they had 'at the end of the campaign' 46 Wessex HU.5s (16 troops) , 1 Chinook (up to 81 troops apparently but officially up to 55) and 13 Sea King HU.4s (42 troops).
The Sea Kings were dedicated to other lift. The Wessex is not a true crane bird and the 1 Chinook cannot be everywhere.
Certainly the loss of the 3 Chinooks put a crimp on things but that's still a big chunk of airlift left and a number of HAS Helicopters were repurposed during the campaign as the Sub threat disappeared.
The point is that a lot of British infantry, not trained for it, had to manpack and mule heavy loads across a lot of difficult ground and the days wasted cost three RN ships hit and the risk of losing the anchorage as a couple of more ships hit and the RN might have had to relocate.
 
The point is that a lot of British infantry, not trained for it, had to manpack and mule heavy loads across a lot of difficult ground and the days wasted cost three RN ships hit and the risk of losing the anchorage as a couple of more ships hit and the RN might have had to relocate.

"Not trained for it?"

Sorry, as one of the British infantry involved, I can assure you that we were trained for it. Part of earning the Green Beret involves demonstrating exactly that - 30 miles across Dartmoor (conditions surprising similar to the Falklands, as a coincidence) in 7 hours under full fighting kit (120 lbs - not quite the Falklands load we had of around 150lbs, but close enough for Government work). And every second year, that test had to be retaken.

Of the units spearheading 3 Commando Brigade (40, 42, 45 Commando, 2 and 3 Para), every man jack had been through that basic training.

Of the 3 follow-up units in 5 Brigade, 2 (Scots and Welsh Guards) weren't in condition, but 7RGR were.

"Not trained for it?" forsooth.

I'm sorry, I'm here to tell you that you have been misinformed.

The conditions of the peat bogs and the ubiquity of the unmarked mine fields caused delays, certainly. Lack of training is, to put it mildly, not accurate.

Now, in the interests of full disclosure, I (and my troop) did get a 10 mile lift on the way forward (in order to take and hold Mt Kent), but other than that, we walked the whole way there (and others didn't get the dubious benefit of the lift). Also in the interests of full disclosure, I did get a lift back all the way from Mt Harriet first to San Carlos, then to Uganda. But I wasn't really in a position to appreciate that benefit.

"Not trained for it," indeed.
 
"Not trained for it?"

Sorry, as one of the British infantry involved, I can assure you that we were trained for it. Part of earning the Green Beret involves demonstrating exactly that - 30 miles across Dartmoor (conditions surprising similar to the Falklands, as a coincidence) in 7 hours under full fighting kit (120 lbs - not quite the Falklands load we had of around 150lbs, but close enough for Government work). And every second year, that test had to be retaken.

Of the units spearheading 3 Commando Brigade (40, 42, 45 Commando, 2 and 3 Para), every man jack had been through that basic training.

Of the 3 follow-up units in 5 Brigade, 2 (Scots and Welsh Guards) weren't in condition, but 7RGR were.

"Not trained for it?" forsooth.

I'm sorry, I'm here to tell you that you have been misinformed.

The conditions of the peat bogs and the ubiquity of the unmarked mine fields caused delays, certainly. Lack of training is, to put it mildly, not accurate.

Now, in the interests of full disclosure, I (and my troop) did get a 10 mile lift on the way forward (in order to take and hold Mt Kent), but other than that, we walked the whole way there (and others didn't get the dubious benefit of the lift). Also in the interests of full disclosure, I did get a lift back all the way from Mt Harriet first to San Carlos, then to Uganda. But I wasn't really in a position to appreciate that benefit.

"Not trained for it," indeed.
The time wasted was what actually concerned me when I reviewed the lessons learned. The original plan was heavily dependent on helo-lift of the infantry in shuttle stages along with much of their combat load to compress the exposure time of the shipping to air attack in the anchorage. A fast ground campaign = fewer Argentine sorties generated before the objectives were secured.

And as underlined, a lot of the British infantry were not trained to the Plan B, when Plan A failed.
 
While I agree that the US actively supporting Argentina is probably ASB but what about a US government that is neutral or not pro British and therefore does not supply any assistance at all to the UK (diplomatic, logistical etc)?

For example if there was a president from a community that was historically anti British, like the Irish Americans or a congress that was heavily influenced by a Latin American lobby
 
Chinooks, they lost Chinooks.

Correct.

The Sea Kings were dedicated to other lift. The Wessex is not a true crane bird and the 1 Chinook cannot be everywhere.

The point is that a lot of British infantry, not trained for it, had to manpack and mule heavy loads across a lot of difficult ground and the days wasted cost three RN ships hit and the risk of losing the anchorage as a couple of more ships hit and the RN might have had to relocate.
The Wessex could lift a L118 Light gun!

And did - all of the Light guns and the Rapier Posts, their ammo and fuel were moved forwards by Wessex and Sea King.

The HU.5s were twin engine models and had far greater lift than the earlier single engine HAS Wessex models.

Anyway the point is that while the loss of the Chinooks was certainly missed it did not otherwise massively reduce the number of Transport Helicopters with 60 (plus some adapted HAS birds) still being available the day the Argentines surrendered.

Granted the Guards (both Battalions had been pulled from public duties in London to replace the 2 Para Battalions added to 3rd Commando) were not fit enough to walk across the island but IMO they should not have been sent into battle as they and their commanders were not good enough and the intention had been for them to act as the Garrison force once the Island had been captured but instead the Army seemed to have its own ideas.

In fact the bluff cove disaster can be laid at the feet of 5th Brigades commander who gave permission to 2 Para (now under his command) to 'steal' the remaining Chinook and advance unsupported to Fitzroy and Bluff cove where they would be unsupported.

This left Moore with a dilemma as 5th Brigade would have taken about a week to reinforce at their slow pace (his intention was for 5th Brigade to appear to be a threat moving along the south flank) and 3rd Brigade were too far north hence the move by sea of the Welsh Guards and the subsequent losses sustained.

Granted this might not have been an issue had the Chinooks not been lost but it was a foolish decision by the commander of 5th brigade all the same.
 
The time wasted was what actually concerned me when I reviewed the lessons learned. The original plan was heavily dependent on helo-lift of the infantry in shuttle stages along with much of their combat load to compress the exposure time of the shipping to air attack in the anchorage. A fast ground campaign = fewer Argentine sorties generated before the objectives were secured.

And as underlined, a lot of the British infantry were not trained to the Plan B, when Plan A failed.

If you meant "time wasted", then you shouldn't have said "not trained for it".

Of the 8 spearhead units, 6 were bloody well trained for Plan B. The Scots and Welsh Guards, I will grant, were out of condition. The Scots Guards realised this; the Welsh Guards didn't. The Welsh Guards took minimal part in the movements (and were of damn all use on the ground. Don't get me started about: "Protecting the integrity of the Start Line."

You are going to claim that a lot of the infantry were not trained for it, when I know for an absolute stone-cold certain fact - having first-hand experience of the training and actually being there, then I think we have reached an impasse.

Now, if you want to talk about leaking boots, or Admirals who had no conception of what being a Marine actually involved, or the absence of nutty, then I can quote chapter and verse.

But if you continue to claim that "a lot of the British infantry were not trained to the Plan B" when one of those who was actually involved is claiming otherwise, then we have reached an impasse.
 
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I am familiar with the capacities of the Sikorsky H-34 Wessex derivative. Good bird. capacity is squad + gear or a howitzer.

Chinook = platoon + gear + howitzer.
 
While I agree that the US actively supporting Argentina is probably ASB but what about a US government that is neutral or not pro British and therefore does not supply any assistance at all to the UK (diplomatic, logistical etc)?

For example if there was a president from a community that was historically anti British, like the Irish Americans or a congress that was heavily influenced by a Latin American lobby
President Reagan was a good Irishman, as was the Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil. The fact was that the military junta in Argentina launched a military aggression against a democratic NATO member. There was no real alternative but to back the UK, and pay the price in Latin America.
 
Ouch!

Sorry to hear that!

It had its upside. The nurse who escorted me from San Carlos to Uganda was one Alison Brooks and, well, we ended up getting married.

It was an unusual first date - two months on a luxury liner with an engagement agreed by the end of it.

And Mills & Boon rejected this story outline as being: "too unrealistic".
 
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