WI: The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War Occurred in October 1972

[Delta Force]

What if the 1973 Arab-Israeli War had occurred in October 1972, at the height of the elections for President and Congress in the United States? Would the response of President Nixon have changed? Would there have been a petroleum embargo and energy crisis? What kind of impact would there have been on the United States elections and the war?

 

[Delta Force]

Would anything change if President Nixon and Congress had to respond to it as an October surprise near the end of a major election cycle, instead of during a non-election year?

 

[Realpolitik]

I'm not sure how feasible this is, Sadat and Assad needed time to plan and arm. But, if everything is the same...

1) No, it wouldn't have changed. If anything, there are even more incentives to do this. The election and the Munich Olympics (the Israelis were needless to say, out for blood after that. Operation Wrath of God really relieved the administration, they thought it was going to be far worse, and the prevailing mood in the US and in Congress would have made them support far worse) made sure that any serious shift in the post Black September/Nasser policy, which was pro-Israel in a strategic sense for the first time, in the Middle East for Nixon had to wait until 1973, with the obvious crucial consequences. The Israelis have a nuclear arsenal and the Arabs are still relying off of Soviet arms. I'm pretty sure that Operation Nickel Grass goes on if the war plays out the same.

2) Yes. They were going to use the oil weapon the next time the region blew up, as Nixon well knew.

The big possible ATL changes come afterwards, as Nixon is a fully focused President at the height of his power and does not need to put up with Congressional bullshit as Ford did OTL. But it will be tough. Remember, Faisal cares about Jerusalem, not the Sinai, and I'm not sure Nixinger's preferred solution of a Vatican like status will satisfy them. With Egypt, it's vice versa. Syria cares about the Golan Heights. Israel cares about... not giving anything up. Tough, even without Watergate, and that blows up come April.

Congress and Nixon loathed each other by this point, well before Watergate. Nixon had one of the most dreadful relationships with Congress in history. But Congress is also dominated by the Democrats, which back then were the pro-Israel party. McGovern had committed himself to a stronger position with Israel than Nixon had, ironically enough. It would be tough to attack Nixon over the response, given that he already had a 60+ percent approval rating. Again, the danger is that Watergate still lurks. The question is can Richard Nixon get some important bridges built before he becomes a lame duck and Congress can destroy them?

 

[Realpolitik]

Would anything change if President Nixon and Congress had to respond to it as an October surprise near the end of a major election cycle, instead of during a non-election year?

No. Nixon at that point is electorally unstoppable barring nuclear war or him being caught in a Satanic ritual. The man won 49 states and had an approval rating in the high 60s. Even the North Vietnamese knew it-they would have never compromised on Thieu and the ARVN otherwise. There was a reason they wanted him to sign before the election.

 

[M. Adolphe Thiers]

Probably not. However Nixon was incapacitated OTL and Henry Kissinger handled the crisis in his stead.

 

[Realpolitik]

Probably not. However Nixon was incapacitated OTL and Henry Kissinger handled the crisis in his stead.

The big difference is not so much how the crisis is handled. That actually really wouldn't be too different, as Nixon ordered Operation Nickel Grass, not Kissinger. That was the most important thing for the war itself, and that arguably was the last time that Nixon acted as a real President, if only for a few days. It was later that he was incapacitated. Kissinger and General Haig sounded off DEFCON III after the Saturday Massacre when Nixon was emotionally burnt out and possibly drunk, as a warning to the Soviets.

The difference is what happens afterwards. Nixon was far more open to the idea of pressuring the Israelis and seriously working on an overall treaty-with a Soviet role-than Henry Kissinger was. They weren't always a hive mind. OTL, Nixon knew that he just had to get any foreign policy success he could, welcomed any chance to think about something other than Watergate policy wise, and was in no position to contradict the extremely popular Kissinger.

A little known thing about the Saturday Night Massacre was the fact that Nixon already was not someone you wanted to be around by the time Richardson wouldn't fire Cox, mood wise. Nixon was *furious* when Kissinger ignored his orders in Moscow to seek an overall imposed settlement, so Archibald Cox demanding the tapes and rejecting the Stennis deal was not exactly what a POTUS in an already unstable mood needed... ("How the hell am I supposed to get Brezhnev to take me seriously if I can't even get my Attonery General to obey me?")

That led to a pretty bad chain reaction.

 

[Delta Force]

Wouldn't the start of the Energy Crisis and the imminent national recession draw some votes away if Nixon acted in a way that led to an embargo?

On the other hand, could it help make energy a campaign issue and give Nixon a chance to make Project Independence a major part of his platform?

 

[viperzero]

Wouldn't the start of the Energy Crisis and the
On the other hand, could it help make energy a campaign issue and give Nixon a chance to make Project Independence a major part of his platform?

now thats interesting, I always thought something like that would have been a good idea after 9/11 after we found out the relations between the Saudis and some of the hijackers.

 

[Plumber]

2) Yes. They were going to use the oil weapon the next time the region blew up, as Nixon well knew.

Actually, he dismissed the possibility of an embargo being initiated and the possibility that it would amount to anything economically. Nixon's cavalier attitude towards the importance of oil underscored his economic ignorance and is probably the biggest mistake of any president of the Cold War.

However, he was sufficiently paranoid during election years that it's possible he takes the threat more seriously. But it may also be true that Nixon supports Israel even more than OTL to win more support from Jewish voters. Since Nixon largely delegated handling the war to Kissinger, there are a number of ways this could've gone.

 

[Blackfox5]

Are you just assuming everything happens as IOTL, but one year earlier (lots of assumptions)? Or do you want to examine the actual differences that may happen in the war?

Chances are that the Arabs are defeated even more without one more year to prepare. Successfully crossing the canal is a significant achievement, and without that extra year to prepare, the Egyptians may not do it as well. Furthermore, much of the success the Arabs had was due to strategic surprise. It can't be guaranteed the Israelis make the same bad decisions ITTL's October 1972 that they did IOTL's October 1973. In the aftermath of the Munich Massacre, the Israelis could be expecting something else. Furthermore, they would have a lot of world sympathy if they decided to launch a preemptive strike if the Arab preparations are noticed. They could have a success on par with the Six Day War. Another Arab fiasco will have lots of repercussions.

If so, Sadat cannot make peace. He may not even survive as President. Egypt can't turn from the Soviets to the US, and its economy gets even worse. In Israel, Labor may continue to stay in power and continue to occupy the Sinai.

 

[Delta Force]

now thats interesting, I always thought something like that would have been a good idea after 9/11 after we found out the relations between the Saudis and some of the hijackers.

Of course, President Nixon ended up resigning less than a year after announcing Project Independence. President Ford and Congress then greatly revised the program, and President Carter made his own revisions and additions.

Actually, he dismissed the possibility of an embargo being initiated and the possibility that it would amount to anything economically. Nixon's cavalier attitude towards the importance of oil underscored his economic ignorance and is probably the biggest mistake of any president of the Cold War.

However, he was sufficiently paranoid during election years that it's possible he takes the threat more seriously. But it may also be true that Nixon supports Israel even more than OTL to win more support from Jewish voters. Since Nixon largely delegated handling the war to Kissinger, there are a number of ways this could've gone.

Might Nixon be more paranoid in an election cycle? After all, was paranoid enough to spy on the McGovern campaign, which never really stood a chance.

Are you just assuming everything happens as IOTL, but one year earlier (lots of assumptions)? Or do you want to examine the actual differences that may happen in the war?

Chances are that the Arabs are defeated even more without one more year to prepare. Successfully crossing the canal is a significant achievement, and without that extra year to prepare, the Egyptians may not do it as well. Furthermore, much of the success the Arabs had was due to strategic surprise. It can't be guaranteed the Israelis make the same bad decisions ITTL's October 1972 that they did IOTL's October 1973. In the aftermath of the Munich Massacre, the Israelis could be expecting something else. Furthermore, they would have a lot of world sympathy if they decided to launch a preemptive strike if the Arab preparations are noticed. They could have a success on par with the Six Day War. Another Arab fiasco will have lots of repercussions.

If so, Sadat cannot make peace. He may not even survive as President. Egypt can't turn from the Soviets to the US, and its economy gets even worse. In Israel, Labor may continue to stay in power and continue to occupy the Sinai.

I'm thinking of both options in terms of as historical, but a year earlier, or actually being launched a year earlier. One argument for a year earlier (or a year later) is that there might be hope that the upcoming election would constrain options for the United States.